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 i 
ABSTRACT  
 
 
 
The republication of Theory of Film: The Redemption of Physical Reality by Siegfried 
Kracauer (1889 – 1966) in 1997 marked not just the highpoint of a period of renewed 
interest in his work, a period initiated by a series of events organized to mark the centenary 
of his birth, but also the limit of his scholarly influence. Though enthusiasm for his early 
sociological and cultural criticism written in Frankfurt and Berlin during the 1920s and 
1930s continues to permeate research in numerous other disciplines within the humanities, 
his film theory continues to have little or no impact on the debates that currently define film 
studies. The reason for this, I argue, relates to the problematic role of philosophy in his film 
theory. Focusing primarily on Theory of Film, I examine in detail what makes Kracauer’s 
theory peculiar; peculiar in the sense that it belongs specifically to the film medium and 
peculiar in regard to the ambiguous philosophical claims that distinguish it from subsequent 
methods of film analysis. The contemporary image of Kracauer as a cultural philosopher, I 
argue, restricts how we read the relationship between film and philosophy in his work. I 
propose that from the perspective of the contemporary film-philosophy debate a critical 
notion of the cinematic can be restored to all facets of his work enabling a clearer 
understanding of how Kracauer comprehends the relationship between the filmmaker, 
spectator and film theorist. In turn, I conclude, this review of Kracauer’s cinematic 
approach as a democratised form of critical agency will benefit the understanding of 
philosophy and film theory as related forms of social practice. 
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CHAPTER 1:   
 
FROM FILM THEORY TO CINEMATIC PHILOSOPHY 
 
1.1  Introduction: The Problem of Philosophy in Kracauer’s Theory 
 
 
Perhaps film is a gate rather than a dead end or a mere diversion? 
 
Siegfried Kracauer (1889 – 1966).1 
 
 
This thesis examines the philosophical aspects of Siegfried Kracauer’s film theory. 
More precisely it looks at the problem of philosophy in Kracauer’s film theory. Seen 
by philosophers as too much about film to be philosophy and by film scholars as too 
philosophical to be an analytical tool for film studies, Kracauer’s work on film has 
suffered as a result of its academic indeterminacy. However, as I shall demonstrate, 
considered from the perspective of recent developments in the hybrid discipline of 
film-philosophy such ambiguity can now be viewed not as an obstacle but as a 
catalyst for a reappraisal of his “cinematic approach” to critical theory.2  
 
Throughout his writings on film, Kracauer maintained that cinema “has a definite 
bearing on the era into which it is born”. 3 The reason for this social and historical 
significance, he argues, relates to the antinomic nature of the medium’s peculiar 
recording and revealing capabilities. In the first instance this concerns film’s 
versatility as ideological apparatus but also its capacity to record phenomena that 
resist such hegemony. In the second, the cinematic reveals a historically peculiar 
mode of subjectivity, the experience of which complicates (through the interplay of 
reason and sensation) conventional notions of individual and collective agency. As 
the above quotation from Theory of Film suggests (and as I will establish in this 
study) Kracauer’s work presents film not as a novelty to be intellectually scrutinized 
but as an opportunity through which an unorthodox philosophical engagement with 
our technological environment can be imagined and rehearsed.  
                                                
1 Kracauer, Siegfried, Theory of Film. The Redemption of Physical Reality [1960] (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1997), p. 287.  
2 Kracauer, 1997, p. 37. 
3 Kracauer, 1997, p. li. 
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The literary critic and philosopher Walter Benjamin once called Kracauer “an enemy 
of philosophy”.4 Another, more recent film critic, I.C. Jarvie, has asserted that his film 
theory is “no sort of tool for film analysis”.5 This thesis will examine these claims and 
argue that “the cinematic approach” that Kracauer explicates in Theory of Film (1960) 
does indeed frustrate the academic demarcation of philosophy and film aesthetics but 
does so with a view towards their mutual transformation.6 Any provisional taxonomy 
of cinematic phenomena, Kracauer contends, exposes the limits of extant 
philosophy’s conceptual frameworks. In contrast, a theory peculiar to film presents 
the possibility of an alternative critical perspective that complements rather than 
supersedes the aggregated insights of film studies and philosophy. This thesis 
examines how Kracauer’s experience of the cinema influenced his development as a 
writer, critic and philosopher of modern culture. It argues that rather than simply 
being used by Kracauer to illustrate or corroborate a predetermined philosophical 
position, film spectatorship affected a fundamental revision of how he conceptualised 
the relationship between thought, perception and experience. The perspective of 
Kracauer’s cinematic approach, I conclude, maintains its relevance today as it still 
poses questions of our relationship with the moving image that persist in 
contemporary debate about the role of theory in the cinema experience as well as in 
its technical and social evolution. 
 
Before proceeding with an exposition of Kracauer’s cinematic approach I will 
introduce in the following two chapters the various interpretations of his writings that 
have contributed to the contemporary image of Kracauer both as a film theorist and as 
a philosopher of modern culture. As I shall demonstrate, the relationship between 
these two approaches to Kracauer’s work has until very recently been almost entirely 
antagonistic with the contested merit of his work in either discipline being at the 
expense of his standing in the other. For example, as a consequence of Kracauer’s re-
establishment as an important critic of pre-War Weimar society in university Cultural 
Studies and European Language departments attention has moved away from him as a 
                                                
4 Adorno, Theodor W., “The Curious Realist: On Siegfried Kracauer”, New German Critique, No. 54 
(1991), pp. 160 – 161. 
5  Jarvie, I. C., Towards a sociology of the cinema: a comparative essay on the structure and 
functioning of a major entertainment industry (London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1970), p. 134. 
6 Kracauer, 1997, p. 37. 
 3 
film theorist. This shift in the pattern of reception has meant that many 
misconceptions and partisan readings of his film theory from previous decades have 
remain unchallenged, rendering the idea of revisiting Kracauer’s approach an 
unattractive proposition for many contemporary film scholars. Though the renewed 
interest in his early non-film writings (for example, his architectural and design 
criticism) is testament to Kracauer’s inclusive and broad critical approach, his 
unfashionable English language work on film, with its chequered reception history, 
has been in turn implicitly or explicitly sidelined. 7 In this new critical paradigm, 
where Kracauer’s problematic insistence on the “cinematic approach” is either 
historically quarantined or made a periphery concern, there is a danger of its 
philosophical significance in relation to his other work being lost, in other words (to 
use an old German proverb), of the baby being thrown out with the bathwater. 
 
 
1.2  Re-Opening the Cabinet of Dr. Kracauer: Why Return to Kracauer Now? 
 
 
With Siegfried Kracauer, the relationship of cinema to philosophy is 
peculiar. From his reviews and essays on modern culture to his  
books written in America, Kracauer’s cinema theory is not 
primarily about films, filmmakers, cultures or media technologies. 
Rather, cinema is itself something comparable to philosophy. 
            Drehli Robnik, Siegfried Kracauer, 20098 
 
To advocate the author of From Caligari to Hitler: A Psychological History of he 
German Film (1947), a book the film historian Barry Salt calls “the worst piece of 
film history” ever written, as primarily a philosopher could be interpreted as either 
defensive or misinformed revisionism.9 To go further and recognize Kracauer’s 1960 
book, Theory of Film as essentially a work of philosophy that, as Kracauer himself 
suggests, uses film as “a means to make certain sociological and philosophical 
                                                
7  Reeh, Henrik, Ornaments of the Metropolis: Siegfried Kracauer and Modern Urban Culture, 
translated by John Irons (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2006). 
8 Robnik, Drehli, ‘Siegfried Kracauer’, in Felicity Colman (ed.), Film, Theory and Philosophy. The Key 
Thinkers (Durham: Acumen, 2009), p.40. 
9 Salt, Barry, “From Caligari to Who?’, Sight and Sound, No. 48 (1979), p. 122. 
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statements” could also seem an unnecessary counter to established scholarship.10 
However, Kracauer’s inclusion in the 2009 anthology, Film, Theory and Philosophy: 
The Key Thinkers, in which the above quoted Robnik essay appears, marks a twofold 
moment of transition in the reception of his work. On the one hand, it seeks to 
establish him as a pioneer of “film-philosophy”, a recent initiative in aesthetic theory 
and the philosophy of art that seeks to collapse the academic distinction between 
philosophy and film theory.11 And on the other, it marks the end of a posthumous 
process of critical rehabilitation that slowly saw the image of Kracauer transformed 
from that of an intellectual anachronism to politically engaged cultural critic whose 
work resonates with the concerns of new media theorists today. 
 
The transitional nature of the current phase in the critical reception of Kracauer’s 
work affords its reader the opportunity to reassess its merit in a variety of ways. It 
presents to the historian an opportunity to evaluate the contributions made by, what 
Leonardo Quaresima deems, the “flurry of scholarly activity” that followed the 
centenary of the writer’s birth and resulted in the republication of both Theory of Film 
and From Caligari to Hitler.12 It also offers to those interested in the interdisciplinary 
potential of a synthesis of film theory and philosophy an alternative to the Franco-
centric tendency that has to date determined the scope of many available studies on 
the subject. More significantly, in shifting what is designated by the term “film” from 
an object of study to what Havi Carel and Greg Tuck have recently suggested is “a 
more troubling site of thought and experience”, the film-philosophy perspective 
addresses in an innovative way the problem that has increasingly come to delimit 
much recent Kracauer scholarship: what is the relevance of an historical film theory to 
media studies in the digital age? 13 
 
 
                                                
10 “Was den Film betrifft, so war er mir immer nur ein Hobby, ein Mittel, um gewisse soziologische 
und philosophische Aussagen zu machen”, Letter quoted in Belke, Ingrid and Irina Renz, (eds.), 
“Siegfried Kracauer 1889-1966”, Marbacher Magazin (Deutsche Schillergesellschaft), No. 47 (1988), 
pp. 118 – 119. 
11 See Carel, Havi and Greg Tuck (eds.), New Takes in Film-Philosophy (Basingstoke and New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 1 – 3. 
12  Quaresima, Leonardo, “Introduction to the 2004 edition: Rereading Kracauer”, in Kracauer, 
Siegfried, From Caligari to Hitler. A psychological history of the German film [1947], revised edition 
edited by Leonardo Quaresima (New York: Princeton University Press, 2004), p. xv. 
13 Carel & Tuck, 2011, p. 2. 
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1.3 An Enemy of Philosophy? 
 
The proposition of Kracauer as primarily a philosopher does not remove in a single 
stroke the “sum of errors” that film theorist Gertrud Koch argues lies at the root of his 
“unsteady” reputation as a film theorist. 14 The problem, for Koch, in ascertaining 
Kracauer’s contemporary intellectual standing is due not to a lack of alternative 
perspectives on his work but the inverse. Kracauer exists, she explains, 
simultaneously as film theorist, journalist, essay writer, novelist and poet. As a 
consequence, interpreting any of the myriad elements of Kracauer’s oeuvre through 
the filter of any one these activities inhibits the appreciation of their integrated 
“structural identity”. When “[s]een from a distance”, she writes, “we can discern a 
pattern in the various maps readers have made of the author’s work and the divergent 
interpretations they have come up with”.15 In fact, Koch states, it is an ignorance of 
this pattern’s “constitutive” function that explains why “some theorists of film” are 
driven to “punish the name Kracauer”.16 Kracauer was not a film theorist with 
philosophical aspirations, argues Koch, but a philosopher that used film to articulate 
certain aspects of his cultural theory. The methodological flaws identified in his film 
theory by film specialists, she concludes, are faults only from their singular 
perspective and should in fact be understood as indicative of his film texts’ true 
constituent function within a larger scheme.  
 
Though Koch’s interpretative model of Kracauer’s disparate corpus has proved 
influential in his establishment as a cultural theorist, not all of his advocates have 
been as keen to interpret his peripatetic approach as indicative of an immanent 
philosophy or sustained reasoning.  “In a way that is difficult to articulate”, suggests 
the German philosopher Theodor Adorno, Kracauer’s “thinking was always more 
contemplation than thought, singularly intent on not letting anything that solid things 
had impressed upon him be wrangled away through explanation”.17 It is this 
motivation, Adorno argues, that accounts for the primacy of the immediate experience 
over the philosophical concept in Kracauer’s thinking. As a result of this, Adorno 
                                                
14 Koch, Gertrud, Siegfried Kracauer: An Introduction, translated by Jeremy Gaines (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000), p.3. 
15 Koch, 2000, p.3. 
16 Koch, 2000, p.3. 
17 Adorno, 1991, p. 163. 
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suggests, “incommensurability”, a resistance to any common standard of 
measurement, should be considered the “central theme” of his work.18 It is Kracauer’s 
intellectual fidelity to the philosophically anomalous, Adorno concludes, that stops 
his thinking from being philosophy. It is this reluctance to judge the 
incommensurable, the weighting of “the expressive moment in philosophy” over the 
objective “moment of rigor” that prompted their mutual friend, the literary critic and 
philosopher Walter Benjamin to call Kracauer “an enemy of philosophy”.19 However, 
Adorno adds, in “all his works, Kracauer reminds us that thought, looking back, 
should not forget what it divested itself of in order to become idea”.20 
 
1.4  Hybrid Perspectives and Research Questions 
 
The idea of a true synthesis of film theory and philosophy revealing new intellectual 
“terrain” is one explored more recently by Havi Carel and Greg Tuck in their 
introduction to New Takes in Film-Philosophy.21 “While there are studies that 
describe themselves, perfectly legitimately”, explain Carel and Tuck, “as exercises in 
the philosophy of film, in these cases film is clearly positioned as the junior 
partner”.22 In such instances, when “placed under a pre-existing and fully-developed 
philosophical gaze”, films are reduced to the status of illustrations.23 Another 
approach, they identify, is one that seeks a greater equality between the terms “film 
and philosophy” but maintains “a pre-existing demarcation between the fields”. 24  
This approach, they conclude, is prone to consider film as a formal exercise devoid of 
social, historical and commercial context. By ignoring the contribution of Film 
Studies, suggest Carel and Tuck, philosophy can also run the risk of reducing a film to 
a “set of notions or concerns that could have been identified from the script, rather 
than issues that arise from an engagement with the visual, aural and kinetic 
experience of moving images”.25 However, argue Carel and Tuck, there is an 
alternative to “this particular binary of a successful or failed assimilation” which is a: 
                                                
18 Adorno,1991, p. 163. 
19 Adorno,1991, pp. 160 – 161. 
20 Adorno,1991, p. 164. 
21 Carel & Tuck, 2011, p. 2. 
22 Carel & Tuck, 2011, p. 2. 
23 Carel & Tuck, 2011, p. 2. 
24 Carel & Tuck, 2011, p. 2. 
25 Carel & Tuck, 2011, p. 2. 
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revitalising hybridity that aims at a more truly synthesising 
outcome. Here the conjunction is less a boundary, traversed from 
one side to the other more or less successfully, but a moment of 
expansion in which a field of thought becomes mapped and 
nourished by both traditions. The boundary is not so much crossed, 
as expanded, broadened so as to become a terrain of its own. To 
keep open the possibility of mutual transformation while offering a 
coherent yet non-excluding notion of what this new terrain may 
yield, we describe this domain as film-philosophy.26 
 
In light of this present interest in defining “film-philosophy”, this study will examine 
the ways in which Kracauer uses the film experience as the impetus for a critical 
approach designed to challenge conventional modes of philosophical practice. In 
doing so, it will explore how Kracauer develops his idea of the film camera’s scrutiny 
of our physical surroundings as the basis of a set of questions and responses that were 
novel to established political, social and cultural theories. It argues that Kracauer’s 
cinematic approach to theory is not a prescriptive model of filmmaking and film 
interpretation but the mapping out of what he defines in Theory of Film as “an 
approach to the world” that is not peculiar to the medium but articulated by it in an 
exemplary fashion.27 Questions addressed by this study include: what is it about film 
that for Kracauer identified it above other forms of modern culture (such as theatre) as 
a facilitator for critical thinking? For Kracauer, what are the potential social and 
political ramifications of his critical re-evaluation of this form of mass media?  How 
does Kracauer’s philosophy of the cinematic inform his literary work and sociological 
research? Does the cinematic approach that Kracauer describes in Theory of Film 
suggest a mode of critical agency distinct from that of established forms of 
philosophical and artistic practice? Is Kracauer’s theory of film a mode of film-
philosophy avant la lettre? Is his film theory better understood as cinematic 
philosophy? 
 
 
 
                                                
26 Carel & Tuck, 2011, p. 2. 
27 Kracauer, 1997, p. li. 
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1.5  Chapter Structure and Content 
 
“Anyone who thinks that Theory of Film contains everything that Siegfried Kracauer 
had to say about film”, writes Heide Schlüpmann, “is quite mistaken”. “In fact”, she 
concludes, “the opposite is true”. 28 Though Schlüpmann’s remark is made in 
reference to the hundreds of film reviews that Kracauer wrote whilst a journalist 
during the 1930s, the point she is making can also be extended, I argue, to include his 
work on other subjects. In this thesis I will demonstrate how Kracauer’s explication of 
the cinematic approach is not restricted to his books on film or to his numerous film 
reviews but permeates and informs almost all of his work. Examining how the 
designation cinematic for Kracauer refers not to a fixed set of properties that are 
inherent to a particular object (be that defined technologically, culturally or socially) 
but a process, what he calls in Theory of Film, “a mode of human existence”, is a key 
factor in understanding its philosophical function.29 In the introduction of his last, and 
unfinished book, History: the last things before the last (1966), Kracauer describes, 
Theory of Film, as not just “an aesthetics of the photographic media” but also an 
attempt ”to bring out the significance of areas whose claim to be acknowledged in 
their own right has not yet been recognized”. 30   
 
PART ONE:  FROM THEORIST TO PHILOSOPHER   [Chapters 2 – 4] 
 
Through a survey of secondary literature, Chapters 2 and 3 will chart the decline and 
resurgence of interest in Kracauer’s work over the past five decades. It will examine 
in detail how his name became associated with a regressive dilettantism by film 
historians and critics during Film Studies’ formative academic period and how 
archival materials helped in the re-invention of Kracauer as a cultural philosopher. It 
will focus specifically on how film went from being the defining factor in Kracauer’s 
critical reception to a peripheral component in later considerations of his cultural 
philosophy as a whole. In conjunction with issues raised in chapters 2 and 3, chapter 4 
will propose an alternative context for the study of Kracauer’s work in which a 
                                                
28 Schlüpmann, Heide, “Phenomenology of Film: On Siegfried Kracauer's Writings of the 1920s”, New 
German Critique, No. 40 (1987), p. 97. 
29 Kracauer, 1997, p. li. 
30  Kracauer, Siegfried, History. The Last Things Before the Last, completed after the death of the 
author by Paul Oskar Kristeller (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1995), p.4. 
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critical notion of the cinematic presents itself again as a central concern in the 
development of his intellectual project. 
 
Chapter 2: Peculiar Anachronism: The Issue of Relevance 
 
This chapter will look at the critical response to Kracauer’s film theory, firstly by a 
post-War generation of film scholars trying to establish film studies as a legitimate 
academic discipline and then by those arguing for a revision of his contribution from 
the perspective of Cultural Studies and Feminism. It will examine how all of these 
interpretative strategies, to some degree narrativise Kracauer’s work and his 
intellectual biography in order to synchronise an image of him with a particular aspect 
of their own intellectual agendas. Though antithetical, I argue, a common element in 
all of these approaches to Kracauer is a critical notion of obsolescence. In other 
words, from a relatively early stage Kracauer’s English language film theory is 
identified by various critics as being technologically and methodologically outmoded.  
 
Rather that refute the anachronistic nature of Kracauer’s American publications, 
subsequent defences of his work confirm it by reading them as damaged remnants of 
an intellectual project whose radical potential was negated by the trauma of exile. It is 
in his pre-War German language work (completed whilst a journalist in Frankfurt and 
Berlin) and not in his more famous American books, argues exponents of this 
psychological and existential reading of his work that his true intellectual contribution 
can be found.  Subsequently interest has shifted from his post-War work to his 
Weimar texts and though the former are still widely known they are considered more 
of an historical curiosity than his earlier articles and essays. As a consequence, I 
argue, many criticisms about them from previous decades have remained 
unchallenged. This chapter argues that the outmoded character of his post-War book, 
Theory of Film is the product of a conscious and deliberate strategy adopted by its 
author as part of a larger critique of teleological models of historical change. 
Understanding the anachronistic nature of Kracauer’s later work, I argue, provides not 
just an alternative perspective on his work but also the critical means with which to 
challenge the prevailing interpretive models of his work as a whole. 
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Chapter 3: Exile and Repatriation. Kracauer’s Redemption Cycle 
 
Developing themes introduced in the previous section, this chapter will examine in 
detail the origins of what has been referred to as the “Kracauer renaissance”, a period 
of renewed interest in his work in the 1990s that resulted in the translation and 
republication of many of his texts.31 In this chapter, I argue that rather than the 
outcome of serendipitous archival discoveries or the inevitable result of the circularity 
of intellectual fashion, Kracauer’s reinvention, as a Weimar cultural philosopher is a 
product of a concerted and deliberate group effort. This group, initially formed around 
the German film historian and critic Karsten Witte and later the U.S. journal New 
German Critique, propagated an image of Kracauer as primarily a German author and 
philosopher. The reason for doing so, I demonstrate, relates to their desire to re-
establish a German cultural tradition in film aesthetics that had been truncated by the 
rise of National Socialism. Using psychological and philosophical concepts such as 
trauma and exile, Kracauer became the personification of Germany’s violently 
fractured intellectual history. With the focus entirely on his early Weimar texts, critics 
such as Witte, Hansen and Koch worked to transform Kracauer’s work into an 
intellectual bridge that would connect the work of a generation of post-War German 
filmmakers (New German Cinema) with a politically progressive Weimar theoretical 
tradition untainted by fascism.  
 
Looking at the work of film historians such as Eric Rentschler and Thomas Elsaesser, 
I shall show how the changes in the image of Kracauer, from staid academician to 
politically engaged cultural critic, reflects the role played by Weimar cinema and 
mass culture in the relationship between Film Studies and Cultural Studies and in turn 
in the development of Cinema Studies. This chapter will review the legacy of this 
period of critical activity in Kracauer’s work and analyse how certain aspects of this 
conflation of Kracauer’s personal biography and his intellectual project have both 
improved Kracauer’s academic profile in both Europe and America but also restricted 
how his work is viewed, particularly in the context of Film Studies. 
 
 
                                                
31 Koch, 2000, Back cover. 
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Chapter 4:  The Context of Film-Philosophy 
 
In this chapter I will introduce the idea of film-philosophy as an alternative context in 
which to interpret Kracauer’s work. It will focus in particular on the work of film 
scholars that argue for a more fluid and interactive relationship between film theory 
and philosophy. I argue that from the perspective of this debate certain elements of 
Kracauer’s work, in particular those relating to his “cinematic approach” which are 
currently sidelined by the prevailing interpretive approaches, present themselves as 
significant and integral to his work as a whole.  
 
Using Thomas Wartenberg’s provisional typology of cinematic philosophies as a 
framework, this chapter will examine the various contrasting positions espoused by 
film theorists and philosophers on the intellectual capacity of filmmaking and the film 
viewing experience. As I shall demonstrate, though the views on this subject range 
from extreme evangelism to absolute repudiation, commonalities can be identified, 
specifically in relation to how the immediate experience of film spectatorship 
simultaneously courts and resists philosophical interpretation. Focusing on the work 
of Wartenberg, Robert Sinnerbrink and John Mullarkey, this chapter explores how 
film paradoxically makes philosophy more comprehensible through narrative and 
visual exposition but also demonstrates its inadequacies as a vehicle for thought. The 
purpose of this contextualisation is not to identify the conceptual origins of film-
philosophy in Kracauer’s work but to use its peculiar destabilisation of the film / 
theory relationship as a catalyst with which to reinterpret particular aspects of 
Kracauer’s work on film outside of the existential narrative constructed for it by 
previous studies. 
 
PART TWO: A CINEMATIC APPROACH TO PHILOSOPHY  
[Chapters 5 – 9] 
  
In the second part of this study I will examine in detail how Kracauer understood and 
articulated the relationship between film and philosophy and how that relates to 
contemporary notions of film-philosophy. In the following chapter breakdown I will 
show how I intend to demonstrate that the cinematic approach the Kracauer explicates 
in Theory of Film is not the medium specific application of a predetermined 
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philosophy of culture (as discussed in chapter 3) but a proposal for a mutual 
transformation of film aesthetics and philosophy. This transformation, I argue, is not 
as a result of their dialectical synthesis of theory and its object into a hybrid mode of 
reasoning but through a consideration of their relationship as performative; that is 
they remain distinct but intertwined in a way where changes in one effect the 
constitution of the other.  
 
Chapter 5:  Cinematic Subject Relations: How Film Affects Its Theory 
 
In this chapter I examine how Kracauer developed his understanding of film’s 
intellectual capacity especially in relation to the established arts. It describes how a 
Marxist model of social and cultural relations initially informs Kracauer’s approach to 
film as a vehicle for ideological critique. It also shows how Kracauer allows the 
corporeal cinema experience to transform his philosophical understanding of material 
and social phenomena and in turn the relationship between theory and praxis. 
 
Through a detailed examination of his analysis of the films of French filmmaker Jean 
Vigo I demonstrate how Kracauer uses film to articulate his proposed revision of 
Marx’s dialectic materialism. I also argue that as well as using film to illustrate his 
theory Kracauer’s writings on film operate as exemplar incidences of his peculiarly 
cinematic approach to the philosophical object. This peculiarity, I explain, manifests 
itself in his work as an overt recognition of the role of the object in determining the 
relative position of the philosophical subject. The film experience for Kracauer, I 
conclude, does not just provide a novel means for the audio and visual enunciation of 
a philosophical position but through its peculiar relativisation of the viewer’s subject 
position questions the legitimacy of maintaining Idealism’s teleological perspective.  
 
Chapter 6:  Feedback Loops: Defining Cinematic Agency 
 
For Kracauer, film and thinking about film exists in a dynamic conceptual feedback 
loop, in other words, how we conceptualise the film experience shapes how we 
comprehend it and subsequently how we produce it. It is an understanding of this 
peculiar self-reflectivity that philosophy brings to film theory and with it the potential 
to emancipate it from the teleological models that dominate contemporary notions of 
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its development. Considered philosophically, the cinematic experience can been seen 
to provide a context in which not just the film object or the viewing subject is 
destabilized but also thought’s relationship to its object. In this regard Kracauer’s 
cinematic approach can been seen as proposing a paradigm shift comparable to that of 
quantum physics and its challenge to the Newtonian belief in the absolute autonomy 
of theory and reality. Kracauer’s film theory, I argue, is as much about the nature of 
theory as it is about the nature of film.32  
 
In this chapter I will examine how Kracauer envisaged his film theory as belonging 
(as Mullarkey suggests) “both to the theorist and, in part, to the film” through an 
analogy he makes between film spectatorship and the dreaming process. 33 This 
comparison, I argue, is done not to facilitate a psychoanalytical deciphering of film’s 
overt and covert symbolic meaning (in relation to the filmmaker’s and / or the 
spectators conscious and unconscious desires) but in order to help explain the peculiar 
nature of cinematic agency as a mutually modifying process between subject and 
object (a feedback loop). Using Kracauer’s recourse to the work of Walter Benjamin 
and then to the post-Newtonian physics of Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg as 
reference points, this chapter demonstrates how Kracauer incorporates the idea of the 
spectator / observer influencing (co-creating) the object of study into his notion of the 
cinematic. This chapter concludes with a comparison between Kracauer’s dynamic 
concept of spectatorship and contemporary philosopher Jacques Rancière’s notion of 
the emancipated spectator. Both critical positions, I argue, work to collapse the 
antithetical dialectic of passive and active modes of behaviour that is immanent to 
philosophy’s notion of agency. 
 
Chapter 7:    The Cinematic As Social Practice 
 
Following on from the conclusions of the previous chapter, this section will explore 
further how Kracauer perceives the way film mediates in the relationship between the 
individual and the collective social body. In particular it will assess how Kracauer 
                                                
32 For its publication in England the London publisher, Denis Dobson changed the title of the book to 
“Nature of Film”, see Kracauer, Siegfried, Nature of film: the redemption of physical reality (London: 
Denis Dobson), 1961. 
33 Mullarkey, John, “Film Can’t Philosophise (and Neither Can Philosophy): Introduction to a Non-
Philosophy of Cinema, in Havi, Carel and Greg Tuck (eds.), New Takes in Film Philosophy 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 94. 
 14 
understood the nature of the connection between the culturally constructed idea of 
individual subjectivity and the image of the collective social body as a mutually 
defining and dynamic process. Kracauer’s readings of the Czech writer Franz Kafka 
and the slapstick comedy of Charlie Chaplin, I argue, informs his understanding of the 
relationship between the private and the social self. The peculiar modes of 
subjectivity that he associates with their work, I suggest, not only blurs the boundaries 
of what is conventionally seen to delimit the concept of the cinematic but also work to 
corroborate his image of the relationship between people and things as a reciprocal 
performance. 
 
In establishing what Kracauer understood as individual and collective agency, this 
chapter demonstrates the immanent performative component of Kracauer’s film 
theory. By drawing parallels between Kracauer’s critical notion of community and the 
work of Georg Lukács, Giorgio Agamben and Jacques Rancière I will demonstrate 
how their corresponding endeavours work to collapse the distinction between active 
and passive modes of intellectual and physical activity and in turn conflate the 
conceptual antagonism of theory and practice. Kracauer’s ontological concerns 
regarding the nature of the cinematic community, I conclude, distinguish his work 
from abstract hermeneutics and give his cinematic approach a distinct social function. 
 
Chapter 8:     Theory and Its Cinematic Illustration 
 
The following two chapters look in detail at the ways the immediate sensory 
experience of the cinema is evident in how Kracauer devises and presents his theory. 
Using his theory of time and historical change as an example, I argue that Kracauer 
uses film to both illustrate his ideas as well as actively encouraging the reader to 
experience how film resists being entirely subservient to philosophy. I conclude that, 
for Kracauer, the cinematic experience operates alongside philosophy as a repository 
of knowledge (brought about by the exercise of the cinematic approach) and as such 
possesses a potential to circumvent the limitations of readymade theoretical 
frameworks. 
 
In Chapter 8, using comparisons with the work of Walter Benjamin, the philosopher 
Michel Serres, the anthropologist and art historian George Kubler and the Marxist 
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philosopher (and friend of Kracauer’s) Ernst Bloch, I demonstrate how Kracauer’s 
various statements on temporal relations in Theory of Film and History can be 
considered as constituting a philosophy of time.  By examining how ideas such as 
Bloch’s concept of “non-simultaneity” and Kubler’s notion of “shaped time” inform 
his work I argue that Kracauer identifies a notion of temporal extraterritoriality, which 
though comprehensible in relation to film narratives can not be directly represented 
by them. This chapter analyses how Kracauer, using the films of D.W. Griffith as a 
model, develops a “non-solution” to this problem of narrative representation by 
initiating a critical notion of ambiguity. The subsequent ambiguous cinematic motifs 
that recur throughout Theory of Film, I argue, are not expressions of their author’s 
inappropriate poetic aspirations, cryptic symbols of a hidden deeper meaning or 
expressions of Kracauer’s pseudo-mystical insight into the cinematic process. These 
motifs, I suggest, are the record of incidences where film has demonstrated its 
epistemological potential by correlating narrative and extra-narrative elements in a 
way peculiar to the medium. For Kracauer, I conclude, the key to understanding 
film’s peculiar intellectual capacity relates to its immediate physiological appeal 
being understood as integral to and not distinct from its philosophical potential. 
 
Chapter 9:     The Critical Experience of Cinematic Analogies                                    
 
In this penultimate chapter I analyse the concept of the thought-image [Denkbild] as a 
strategy devised by exponents of Critical Theory to expose the conceptual limitations 
of philosophical language. The abstruse thought-image, I argue, provides an 
alternative perspective for interpreting the evanescent cinematic motifs that recur in 
Kracauer’s Theory of Film, one that preserves their kinetic nature from the stasis of 
symbolic interpretation. With reference to the work of Kracauer’s one time mentor, 
the German sociologist Georg Simmel I demonstrate the various critical functions that 
Kracauer’s illustrations and film references in Theory of Film fulfill with a particular 
emphasis on their kinesthetic effect. Kracauer’s exposition of the physiological 
experience of film, I argue, is immanent to his understanding of its critical capacity 
and is also fundamental to his identification of the cinematic approach with a 
democratization of philosophical and artistic practice. This chapter concludes with an 
examination of how Kracauer’s notion of film’s photographic mediation of everyday 
experience acts as a catalyst for this pluralisation of critical activity. 
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Chapter 10: Conclusion: Utopia of the In-between 
 
In this final chapter, before offering a summary of and proposing some possible future 
applications for Kracauer’s peculiar philosophical mediation between film theory and 
its object, I look at the utopian character of the cinematic approach in relation to his 
critical project as a whole. Mapping out the utopian aspect of Kracauer’s oeuvre, I 
argue, particularly in relation to the work of his peers Adorno and Bloch, assists the 
contemporary reader to better comprehend Theory of Film not as the (successful or 
failed) application of an esoteric philosophy of culture but as an attempt by an 
individual to relinquish sovereignty of their philosophy. The cinematic approach is 
not a prescriptive set of principles aimed at the film-makers in order to better facilitate 
the teleological advancement of a medium specific aesthetic nor is it an instructional 
programme designed to replicate Kracauer’s advanced appreciation of the medium. 
Kracauer’s Theory of Film, I conclude, is a record of what happens when film is 
allowed to act alongside theory, to be its companion rather than servant, like the 
peculiar relationship that Kafka describes between Don Quixote and Sancho Panza. 
 
Finally returning to the questions posed in the introduction of this study I assess the 
relationship between Kracauer’s film theory and contemporary notions of film-
philosophy. Kracauer’s approach, I suggest has much in common with certain 
elements of the cinematic philosophy debate but too close an identification negates 
the historical character of Kracauer’s critical intervention into the film experience. 
However, film-philosophy does demonstrate how the peculiar intellectual potential 
that Kracauer sought to describe through his convolution of film, theory and 
philosophy still exists regardless of how the individual terms are currently defined.   
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CHAPTER 2:  
 
PECULIAR ANACHRONISM: THE ISSUE OF RELEVANCE 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In the context of Film Studies today the “classic” film theory of Siegfried Kracauer is 
often presented as a museum piece, an approach to a medium that has been 
superseded both theoretically and technologically.1 This, however, has not always 
been the case. This chapter will look at how Kracauer’s theory has been critically 
received historically, initially by those advocating film studies as an autonomous 
academic discipline in the 1960s / 70s and then by those arguing for a revision of his 
beleaguered reputation in light of developments in Cultural Studies, Feminism and 
archival research. It will examine how these psychological and philosophical 
approaches to Kracauer’s work on film address the issue of relevance in a 
contemporary film studies context. It argues that far from being an obstacle to be 
overcome in order to appreciate the true nature of Kracauer’s legacy in relation to 
Film Studies, the outmoded character of his post-War film theory is indicative of its 
author’s complex and non-laminar notion of historical change. Intentionally 
conceived as an anachronism, it concludes, Kracauer’s Theory of Film works to 
situate the cinematic approach it advocates in a critical tradition of aesthetic theory 
and art practice that resists assimilation into (or affirmation of) a reductive model of 
technological and social progress.  
 
2.2     Pioneer or Obstacle: The Problem of Kracauer in Film Studies 
 
In 1980 the film historian Eric Rentschler, an influential figure in the recent English 
language reception of German cinema, wrote that the problem with teaching film at 
University level was that “the ghost of Dr. Kracauer still haunts American scholars”.2 
For those, such as Rentschler, wishing to establish film studies as a distinct academic 
                                                
1 For example, Noel Carroll’s “Introducing Film Evaluation” in Gledhill, Christine and Linda Williams 
(eds.), Reinventing Film Studies (London: Arnold, 2002), p. 273 clearly identifies the designation 
“classic” with being defunct, what the editors of the volume label as not really “useful for the future”, 
p. 1. 
2 Rentschler, Eric, “Reopening the Cabinet of Dr. Kracauer: Teaching German Film as Film.” Modern 
Language Journal, Vol. 64, No. 3. (1980), p. 320. 
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discipline, Kracauer’s continued presence in debate was proving a stubborn 
distraction. Kracauer’s work represented the outmoded, his approach was considered 
crude and his influence regressive. Though recognised as an important contributor to 
the development of academic film analysis Kracauer was now proving more problem 
than precedent. For a post-War generation of film scholars, such as Rentschler, 
Kracauer’s approach was a methodological dead end, a curious museum piece, 
something to be appreciated rather than actually used.  
 
In England, philosophers, theorists and film critics also keen to distinguish the 
novelty of their own approaches to film analysis where equally forthright in 
castigating the mistakes of their predecessors. For example, V.F. Perkins, in Film as 
Film (1972) introduces his exposition of a logical “synthetic theory” of film with a 
chapter titled “The Sins of the Pioneers”. 3 Alongside essays by the French critic 
André Bazin (1918 – 1958), Kracauer’s Theory of Film (1960) is presented by Perkins 
in his study as a prime example of how personal preference is fashioned into 
prescriptive dogma. For Perkins, their shared proclivity for the supposed 
objectiveness of a naturalistic approach to filmmaking is a subterfuge for a 
predominately subjective and fundamentally undisciplined and amateurish approach 
to the subject.  Kracauer’s “at time impenetrable, line of reasoning”4, he argues, is 
evidence of how he has confused, like Bazin, his “own critical vocation” for the “true 
vocation of cinema”.5 In contrast, his own professional approach to film analysis, 
declares Perkins, will assist “the critical spectator” to “master” the “raw experience” 
of the cinema.6  
 
In parallel to Perkin’s work, I.C. Jarvie in Towards A Sociology of the Cinema (1970) 
attributes Kracauer’s work a more insidious character. Kracauer’s dilettante method, 
argues Jarvie, is an obstacle to be overcome if Film Studies is to be taken seriously 
like Sociology as a scholarly discipline. In contrast to Perkins’ measured rebuttal of 
Kracauer’s theoretical naivety, Jarvie opts for a more direct approach and ridicules 
                                                
3 Perkins, V.F., Film as Film. Understanding and Judging Movies (London: Penguin, 1974), p.9. 
4 Perkins, 1974, p. 29. 
5 Perkins, 1974, p. 39. 
6 Perkins, 1974, p. 193. 
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Kracauer’s theory of film as “an absurd edifice”.7 For Jarvie, Kracauer’s film theory 
with its “tendency to mystical utterances” is an embarrassing anachronism and “no 
sort of tool for film analysis”.8 Considered as a whole, he concludes, Kracauer’s work 
is “poorly argued and incredibly overrated”. 9  A precursor to (and possible model for) 
Jarvie’s assessment of Kracauer’s method as a form of neurosis is the New York critic 
Pauline Kael’s 1962 review of Theory of Film.10 
 
In this text, provocatively titled “Is there a cure for Film Criticism”, Kael (like 
Perkins) criticises Kracauer’s theory for confusing a subjective approach for an 
objective method. “Kracauer”, writes Kael, “doesn’t mean to spoil movies for us”: 
 
it’s obvious that he really loves certain movies – and he does his 
best to justify this affection by bending and twisting his theory to 
include, or at least excuse, the movies he likes. This is made 
possible by our confusion about what the theory is.11 
 
However, unlike Perkin’s subsequent critique of Kracauer’s covert subjectivity, 
Kael’s criticism of Kracauer’s Theory of Film is overtly anti-intellectual. Theories 
such as Kracauer’s, argues Kael, are obstacles to honest criticism, the basis of which 
is personal judgement and freedom of choice. Film theory, for Kael, is something 
“imposed on motion pictures” an unnecessary mediation that looks not to develop 
what she refers to as “a critical attitude” but to regulate it. 12 There is, writes Kael: 
 
in any art, a tendency to turn one’s own preferences into a 
monomaniac theory; in film criticism, the more confused and single 
minded and dedicated (to untenable propositions) the theorist is, the 
more likely he is to be regarded as serious and important and 
‘deep’”.13  
                                                
7 Jarvie, I. C., Towards a sociology of the cinema: a comparative essay on the structure and 
functioning of a major entertainment industry (London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1970), p. 134 . 
8 Jarvie, 1970, p. 134.  
9 Jarvie, 1970, p. 134.  
10 Jarvie, 1970, p. 132. For reference to Kael’s “devastation” of Kracauer see Jarvie, 1970, p. 299. 
11 Kael, Pauline, ‘“Is There a Cure for Film Criticism?' Or, Some Unhappy Thoughts on Siegfried 
Kracauer’s Theory of Film: The Redemption of Physical Reality’, in I Lost it at The Movies (Boston: 
Atlantic Monthly Press, 1965), p. 269. 
12 Kael, 1965, p. 270. 
13 Kael, 1965, p. 271. 
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Citing as evidence of this ruse Theory of Film’s grandiloquent “dust-jacket blurbs”, 
Kael takes it upon herself to call Kracauer’s intellectual bluff.14 Her subsequent 
denunciation of Kracauer revolves around an identification of his Germanic heritage 
and an intellectual approach to film that is foreign to the medium. For example, Kael 
writes: 
Obviously English is not Kracauer’s native language, and it seems 
cruel and unfair to protest his usage of it. But how can we judge 
what he’s saying when he sets up terms and classifications (like 
‘mental reality’) that seem to mean something for him that they 
could hardly mean to anyone else? Are we perhaps being more 
generous to his ideas than we would be if we could decipher them? 
What good are Kracauer’s terms if no one else can apply them? 
How can anyone tell what fits his scheme? It’s so arbitrary; it’s like 
a catechism to which he owns the only set of correct answers.15 
 
For Kael, this “game of arbitrary definitions” is a “dull game” which we don’t have to 
play.16 “In all art”, she concludes: 
 
we look and listen for what we have not experienced quite that way 
before. We want to see, to feel, to understand, to respond a new 
way. Why should pedants be allowed to spoil the game?17 
 
Kael’s negative effect upon Theory of Film’s critical reception was immediate and 
long lasting. As Miriam Hansen notes in her introduction to its 1997 re-publication, 
Theory of Film “did not have to wait for the digital revolution to be laid in ruins” as 
the influence of Kael’s “smug polemics” can be traced in various guises throughout 
the following decades.18 For instance, in his 1968 essay, “What, Indeed, Is Cinema?”, 
Peter Harcourt, sets about extrapolating Kael’s notion of Theory of Film’s conceptual 
                                                
14 Kael (1965), pp. 270 -271. Kael is here referring to the texts contributed by the British filmmaker, 
historian and critic Paul Rotha (1907 – 1984) and Richard Griffith (1912 – 1969), then curator of the 
Museum of Modern Art (New York) Film Library for the first edition of Theory Film, printed in 1960 
by the Oxford University Press. 
15 Kael, 1965, p. 288. 
16 Kael, 1965, p. 275. 
17 Kael, 1965, p. 292. 
18 Hansen, Miriam, “Introduction” in Kracauer, Siegfried, Theory of Film. The Redemption of Physical 
Reality [1960] (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), p. ix. 
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foreignness as cultural detachment and personal neurosis. Confessing no knowledge 
of his background, Harcourt suggest that “Kracauer's problem” is ultimately with 
himself. 19 Theory of Film, argues Harcourt, is the product of “ a man alone in a 
museum” and though the reasons for embarking on such an enterprise may have been 
“noble” it resulted in “something a little sad”. It is, Harcourt concludes: 
 
as if his chosen society encouraged him to be "merely" an 
academic. He was not writing in Hollywood, close to the film- 
making scene; nor would anything he wrote ever affect anything 
that Hollywood might do. His academic pedantry-if that is what we 
have to call the tautological insistences of his book-must have been 
aggravated by the isolation he must have felt, working so far away 
from the active film scene.20 
 
In contrast to Harcourt’s sympathetic reading, J. Dudley Andrew in his 1976 book, 
The Major Film Theories: An Introduction, cared little for Kracauer the individual 
and set about attacking the subject of Kracauer as one would an oppressive social 
institution. As well as mimicking Kael’s condescending tone, J. Dudley Andrew (like 
Jarvie a sociologist) embellishes Harcourt’s image of Kracauer as socially detached. 
Where as Harcourt was openly ignorant of Kracauer’s background, Andrew informs 
his readers of Kracauer’s pre-War career as a journalist as well as his other “equally 
serious” non-film publications.21 However, this contextual information has little 
bearing on Andrew’s approach which takes as its main motivation a desire to deride 
those who esteem Kracauer’s work as “a landmark in film scholarship”.22  
 
For Andrew, following Kael’s lead, Kracauer’s Theory of Film established itself 
(along with its author) as an authority on film in the absence of the genuine thing by 
opportunistically presenting itself as such at a time when film scholarship was eager 
to prove itself academically. “While little known in Europe”, argues Andrew: 
 
                                                
19 Harcourt, Peter, “What, Indeed, Is Cinema?”, Cinema Journal, Vol. 8, No. 1. (1968), p. 25. 
20 Harcourt, 1968, p. 25. 
21 Andrew, J. Dudley, The Major Film Theories: an introduction (London and New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1976), p. 107. 
22 Kael, 1965, p. 270. 
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Kracauer’s book has had incredible impact in England and America, 
in part because its appearance coincided with the advent of 
widespread film study in both countries. More telling than this, 
however, is the book’s solid structure and broad scholarship. Theory 
of Film appears authoritative in its very format, especially when 
compared to its rivals. It is a big book, replete with references to a 
vast range of films, film theorists, and scholars from all fields, and 
written with incomparable self-confidence and an imposing 
Germanic seriousness.23 
 
What Andrew subsequently sets out to do is to demonstrate, like Kael, Perkins and 
Jarvie before him, that though Theory of Film bares all the hallmarks of a standard 
text for a then fledgling intellectual discipline, the superficiality of its method and 
conclusions render its true influence counterproductive in relation to the subject’s 
academic development. 
 
2.3    Theory of Film as Philosophical Ruin: Kracauer’s Relevancy in the Digital Age 
 
As I will describe in detail in the next chapter, by the beginning of the 1990s 
(following the republication of some of his pre-War writings) attitudes to Kracauer’s 
work began to change. However, the problem (that Kael identified) of distilling a 
reproducible and coherent method from Kracauer’s idiosyncratic approach remained. 
This issue is acknowledged by the film historian Miriam Hansen in her introduction to 
the 1997 republication of Theory of Film. “[M]uch as Theory of Film strives toward 
transparency and systematicity”, writes Hansen, “the text remains uneven, slippery, 
and occasionally inconsistent, defying an attempt to deduce from it a coherent, clear-
cut, and univocal position”. However, for Hansen it is this opacity that assures rather 
than negates Kracauer’s continued relevance. Perhaps, she writes, “the insights that 
the work still yields are to be found in this unevenness and do not depend upon its 
status as logically consistent […] nor, for that matter, upon claims to trans-historical 
and trans-cultural validity”.24  
 
                                                
23 Andrew, 1976, p. 106. 
24 Hansen, 1997, p. x. 
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One possible reason for this change in approach to Kracauer’s text, suggest Thomas 
Elsaesser and Malte Hagener in Film Theory: an introduction through the senses, is 
the “historicity of theory itself”.25 For Elsaesser and Hagener, any “new” theory 
“implicitly or explicitly” defines itself as such by addressing certain problems that 
though possibly explicated beforehand are shown to have not yet been resolved or at 
least explained “in a satisfactory manner”.26 However, in the process of doing so 
(within a singular field of research) there is a considerable likelihood that certain 
issues, ones previously considered resolved, might also be revived. An example of 
this, suggest Elsaesser and Hagener, is the recent revival in interest in Andre Bazin’s 
work. The reason for this, argue Elsaesser and Hagener, is due to a physical change in 
the medium rather than a shift in social conditions. The technological evolution of 
film from analogue to digital media, they assert, raises (“albeit in a new form”) 
Bazin’s primary concern regarding the ontology of the photographic image. They 
conclude that: 
 
The revival of Bazin (but also that of Kracauer […]) proves that the 
history of film theory is not a teleological story of progress to ever-
more comprehensive or elegantly reductive models.27 
 
The cyclical historical model proposed by Elsaesser and Hagener here is also used by 
Hansen in her re-contextualization of Kracauer’s film texts. For Hansen, Kracauer’s 
peculiar attempts to define the essential elements of the medium in Theory of Film 
resonate with contemporary debates concerning the “digital revolution” and its 
challenge to traditional concepts of the cinema as a cultural and social phenomenon. 
Kracauer’s self-frustrating and “slippery” taxonomy, suggest Hansen, has belatedly 
found a more receptive historical context in the digital age. 28 The hostility towards 
Kracauer’s work exhibited by the likes of Andrew and Kael, Hansen argues, stems 
from their consideration of his work as instantly outmoded. For a post-war generation 
of critics, it was not just the formal and stylistic character of Theory of Film’s that 
marked it out as decidedly old fashioned, its concerns about the nature of the medium 
                                                
25 Elsaesser, Thomas and Malte Hagener, Film Theory. An introduction through the senses (New York 
& London: Routledge, 2010), p. 6. 
26 Elsaesser and Hagener, 2010, p. 6. 
27 Elsaesser and Hagener, 2010, p. 6. 
28 Hansen, 1997, p. viii. 
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also seemed to distance it from contemporary debate. Too new to be considered as 
part of the establishment, too nostalgic in its examples to be relevant, the resultant 
historical indeterminacy, argues Hansen, not only accounts for the rapid labelling of 
Theory of Film as a classic text in the film studies canon (by those eager to establish 
one) but also accounts for its equally speedy rejection by those wishing to take the 
next critical step and undermine the orthodoxy of their predecessors. It is, 
nevertheless, Hansen argues, the peculiar anachronistic character of Theory of Film 
that is the key to understanding its relevance today.  
 
The key concept in Hansen’s critical revision of Theory of Film’s historical 
displacement is that of exile. Instead of refuting Kael’s derisory image of the author 
as a foreigner Hansen appropriates it and reverses its critical function. For Hansen, in 
order to effectively evaluate the merit of Kracauer’s contribution to film theory the 
reader must factor in the psychological implications of his enforced migration from 
Europe in 1941 (described in the next chapter). The harrowing experience of escaping 
National Socialism, argues Hansen, “violently fractured” Kracauer’s “intellectual 
biography” causing a hiatus in his intellectual development (the first draft of Theory 
of Film is dated 1940/41).29 The reticent tone Kracauer adopts in Theory of Film, 
argues Hansen, the “detached, Olympian vision” that so riled Kael and Andrew, can 
be explained as the deferred expression of this trauma. Had it been completed at a 
time closer to the stage of its conception, she proposes, Kracauer’s book on film 
aesthetics would have adopted a more overtly radical approach to its subject.  
 
Theodor Adorno wrote in 1944: “Every intellectual in emigration is without 
exception, mutilated”. 30 A keen student of Adorno, Hansen’s approach seeks to 
restore Kracauer’s mutilated text by tracing its “hidden lineages” with a view to 
reviving its “history” – its correct historical context - and in turn “reactualize the 
argument of the book”.31 Through the use of archival sources, Hansen sets about 
proving that the book we know today is in fact a damaged remnant of a larger more 
progressively political project started by Kracauer in pre-War Weimar Germany.  
                                                
29 Hansen, 1997, p. xvi. 
30Adorno, Theodor, W., Minima Moralia. Reflections from Damaged Life, translated by E.F.N. 
Jephcott, [1951], (London and New York: Verso, 1996). p. 33. 
31 Hansen, 1997, p. xvi. 
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By demonstrating Theory of Film’s radical pedigree Hansen looks to relocate 
Kracauer’s theory of cinema both temporally and geographically. It is this contextual 
shift that allows Hansen to draw parallels between the ontological theories that 
accompanied cinema’s juvenile form with those that have developed alongside the 
latest phase of its digital evolution.  
 
However, in this revised comparative model, with its focus on Kracauer’s Weimar 
period, Theory of Film stands not as the culmination of Kracauer’s critical project but 
evidence of its untimely truncation. Kracauer’s book, argues Hansen, is a document of 
historical trauma, an oblique manifestation of the irreversible damage done to a 
generation of European Jewish intellectuals by the tyranny of National Socialism. It is 
not “technological progress”, argues Hansen, that has reduced Theory of Film and 
Kracauer’s other post-War texts to what the German critic Norbert Bolz has called 
“ruins in the philosophical landscape” - it was debris from the start. 32 If it can 
contribute anything to current ontological debate about the nature of cinema, 
concludes Hansen, then “Theory of Film may help us understand the experience that 
cinema once was and could have been, whatever may become of it.” 33 For Hansen 
and Koch, “the elided historical object of the book is not film as a phenomenon of late 
capitalism but, more specifically, the question of film after Auschwitz”.34  Hansen’s 
approach is not to defend Theory of Film against the criticism leveed against it by the 
likes of Andrew and Perkins on an analytical level but to (like Koch) redefine the 
meaning of the errors they detect. Echoing Peter Harcourt’s pity for Kracauer the old 
recluse, Hansen paints a picture of Kracauer as a victim of circumstance. For Hansen, 
the faults and inconsistencies evident in the methodology and tone of his English 
language work should be understood as symptoms of a psychological coping strategy. 
As such they should be resolved psychoanalytically by understanding their function in 
relation to a personal and national narrative of trauma and exile. 
 
                                                
32 Quoted in Hansen, 1997, p. viii. 
33 Hansen, 1997, p. xxxv. 
34 Hansen, 1997, p. xiv. Koch discusses this issue in Koch, Gertrud. "Not Yet Accepted Anywhere": 
Exile, Memory, and Image in Kracauer's Conception of History”, translated by Jeremy Gaines, New 
German Critique, No. 54 (1991), pp. 95 – 109. The psychological impact of the holocaust on 
Kracauer’s post-War work is also examined in Schlüpmann, Heide, “The Subject of Survival: On 
Kracauer’s Theory of Film”, New German Critique, No. 54 (1991), pp.  111-126. 
 26 
With its combination of a psychological reading of Kracauer’s work and a 
comparison between his early writings and current concerns about the future of film 
in the context of digital media technology, Hansen’s introduction fuses together the 
two major tendencies in the brief resurgence of interest in his work. The first, the 
psychological approach, with its reading of Kracauer’s work on the mass media as a 
fragmented narrative of personal alienation during a period of “mass destruction”, is 
intricately bound up with a period in the 1980s in which German film theory along 
with German New Wave cinema was seeking to establish itself against the dominant 
Francophile tendency of English language film studies (especially in America). 
Understanding how this period of critical activity was crucial in developing how 
scholars view Kracauer today, and how it was instrumental in redeeming his name 
from historical obscurity, is essential to any project that seeks to reassign to his work 
a contemporary relevance. In the following chapter I will map out in detail how the 
image of Kracauer as an extraterritorial intellectual and existential exile, one that 
currently persists in Cultural Studies, stems from a debate about German cinema 
history and theory.  
 
As well as advocating Kracauer’s significance in relation to a psychological history of 
a traumatised German film culture Hansen’s comparison of his pre-War ontological 
concerns with those of contemporary media theorists also strives to situate his work in 
the debate about the nature of film’s technological development.35 Though both of 
Hansen’s temporal models – the psychological and the technological - share (to a 
degree) a similar cyclic dynamic, how they construct a notion of Kracauer’s relevance 
is quite distinct.36 In the next section I will look at how criticism of the identification 
of historical debates about the nature of film also raises questions about the relevance 
of Kracauer in terms of the history of philosophy.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
35 Harbord, Janet, “Contingency's Work: Kracauer's Theory of Film and the Trope of the Accidental”, 
New Formations, No. 61 (2007), pp. 90 – 103. 
36 For a critique of psychoanalysis’ narrativisation of history and the cyclic relationship between 
memory and trauma in relation to film see, Hebard, Andrew, “Disruptive Histories: Toward a Radical 
Politics of Remembrance in Alain Resnais' Night and Fog”, New German Critique, No. 71 (1997), pp. 
87 – 113. 
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2.4     Historicising the Ontological Debate About Film 
  
In the recent “return to Kracauer’s work in contemporary film theory” argues Janet 
Harbord , there is  “a predilection for continuities”. 37 These “continuities”, she 
explains, are “threads that link an earlier project seeking to identify medium 
specificity, and a present fascination with the changing ontology of film in the wake 
of digitalisation”.38 This return, explains Harbord, “historicizes and legitimates” this 
ontological debate about the nature of film and its appropriateness as a designation in 
media studies. 39  In her own ontological study of the medium, The Evolution of Film 
(2007), Harbord, following the approach set out by Friedrich Kittler in Gramophone, 
Film, Typewriter (1986), examines how our present relationship with technology 
influences “how we think about the media of the past” and imagine how it will change 
in the future.40 “Film historiography”, writes Harbord, “provides not so much a 
reconstruction of events as a reflection of our current fascinations and intellectual 
concerns” and the questions it asks of the medium, “are questions very much of our 
time”. 41 For Harbord, questions relating to film’s technological development and 
standardization, and studies focused on its transformation from sideshow novelty to 
industrial institution are “fuelled, albeit implicitly, by a desire to comprehend and 
model change”: 
 
That change rebounds from the past as a messy, arbitrary and 
inconsistent process, in equal measure to moments of consolidation 
and discovery, reflects the complex ways in which transformation is 
currently thought […] Just as film has been detached from a logic of 
objective observation, film theory as historical enterprise has come 
to be seen as a double framing of the past from the present.42 
 
Within such a critical context, suggests Harbord in an earlier essay on Kracauer, “to 
return to Theory of Film only to map a landmark in the ongoing elaboration of film’s 
                                                
37 Harbord, 2007, p. 99. 
38 Harbord, 2007, p. 99. 
39 Harbord, 2007, p. 99. 
40 Harbord, 2007, p. 99. 
41 Harbord, Janet, The Evolution of Film. Rethinking Film Studies (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007b), p. 5. 
42 Harbord, 2007b, p. 5. 
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ontology misses the mark, twice over”.43 Firstly, and fundamental to Harbord’s 
reading, is the recognition of Kracauer’s project to “define film’s ‘nature’” as a 
failure. Instead of revealing the essential components of the cinematic, argues 
Harbord, the apparent methodological rigour demonstrated by Theory of Film upon 
the medium shows little more than film’s ability to elude such a formal taxonomy: 
 
Indeed, if Theory of Film  is revelatory at all in relation to medium 
specificity, it is in the illustration that whilst the word ‘film’ evokes 
a stable referent, what it refers to is in a state of constant flux. The 
failure of Theory of Film to properly designate the specificity of the 
medium, however, is arguably more generative in its production of 
concepts than a decisive taxonomy could ever be.44 
 
The failings of Kracauer’s attempt to formulate the nature of film, concludes Harbord, 
should therefore not be considered as evidence of a more significant error in his 
philosophical approach as a whole. In the attempt to make film “relate to pre-existing 
aesthetic criteria”, argues Harbord, Kracauer succeeds in “tracing and coaxing” from 
it “a set of contingent sensory relations that has otherwise eluded film theory”.45   
 
The other way in which such a focus on “historical continuity” in Theory of Film is 
“counterproductive”, argues Harbord, is “in the oversight of the distance, and 
difference in between ‘then’ and ‘now’”.46 For Harbord, careful consideration of the 
historical context of Kracauer’s conceptualisation of film provides an important 
insight into contemporary thought’s relationship with an indeterminate film object 
and in turn this relationship’s own relation to historical contingency. Reading Theory 
of Film now, argues Harbord, presents to the reader “usefully, stark differences 
between what might be stated for both film and contingency in the present, against 
which Kracauer’s investment in indeterminacy appears retrospectively optimistic”.47 
In fact, she adds, “as much as Theory of Film resonates with the present, it 
simultaneously haunts a past irretrievably lost”.48  
                                                
43 Harbord, 2007, p. 99. 
44 Harbord, 2007, p. 99. 
45 Harbord, 2007, p. 99. 
46 Harbord, 2007, p. 99. 
47 Harbord, 2007, p. 99. 
48 Harbord, 2007, p. 99. 
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2.5    The Parallel and Alternative Histories of Film and Philosophy 
 
Appropriating Adorno’s notion (introduced in the previous chapter) that something 
significant is lost, or more precisely absent in the consideration of Kracauer’s thought 
as philosophy, film historian Heide Schlüpmann has in turn argued that cinema does 
not provide a surrogate conceptual space for Kracauer’s failure to philosophise but a 
critically valid alternative to it. In Kracauer’s “own eyes”, explains Schlüpmann, “as 
in the eyes of philosophers, it was his love of cinema that separated the film theorist 
and historian from philosophy”: 
 
And yet it was precisely this love of cinema that was to form the 
basis of a theoretical concept, which shatters the mould of 
philosophy's monopoly on the truth. This is, expressly, not another 
'philosophy' intended to supersede systematic philosophy […] Such 
a distinction is to be seen instead as a call to examine the 
significance of cinema for the formation of theory and it is only in 
this respect that it rejects the claims of philosophy.49 
 
For Schlüpmann, what Kracauer discovers in cinema and subsequently documents in 
his writing on film is “a lost process of theorizing”, one in which aesthetic phenomena 
exist in parallel to abstract reason as agents of thought rather than being subservient to 
it.50 Key to understanding this, argues Schlüpmann, is what she refers to as “aesthetic 
enlightenment”: a mode of inquiry into the natural world introduced by the German 
philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche (1844 – 1900) and later developed by Theodor 
Adorno that seeks through the interplay of aesthetic form and philosophical content a 
degree of “self-reflectivity” in art comparable but not identical to that of conventional 
philosophy.51 “By valuing our aesthetic experience of the world above all”, explains 
Morton Schoolman in his examination of Adorno’s and Max Horkheimer’s seminal 
critique of modernity, Dialectic of Enlightenment (Dialektik der Aufklärung, 1944), 
“such an enlightenment would protect the ways in which the world is different from 
                                                
49 Schlüpmann, Heide, “Re-reading Nietzsche through Kracauer: towards a feminist perspective on 
film history.” Film History, Vol. 6, No.1 (1994), p. 80. 
50 Schlüpmann, 1994, p. 85. 
51 Schlüpmann, 1994, p. 81. 
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our every thought of it, the world as it appears in its diversity of differences, thus 
ending the domination of formal reason”.52  
It is as a vehicle for the return of “aesthetic enlightenment”, argues Schlüpmann that 
gives film and in-turn its theory the potential to be “equal to philosophy”.53 However, 
Schlüpmann concludes, that the consideration of film as such a vehicle is reliant on 
the medium’s resistance to being culturally assimilated as Art – “an area which 
philosophy successfully co-constituted”.54 The concept of Art (with a capital A), for 
Schlüpmann, is the product of the subordination of the aesthetic experience to 
philosophy. “The history of film”, she asserts, “is not to be subsumed under any 
philosophy”.55 For Schlüpmann, writing the history of film “philosophically” means 
“portraying the return of a lost history of philosophy”; in other words, documenting 
the elements of the cinema experience that either fall below the eye line of 
philosophical inquiry or are suppressed by it.56 As Kracauer explains in Theory of 
Film, works of art “consume the raw material from which they are drawn, whereas 
films as an outgrowth of camera work are bound to exhibit it”.57 Therefore, no matter 
how purposefully directed the film camera retains the potential to record phenomena 
of which its operator is unaware. “If film is an art”, states Kracauer, “it is art with a 
difference”. 58  
It is into this debate concerning film and the “issue of art” that film-philosophy has 
also recently intervened.59 As Robert Sinnerbrink has explained in his own more 
recent exposition of aesthetic enlightenment and “cinematic thinking”, what 
distinguishes the “path-breaking” approach of the “founding figures” of film-
philosophy is that their: 
 
works treated film as an artform capable of engaging in a distinctly 
cinematic exploration of philosophically important themes, and one 
                                                
52 Schoolman, Morton, Reason and Horror: Critical Theory, Democracy and Aesthetic Individuality 
(New York & London: Routledge, 2001), p.11.  Adorno, Theodor, W. and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic 
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55 Schlüpmann, 1994, p. 92. 
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that could provoke philosophy to respond in its own way to what 
film allows us to experience.60  
 
For Sinnerbrink, in “highlighting the significance of affect, pleasure and thought in 
our experience of film”, film-philosophy calls into question a prevailing trait in 
Anglo-American film theory, what the American philosopher of art, Arthur Danto has 
called, the “philosophical disenfranchisement of art”.61 Rather than looking to 
“subsume” cinematic works of art “into a philosophical discourse that enables us to 
master, comprehend and subordinate the work to theoretical or moral concerns”, film-
philosophy defends the notion that a film is a vehicle of “a distinctive kind of 
‘cinematic thinking’ that resists reduction to philosophical theory”.62 If we conceive 
of film in terms of art, Kracauer argues, then we are doing a disservice to a medium 
that can potentially represent the world and our relationship to it in a manner that does 
not codify our experience according to existing philosophical systems but in a way 
that tests the certitude of its parameters. As a statement of intent, Kracauer begins the 
first chapter of Theory of Film with a quote from the philosopher Susanne Langer: 
“the medium in which we naturally conceive our ideas may restrict them not only to 
certain form but to certain fields”.63 
 
Though the “issue of art” is a central concern for Kracauer in his 1960 text, for 
Schlüpmann, his approach to cataloguing the unique potential of the medium is in fact 
detrimental to the perpetuation of aesthetic enlightenment.64 For Schlüpmann the 
problem with Theory of Film is that it is too philosophical. In defending the film 
object against cultural (and philosophical) assimilation as Art, Kracauer has omitted 
to safeguard his theory from becoming philosophical. Only in his earlier German 
period, argues Schlüpmann, with its emphasis on the immediate experience over 
abstract conceptualisation does Kracauer demonstrate film’s potential resistance to 
philosophy. 
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and Greg Tuck (eds.), New Takes in Film Philosophy (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 4 
61 Sinnerbrink, 2011, p. 4. 
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63 Kracauer, 1997, p. 3. 
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It is the early texts, those written before his enforced emigration from Germany in 
1933, that Schlüpmann identifies as containing Kracauer’s most significant and 
lasting contribution to film studies, what Kracauer himself refers to in History as the 
“possibilities which history did not see fit to explore”. 65 With their journalistic focus 
on everyday experience, the ideas about cinema expressed in Kracauer’s Weimar 
texts are for Schlüpmann saturated with a peculiar social and political potential that is 
absent from his English language texts. As Schlüpmann states in an essay about 
Kracauer’s writing of the 1920s: 
  
In From Caligari to Hitler and Theory of Film, Kracauer's tendency 
to generalize, to subsume particulars within conceptual constructs, 
presents an obstacle to the expression of his ideas. The strength of 
the essays of the 1920s lies in their phenomenological procedure, 
their taking up of individual manifestations of daily life and 
dwelling upon them reflectively.66 
 
In direct contrast to the immediacy exhibited by his early writings, the experience of 
cinema presented in Theory of Film, Schlüpmann argues, is one mediated by abstract 
theoretical concerns. As the artwork, argues Kracauer, consumes its raw material, so 
for Schlüpmann does Kracauer’s Theory of Film assimilate the aesthetic experience of 
film for its own perpetuation. If Kracauer’s early reviews and articles document for 
Schlüpmann, “a lost process of theorizing”, then Theory of Film is a testament to its 
historical transience.  
 
As Patrice Petro has suggested in her essay on the critical reception of Kracauer’s 
early and late work, for Schlüpmann “Kracauer’s work evidences a significant 
theoretical division, with the later work marking a lapse into a fundamentally flawed 
or one-dimensional reasoning”.67 Prefiguring Koch’s psychological assessment of the 
contradictory nature of Kracauer’s oeuvre, Schlüpmann concludes: “All that remains 
of the ‘art with a difference’ in late Kracauer is the subjectivity which constitutes”.68 
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For Robnik, Schlüpmann’s work on Kracauer “sketches a reversal in the relationship 
of cinema and philosophy” and in doing so provides an invaluable guide to how to 
approach philosophically the historical document that is Theory of Film. Taking as a 
starting point Schlüpmann’s idea that cinema history preserves the moral and political 
questions now “abandoned” by philosophy, Robnik proceeds to argue that what 
distinguishes her approach from her contemporaries (such as Koch and Hansen) is 
how she works to construct a history for cinema in parallel to and fundamentally 
discrete from the computer based visual culture of today.69   
 
Schlüpmann writes from the perspective of what she refers to as “a feminist film 
historiography”. 70 Key to this approach is the linking of the feminist concept of 
“patriarchal cinema”, which she identifies with the “feminist-historical film analysis” 
of the British film theorist and filmmaker Laura Mulvey and the “historicity” of 
Kracauer’s early film criticism and Adorno and Horkheimer’s Dialectic of 
Enlightenment.71 For Schlüpmann (following Mulvey’s psychoanalytic approach), the 
Hollywood model of commercial film production is patriarchal. It is patriarchal  
because the pleasure it elicits from the spectator (which in turn assures its continuance 
as a form) is reliant on the suppression of a female subject position in favour of one 
that objectifies women. What Schlüpmann sees in Weimar cinema and film theory is 
the expression of an alternative subject position. The “lost process” to which she 
refers is therefore identified as the development of female subjectivity not just in film 
production but also in film theory. By referring back to such historical models, argues 
Schlüpmann, feminist film history “creates a philosophical tradition for itself”: 
 
However, this also means that it does not develop its film history on 
the basis of a philosophy, but that it acquires a philosophy derived 
from film history.72 
 
For Schlüpmann, the experience of cinema offers the possibility of an alternative 
approach to that of the individual subject established by the male orientated subject / 
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object relations of conventional (that is pre-feminist) philosophy. However, “the 
perspective of that which has been lost”, Schlüpmann concludes, “is not the 
perspective of the female historian alone”. 73 Adorno and Horkheimer’s sociological 
approach to philosophy (which they named Critical Theory) and Feminism’s negative 
evaluation of popular (American) film, explains Schlüpmann, are both informed by an 
equally hostile assessment of what philosophically constitutes historical progress. For 
them, modernity does not represent a “success story” but is an historical process of 
repression and exclusion that substantiates a single ideological viewpoint.74 
Therefore, ideas of what is modern or what constitutes the present are not 
ideologically neutral but the canalisation of many competing, parallel and 
contradictory histories.  
 
What connects the feminist cinema historian’s project with Kracauer’s early work, 
argues Schlüpmann, is the idea of the object of critical inquiry (in Schlüpmann’s case 
archive silent film footage) providing the form as well as the content of that inquiry. It 
does this by initiating a perception of “selfness”, an awareness of the body that comes 
from cinema’s peculiar disjunction of the corporal form from its relative subject 
position on screen (hence the ability for a particular gender to become dominant in 
cinema’s industrial form) and then positing it as a “philosophical force that has 
always been subjugated and destroyed in modernity”.75 It is this subjectivity, this 
perception of “selfness”, argues Schlüpmann that philosophy represses in order to 
perpetuate its supposed objectivity and its claims of universalism. Only cinema as a 
shared and public experience, Schlüpmann concludes, can really have the right for 
such a claim: 
 
For the aesthetic enlightenment which philosophy represses is one 
in which all participate; in the age of the expert, the philosopher 
might well be reminded by the cinema that his enlightenment 
depended, not on theory and knowledge, but on the capacity to 
generate self-enlightenment.76 
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As Petro has argued, Schlüpmann’s identification of aesthetic enlightenment with an 
historical experience of cinema, rather than with an abstract concept of the moving 
image, certainly shapes how she approaches Kracauer’s later writings on film. 
However, in subjecting Kracauer’s corpus, in particular his post-War work, to a 
predetermined developmental model, be that immanent (psychological) or extraneous 
(cultural), she is far from alone. What connects Schlüpmann, Hansen, Koch, Kael, 
Andrew (and the others mentioned above) is  the idea that in some way or other 
Kracauer’s Theory of Film is out of sync with its contemporary context. How and why 
it is, as we have seen above, is open to debate. Whether it is the product of some 
misanthropic megalomania (Kael), a profound social disjunction (Harcourt) or a 
manifestation of a psychological trauma (Hansen) the image Kracauer as a refugee 
from another time persists.77  
 
In the next section I will look at how Kracauer articulates in the introduction to 
Theory of Film a resistance to engaging with certain formal developments in cinema 
and in turn the ontological debates they prompt. As I have shown above, Kracauer’s 
refusal to be à la mode has been interpreted in various ways, from Andrew’s 
interpretation of Theory of Film as a vainglorious attempt at universalism to Hansen’s 
image of the book as evidence of a psychological defence strategy. Alternatively, I 
will argue that the temporal model that Kracauer identifies with the cinematic 
approach is not one that has been expurgated by factors extraneous to the experience 
of watching films but one that has developed from a personal and social involvement 
with it. In the following section I will demonstrate how Kracauer uses a notion of the 
outmoded to suggest a more complex rather than a reductive historical model for the 
relationship between film and theory. 
 
2.6    The New and the Outmoded –The forgotten lesson of the Lumières 
 
Though concerned with bringing our attention to objects and occurrences which 
currently fall below the eye line of philosophical inquiry, Kracauer’s cinematic 
                                                
77 A good example of the debate about Kracauer’s relevance contemporary to the publication of Theory 
of Film in 1960 see, Callenbach, Ernest, “Theory of Film: The Redemption of Physical Reality by 
Siegfried Kracauer”, Film Quarterly, Vol. 14, No. 2. (1960), p. 57 and Hughes, Robert and Ernest 
Callenbach, “Film: Book 1 vs. Film Quarterly (Round Two)”, Film Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 4. (1959), 
p. 62. 
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reclamation of physical reality does not promote itself as the basis for a radical new 
mode of thought designed to supersede conventional philosophy. In this respect, 
Kracauer’s explication of the cinematic approach bears little resemblance to the more 
progressive variants of film-philosophy, such as Daniel Frampton’s “Filmosophy”.78 
For Frampton, what “is significant about film is that it shows us a new reality, and 
thus engenders new thinking, new experiences, new emotions” and rather than help us 
understand and engage with this new reality the established forms of film theory and 
philosophy hinder our access to its potential. 79 In order for it not to become just a 
“translation” of philosophy, argues Frampton, film must seek “its own 
philosophicalness – that of revealing a new thinking, a new point of view about the 
world”.80 In such a scheme, according to Frampton, the designation cinematic relates 
to “a model for a new kind of non-philosophical investigation: a post-metaphysical 
post-phenomenology”.81 As will be come clear in the following text, though 
Kracauer’s consideration of the cinematic approach includes notions of social and 
political reform it stands in sharp contrast to Frampton’s evangelical faith in the 
teleological advancement of philosophy (through its dialectical synthesis with film 
theory).82  
 
In the introduction to Theory of Film, Kracauer articulates this distrust in what 
purports to be new (formerly, stylistically or philosophically) and in turn presents a 
more complex and  non-linear idea of what constitutes the contemporary. “It would be 
fair to advise the reader at the outset”, writes Kracauer at start of the introduction, 
“that this book does not include all the things he may be looking for”.83 As well as 
neglecting the animated cartoon, he continues, there are other “recent developments 
and extensions of the medium” that are also left undiscussed.84 To this he adds:  
 
                                                
78 Frampton, Daniel, Filmosophy (London & New York: Wallflower Press, 2006). 
79 Frampton, 2006, p. 155. 
80 Frampton, 2006, p. 212. 
81 Frampton, 2006, p. 203. 
82 A recent critique of film theory’s teleological advance “toward perfection” is presented in Elsaesser 
& Hagener, 2010, pp. 1- 12. 
83 Kracauer, 1997, p. xlvii. 
84 Kracauer, 1997, p. xlvii. The first text in English by Kracauer was about animated cartoons, see 
Kracauer, Siegfried. “Dumbo.” The Nation, No. 153 (8 Nov. 1941), p. 463. 
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There are doubtless still other omissions; indeed, some of the topics, 
which loom large in most writings on film, have either been 
relegated to the background or completely dropped.85  
 
The examples, he gives include: colour film, widescreen cinema and television. 
“Evidently”, Kracauer concedes, “I am caught in a dilemma” about what to include, 
“[o]r rather I would be caught in it did I not feel strongly against rushing through 
places which ought to be dwelt in”.86 Here Kracauer anticipates another possible 
objection to the scope of his study: 
 
Perhaps the reader will wonder why, in substantiating my views, I 
do not limit myself to the testimony of current films which stand out 
in his memory, but refer him so often to movies he has long since 
forgotten or never heard of. This old stuff, he may maintain, is very 
difficult to check not to mention that it is probably outmoded in 
various ways. In consequence, he is likely to question the validity, 
or the range of validity, of many of my arguments and conclusions. 
Would they not offer greater interest, I hear him ask, if they mainly 
derived from contemporary achievements. 87 
 
Such a line of reasoning, states Kracauer, is “fallacious” as within a few years these 
too will also be considered out-dated. “Frequently the seeming new”, he concludes, 
“is nothing but a variation of old models”.88 As Miriam Hansen demonstrates in her 
introduction to Theory of Film, such a disinterest in technical innovation makes it 
difficult to communicate the merits of Kracauer’s asceticism to an audience raised “in 
the age of video and digital”. 89 In order to make Kracauer’s apparent 
curmudgeonliness a bit more palatable for today’s reader she suggests that: 
 
it might be productive to think of Theory of Film as 
contemporaneous with the magazine Film Culture [1954 – 1996] 
and the developments in independent film production and 
                                                
85 Kracauer, 1997, p. xlvii.   
86 Kracauer, 1997, p. xlvii. 
87 Kracauer, 1997, p. xlviii.  
88 Kracauer, 1997, p. xlviii. 
89 Kracauer, 1997, p. viii. 
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distribution; with existentialism in philosophy and lifestyle, 
minimalism in art and music; with Susan Sontag’s essay ‘Against 
Interpretation,’ [1964] Miles Davis’s Kind of Blue [1959], 
Lawrence Ferlinghetti’s A Coney Island of the Mind [1958], and 
movies such as Shadows [Cassavetes, 1959] and The Hustler 
[Rossen, 1961]. Likewise, on a more international scale, Kracauer’s 
book, like Bazin’s writings, has to be seen as part of the cineaste 
environment that spawned and supported New Wave movements in 
France, Germany, Eastern Europe, India, and other parts of the 
world.90 
 
Though chronologically accurate, Hansen’s attempt to identify what she sees as 
conceptual unevenness of Kracauer’s text with the formal innovations of what 
Theodore Roszak termed “counter-culture” or its proto-forms does little more than 
emphasize its disjunction with contemporary developments in the medium.91 
Kracauer himself does little to support Hansen’s historicizing defence of Theory of 
Film. Lamenting the lack of “movie houses” showing “old pictures”,  Kracauer states 
in his preface that “were there more such opportunities, people would be less inclined 
to mistake for a ‘new wave’ what is actually an old story”.92  
 
However, though not working in the way that she intends, Hansen’s reference to the 
Mekas brothers’ Film Culture journal does provide an important corrective to 
Harcourt’s image of Kracauer as “a man alone in a museum”.93 As Scott McDonald’s 
documentation of the seminal New York film society Cinema 16 attests, Kracauer 
was an important and active figure in the development of independent American film 
culture.94  What is interesting in the current context about this involvement with 
experimental film makers like Amos Vogel, Gregory Markopoulos, Kenneth Anger 
etc. is how it is underplayed in Theory of Film. Compared to his earlier articles and 
interviews on the New York alternative cinema scene, the chapter on “Experimental 
                                                
90 Kracauer, 1997, p. ix. 
91 Roszak, Theodore, The making of a counter culture: reflections on the technocratic society and its 
youthful opposition [1968] (London : Faber and Faber, 1970). 
92 Kracauer, 1997, p. xlix. 
93 Harcourt, 1968, p. 25. For an introduction to the work of the Mekas Brothers see James, David E., 
“Introduction” in James, David E., (ed.), Free the Cinema: Jonas Mekas and the New York 
Underground (Princeton: Princeton University Press), pp. 3 – 16. 
94 MacDonald, Scott, Cinema 16: Documents Toward a History of the Film Society (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 2002), p.  24, p. 67 and p. 130. 
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Film” in Theory of Film is far from an enthusiastic endorsement of their practices.95 
The “salient point here” about experimental film, writes Kracauer in Theory of Film, 
“is that, all in all, the current output sticks to patterns developed in the ‘twenties; that, 
except for minor adjustments to the contemporary scene […] not much has changed in 
terms of motivations, preferences, and objectives”. 96  Though Kracauer notes in his 
introduction to Theory of Film that he prefers “to stick to the prototypes which, more 
vividly than all that follows, still vibrate with the intentions engendering them”, his 
subsequent choice of examples suggests a pattern of concerns that does not wholly 
obey the linear chronology of a teleological (goal orientated) narrative. 97 In his last, 
unfinished book History, Kracauer writes:  
 
Every idea is coarsened, flattened, and distorted on its way through 
the world […] Once a vision becomes an institution, clouds of dust 
gather about it, blurring its contours and contents. […] Otherwise 
expressed, an idea preserves its integrity and fullness only as long 
as it lacks the firmness of a widely sanctioned belief. Perhaps the 
period of its inception is most transparent to the truths at which it 
aims in the midst of doubts. 98 
 
In light of History’s decidedly un-Hegelian (non-teleological) conception of progress 
and enlightenment (that I will examine in greater detail in the subsequent text) Theory 
of Film’s focus on the narrative aspects of  contemporary experimental film and its 
historical antecedents can be read as performing a specific function in the explication 
of the cinematic approach. For Kracauer, the common trait in experimental cinema 
practice is a “conviction that the story as the main element of feature films is 
something alien to the medium”.99 In rehearsing the motivations, preferences, and 
objectives or their prototypes, contemporary experimental film makers demonstrate a 
predilection for discontinuity that mirrors Kracauer’s own non-laminar idea of 
historical change and development. 
 
                                                
95 For example see, Kracauer, Siegfried, “Filming the Subconscious.” Theatre Arts, Vol. 32,  No. 2 
(Feb 1948), pp. 37 – 44. 
96 Kracauer, 1997, p. 178 . This was not always the case. In 1950 Kracauer wrote a very enthusiastic 
letter to Amos Vogel about the work of Cinema 16, see MacDonald, 2002, p. 24.  
97 Kracauer, 1997, p. xlviii. 
98 Kracauer, 1995, p. 7. 
99 Quoted in Kracauer, 1997, p. 178. 
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For Kracauer, experimental film practice enacts -  to borrow the title of a Maya Deren 
film - a “ritual in transfigured time” in that its formal preference for visual and 
narrative indeterminacy looks to mimic their historical predecessors rather than 
supersede their achievements. Instead of looking to perfect a synthesis of visual and 
narrative technique, these experiments are concerned with inducing in the spectator a 
novelty of effect comparable to that of the pre-industrial forms of the medium. 100 In 
experimental film making chronology is immanently (in its form) and extraneously 
(in its historical development) deemphasised.  In Theory of Film, Kracauer quotes 
from Germaine Dulac, “one of the leading avant-garde artists” of the 1920s, on the 
“sad fact that the lessons of [Lumière’s] Arrival of a Train had not been heeded”.101 
“Instead of recognizing the new aesthetics inherent in the Lumière brothers’ camera”, 
writes Kracauer, Dulac argues that subsequent film makers became “content with 
subordinating it to traditional aesthetic”. 102 “In conclusion”, writes Kracauer, “Mme 
Dulac accuses those who imprison cinematic action in a narrative of a ‘criminal 
error’”.103 Equally, as I will argue in the following study, those that strive to arrange 
and define the components of the cinematic approach in accordance to a philosophical 
narrative are for Kracauer also dissipating the critical potential of the medium.  
 
It is important to remember here (and as I will demonstrate throughout this text) that 
for Kracauer, the glimpses afforded by the film experience of its philosophical 
potential are not limited to avant-garde or experimental modes of film production. 
This potential to remind the film spectator of a lost process of theorising is immanent 
to film and is therefore possible in all of its myriad forms. What experimental film 
does by repeating the formal and stylistic investigations of its chronological 
predecessors is to challenge (knowingly or not) the film historian’s and theorist’s 
proclivity for narrative. However, it is not alone in performing this critical task. What 
the artist’s film does overtly is also detectable, argues Kracauer, in even the most 
cynically conceived commercial forms of cinema once their immediate capitalist 
function has been fulfilled and their shelf life expired. “Many a commercial film or 
television production”, writes Kracauer in Theory of Film, “is a genuine achievement 
                                                
100 Kracauer discusses Deren’s work in, Kracauer (1948), pp.37 – 44. 
101 Kracauer, 1997, pp. 178 – 179. L'arrivée d'un train en gare de La Ciotat [The Arrival of a Train at 
La Ciotat Station], directed by Auguste and Louis Lumière (France: Lumière, 1895). 
102 Kracauer, 1997, pp. 178 – 179. 
103 Kracauer, 1997, p. 179. 
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besides being a commodity. Germs of new beginnings may develop within a 
thoroughly alienated environment”.104  
 
In an introductory essay about his work, Kracauer’s long time acquaintance and 
sometime friend, the German philosopher Theodor W. Adorno writes that “Kracauer 
once mockingly called himself the derrière-garde of the avant-garde. It came neither 
to a break with the latter nor to an agreement”.105 Though made in jest, Kracauer’s 
description of his approach is instructive for two reasons. Firstly it helps understand 
his reticence in fully supporting a successful culture of experimental filmmaking in 
New York in the 1950s. Secondly it allows us to locate and thus comprehend 
Kracauer’s peculiar relationship with contemporary cinema within a particular critical 
tradition.  
 
The idea of critically re-appropriating objects of the recent past, the “outmoded”, the 
“old-fashioned” played an important role in the work of Surrealist artists and writers, 
in particular the French poet Andre Breton.106 In his 1929 essay Surrealism, the last 
Snapshot of the European Intelligentsia, Walter Benjamin writes that Surrealism “can 
boast an extraordinary discovery”: 
 
it was the first to perceive the revolutionary energies that appear in 
the ‘outmoded’, in the first iron constructions, the first factory 
building, the earliest photos, the objects that have begun to be 
extinct, grand pianos, the dresses of five years ago, fashionable 
restaurants when the vogue has begun to ebb from them. The 
relation of these things to revolution – no one can have a more exact 
concept of it than these authors. No one before these visionaries and 
augurs perceived how destitution – not only social but architectonic, 
the poverty of interiors, enslaved and enslaving objects – can 
suddenly turn over [umschlagen] into revolutionary nihilism.107 
                                                
104 Kracauer, 1997, pp. 217 – 218. 
105 Adorno, Theodor W., “The Curious Realist: On Siegfried Kracauer”, New German Critique, No. 54 
(1991), p. 164. 
106 See Breton, André, Nadja, translated by Richard Howard (London: Penguin, 1999).  
107 Quoted in Cohen, Margaret, Profane Illumination: Walter Benjamin and the Paris of the Surrealist 
Revolution (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995), p. 190. In French, Breton 
uses the word “démodé” – which is usually translated as “old-fashioned”. In German, Benjamin uses 
the word “veraltet” – which means obsolete and has more Marxist connotations. Surrealism’s use of the 
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“Only retrospectively”, writes Graeme Gilloch, “through the lens of an object’s 
gradual demise, does its true character emerge”.108 In his interpretation of Surrealism, 
Jonathan Crary stresses that the Surrealist’s asceticism towards the visceral pleasures 
of the modern spectacle was not a rejection of the present but a rescue plan. “The 
strategy incarnated a refusal of the imposed present”, argues Crary, “and in 
reclaiming fragments of a demolished past it was implicitly figuring an alternative 
future”.109 As Gilloch suggests (in relation to Benjamin):  
 
the modern is the already old. The old dressed up as the new is the 
essence of both fashion and the concept of progress. This insight is 
the possibility of the realization (the making real) of the actually 
new.110  
 
Benjamin concentrated his studies on the architectural phenomena of the shopping 
arcade. The covered passageways lined with shops, that came to prominence in the 
1830s but then quickly became regarded as antiquated and fell into disrepair. What 
fascinated Benjamin was the speed at which these often huge undertakings became 
outmoded. It was a shared interest in the liminal existence of the outmoded and the 
peculiar freedom (from cultural and social norms) that it entails that not only drew 
Kracauer to the semi-derelict arcades of Berlin and Paris but also to the cinemas that 
superseded them as the locations for certain vicarious entertainments.111  
 
As I will illustrate in the later chapters of this text, the fate and value of the outmoded 
is an integral concern of Kracauer’s cinematic approach. To try and explain away 
(psychologically) or simply castigate (methodologically) Theory of Film’s démodé 
character is to sideline the issue of how the object of Kracauer’s study affects and 
influences the manner in which it is comprehended. The “vanishing point of 
                                                                                                                                      
concept of the “outmoded” is discussed in detail in Foster, Hal, Compulsive Beauty (Cambridge, Mass: 
The MIT Press, 1993), pp. 157 – 192. 
108 Gilloch, Graeme, Myth and Metropolis. Walter Benjamin and the City (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1996), pp. 110 – 111. 
109 Crary, Jonathan, “Spectacle, Attention, Counter-Memory”, October, No. 50 (1989), p. 107. 
110 Gilloch, 1996, p. 111. 
111 Kracauer, Siegfried, “Farewell to the Linden Arcade” [1930], in Kracauer, Siegfried, The Mass 
Ornament. Weimar essays, translated and edited by Thomas Y. Levin (Cambridge, Mass. and London: 
Harvard U.P., 1995b), pp. 337 - 342. 
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Kracauer’s thinking”, suggest Elsaesser and Hagener,  “is a theory of history that 
attempts to redeem the vanished material existence of history through the permanent 
ephemerality of the moving image.”112 It is the critical potential of this temporal 
paradox , the arrest of historical progress effected by this “permanent ephemerality” 
that the cinematic approach looks to explore. 
 
2.7   Conclusion 
 
The tendency to narrativise a context for Kracauer’s contribution to film and cultural 
studies (whether in relation to a teleological model of film studies or a psychological 
model of social and personal transformation) has influenced how Kracauer’s 
explanation and use of the “cinematic approach” has been interpreted. If the 
“cinematic approach” is a challenge to philosophical narratives then interpreting 
Kracauer’s practice of it according to either an implicit or explicit narrative model 
reduces the complexity of temporal model to which it relates.  
 
As I shall argue in the following text, though it derives its name from the experience 
of the cinema, the “cinematic” represents for Kracauer a dynamic approach to an 
individual phenomenon that recognises the importance of the immediate experience in 
constituting how we perceive it and subsequently how the experience is abstracted in 
relation to a philosophical or theoretical scheme. Film, I shall argue, enables Kracauer 
to name an historical “mode of being” that is not exclusive to the dark cinema 
auditorium but is given a comprehensible public form by it as a paradoxically shared 
private experience. As Kracauer writes in History, his work on film and other forms 
of popular culture, his novels and sociological research, “have all served, and 
continue to serve, a single purpose: the rehabilitation of objectives and modes of 
being which still lack a name and hence are overlooked or misjudged”.113 To 
Kracauer, they all mark to some degree “a bent of the mind and defines a region of 
reality which despite all that has been written about them are still largely terra 
incognita”. 114 
  
                                                
112 Elsaesser & Hagener, 2010, p. 127. 
113 Kracauer, 1995, p.4. 
114 Kracauer, 1995, p.4. 
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Before discussing how film-philosophy looks to explore the terrain opened up by the 
interaction of film theory and philosophy and how this debate offers an alternative 
perspective on Kracauer’s work, in the following chapter I will examine in detail how 
one particular narrative has come to dominate Kracauer studies. As well as 
contextualizing the approaches of Rentschler, Hansen, Koch and Schlüpmann it will 
demonstrate how the resurgence of interest in Kracauer in the 1990s served a specific 
critical function in relation to the development of German Cultural Studies in 
America and later Cinema Studies in the U.K.  Now that Kracauer’s usefulness in this 
regard has passed and interest in his work has again started to recede I will look at the 
critical legacy of these interpretative strategies and assess how they still influence the 
way we read Kracauer today. 
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CHAPTER 3:   
 
EXILE & REPATRIATION: KRACAUER’S REDEMPTION CYCYLE 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter consists of two parts. The first provides an overview of Kracauer’s life. 
My intention in this part is to explain to those unfamiliar with Kracauer’s biography 
some of the key events and relationships (personal and institution) that occurred 
during his career and how they relate to his writing. The second part of this chapter 
comprises a detailed review of secondary literature on Kracauer. Through a rigorous 
study of these texts I will demonstrate how the image of Kracauer has changed since 
his death from that of an outmoded academician to a politically and socially engaged 
cultural philosopher. I argue that this transformation undertook several distinct 
phases and that the image of Kracauer that persists today is a composite of ideas that 
originate from the historical interaction between Film Studies and Cultural Theory. I 
conclude that though this reinvention of Kracauer has had a significant impact on 
raising his academic profile it has also affected how his film work is evaluated and 
interpreted. 
 
3.2   Biographical Sketch 
 
Siegfried Kracauer was born February 8th, 1889 in Frankfurt am Main, Germany, the 
only child of Adolf and Rosette Kracauer. As a boy Siegfried attended the 
Philanthropin, a school founded by the Frankfurt Jewish community to promote 
education in the humanities. His uncle Isidor K. Kracauer taught at the school. Isidor 
was a renowned historian of the Frankfurt Jewish community, and exerted a strong 
influence on Siegfried’s early intellectual development. Though the Kracauers were 
an observant religious family (Isidor had trained in Poland to be a Rabbi), the young 
Siegfried was encouraged to pursue his secular academic and literary interests. 
Kracauer graduated from high school in 1907 and then went to the Polytechnic in 
Darmstadt to study architecture. Alongside his technical courses Kracauer also 
maintained a keen interest in philosophy and the arts, producing many poems, 
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drawings, articles and reviews, the first of which he had published in the Frankfurter 
Zeitung in August 1906. 1  
 
After Darmstadt, Kracauer continued his architectural training at the Polytechnics in 
Berlin and Munich graduating in 1911. After working briefly as an apprentice in an 
architect’s office in Munich, Kracauer travelled around Europe before returning to 
Berlin to study for a PhD. in engineering. His thesis on architectural ironwork of the 
Berlin / Potsdam area from the 17th to the 19th century was passed in 1914 and 
published the following year.2 With the outbreak of war, Kracauer returned to 
Frankfurt where he found work at another architect’s office. In 1916 Kracauer won 
his first and only major commission as an architect for a soldiers’ memorial cemetery 
in Frankfurt.3 In 1917, after a relatively uneventful period of military service, 
Kracauer found employment as an architect in Osnabruck.  
 
Upon hearing of the death of his father Kracauer returned again to Frankfurt where 
he subsidised his income as an architect with work as a private tutor. It was in this 
capacity that he first met Theodor Adorno with whom he was to have a close but 
“troubled” relationship for the rest of his life.4 Encouraged by the philosopher Max 
Scheler and the sociologist Georg Simmel, whom he’d met and befriended whilst a 
student in Berlin, Kracauer dedicated more of his time to writing and soon after 
                                                
1 An account of Kracauer’s early life as well as illustrations of his drawings, poems and photographs 
can be found in Belke, Ingrid and Irina Renz, (eds.), “Siegfried Kracauer 1889-1966”, Marbacher 
Magazin (Deutsche Schillergesellschaft), no. 47 (1988). A chronological list of all known published 
work by Kracauer is available in Levin, Thomas Y., Siegfried Kracauer: Eine Bibliographie seiner 
Schriften (Marbach am Neckar: Deutsche Schillergesellschaft, 1989). See also, Kracauer, Siegfried, 
Zum Werk des Romanciers, Feuilletonisten, Architekten, Filmwissenschaftlers und Soziolgen, edited 
by Andreas Volk (Zurich: Seismo Verlag, 1996). The first English language biography of Kracauer 
was published in 1976 see, Jay, Martin, “The Extraterritorial Life of Siegfried Kracauer”, in Jay, 
Martin, Permanent Exiles. Essays on the Intellectual Migration from Germany to America (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1985), pp. 152 – 197. 
2 Kracauer, Siegfried, Die Entwicklung der Schmiedekunst in Berlin, Potsdam und einigen Städten der 
Mark vom 17. Jahrhundert bis zum Beginn des 19. Jahrhunderts (Berlin: Worms, 1915). For a 
discussion of Kracauer’s dissertation see Reeh, Henrik, Ornaments of the metropolis: Siegfried 
Kracauer and modern urban culture (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press), 2004, pp. 63 -70. Also, 
Staubmann, Helmut Michael, “The Ornamental Form of the Iron Cage: An Aesthetic Representation 
of Modern Society?”, International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society, vol. 10, no. 4 (1997), pp. 
591 – 607. Staubmann’s study contains reproductions of some of Kracauer’s original photographs and 
drawings. 
3 Kracauer’s design for the memorial can be seen in Belke & Renz, 1988, p. 25. 
4 For accounts of Kracauer’s and Adorno’s “troubled” relationship see, Jay, Martin, “Adorno and 
Kracauer: Notes on a Troubled Friendship” in Jay (1985), pp. 217 – 236 and Moltke, Johannes, von 
“Teddie and Friedel: Theodor W. Adorno, Siegfried Kracauer, and the Erotics of Friendship”, 
Criticism, vol. 51, no. 4 (2010), pp. 683-694. 
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completing a book length study on Simmel in 1919 he gave up architecture as a 
career. In 1921 Kracauer obtained a permanent position at the Frankfurter Zeitung 
newspaper as a staff writer achieving the position of editor three years later.5 As well 
as producing numerous film, book and theatre reviews during this period Kracauer 
also published a book length sociological study, Soziologie als Wissenschaft 
[Sociology as Science].6 He also completed an unpublished monograph on the 
detective novel.7  
 
In the following years Kracauer’s reputation and influence as a critic in Frankfurt’s 
intellectual circles continued to grow and his position at the Frankfurter Zeitung 
enabled him to facilitate the publication of his friends’ work, in particular that of 
Walter Benjamin and Ernst Bloch, whom he had met whilst a student.8 However, 
Kracauer’s time at the newspaper was not without difficulties and many of his 
editorial decisions led to friction between him and his peers.9 As the political 
situation in Germany became more factional so Kracauer’s friendship and 
allegiances were tested, often to breaking point. Whilst many of his friends joined the 
Communist party in Germany, Kracauer resisted any direct affiliation with political 
organizations. Kracauer was not apolitical though and the journalism he produced 
during this period is vehemently critical of both National Socialism and the far left.10 
 
                                                
5 For details of Kracauer’s time as a journalist see, Levin, Thomas Y., “Introduction”, in Siegfried 
Kracauer, The Mass Ornament: Weimar essays (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995), 
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(Dresden: Sibyllen-Verlag, 1922). 
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Detektiv-Roman. Ein philosophishcer Traktat (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1979).  Kracauer’s 
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Chesterton’s The Innocence of Father Brown”, Orbis Litterarum, No. 54 (1999), pp. 399 – 423. 
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Richter Gerhard, “Siegfried Kracauer and the Folds of Friendship”, The German Quarterly, Vol. 70, 
no. 3 (1997), pp. 233-246. For Kracauer’s friendship with Benjamin see, Jay, Martin, “Politics of 
Translation: Siegfried Kracauer and Walter Benjamin on the Buber-Rosenzweig Bible” in Jay (1985), 
pp. 198 – 216.  
9 For an account of tensions between Kracauer and his friends during this period, in particular his 
strained relationship with Bloch see, Barnouw, Dagmar, Critical Realism: History, Photography, and 
the work of Siegfried Kracauer (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1994), pp. 33 – 52. 
10 The idea of Kracauer’s film criticism as ideological critique is explored in Hake, Sabine, The 
Cinema’s 3rd Machine: Writing on film in Germany 1907 – 1933 (Lincoln, Nb. & London: University 
of Nebraska Press, 1993), pp. 247 – 270. 
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In parallel to his extensive reportage, Kracauer also wrote fictional work. In 1928 his 
first novel Ginster was published having first been serialized in the Frankfurter 
Zeitung. This novel, a loosely autobiographical satire of the trials and tribulations of 
a young man growing up around the time of the First World War, was published 
anonymously and was generally well received.11 However, the high watermark of 
Kracauer’s success came two years later with the publication of his sociological 
study of Germany’s young white collar workers, Die Angestellten: Aus dem neuesten 
Deutschland [The Salaried Masses: from the newest Germany]12. Like Ginster, Die 
Angestellten was initially serialized in the Frankfurter Zeitung and quickly earned a 
noteworthy reputation for its innovative stylistic approach and novel subject matter. 
In a contemporary review, the economist Hans Spier placed Kracauer’s work in the 
tradition “of the great French and English novelists of the last century”, as he not 
only “measures out the place in which employees live” but also renders “the air they 
breathe”.13 Looking to build upon on this success, Kracauer married his partner, Lili 
Ehrenreich, whom he’d met at the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research and moved 
to Berlin to join the local editorial team of the Frankfurter Zeitung. 
 
The Institute for Social Research [Institut für Sozialforschung] was, alongside the 
Frankfurter Zeitung, an important supporter of Kracauer’s intellectual circle. 
Founded in 1923 by the political scientists Felix Weil and Friedrich Pollock it is a 
research organization affiliated primarily with the University of Frankfurt am Main.14 
From 1930, under the directorship of the philosopher and sociologist Max 
Horkheimer, the Institute quickly established itself as an influential disseminator of a 
Marxist / Freudian approach to social psychology. Key figures in its development 
were the social psychologist, Erich Fromm, the philosopher Herbert Marcuse, 
political theorist Franz Neumann and the sociologist Leo Löwenthal. Löwenthal, like 
Adorno (who had become a lecturer at Frankfurt University in 1931) was a student of 
                                                
11 Anonymous [Siegfried Kracauer], Ginster. Von ihm selbst geschrieben (Berlin: S. Fischer, 1928). 
For its republication details see, Levin (1989), p. 51. 
12 Published in English as Kracauer, Siegfried, The Salaried Masses. Duty and Distraction in Weimar 
Germany, translated by Quintin Hoare (London and New York: Verso, 1998). 
13 Mulder-Bach, Inka, “Cinematic Ethnology: Siegfried Kracauer’s The White Collar Masses”, New 
Left Review, No. 226 (1997), p. 56. 
14 For a comprehensive history of the Institute see Wiggershaus, Rolf, The Frankfurt School. Its 
History, Theories and Political Significance, translated by Michael Robertson (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1995). 
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Kracauer’s and enabled him to maintain a close, though never entirely congenial, 
relationship with the Institute and its director. 15 
 
The complex social dynamic of pre-War Berlin proved a rich source of inspiration 
for Kracauer who alongside his usual book and film reviews produced a series of 
literary portraits of Berlin street life.16 However, as Hitler and the National Socialists 
consolidated their grip upon German life, Kracauer experienced a marked breakdown 
in staff relations at the newspaper. Anti-Semitism became rife and by the end of 
1932, after a series of mass pay cuts and constructive dismissals, maintaining a 
professional position in Germany for anybody of Jewish origin was becoming near 
impossible. Soon after the burning of the Reichstag parliament building in February 
1933, an event that led to Hitler being sworn in as Chancellor, the Kracauers 
relocated to Paris.  
 
In Paris, the mass influx of refugees from Germany made finding work extremely 
difficult. Promised employment as a foreign correspondent for the Frankfurter 
Zeitung failed to materialise and Kracauer had to scrape a living as a freelance 
journalist. In 1934 Kracauer finished writing his second novel Georg but its planned 
publication in Germany was cancelled. Unable to find an alternative publisher (it was 
eventually published posthumously) Kracauer embarked on another project; a history 
of the German-born French composer Jacques Offenbach. Jacques Offenbach und 
das Paris Seiner Zeit [Jacques Offenbach and the Paris of His Time] was published 
simultaneously in German, French and English editions in 1937 the book was not a 
success. Although the style and the subject matter were chosen by Kracauer to 
increase its popular appeal, the only attention it found was the negative criticism of 
his peers.17 
                                                
15  Jay (1985), p. 167. See also, Lowenthal, Leo, “As I Remember Friedel”, New German Critique, 
No. 54 (1991), pp. 7 – 10. 
16 Selections of these short prose pieces are published in Kracauer, Siegfried, Strassen in Berlin und 
anderswo (Berlin: Das Arsenal, 1987). English translations of a some of these texts can be found in 
Kracauer, Siegfried, “Loitering: Four Encounters in Berlin”, translated by Courtney Federle and 
Thomas Y. Levin, Qui Parle, Vol. 5, No. 2  (1992), pp. 51 - 60. For an overview of these texts see, 
Gilloch, Graeme, “Impromptus of a Great City. Siegfried Kracauer’s Strassen in Berlin und 
Anderswo” in Mari Hvattum and Christain Hermansen (eds.), Tracing Modernity. Manifestations of 
the Modern in Architecture and the City (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), pp. 307 – 324. 
17 For an introduction to Kracauer’s Offenbach book and the reaction of his peers see, Koch, Gertrud, 
“Foreword” in Kracauer, Siegfried, Jacques Offenbach and the Paris of His Time, translated by 
Gwenda David and Eric Mosbacher (New York: Zone Books, 2002). Kracauer also prepared a 
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In parallel to his Offenbach project and journalistic work, Kracauer spent his time in 
Paris trying to secure work abroad, in particular in the United States of America, 
where the Institute of Social Research had relocated in 1934. Though he never 
received direct employment from the Institute its members, in particular Löwenthal, 
were instrumental in arranging for him to receive the necessary paperwork that 
allowed him to apply for emigration to the U.S. Another key figure in this respect 
was the Art historian Meyer Schapiro, who facilitated a commission for Kracauer 
from the Museum of Modern Art (MOMA) Film Library in New York to write a 
social history of the German film. 18 With the outbreak of war in 1939, the 
Kracauers’ precarious status as Parisians deteriorated further. Their plans for 
emigration collapsed and as German nationals they were held and released from 
various internment camps around France for most of the following year. Escaping 
from one such camp the Kracauers made their way to Marseilles where they met up 
with many of their old acquaintances from Frankfurt, including Benjamin. Marseilles 
was the last refuge for many wishing to escape France but sea passage from the 
Mediterranean port proved practically impossible. The overland route across the 
Pyrenees to Spain was also becoming increasingly dangerous. Shortly after Benjamin 
had died in his attempt to cross the border in September 1940, the Kracauers’ 
managed to find a way across the mountains and down into the Portuguese port of 
Lisbon. After an arduous 10-day sea voyage the Kracauers finally reached New York 
in April 1941. 
 
After a short period of readjustment Kracauer started work at the MOMA Film 
Library.19 The project he worked on, eventually published as From Caligari to 
Hitler: a Psychological History of the German Film (1947), was overseen by the 
                                                                                                                                     
“motion picture treatment” based on his Offenbach book see, Gilloch, Graeme, “Orpheus in 
Hollywood: Siegfried Kracauer’s Offenbach film”, in Hvattum & Hermansen (2004), pp. 307 – 324. 
18 Kracauer’s and Schapiro’s friendship is detailed in Anderson, Mark M. “Siegfried Kracauer and 
Meyer Schapiro: A Friendship”, New German Critique, No. 54 (Autumn 1991), pp. 18-29. See also, 
Thompson, James, Susan Raines, and Meyer Schapiro, “A Vermont Visit with Meyer Schapiro 
(August 1991)”, Oxford Art Journal, Vol. 17, No. 1 (1994), pp. 3-12. 
19 Details of Kracauer’s appointment are discussed in Culbert, David, “The Rockefeller Foundation, 
The Museum of Modern Art Film Library and Siegfried Kracauer 1941”, Historical Journal of Film 
Radio and Television, Vol. 13, No. 4 (1993), pp.  495 - 511. 
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library’s curator, the English film critic and pioneer of film preservation, Iris Barry.20 
As well as his position at MOMA, Kracauer was also employed (along with others 
from the Institute of Social Research) by the U.S. Government to analyse German 
propaganda. 21 Though initially confidential, the reports Kracauer produced during 
the war were later published.22  
 
In 1946 Kracauer became a U.S. citizen and although he visited Germany in the late 
1950s he never showed any desire, like Adorno, Pollock and Horkheimer, to return 
permanently.23 After the publication of From Caligari to Hitler, Kracauer was 
employed as a consultant for the John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation 
(who had helped fund his work at MOMA). In this role he supported the work of 
many influential film historians and critics, including: Arthur Knight, Robert 
Warshow and Parker Tyler. 24 As a consultant for the Guggenheim and other 
foundations Kracauer also helped secure funding for the work of many up-and-
coming independent film makers such as Gregory Markopoulos and Shirley Clarke, 
as well as helping to re-establish old friends from Berlin like the dada filmmaker 
Hans Richter. Kracauer also played a significant role in helping Amos Vogel to 
establish the film society, Cinema 16 in New York in 1947. This society quickly 
became an important and popular promoter of American and European underground 
and avant-garde film and helped establish the careers of many influential filmmakers, 
                                                
20 Kracauer, Siegfried, From Caligari to Hitler. A psychological history of the German film [1947], 
revised edition edited by Leonardo Quaresima (New York: Princeton University Press, 2004). 
21 The working relationship between the Institute of Social Research and the U.S. Government’s 
Intelligence Agencies is examined in Kātz Barry M., “The Criticism of Arms: The Frankfurt School 
Goes to War”, The Journal of Modern History, Vol. 59, No. 3 (1987), pp. 439-478. 
22 Kracauer, Siegfried, “Propaganda and the Nazi War Film” in Kracauer (2004), pp. 275 – 307. 
Kracauer, Siegfried, “The Conquest of Europe on Screen – The Nazi Newsreel, 1939 – 1940”, Social 
Research, vol. 10, no. 3 (1943), pp. 337 – 357. Some details of the historical context and the support 
he received from various foundations is mentioned by Kracauer in the prefaces included in From 
Caligari to Hitler and Propaganda and the Nazi War Film, see Kracauer (2004) p. li 7  and p. 274. 
The complex relationship between the U.S. government and the academic community in the 
development of mass communication research is examined in Simpson, Christopher, Science of 
Coercion. Communication Research and Psychological Warfare 1945 -1960 (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1994). 
23 Jay (1985), pp. 171 - 172 
24 Jay (1985), p. 171.  Warshow’s application to the Guggenheim foundation (which specifically 
mentions Kracauer’s work) is included as a preface to Warshow, Robert, The Immediate Experience. 
Movies, Comics, Theatre and Other Aspects of Popular Culture  [1962], revised edition (Cambridge, 
Mass. and London: Harvard University Press,  2002), pp. xxxvii – xliii. Tyler includes a brief but 
insightful portrait of his relationship to Kracauer in the preface of Tyler, Parker, Magic and Myth of 
the Movies [1947] (London: Secker & Warburg, 1971), pp.  13 – 14.  
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such as Andy Warhol and Kenneth Anger. 25 During this period Kracauer also 
regularly contributed articles and reviews for journals such as Harpers, Commentary, 
New Republic and Partisan Review.26 
 
In 1949 Kracauer obtained funding to finish a project on film aesthetics that he had 
started in Marseilles during the war. The book took ten years to complete and was 
published in 1960 as Theory of Film: the Redemption of Physical Reality.27 Whilst 
working on Theory of Film, Lowenthal arranged a short-term position for Kracauer 
as a research analyst at the Voice of America, the broadcast institution of the U.S. 
Government. From there Kracauer went on to work with influential American 
sociologist Paul Lazarsfeld at the Bureau of Applied Social Research at Columbia 
University. During his period at Columbia, Kracauer established himself as an active 
member of the American social sciences community and published various studies 
on empirical social research and content analysis.28 In 1956, with the assistance of 
further grants from the Bollingen and Chapelbrook Foundations and later the 
American Philosophical Society, Kracauer was able to turn his attention to 
completing Theory of Film.29  Though basing himself once again primarily at the 
MOMA New York film library, Kracauer also travelled to Paris, where he was 
assisted by Henri Langlois at the recently established Cinématèque Française 
(Kracauer knew Langlois from his previous stay in France), and London where he 
studied at the British Film Institute. 
 
                                                
25 MacDonald, Scott, Cinema 16: Documents Toward a History of the Film Society (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 2002). 
26  For bibliographical details of Kracauer’s U.S. articles see Levin, Thomas Y. “Kracauer in English: 
A Bibliography,” New German Critique, No. 40 (1987), pp. 140 – 150. 
27 For details of Kracauer’s Marseilles manuscript see Hansen, Miriam, ‘“With Skin and Hair’: 
Kracauer’s Theory of Film, Marseille 1940”, Critical Inquiry, No. 19 (1993), pp. 437 – 469. 
28 Kracauer’s time at the Bureau and Voice of America is discussed in Lowenthal, Leo, “As I 
Remember Friedel”, New German Critique, No. 54 (1991), pp. 7 – 10. Two key publications produced 
by Kracauer during this period that demonstrate the nature of his work for the bureau are: Kracauer, 
Siegfried.  “The Challenge of Qualitative Content Analysis.” Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 4 
(winter 1952-3),  pp.631- 42 and Kracauer, Siegfried and Paul L. Berkman. Satellite Mentality. 
Political Attitudes and propaganda Susceptibilities of Non-Communists in Hungary, Poland and 
Czechoslovakia (London: Thames and Hudson, 1956). See also Kracauer, Siegfried, On the Relation 
of Analysis to the Situational Factors in Case Studies [unpublished discussion paper], Bureau of 
Applied Social Research. Columbia University (April 1958). 
29 Kracauer’s close involvement with these foundations is evident in an open letter he co-wrote in 
1949 defending their work; see Kracauer, Siegfried, Herman. Broch and Erich Kahler. “Letter to the 
Editor.” Saturday Review of Literature, Vol. 32, No. 36 (3rd Sept. 1949), p.26. 
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After Theory of Film’s completion and publication, Kracauer started to travel more 
extensively around Europe, visiting old friends, attending colloquia and preparing 
drafts for a book on historiography. In 1963, Ginster was republished in Germany 
(with Kracauer’s name now attached) and he oversaw the publication of Das 
Ornament der Masse (The Mass Ornament), a collection of some of his pre-War 
Weimar essays. 30 With his sudden death from pneumonia in November 1966 
Kracauer’s book on history was left unfinished. However, through the persistence of 
his wife and help from various friends and colleagues at Columbia University, an 
amended version of the manuscript for History: the Last things before the Last was 
published by Oxford University Press in 1966.31 
 
The critical reaction to Kracauer’s work during his long career has reflected the 
variety of its subject matter and ranged from unconditional praise to complete 
rejection. In order to comprehend how the philosophical aspects of Kracauer’s work 
affects the status of him as a film theorist it is necessary to chart the changes that 
have occurred in the reception of his work; in particular during the period between 
the negative appraisals of the early 1970s (as discussed in the previous Chapter) and 
the republication of Theory of Film in 1997. 
 
 
3.3   Literature Review: Introduction 
 
In the following review of secondary literature I shall demonstrate how changes in 
the reception of Kracauer’s work reflect the growing influence of German 
philosophy and cultural theory in English language Film Studies. Initially focusing 
on the debate in the late 1970s and early 1980s surrounding the reception of New 
German Cinema, I shall describe how and why critics trying to inaugurate an 
alternative to a predominately French approach to film analysis adopted the then 
discredited figure of Kracauer as a vehicle for their challenge to the established 
                                                
30 Siegfried Kracauer, The Mass Ornament: Weimar essays (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 1995). For details of this books origins and publication see Levin, Thomas Y., “Introduction” in 
Kracauer (1995), pp. 1 – 34. 
31 The publication history of Kracauer’s posthumous work is examined in Paul Oskar Kristeller’s 
preface, foreword and introduction to Kracauer, Siegfried, History. The Last Things Before the Last, 
completed after the death of the author by Paul Oskar Kristeller (Princeton: Markus Wiener 
Publishers, 1995), pp. v – xviii. 
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paradigm. 32 An important contributor in the transformation of Kracauer’s image is 
the German critic and film historian Karsten Witte (1944 – 1995). Charting Witte’s 
work and its influence of his peers, I argue, is essential in order to understand how 
contemporary advocates of Kracauer’s work, such as Miriam Hansen, can 
successfully promote an image of the author as a cultural philosopher. Charting the 
developmental phases of the subsequent resurgence of interest in Kracauer’s work, I 
explain how the psychological readings of his corpus that begin to prevail in the 
early 1990s relate to the influence of Cultural Studies on the development of cinema 
theory. Looking in detail at the work of historians and theorists such as Martin Jay, 
Thomas Elsaesser, Gertrud Koch and Inka Mülder-Bach, I demonstrate how the 
contemporary image of Kracauer is a composite of often disparate approaches that 
nevertheless share a determination to correlate the fractured trauma narratives of 
Kracauer’s personal biography and that of Germany’s intellectual traditions. 
Kracauer’s philosophical repatriation by a post-War generation of cultural theorists 
and historians, I argue, plays an integral part in the academic rehabilitation of 
German theory in the second half of the twentieth century. However, I conclude, 
many of the critical approaches that initially worked to raise awareness of Kracauer’s 
work outside of the specialism of film historiography are now proving 
counterproductive to the further dissemination of his ideas. 
 
3.4  Karsten Witte and New German Critique 
 
In 1981 the American film critic Andre Sarris wrote that, “American critics are 
largely to blame for predetermining the categories within which foreign films are 
permitted to enrich our cultural diet”.33 For the film historian Eric Rentschler, the 
history of New German Cinema is an exemplar of such acculturation.34 Lacking an 
enthusiastic domestic audience for their idiosyncratic formal experiments, a 
                                                
32 One notable anomaly in the otherwise almost entirely negative English language assessments of 
Theory of Film during the 1970s is the work of the Kantian philosopher of art, Jerome Stolnitz. 
Stolnitz’s analysis of Kracauer’s film studies revolved around the identification and examination of 
certain Kantian concepts within Kracauer’s text. See Stolnitz, Jerome, “Kracauer: Thing, Word, and 
Interiority in the Movies”, The British Journal of Aesthetics, Vol. 14, No. 4  (1974), pp. 350-367 and 
Stolnitz, Jerome, “The Boatman of Kaizu: A Study in Movie Fantasy”, Philosophy and Literature, 
Vol. 1, No. 2 (Spring 1977) p. 222-237. 
33 Quoted in Rentschler, Eric, “American Friends and New German Cinema: Patterns of Reception”, 
New German Critique, Nos. 24/25 (Autumn, 1981 – Winter, 1982), p. 7. 
34 For a history of New German Cinema see, Elsaesser, Thomas, New German Cinema: A History 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan and Rutgers University Press, 1994). 
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generation of post-War filmmakers such as Rainer Werner Fassbinder, Werner 
Herzog and Wim Wenders found and nurtured an alternative one in America. First 
shown in the late 1960s at the New York film festival, Junger Deutscher Film 
[Young German Film] was considered by its organizers, suggests Rentschler, as “an 
esoteric bit of exotica, a ripple amidst the ebbing tides of Czech and French new 
waves”. 35 However, by the end of the 1970s, New German Cinema as a brand had 
established a considerable market abroad, with the American audience alone proving 
larger than that of their native Germany. Such success, notes Rentschler, was not 
without its costs as “a product of the 1960s ferment, the revolt of a generation 
disenchanted with its elders’ abuse of the cinematic medium, became transformed 
into an art-house commodity”. 36  
 
For Rentschler, the adulation heaped upon individual directors such as Fassbinder 
and Herzog by American cineastes stood in sharp contrast to the “the moderate, often 
sceptical, indeed more than occasionally harsh appraisals” they received from the 
German public. The reason for this discrepancy, argues Rentschler, relates to “the 
problematic nature of Germany's broken film history”. 37 As Rentschler explains: 
 
Unlike their French nouvelle vague counterparts, the Young 
Germans initially had no film culture out of which to work, no 
widespread network of film clubs, no Cahiers du Cinema. The 
major film periodical of the late 1950s and 1960s, Filmkritik, 
concentrated more on foreign productions and rarely spoke of 
domestic activity. The new generation had no critical identification 
figure like Andre Bazin, no dedicated protector of its film heritage 
like Henri Langlois, no accepted master like Jean Renoir. Siegfried 
Kracauer had fled to New York, Lotte Eisner to Paris, both many 
years before. 38 
 
In contrast to their German counterparts, argues Rentschler, American critics 
appreciated “the important and continuing contribution German filmmakers have 
made toward universal notions of the possibilities of filmic expression, in terms of 
                                                
35 Rentschler, 1981/2, p. 9. 
36 Rentschler, 1981/2, p. 7. 
37 Rentschler, 1981/2, p. 7. 
38 Rentschler, 1981/2, p. 10. 
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form and style”. 39 In turn, they quickly recognised New German Cinema “ as the heir 
of Lang, Murnau, and Pabst”. 40 In promoting this reading, suggests Rentschler, 
American critics were following the example of Lotte Eisner’s L’Ecran Démoniaque 
[The Haunted Screen, 1952], with its emphasis on stylistic continuity in 
Expressionist art, theatre and film.41 By adopting an opposing stance that was critical 
of the filmmaker’s “failure to mirror” contemporary social problems, Rentschler 
argues, West German critics demonstrated that they were still “very much under the 
influence of Siegfried Kracauer - or at least a watered-down version of the premier 
German film historian and theoretician”.42 However, Rentschler adds a significant 
qualification to this cultural antagonism: 
 
Kracauer for all his often-noted stress on the primacy of content 
nevertheless demonstrated in his own film criticism considerable 
understanding for cinematic form and style. Not all West German 
critics have reduced his lessons down to such monolithic terms.43 
 
The idea of Kracauer representing an obstacle to overcome, an opinion Rentschler 
clearly articulates in his previous work (as discussed in Chapter 2), is gone. Instead 
Kracauer is here introduced as a casualty of misinterpretation. Rentschler’s model for 
this more enlightened perspective is a 1978 essay by Karsten Witte on the German 
Revue films of the Third Reich. 44  In this essay, Witte discusses Kracauer’s 
Frankfurter Zeitung articles written in the late 1920s / early 1930s, in particular Das 
Ornament der Masse (1927), an English translation of which is included in the same 
issue of New German Critique as Rentschler’s text. The Kracauer Witte describes is 
an engaged “critic of cultural intermediate zones”, whose forgotten German language 
texts provide not only a prompt for the revision of Kracauer’s intellectual 
                                                
39 Rentschler, 1981/2, p. 13. 
40 Rentschler, 1981/2, p. 14. 
41 Eisner, Lotte, The Haunted Screen: expressionism in the German cinema and the influence of Max 
Reinhardt, translated by Roger Greaves (Berkeley & Oxford: University of California Press, 1973). 
42 Rentschler, 1981/2, p. 11. Since 1945 Eisner had worked alongside Henri Langlois at Cinémathèque 
Française in Paris where she became along with Langlois a mentor for the younger generation of 
critics that worked for Cahiers du Cinema.  
43 Rentschler, 1981/2, p. 11. 
44 Witte, Karsten, “Visual Pleasure Inhibited: Aspects of the German Revue Film”, translated by J. D. 
Steakley and Gabriele Hoover, New German Critique, No. 24/25 (Autumn, 1981 - Winter, 1982), pp. 
238 – 263.  
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contribution but also an alternative critical perspective from which to view 
contemporary German film production.45  
 
In post-war Germany, explains Leonardo Quaresima, knowledge of Kracauer’s other 
writings was extremely limited and, like their English-speaking counterparts during 
the 1970s, many supposedly definitive statements were made about his approach 
from the singular perspective of either From Caligari to Hitler or Theory of Film. 
This problem was compounded in West Germany, where the only version of From 
Caligari to Hitler was a “bowdlerized” translation that, as Quaresima suggests “tried 
to mitigate or even alter the original approach”.46  
 
It was Witte’s work, as editor of Suhrkamp Verlag’s complete edition of Kracauer’s 
work as well as the translator of the 1979 unabridged version of From Caligari to 
Hitler that for Quaresima “reopened on new ground” the discussion about Kracauer 
in Germany. 47 In America, Witte’s restoration of Kracauer’s reputation was carried 
out ostensibly through the journal New German Critique (NGC), a journal first 
published by the University of Chicago in 1974 with a “mission to retrieve Critical 
Theory and Western Marxism” and promote the work of the Frankfurt School 
(Institute for Social Research, Frankfurt) and its associates (Adorno, Horkheimer, 
Marcuse et al.).48 As one time editors of the journal, Andreas Huyssen and Anson 
Rabinbach explain, by initially concentrating on translations and republications of 
“the classics” of Critical Theory, the journal sought to break German Marxism out 
from the “Ghetto existence of German departments” with a view to replicating the 
influence that their French counterparts (such as Jacques Lacan, Michel Foucault and 
Louis Althusser) were exercising over American and English cultural studies.49 
NGC’s motivation to establish the significance of Critical Theory in contemporary 
political and sociological debate was in turn duplicated in the context of film studies 
by Witte in his introduction to the first English language translation of Kracauer’s  
                                                
45 Witte, 1981 – 1982, p. 240. 
46 Quaresima, Leonardo, “Introduction to the 2004 edition: Rereading Kracauer”, in Kracauer, 
Siegfried, From Caligari to Hitler: a psychological history of the German film [1947], revised edition 
edited by Leonardo Quaresima (New York: Princeton University Press, 2004), p. xvii. 
47 Quaresima, 2004, p. xvii. 
48 Huyssen, Andreas and Anson Rabinbach, “New German Critique: The First Decade”, New German 
Critique, No. 95 (Spring-Summer 2005), p. 13. 
49 Huyssen and Rabinbach, 2005, p. 22. 
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“The Mass Ornament” [1927] by Barbara Correll and Jack Zipes that had been 
commissioned by NGC and published in 1975. In this text Witte argues that: 
 
From Caligari to Hitler and Theory of Film made Siegfried 
Kracauer so well known in his American exile that his important 
work before his emigration to New York in 1941 has escaped our 
attention. Although the theoretical premises of the early Kracauer 
are present even in his posthumously published meditation on 
historiography, History his early writings in Germany aroused no 
interest in New York during his lifetime. […] The link between his 
early and late work lies in his intention to decipher social 
tendencies revealed in ephemeral cultural phenomena.50 
 
Though at the time Witte’s work was an isolated example of NGC’s limited interest 
in film history and film theory by the early 1980s New German Cinema “the other 
ngc” became a central theme of the journal.51 The catalyst for this shift in focus was 
the inclusion on the editorial board of Miriam Hansen who, by the time NGC 
published a special issue dedicated to New German Cinema in 1981/1982, had 
become a close friend of Witte.52 Hansen, along with Gertrud Koch (who at the time 
worked alongside Witte as a film critic at the Frankfurter Rundschau newspaper), 
had been students of Adorno at Frankfurt University. “Contrary to much film theory 
at the time which employed semiotic and psychoanalytic models derived from 
structuralism and post-structuralism”, explain Huyssen and Rabinbach, Hansen 
“embedded issues such as spectatorship and reception, gender representation and 
auteurism, genre analysis and exhibition practice in specific historical and social 
formations” as the central themes of the special issue.53  
 
                                                
50 Witte, Karsten, “Introduction to Siegfried Kracauer's ‘The Mass Ornament’", translated by Barbara 
Correll and Jack Zipes, New German Critique, No. 5 (Spring, 1975), p. 59. 
51 Huyssen and Rabinbach, 2005, p. 25. 
52 See Rentschler, Eric, “Karsten Witte: The Passenger and the Critical Critic”, New German Critique, 
No. 74 (Spring –Summer 1998), pp. 15 – 22 and Hansen, Miriam, “For Karsten Witte”, New German 
Critique, No. 74 (Spring –Summer 1998), pp. 5 – 7. 
53 Huyssen and Rabinbach, 2005, p. 25. 
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If the French filmmaker Jean-Luc Godard provided the British journal Screen with 
an Althusserian / Brechtian model for ideologically critical praxis during the 1970s 
then it was the work of Alexander Kluge (another student of Adorno) that  
provided NGC with theirs.54 In particular, it was Kluge’s essay, “On Film and the 
Public Sphere” (translated by Thomas Levin in NGC) and Adorno’s essay on Kluge 
“Transparencies on Film” (translated by Hansen and Levin) that introduced the 
concept of the “counter-public sphere” that was to become the leitmotif of NGC’s 
questioning of Screen’s Marxist orthodoxies and their locating of the New German 
Cinema as part of a “larger social and cultural formation in post-War West 
Germany.”55 As Bathrick states in his introduction to the NGC special issue on New 
German Cinema: 
 
For the most part, treatments of New German Cinema in this 
country [America] have misread, ignored or distorted its place 
within the long-range history and present context of the German 
Federal Republic. The few studies which have gone beyond 
immediate responses to individual films […] fail to connect the 
aesthetics of contemporary filmmaking to the political and social 
traditions emerging from the Weimar and fascist periods, or to the 
production of culture in general within the post-war public 
sphere.56 
 
Though intended to expand the application of Critical Theory into a contemporary 
context the limitations of, what Bathrick describes, as the Adorno-Kluge 
“framework” were clearly evident to those already familiar with Adorno’s work.57 
From the 1930s onwards, Adorno time and again absolutely rejected the possibility 
of any aspect of popular culture having a genuine critical or socially emancipatory 
function. Favouring the avant-garde elitism of Arnold Schoenberg and Samuel 
Beckett over Jazz records and Orson Welles’ films, Adorno’s assessment of any form 
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of commercial art was categorically negative.58 Though Adorno does allude to a 
possible future form of critical film practice in his text on Kluge his statements about 
the medium are abstruse and carefully qualified through references to Kluges work 
as a writer. As Dagmar Barnouw has argued, Hansen’s championing of Critical 
Theory leads to her over-extending Adorno’s consideration of the alternative film 
practice beyond its original intentions. “Adorno’s position on mass culture”, writes 
Barnouw, “is really untenable in the late twentieth century: reading him in this 
situation requires rewriting him”.59 
 
As Hansen suggests in her obituary for Witte, the problem of rendering Adorno and 
Horkheimer’s version of Critical Theory pertinent to contemporary society was one 
that taxed them both and indeed brought them together as friends. In this respect, she 
concludes, Witte’s legacy was in demonstrating how “transforming” Critical Theory 
could maintain its relevance.60 For Witte, the catalyst for this transformation was 
Kracauer’s early work. In the introduction to Kracauer’s “The Mass Ornament”, he 
writes: 
If they were to be re-examined in a new and productive manner, 
they could well lead to a differentiated assessment of Critical 
Theory's formative period. Most important about Kracauer's early 
work is that his critical gaze looked to the marginal areas of high 
culture and to the media of popular culture: film, the streets, sports, 
operetta, revues, advertisements and the circus.61 
 
Following Witte’s proposal, the subsequent shift in NGC’s approach to cinema and 
Kracauer after the special issue on New German Cinema was to have a decisive 
effect on the reception of Kracauer’s work in England and America and the 
reinvention of him as a philosopher of Weimar culture. However, Witte, Hansen and 
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the other contributors to NGC were not the only ones with a “mission to retrieve 
Critical Theory and Western Marxism” and promote the work of the Frankfurt 
School and its associates.62 Another key figure in this respect is the historian Martin 
Jay, whose biographical essay on Kracauer was not only the first in English but was 
to prove seminal in initiating a critical correlation between his personal experience of 
exile and the fate of progressive German philosophy after the war. 
 
3.5  The Permanent Exile of Siegfried Kracauer 
 
In 1974 Jay published The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt 
School and the Institute of Social Research, 1923-1950.63 This text charted the work 
of Marcuse, Fromm, Horkheimer, Neumann, Adorno, and Lowenthal during the 
Institute’s early years in Germany and later in exile in the United States and was the 
first full-length study of the subject in English. Jay’s scholarship was on the whole 
well received and proved instrumental in introducing a wider audience to the 
intellectual and biographic background behind the work of the Institute.64 Revealing 
the complex personal and philosophical history behind established figures such as 
Adorno and Horkheimer, the book stirred new interest for their work in a post-War 
generation of critics who had until then considered their approach obsolete. It was 
whilst conducting research for the book that Jay became interested in the work of 
some of the Institute’s more periphery associates, the names of which recurred in 
documents and interviews. Out of this group, which included Benjamin and Hannah 
Arendt, it was Kracauer that intrigued Jay the most and in 1975 Jay published the 
essay “The Extraterritorial Life of Siegfried Kracauer” in the liberal arts journal, 
Salmagundi.65  
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As the title of the essay suggests, for Jay, the key to understanding Kracauer’s 
diverse corpus as a coherent whole was a formative concept of liminality. Though 
“alienation and outsiderness”, writes Jay, “have been among the stock obsessions of 
intellectuals ever since the time of Rousseau” few have “focused as consistently on 
the manifestations of the malaise throughout their entire careers as did Kracauer”.66  
Marginality, Jay argues, was Kracauer’s philosophical modus operandi and though 
fashioned into “a positive good” by the Frankfurt writer it was done so out of the 
necessity of his own personal circumstances. All of Kracauer’s work, explains Jay: 
 
can be read as a series of seemingly disparate projects almost all 
with the common goal of redeeming contingency from oblivion. In 
important if not fully transparent ways, this effort paralleled 
Kracauer’s personal struggle with the extraterritorial nature of his 
own life.67 
 
Jay’s dedication to the legacy of the Frankfurt School and its associates was in part a 
reaction to what was referred to at the time by American political historian, Theodor 
Draper as “the specter of Weimar”.68 At a conference on Weimar culture held at The 
New School for Social Research in New York in 1972, Draper presented a paper that 
analysed characteristics of the Weimar Republic in Germany which had heralded the 
decline of the democratic state and compared these to trends in the United States 
which he (and many others) felt indicated a similarly disastrous political outcome. 
With growing social unrest spreading across America in the 1960s (following the 
American intervention in the Vietnam War) parallels began to be made by historians 
such as Draper and the Marxist sociologist Göran Therborn between the student 
movement’s re-adoption of Herbert Marcuse’s work and the role of the Institute in 
frustrating a united Communist response to fascism in the Weimar republic.69 
Though the “specter of Weimar” was a relatively short lived paradigm in political 
and social theory the response of those associated with the Frankfurt School to its 
allegations, in particular those who had appointed themselves guardians of its legacy, 
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had a significant impact on how we perceive Critical Theory today and in turn 
(through Jay’s work) how we perceive Kracauer’s relation to it. 
 
The most active guardian of the Institute’s legacy was the German philosopher and 
sociologist Leo Lowenthal. From his appointment as “Hauptassistent” [first-
assistant] in 1930, Lowenthal maintained an archive of personal correspondence and 
unpublished manuscripts relating to the running of the Institute. 70 In 1968, prompted 
by concerns about how their work was being misconstrued and appropriated by the 
political activists of the New Left in America, Lowenthal approached Jay to examine 
his collection with a view to writing a history of the Frankfurt School. 71 One of the 
problems that faced Jay was the Institute’s identification of American capitalism as 
another form of totalitarianism. The Frankfurt School’s critique of American society, 
explains Jay: 
 
sometimes appeared to suggest no real distinction existed between 
Nazi coercion and the ‘culture industry’ [of Hollywood]. In fact, so 
some of its critics would charge, the Nazi experience had been so 
traumatic for the Institute’s members that they could judge 
American society only in terms of its fascist potential [Therborn]. 
By insulating themselves from American life to the extent that they 
did, the unique historical factors that made American advanced 
capitalism and mass society different from their European 
counterparts were lost to view. 72 
 
Jay’s approach to this problem in The Dialectical Imagination is to restrict his focus 
to the early history of the Institute. Though several of the Frankfurt School’s chief 
protagonists were still alive and writing at the time of his research, Jay adopted an 
“elegiac” tone, stating in the books introduction that though undeniably radical in 
their time the Institute’s “historical moment has now irrevocably passed”.73 Though 
keenly aware of the historically conditioned nature [Zeitbedingtheit] of their critical 
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intervention into Weimar culture, what puzzled Jay was why the core members of the 
School actively refused to review their position now those conditions had changed. 74 
The answer, suggests Jay, is that from the moment of their enforced emigration from 
Germany, Horkheimer, Adorno, Lowenthal and the others considered the Institute as 
an Ark, a receptacle for the safekeeping of the ideas that National Socialism (or 
monopoly Capitalism) wanted to eradicate. In a letter written shortly before the 
outbreak of war, Horkheimer stated:  
 
In view of what is now threatening to engulf Europe […] our 
present work is essentially destined to pass things down through 
the night that is approaching: a kind of message in a bottle.75 
 
Jay’s history of the Institute ends with its return to Frankfurt in 1951 and his epilogue 
(written in 1973) considers Horkheimer’s mission to safeguard their remarkable 
achievements a success: 
 
whereas dispersion usually accompanied exile, the Institute 
managed to remain together. It was furthermore the only collective 
representative of Weimar culture to survive exile and return to 
serve as a bridge between Germany’s cultural past and its post-
Nazi present. When it re-established itself in Frankfurt, it was able 
not only to teach methodological techniques acquired in America, 
but also to restore continuity with the rich heritage Hitler had done 
so much to obliterate. Having helped to bring German culture to 
America, it then proceeded to help bring it back to Germany. 76 
 
Through the process of writing the history of the Frankfurt School, Jay became close 
friends with Lowenthal and his influence on the author’s above conclusions are 
evident both in the finished text’s continued reference to Lowenthal’s personal 
correspondence but also in how Jay conceptualizes and foregrounds the idea of exile 
in relation to their work.77 Though Jay recognizes in The Dialectical Imagination and 
in later essays such as “The Frankfurt School in Exile” (1972) that the Institute was 
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an “interdisciplinary aggregation of scholars” his approach works to consolidate an 
image of it as a fundamentally unified and harmonious collective project.78 The 
model for this approach, argues Barnouw, was provided by Lowenthal and revolved 
around what she has identified as his persistent “equation of intellectual integrity and 
exile”.79 Lowenthal’s “highly selective” and “harmonizing” approach, suggests 
Barnouw, “emphasizes the intellectual’s act of distancing himself from his 
sociocultural environment” (self-imposed exile), as a demonstration of their 
intellectual “integrity”.80 Evidence of Jay’s “harmonizing” and his paradigmatic use 
of exile are both apparent in his introduction to the collection of his essays on the 
Frankfurt School written during the 1970s and published in 1986 as Permanent 
Exiles. On the subject of the title Jay writes: 
 
The phrase “permanent exiles” seemed an accurate and evocative 
term to describe the Frankfurt School as a whole and so I 
considered it as a possible title for the book I was writing on their 
history [The Dialectical Imagination]. Herbert Marcuse and Leo 
Lowenthal, two members of the School who remained in America, 
agreed that it rang true and encouraged me to use it. But much to 
my surprise, Max Horkheimer and Felix Weil, both now living in 
Europe […] were vehemently opposed. Horkheimer, who had 
graciously consented to write a preface to the book, even hinted at 
its withdrawal were I to insist on the title […] But it has always 
been my conviction that the homecoming of certain Frankfurt 
School members to Germany did not really end the exile of Critical 
Theory.81 
 
Jay’s interpretation of Kracauer’s corpus as the expression of a deliberate and self 
perpetuated outsiderness certainly conforms to this notion.  With its conflation of 
geographical, socio-political and psychological factors, Jay’s 1975 existential 
biography of Kracauer has the Frankfurt author emerge from the shadows of its more 
illustrious members and operate as both irritant to and influential associate of the 
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sacrosanct group identity of Adorno, Horkheimer et al.  In such a role, Kracauer’s 
marginality does not question the intellectual probity of the Institute but affirms, by 
rehearsing on a personal level, the identification of integrity and exile, a quality that 
Lowenthal (and Adorno) had initially also attributed to Benjamin. “Benjamin”, 
writes Barnouw, “shares with many Weimar intellectuals the view of the 
intellectual’s identity as defined by his experience of disconnection, distance, and 
exile”.82 If Benjamin, as Lowenthal argues, provides the standard for the Institute’s 
intellectual probity in the first half of the century, then Jay’s work on Kracauer (in 
parallel to Witte’s) can be understood as proposing a different equation of exile and 
integrity for the second half.83   
 
However, the chief obstacle with such an equation is the fact that no other associate 
of the Institute (bar maybe Erich Fromm)84 was so publicly excluded from it. For 
example, Adorno interpreted Kracauer’s compulsion to write solely in English after 
relocating to America as evidence of his friend having succumbed to the “burden of 
conformity”.85 As Kracauer himself complained, in the process of constructing its 
intellectual legacy, the Institute was happy to leave him “among the forgotten 
men”.86 Jay directly addresses Adorno’s allegations in his last essay on Kracauer, 
“Adorno and Kracauer: Notes on a Troubled Friendship” (1978).87 Jay’s approach in 
this text is significant because not only does it look to problematize the conclusions 
of The Dialectical Imagination (that the historical moment of Critical Theory has 
irrevocably passed) but it does so using the antagonistic relationship between the 
American Kracauer (he became an American citizen in 1946) and the resolutely 
German Adorno. In order to write this essay Jay travelled to Germany to visit the 
Deutsches Literaturarchivs in Marbach where the Kracauer’s Nachlaß (his 
manuscripts, notes and correspondence etc.) had been deposited after his death in 
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1966. It was whilst there that he met Witte and his influence of the finished text goes 
beyond the factual assistance that is acknowledged by Jay in its notes.88 
 
For Jay, a historian, Kracauer was primarily a historian and a critic of Marxism. His 
reading of Kracauer’s work on film, though apparently thorough in his 1975/6 essay, 
relies almost entirely on the work of V.F. Perkins and Andrew Tudor.89 What Witte 
contributes to Jay’s account is not only a better understanding of Adorno’s criticism 
of Kracauer’s film theory but also a decided reemphasis of Kracauer’s Weimar work. 
Here Kracauer is less the aloof extraterritorial historian and more the politically 
engaged cultural critic, someone who was prepared to take a provisional critical 
stance in light of contemporary concerns as opposed to Adorno’s more ahistorical 
assertions regarding the preservation of truth content. The problems Kracauer 
highlights in Adorno’s work, Jay concludes, “must be acknowledged as serious 
obstacles for anyone anxious to defend the Frankfurt School’s legacy”.90 However, 
by presenting Kracauer as Witte’s “critic of cultural intermediate zones” Jay does not 
propose Kracauer’s theory as a corrective to Adorno’s philosophical obstinacy but as 
component in the dialectical transformation of Critical Theory as a whole. For Jay, 
Kracauer’s “own solutions” to the problems of the Frankfurt School “were by no 
means superior to Adorno’s” but it “must be acknowledged that he asked many tough 
questions that Adorno’s version of Critical Theory must struggle to answer”.91 In the 
end, argues Jay, the “troubled” and ultimately irreconcilable relationship between 
Kracauer’s position and Adorno’s does not invalidate Critical Theory but in fact 
confirms its fundamental conviction that something’s “true value” is only realised 
through “the relentless exposure” of the social contradictions that define it.92  
 
Also, significant in the present context, is how Jay’s central concept of exile 
undertakes a marked transformation. In his first essay on Kracauer, Jay argues that 
the determining factor in Kracauer’s approach is the idea of chronological 
anonymity. “Chronological anonymity”, argues Jay, was something that Kracauer 
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“insistently guarded” because it fulfilled a very specific philosophical function. As 
Jay explains: 
 
[i]t helped discourage efforts to place Kracauer in the context of 
any one period, such as those that would define him as a “Weimar 
intellectual” with all the resonances that label has acquired over the 
years. By avoiding such a placement, he hoped to thwart the 
compartmentalization of his own work that he had sought to resist 
in the work of those he studied.93 
  
The shift in critical focus towards Kracauer’s Weimar work in both Witte’s and Jay’s 
work marked not the abandonment of this notion of “chronological anonymity” but a 
broadening of its scope from the personal to the public sphere. The initial reference 
text for this adjustment was Peter Gay’s Weimar Culture: The Outsider as Insider 
(1968).94 In Gay’s text, the culture of the Weimar Republic is presented as an 
historical epiphenomenon, a product of the temporal confluence of myriad fringe 
cultural and political forces that flourished in the social and political ruins of a 
defeated imperial Germany. As West Berlin had become an island in post-War 
German Democratic Republic so too was the Weimar Republic conceptualised by 
Gay as an anomaly in the narrative history of the nation; a moment when the social 
forces that usually operated on the peripheries of mainstream culture began instead to 
constitute it (the outsiders became insiders). In such a context, not only Kracauer’s 
extraterritoriality but also Critical Theory’s persistent marginality could be inverted 
and read as a committed engagement with the prevailing cultural forces rather than 
intellectualised misanthropy.  
 
For those, such as the contributors to NGC, arguing for a different critical framework 
with which to comprehend and interpret the cultural products of post-War Germany 
(such as the extraterritorial cinema of New German Cinema) the theoretical 
consolidation of the Weimar Republic as a manifestation of an alternative mode of 
German culture (as opposed to an aberration of it) was to prove a significant 
development. It allowed a relationship to be drawn between the historical and 
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contemporary that did not fall into the problem of the historical analogy, such as the 
“specter of Weimar” where essential differences are sidelined for the sake of critical 
expediency. Instead of “measuring early German film theory against some imaginary 
notion of epistemological progress”, what Bathrick, Hansen and Thomas Elsaesser 
(as the editors of NGC’s special issue on Weimar film theory) propose as the 
journal’s aim is to reexamine Weimar film culture “as much for the questions” it 
raises “as for the answers they supply”.95 This drive for methodological revitalization 
is combined with the conceptualization of Weimar as representing not a past 
evolutionary stage in a linear chronological or narrative sense but an alternative 
tradition that exists alongside contemporary modes of criticism. To this effect NGC’s 
“Introduction to Weimar Film Theory” concludes with the following statement: 
 
It is our hope that this issue will not only reopen a discussion of 
particular historical concepts, but also encourage a more 
experiential and a more speculative dimension in current 
paradigms of textual analysis and historiography. The textual and 
historical specificity that characterizes German film theory in 
effect lends it a high degree of openness, reminding us of a time 
when one could think about the cinema in a political horizon which 
was not exclusively defined by institutional security and 
constraints.96 
 
Published in 1987, this issue of NGC marks an important moment in the English 
language reception of Kracauer’s pre-War work for two reasons. Firstly, centred on a 
new translation of Kracauer’s 1926 essay “Kult der Zerstreuung: Über die Berliner 
Lichtspielhäuser” [Cult of Distraction: On Berlin’s Picture Palaces] (the first since 
Correll’s and Zipes’ version of “The Mass Ornament” in 1975), all the contributions 
not only work to reaffirm the progressive pedigree of German film theory but also 
Kracauer’s key role in its development.  For example, Hansen and Koch contribute 
essays that demonstrate the influence of Kracauer on more celebrated Weimar critics 
whilst texts by Schlüpmann, Petro and Hake use Kracauer’s journalism as the basis 
for their feminist critiques of the prevailing scholarly interpretations of early 
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twentieth century visual culture. 97 Secondly, it represents, with the inclusion of 
Thomas Elsaesser on the editorial team, an amalgamation of two approaches to 
German national cinema that had until this point developed in parallel on different 
sides of the Atlantic. 
 
As Quaresima has commented, the work of Elsaesser in the early 1980s “played a 
special role” in renewing interest in Kracauer’s work.98 What distinguishes 
Elsaesser’s approach, argues Quaresima, is his sustained focus on From Caligari to 
Hitler, the work “most closely associated with Kracauer’s name” but the one that has 
received “the least critical attention and reinterpretation during this latest phase” of 
scholarship. 99  Written in 2004, Quaresima’s essay does not offer a solution to this 
puzzle. However the absence of Kracauer’s book on Weimar cinema in NGC’s 
reconfiguration of Kracauer as a Weimar cultural critic is indicative of the journal’s 
strategy. In order to understand how NGC’s editorial approach effectively devalued 
Kracauer’s exile texts (From Caligari to Hitler and Theory of Film) it is necessary to 
look in some detail at how Elsaesser’s interpretation of these American publications 
changed in his contributions to NGC and other film journals. 
 
3.6  From Film Theory to Cinema Theory. 
 
Elsaesser’s first text on Kracauer’s work was a conference paper called “Cinema 
Histories, Cinema Practices” that he gave at the “Milwaukee Conference” in 
Asilomar, California in 1982. The paper was later published in 1984 as “Film History 
and Visual Pleasure: Weimar Cinema”.100 In this text, Elsaesser argues for replacing 
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the label “expressionist cinema” with the term “Weimar cinema”. The former, he 
argues, propagates a notion of stylistic conformity, which is contradicted by the 
heterogeneous character of the films from that period. 101 Though deliberately 
intended as a counter to the prevailing trends in film studies at the time; namely the 
linguistic and psychoanalytical trends that focused on questions of authorship and 
genre, Elsaesser was not proposing a reinstatement of a traditional concept of 
national cinema. As he later explains in an essay on the history of national cinema 
studies: 
 
from an historical perspective, the classic analyses of national 
cinemas were on the whole ‘essentialist’, meaning that they looked 
to the cinema, its narrative, iconology or recurring motifs with the 
expectation that they could reveal something unique or specific 
about a country’s values and beliefs at once more authentic and 
more symptomatic than in other art forms or aspects of (popular) 
culture.102 
 
The “founding text” for such studies, suggests Elsaesser, was Kracauer’s From 
Caligari to Hitler whose “blend of sociology, group psychology, and metropolitan-
modernist fieldwork ethnography” influenced many investigations into the “national 
character” of a country’s cinema.103 Though recognizing that cultural difference was 
an important factor in determining the nature of a film audience, for Elsaesser, the 
“danger” of such an approach “was not only essentialism regarding the concept of 
national identity: it also risked being tautological, insofar as only those films tended 
to be selected as typical of a national cinema which confirmed the pre-established 
profile”.104 As Philip Rosen states in his 1984 study into the problems of writing 
about national cinema, “History, Textuality, Nation”, it is the “question of 
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coherence” that is of fundamental significance for such studies “on a theoretical as 
well as methodological” level.105 But, adds Rosen, it does not end here: 
 
The discussion of a national cinema assumes not only that there is 
a principle or principles of coherence among a large number of 
films; it also involves an assumption that those principles have 
something to do with the production and / or reception of those 
films within the legal borders of (or benefiting capital controlled 
from within) a given nation-state.106 
 
Like Elsaesser, Rosen focuses on the example of From Caligari to Hitler (Rosen’s 
essay was also initially presented at the 1982 Milwaukee Conference) but he does so 
not to place Kracauer alongside other “straw men” but to “highlight his methodology 
for textual analysis”.107  “As a historian of a national cinema”, states Rosen: 
 
Kracauer is exemplary in his construction of two coherencies – a 
block of filmic (inter)textuality and the social formation of a 
specified period. These are related in such a way as to enable 
Kracauer to investigate the kind of middle-class social-
psychological patterns he treats as crucial for the appeal of 
Hitlerism”.108 
 
The way Kracauer chooses to explore these “patterns”, explains Rosen, is to focus on 
what he argues are “generally and compulsively repeated motifs” that appear 
“throughout all levels of a nation’s films”.109 These motifs are not only “diegetic 
objects and actions” but “also components of form and style”.110 For Kracauer, 
Rosen argues: 
 
These motifs inform individual film narratives with a historically 
pregnant intertextuality. In them, Kracauer can trace a great theme 
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at the heart of the inter-war German collective mentality: that of 
the rejection of the multivalent, undecidable concrete real, and the 
resulting fascination with an authoritarianism whose alternative is 
figured as chaos.111 
 
Kracauer’s “method of pulling together diverse texts in a national cinema”, 
concludes Rosen, “can be likened to interpreting the discourse of a psychoanalytic 
patient”.112  
 
In his 1982 essay, “Social Mobility and the Fantastic”, Elsaesser develops the notion 
of Weimar cinema as an historically discrete manifestation of an alternative tradition 
in German culture: The German silent cinema, argues Elsaesser: 
 
however influential it has been on certain aspects of Hollywood 
filmmaking (the film noir, for instance, and the horror film), 
nonetheless constitutes a body of films whose textual construction 
did not impose itself on the commercial cinema, and it has thus 
remained an “alternative cinema,” so different, in fact, that it has 
almost become incomprehensible, in much the same way as certain 
Romantic narrative genres became obsolete once the novel […] 
had appropriated the codes of representation and conflict whereby 
a society recognized its moral or psychological reality.113 
 
For Elsaesser, Kracauer’s reading of the German silent cinema is an exemplar of the 
inappropriate application of an historical critical method. As with Rosen, Elsaesser 
reads Kracauer’s method as operating a double reduction on its material. In order to 
establish “homology” (coherence) between a national cinema and the country’s 
history, argues Elsaesser, Kracauer first has to “narrativize” German history and then 
“personalize” it.114 In other words, Kracauer conceptualizes (in psychological terms) 
the nation as an individual character (that he refers to as “the German Soul”), 
rejecting any “forces or determinants” that resist such a consolidation.115 Kracauer 
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then reads the films of the period either as the expression or repression of the inner 
conflicts that contribute to the behaviour of this collective identity. The history of 
Weimar cinema that Kracauer subsequently presents, concludes Elsaesser: 
 
is itself an expressionist drama, and while he makes it clear that the 
categories he employs are those that the films themselves suggest, 
the tautologous nature of the reasoning seems inescapable: the 
films reflect German history, because this history has been narrated 
in terms and categories derived from the films.116 
 
Kracauer’s emphasis on story, Elsaesser argues, does “considerable violence” to the 
films’ historically peculiar “visual and narrative organization”. 117 Only the 
examination of “concrete examples”, suggests Elsaesser, can break the “hermeneutic 
circle” of Kracauer’s method.118 
 
Elsaesser next article was such an examination of a concrete example. “Lulu and the 
Meter Man”, published in 1983, uses Kracauer’s From Caligari to Hitler and Die 
Angestellten [The Salaried Masses, 1930]. as reference points for a detailed reading 
of G.W. Pabst’s Die Büchse der Pandora [Pandora’s Box] (1928-9) starring Louise 
Brooks.119 For Elsaesser, what Pabst and Brooks’ film silently articulates through its 
imagery is a disposition in popular Weimar visual culture (cabaret, variety theatre, 
photography, commercial art) for ambiguity (specifically sexual ambiguity) that is 
“rarely” evident “in either the avant-garde or the ‘serious literature’ of the time” and 
has subsequently been labelled a minority concern.120  The reason why this theme of 
ambiguity was common in certain mediums and absent from others, argues Elsaesser, 
is that visual media works on an audience in a different physiological way to literary 
media and therefore can communicate certain ideas more effectively than others. For 
example, explains Elsaesser, compared with the theatre (Pabst’s film was based on a 
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stage play) the “expressivity” of silent cinema, “the way it speaks to the mind and 
senses is different”. 121 Therefore, he concludes: 
 
different affective values attach themselves to gesture, décor or 
face. With it, the relation of expression to repression changes; 
conflict and contrast, antinomies and argument are suggested, and 
perceived by an audience, in forms specific to the cinema.122 
 
For Elsaesser, the “visual pleasure” associated with the reception of these medium 
specific forms, the “curiosity and emotion” they induce in the audience and the way 
that they in turn “might bind an audience to the cinema” also highlights a 
“sociological difference between theatre and cinema audiences”.123 This difference 
manifests itself in the nature of the cinema audience. It is therefore logical to deduce, 
argues Elsaesser, that silent cinema affects different social groups in ways distinct 
from that of the theatre experience. The theatre and the cinema audience are 
therefore not interchangeable but fundamentally different and assumptions made 
about them derived from a literary standpoint are not necessarily valid, especially in 
regards to their gender or class.  
 
In this text, Elsaesser portrays Kracauer as the personification of a rigid literary 
approach that misses out (or chooses to ignore) the multitude of ambiguous messages 
transmitted by the film’s peculiar patterning of its images.  Elsaesser as a result turns 
Kracauer’s identification of the “German soul” as a “male, paranoiac” back at its 
author and presents him as a man of narrow cultural experience and repressed 
emotional responses.124 This derogatory image of Kracauer as an academician more 
accustomed to the library than to the cabaret stands in complete contrast to that 
subsequently presented by Elsaesser five years later in another essay on Weimar 
culture’s relation to the development of cinema theory, “Cinema – The Irresponsible 
Signifier or ‘The Gamble with History’: Film Theory or Cinema Theory”. 125 This 
text, Elsaesser’s contribution to NGC’s special issue on Weimar Cinema (that he co-
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edited with Bathrick and Hansen in 1987), is significant in the current context 
because it not only marks a distinct shift in Elsaesser’s idea of Kracauer’s 
relationship to Weimar culture, but also Kracauer’s relationship to film theory. It also 
helps situate the critical reconstruction of Kracauer as primarily a German critic in 
the context of New German Critique’s remonstrations about the hegemony of French 
Structuralism in Film Studies. 126 
 
“Film theory”, argues Elsaesser, “has attained the degree of self-reflexivity 
appropriate to cognitive endeavour by constantly rearticulating a seemingly 
ineluctable dualism: that between realist tendencies of cinema and formalist ones”.127 
No matter what form this immanent antagonism has adopted over the past century 
(e.g. long take vs. montage, phenomenology vs. semiology etc.), explains Elsaesser, 
“crucial” to each manifestation of it “is the importance given to the basic 
discontinuity of the filmic process when set against the perceptual continuity of the 
viewing process”. 128 For Elsaesser, deliberations on the effect of specific social or 
economic processes on film production and the viewing process have until the mid 
1980s been the preserve of film historians. Their recent proclivity for defining 
historically, geographically, and sociologically distinct audiences has produced a 
model of reception that is as discontinuous as the medium’s multifarious modes of 
production. As a result of this shift in emphasis from the film object to the cinema 
experience, argues Elsaesser, film history has moved towards becoming cinema 
history. “The question is”, adds Elsaesser, “whether film theory can remain film 
theory or whether it to ought to move towards an historicizing self-reflexivity which 
would mark the transition from classic film theory to cinema theory?”129 The main 
obstacle to this transformation, suggests Elsaesser, is that (as they currently define 
themselves), film theory and theories of the cinema “stand in a certain unresolved 
tension to each other”.130 However, he suggests, a precedent for their dialectic 
synthesis is available in a neglected area of film scholarship that he identifies as 
German theory. 
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The neglect of German theory in recent discussions of the cinema is, explains 
Elsaesser, to “some extent justified” when you consider how film studies has framed 
the two critical traditions that define it in relation to film. The most prominent and 
(relatively) influential of these traditions is the cultural theory of the Frankfurt 
School’s critical sociology. The tendency of this form of theory is “to marginalize 
the cinema, depriving it of any historically significant specificity within the overall 
context of the mass-media and the culture industry”.131 In comparison, the variety of 
German theorists that attribute some significance to film (Balázs, Arnheim and 
Kracauer) has exerted comparably little influence in the development of film 
scholarship. The reason for this, Elsaesser explains, is that their individual 
approaches all fall “uneasily between the formalist and the realist tendencies, 
between the film-as-art debate and arguments of ontology”.132 However, suggests 
Elsaesser: 
 
In the light of recent shifts in film theory, towards considerations 
of subjectivity and signification, visual fascination and gender-
specific forms of spectatorship, German film theory can be re-
centred and opened up for reinspection: firstly, in recalling, as 
Miriam Hansen and Gertrud Koch have done in previous issues of 
New German Critique, the crucial interest in spectatorship and 
visual pleasure among early writers on the cinema; and secondly, 
in the way that writers in the tradition of Western Marxism, such as 
Lukács and Benjamin, can be read as offering a theory of the 
cinema (again, in contrast to film theory) which makes the 
discontinuity of the filmic process and its subject-effects central to 
aesthetic as well as historical considerations, thereby sketching a 
cinema theory rather than a film theory.133 
 
For Elsaesser, though the efforts of critics and philosophers such as Lukács, 
Benjamin, Balázs and Bloch were all extremely important in endowing Weimar 
cultural theory (and in turn cinema theory) with an “emancipatory potential”, 
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Kracauer has “a certain exceptional status within this tradition”.134 What affords him 
this status, argues Elsaesser, is the “inner logic and theoretical perspective” of his 
body of work up until and including his enforced move to Paris in 1933.135 Though 
all of his writings are not about film, Elsaesser enthuses: 
  
All of them bear re-reading today: they make Kracauer a very 
contemporary writer indeed, more so, perhaps, than Adorno, whose 
mentor he once was, but whose Hegelian Marxism he did not 
share; consequently, Kracauer's own immanent thinking tends to be 
more responsive to the feel and texture of experience than Adorno's 
often rather formalist dialectical machinery.136 
 
For Elsaesser, key amongst his disparate corpus are the essays he produced between 
1922 and 1933 and later collected under the title Das Ornament der Masse [The 
Mass Ornament] in 1963. This “revelation” of a publication, suggests Elsaesser, is a 
“worthy companion” 137 to the more celebrated texts of his contemporaries (for 
example, Bloch's Heritage of Our Times, Horkheimer and Adorno's Dialectic of 
Enlightenment and Benjamin's Illuminations) and: 
 
might have been as much a key text in the rediscovery of Critical 
Theory as these proved to be, had there been commentaries (and a 
translation) in English to do it justice. In West Germany, the 
influence of early Kracauer (the "sensibilist" of Das Ornament der 
Masse, in contrast to the sociologist of From Caligari to Hitler) is 
clearly in evidence among filmmakers and critics of the New 
German Cinema.138 
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Elsaesser’s guide to the critical antecedents of From Caligari to Hitler is Witte, 
whose introduction to NGC’s translation of Kracauer’s “Mass Ornament” essay and 
editorial commentaries to Suhrkamp’s Kracauer Gesammelte Schriften provide a 
sustained point of critical reference in Elsaesser’s text.  
 
With the influence of Witte, Hansen and Koch clearly evident (and overtly 
acknowledged) in this article it is interesting in the current context to examine how 
Elsaesser reconfigures the relationship between Kracauer’s previous work and From 
Caligari to Hitler and his subsequent interpretation of it. Though Elsaesser 
recognises in his essay on Pabst that Kracauer’s work on Weimar culture extended 
beyond From Caligari to Hitler, the 1947 text remains the exemplar for a narrative 
model of history that he sought to discredit.139 As is evident in the above quotation, 
in order to maintain the validity of his negative interpretation of From Caligari to 
Hitler, whilst promoting Kracauer as a model for a hybrid cinema theory, Elsaesser 
splits Kracauer’s oeuvre into two distinct phases. As he previously condemned 
Kracauer for shaping his history of the German nation in the terms and categories 
derived from the films he examined so too does Elsaesser now appropriate a trope 
from Weimar film to interpret Kracauer’s intellectual biography; that of the 
doppelgänger or double.140 There is the radical Kracauer, the Weimar sensibilist 
beloved of contemporary German cinema and film critics and his antithetical other, 
the conservative Kracauer, the sociologist whose antipathy towards German visual 
culture sought to render it subservient to the narratives of literary theory.  
 
In light of the republication and translation of works such as The Mass Ornament, 
argues Elsaesser, the usefulness of From Caligari to Hitler as a “critical sounding 
board” is a thing of the past. 141 Following Witte’s example, Elsaesser goes on to 
explain that the “post-War ideological suspicion which fell on émigré intellectuals in 
the United States” made Kracauer “play down” and in the end sever the connection 
between From Caligari to Hitler and the radical Weimar critical tradition from 
which it came.142 For Elsaesser, as Hitler and National Socialism had damaged 
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Kracauer’s life by forcing him to leave his native country, so too had Kracauer in 
turn afflicted a comparable fate on his work and condemned it to suffer its own exile 
from its original intellectual context. This is not to say, stresses Elsaesser, that From 
Caligari to Hitler is not a “remarkable” book. 143  However, he argues, what makes it 
remarkable, the impact that it has had over the past decades on those “theorizing the 
relation of cinema to social history”, is traceable to the remnants in the book of 
Kracauer’s Weimar theory (which the American Kracauer tried his best to conceal). 
For example, explains Elsaesser: 
 
[if] one were to replace 'Hitler' as the constantly implied referent of 
the argument in From Caligari to Hitler, one would find a very 
incisive analysis of bourgeois conceptions of narrative and subject-
positions. This, I think, is one of the main reasons why the book 
has remained so convincing and almost unanswerable despite the 
manifest inadequacy if not absurdity of its apparent central 
thesis.144 
 
Elsaesser is not alone in reading Kracauer’s American work as not just deliberately 
concealing its Weimar antecedents but also actively working to frustrate any possible 
theoretical coherency between his German and English texts. Inka Mülder-Bach in 
Siegfried Kracauer—Grenzgänger zwischen Theorie and Literatur. Seine frühen 
Schriften 1913-1933 [Siegfried Kracauer – Crossing Borders Between Theory and 
Literature. His Early Work 1912 – 1933] also makes a key contribution to this idea 
of a critical schism in the narrative of Kracauer’s work.145  
 
3.7  Exile and the Broken Subject 
 
Mülder-Bach was a research student at Tübingen University, and had worked 
alongside Witte on Kracauer’s Nachlaß at the Deutschen Literaturarchivs in 
Marbach. Her book, a revised version of her PhD, was published in 1985 and was the 
first book length study devoted solely to Kracauer. As indicated by its title, Mülder-
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Bach’s examination of Kracauer’s work focuses entirely on his Weimar texts and 
provided at the time the fullest account of his work during this period. Mülder-
Bach’s text is accompanied by a lengthy catalogue of the Weimar period writings 
from the Nachlaß, and represents the first extensive bibliography of his work written 
in German. Whereas Witte focused on Kracauer’s film work, for Mülder-Bach the 
pivotal work in this key period was Kracauer’s investigation of Germany’s new 
salaried employees, Die Angestellten. 
 
This emphasis on Kracauer’s sociology is distinctive to her work (like Jay her 
background was not in film studies) and her influence in this regard is different from 
that exerted by Koch and Hansen in our appreciation of Kracauer today. For 
example, David Frisby’s pioneering English language work on the German 
sociologist, Georg Simmel uses her work on Kracauer as a guide to examining the 
relationship between his work and his followers (including Benjamin and Kracauer). 
146 However, the greatest influence Mülder-Bach’s work exerts on subsequent studies 
comes not from her foregrounding of Kracauer’s sociology but in how she relates his 
Weimar period work to his English texts. Prefiguring Elsaesser’s idea of there being 
two Kracauers (distinguished by geographical and social context), Mülder-Bach 
proposes a more profound division in Kracauer’s intellectual biography. Unlike 
Elsaesser, who seems to suggest (like Witte) that Kracauer, the pragmatist, simply 
concealed his radical Weimar past so as to avoid making waves in the testy and 
paranoid political climate of post-War America, Mülder-Bach reads his change in 
stylistic register as indicative of a more personal psychological and existential crisis. 
 
Though Mülder-Bach shares Witte’s desire to demonstrate the radical nature of 
Kracauer’s early work she does not attempt, like Witte, to read his later English 
language texts as a transformation of their critical concerns but interprets them as 
representing something completely different. For Mülder-Bach, Weimar Kracauer 
and New York Kracauer are two geographically, historically and philosophically 
distinct entities. As with Jay, Mülder-Bach utilizes Adorno’s narrative of Kracauer’s 
intellectual development, but instead of reading the trauma of exile as exasperating a  
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pre-existing (but sublimated) desire for social acceptance (his persistent outsiderness) 
she posits his enforced migration firmly as the decisive moment of its truncation. For 
Mülder-Bach, the work produced after his departure from Germany represents a 
negative counter to the potential of the work produced prior to his exile. There is, she 
argues, mirror symmetry to his corpus: the Weimar republic Kracauer’s work is 
imbued with “a magic gaze” that is only present as a negative form (an absence) in 
New York.147 For Mülder-Bach, the heterogeneous nature of the Weimar Republic 
makes it historically extraordinary, it represents a “realm of a life that has freed itself 
from its own time”.148  
 
Somewhat more prosaically Adorno suggests that the mature Kracauer’s ascetic 
disregard towards his own “verbal art” was prompted by his “revulsion over what 
had happened” in Germany during the war.149 Both interpretations, argues Barnouw, 
deprive Kracauer of any meaningful agency and both imply that English is an 
inferior vehicle for philosophy. Kracauer, she suggests, prompted by Adorno’s 
repeated exhortations to him that “das Eigenste” [the intellectually most intimate and 
authentic] could only by communicated in German, was well aware of the different 
set of challenges that a critical thinker working in any particular language faced.150 
He was also well aware, Barnouw demonstrates, of the practical necessity of 
removing language as a barrier in any given social or cultural context.151 To 
postulate, as Mülder-Bach does, “a profound break in Kracauer’s work connected 
with the irreversible absence of his ‘magic gaze’ in exile”, argues Barnouw, is 
possible “only because in her discussion of his Weimar texts she selects those which 
enable her to claim its presence”.152  
 
Barnouw’s criticism of Mülder-Bach echoes Elsaesser’s criticism of From Caligari 
to Hitler and certainly in order to establish “homology” in the polarised divisions of 
Kracauer’s work she narrativizes German history then personalizes it through 
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Kracauer. As the forces and determinants that conspire to confound the “German 
Soul” are reflected (for Elsaesser) in Kracauer’s model of expressionist cinema, so 
for Mülder-Bach does Kracauer become the personification of a collective social and 
cultural trauma. For Mülder-Bach, all of Kracauer’s work is autobiographical, the 
conceptual changes and variation in terminology his texts exhibit over time are 
indicators of personal trauma and its recurrence, which in turn are extrapolated and 
mapped upon the tragic narrative of German-Jewish culture. The motifs that Mülder-
Bach identifies with Kracauer’s visionary approach are, as Rosen argues in relation 
to From Caligari to Hitler, pregnant with historical intertextuality. Through an 
interpretation of these motifs Mülder-Bach traces not the failings of a German 
collective mentality vis-à-vis authoritarianism (as Kracauer supposedly does in From 
Caligari to Hitler) but modernity’s immanent dialectic of progress and destruction. 
As Elsaesser had accused Kracauer of personifying the German nation as a character 
from Weimar fantasy cinema only to return to that source for his own critique of the 
author so does Mülder-Bach’s Freudian interpretation of Kracauer start to resemble 
one of its doomed protagonists. As Mülder-Bach succeeded Witte in 1990 as editor 
of Suhrkamp’s Kracauer Gesammelte Schriften, so too did this image of Kracauer as 
the embodiment of what Hansen describes as a “violently fractured intellectual 
biography” supersede Witte’s more pragmatic portrayal of the author. 153 However, it 
did not do so without some modification. As demonstrated by Elsaesser’s NGC text, 
Mülder-Bach’s image of Kracauer as the (psychologically) broken subject was 
quickly appropriated and identified with the destabilized subject of cinema theory’s 
model of spectatorship.  
 
Building upon the inroads made by the literary theory of the 1970s into the 
inadequacies of more prescriptive critical approaches (such as Psychoanalysis and 
Orthodox Marxism) to account for contemporary patterns of media consumption, the 
Cultural Studies approach of Stuart Hall, David Morley et al. advocated an idea of 
agency that increasingly foregrounded the idiosyncratic over any predetermined 
collective disposition.154 From such a perspective, “[t]ext, apparatus, discourse, and 
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history, in sum”, explains Robert Stam, “are all in play and in motion. Neither text 
nor spectator is a static, pre-constituted entity; spectators shape and are shaped by the 
cinematic experience within an endless dialogical process”.155 In this respect 
Kracauer’s image becomes a totem for what Elsaesser describes as “a specifically 
modern form of self-estrangement, which signalled not only the end of bourgeois 
notions of the individual, but also of its critiques in the name of the authentic self”.156 
In order to understand how these apparently antinomic approaches (the 
psychoanalytical and the Cultural Studies approach) became combined into a single 
image of Kracauer as the “exceptional” 157 subject of cinema theory and how this 
image subsequently became the conceptual epicentre of the Kracauer renaissance it is 
necessary (as Elsaesser suggests) to return to concrete examples. 158  
 
1989 marked the 100th anniversary of Kracauer’s birth and to mark the occasion the 
Deutschen Literaturarchivs and the Das Schiller-Nationalmuseum (Marbach am 
Neckar) arranged an exhibition of Kracauer’s manuscripts. Organised and curated by 
Ingrid Belke and Irina Renz this display also included many photographs, which in 
turn were collated and published in a special edition of the archive’s journal.159 The 
prize exhibit in this display, the image used for the front cover of the journal, was an 
official portrait photograph of Kracauer taken in 1930 [Figure 1] for inclusion in the 
social and professional directory, Reichshandbuch der Deutschen Gesellschaft 
[Empire Manual For German Society, the English equivalent would be A & C 
Black’s Who’s Who (1849 - )]. It shows the cultural editor of the Frankfurter 
Zeitung, perched on the edge of his desk, gazing to the left of the camera.  
 
The reason for its proliferation throughout the short lived Kracauer renaissance, is 
not that it shows a young optimistic, engaged, version of the dusty old academician 
or that there are no other images of him from that time but because it is damaged. 
The glass plate upon which the image appears has been shattered. A large crack 
                                                                                                                                     
[1980] (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 128 – 138 and Morley, David, “Texts, readers, subjects”, in 
Hall, Hobson, Lowe and Willis (eds.), 1996, pp. 163 – 176. 
155 Stam, Robert, Film Theory: an Introduction (Oxford & Malden, Mass: Blackwell, 2000), p. 231. 
156 Elsaesser, 1987, p. 89. 
157 Elsaesser, 1987, p. 89. 
158 Elsaesser, 1982, p. 16. 
159 Belke, Ingrid and Irina Renz, (eds.), “Siegfried Kracauer 1889-1966”, Marbacher Magazin 
(Deutsche Schillergesellschaft), No. 47 (1988). 
 85 
radiates from bottom to top, forking its way across the picture plane. Like Alexander 
Gardner’s defective portrait of Abraham Lincoln taken shortly before his 
assassination, this accidental damage has subsequently garnered symbolic 
significance.160 There is a fissure that slices through the image of Kracauer’s eye like 
Buñuel’s razor in Un Chien Andalou (Kracauer’s “primacy of the optic” - sous rature 
[under erasure])161 There is also a missing fragment that forms an ominous black 
 
 
Figure 1. Siegfried Kracauer (1930) 
 
shape above his head. Like the shadow of some diabolic contraption - a cross 
between Edgar Allan Poe’s pendulum and the axe yielded by the homicidal Ivan the 
Terrible (Conrad Veidt) in Paul Leni’s Waxworks [Das Wachsfigurenkabinett, 1924], 
                                                
160 For Gardner’s portraits of Lincoln see, Katz, D. Mark, Witness to an Era: the life and photographs 
of Alexander Gardner: the civil war, Lincoln, and the West (New York: Viking, 1991), pp. 105 - 140 
161 An Andalusian Dog [French: Un Chien Andalou], directed by Luis Buñuel (France: Buñuel, 
1929). The “primacy of the optic” is from Adorno, 1991, p.163. For an introduction to Martin 
Heidegger’s idea of “sous rapture” and its subsequent development by Jacques Derrida see, Spivak’s 
“Translator’s Preface” in Jacques Derrida, On Grammatology, translated by Gayatri Chakravorty 
Spivak (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1997), pp. ix – lxxxix. 
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it is a portent of a fate to come.162  Whether as a visual metaphor for Kracauer’s or 
Germany’s “violently fractured intellectual biography”,163 as an ideogram for what 
David Bordwell has deemed cinema theory’s “modernity thesis”,164 or as an icon for 
Weimar visual culture –this image has become a common addition to many recent 
publications on Kracauer.165  Key to understanding why is to look at how it was 
initially contextualized and disseminated. 
 
After its installation in Marbach, the exhibition of items from Kracauer’s Nachlaß 
travelled to Frankfurt and then to Berlin. Before it was dismantled and returned to the 
archive, Andreas Huyssen (then editor of New German Critique) and Mark M. 
Anderson (like Huyssen based at Columbia University) arranged for the exhibition to 
make a “symbolic journey” to New York “where Kracauer had found refuge from 
National Socialism in 1941”.166 To accompany the exhibition, which was installed in 
the library of the Goethe-Institut New York in 1990, Huyssen and Anderson 
organized an academic symposium at New York University’s Deutsches Haus in 
Greenwich Village. This event was called  “Siegfried Kracauer: The Critic in Exile” 
and the keynote address was provided by a ninety year old Lowenthal whose 
personal reminiscences were edited together and included in a special edition of New 
German Critique (NGC) dedicated to the proceedings of the symposium. This 
edition, published in the Autumn of 1991, was considered by its editors (Huyssen 
and Anderson) as “the first comprehensive view in English of Kracauer’s work” and 
“when “taken as a whole”, they explain, it covers “virtually all periods and subjects 
in Kracauer’s wide-ranging career”.167 Though the publication does exhibit a definite 
                                                
162 See Kracauer, Siegfried, From Caligari to Hitler: a psychological history of the German film 
[1947], revised edition edited by Leonardo Quaresima (New York: Princeton University Press, 2004), 
Illustration No. 8. Waxworks [German: Das Wachsfigurenkabinett], directed by Paul Leni (Leo 
Birinsk) (Germany: Universum Film (UFA), 1924). 
163 Hansen, 1997, p. xvi. 
164 Bordwell, On the History of Film Style (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1997), pp. 139 
– 148. For a critique of Bordwell’s criticism of Cinema Theory see, Singer, Ben, Melodrama and 
Modernity: Early Sensational Cinema and Its Contexts (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2001), pp. 101 – 130. 
165 For examples of the use of the “cracked portrait” of Kracauer see: Richter, Gerhard, Thought-
images: Frankfurt School Writers' Reflections from Damaged Life (Palo Alto: Stanford University 
Press, 2007); Traverso, Enzo, Siegfried Kracauer: Itinéraire d'un intellectuel nomade (Paris: Editions 
La Découverte, 2006) ; New Formations (Special issue on Siegfried Kracauer), edited by Jan 
Campbell, No. 61 (2007).  
166 Anderson, Mark M. and Andreas Huyssen, “Introduction”, New German Critique, No. 54 (1991), 
p. 3. 
167 Anderson and Huyssen, 1991, p. 4. 
 87 
variety in relation to the subjects discussed such variation is not evident in the critical 
approaches exercised by its contributors. With the possible exception of Karsten 
Witte’s paper on Kracauer’s career as a literary critic for the Frankfurter Zeitung, 
(which had been presented previously at a symposium at Tübingen University) which 
depicts the Frankfurter as a sober political agent, all of the texts included work to 
cultivate the notion of, what Patrice Petro terms, an “epistemological shift” in 
Kracauer’s work caused by the trauma of exile.168  
 
In her symposium article Hansen (now a permanent member of NGC’s editorial 
board) makes the identification of exile and Kracauer’s “self-definition as an 
intellectual” the explicit intent of her overview of Kracauer’s early writings.169 The 
idea of a “double homelessness” that she espouses in her study, a combination of 
psychological and social outsiderness first intimated by Jay as “extraterritoriality”, is 
proposed as being emblematic of Kracauer’s work as a whole. 170 As well as 
“restoring Kracauer’s complexity as an intellectual figure”, argues Hansen, an 
historical idea of exile also elucidates: 
 
the relevance of Kracauer’s early writings for current debates. For 
in their very historicity, their contradictions and ambivalences, they 
raise questions that touch on the dilemmas of mass culture in a 
postmodern age.171 
 
For Hansen, the cracked photograph of Kracauer pervades this edition of NGC 
operates as a “Denkbild” – a thought-image. This concept, one she adopts from 
Adorno and Benjamin, is a form of philosophical snapshot, a visual encoding of 
thought that operates as a form of critical epigram. Such a “condensed” and “poetic” 
visual form of philosophy, suggests Gerhard Richter, should be understood as, 
“conceptual engagements with the aesthetic and as aesthetic engagements with the 
conceptual, hovering between philosophical critique and aesthetic production”.172 
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Denkbild of Kracauer's photograph, proposes Hansen, “implies the vision of a 
modernity whose spell as progress is broken, whose disintegrated elements have 
become available for an emancipatory practice.173 
 
In conjunction with Hansen’s text, Koch contributes an essay on Kracauer’s 
conception of history that emphasises the role of exile and memory on his 
philosophical practice. Koch portrays Kracauer as an intellectual who never knew the 
“delights of ordinariness” and promotes a reading of his English language texts as a 
“historicophilosophical attempt to redeem historiography from the philosophy of 
history”, in which paradoxically history plays “only a marginal role”.174 In Koch’s 
view, referencing Adorno’s adage that “to write a poem after Auschwitz is 
barbaric”,175 Kracauer’s theory for a redemption of physical reality (the subtitle of 
Theory of Film) represents a work of theory that has reached its “intrinsic limits”.176 
How can film (or any art form) redeem a reality that is beyond any form of aesthetic 
representation? Any attempt to do so would render the absolutely abhorrent into an 
object of bourgeois consumption.177 “Kracauer's writings only address the 
experiences of mass annihilation marginally”, writes Koch, “but one cannot conclude 
from this that the isolated remarks and considerations should be treated as 
negligible”.178 For Koch, the strategy adopted by Kracauer in Theory of Film and his 
other American works, is one of survival, not just in relation to the practical concerns 
of writing in a politically charged social context (Witte) but also of personal 
psychological and emotional survival of someone who has experienced at first hand 
the horrors of National Socialism and exile.  
 
Heide Schlüpmann also addresses and develops this idea of Kracauer’s intellectual 
trajectory being informed by the contradictory forces at work in his theory of film. 
“His theory of film has two bases”, writes Schlüpmann, “one apparent, the other 
concealed: it reflects on film, and it reflects (on) the horror of National Socialism 
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mirrored in film”.179 His survival instinct, his “hope” for the continuation of life, she 
argues, competes with a cultural theory that seeks to negate social hierarchies 
founded on bourgeois notions of subjectivity that uses film to collapse the difference 
between people and things.180  For Schlüpmann, Weimar Kracauer’s emancipatory 
vision for film as an active social agent, its ability to circumscribe social hierarchies 
through the reproduction of nature as a mosaic of interchangeable phenomena, is 
rendered impotent when faced with its dialectical other, the dehumanisation of Nazi 
social engineering. It is Kracauer’s survival instinct, she concludes, that “prevents 
Theory of Film from reaching a conclusion that would confirm film as the mirror of a 
world devoid of people”.181  
 
If Koch’s and Schlüpmann’s contributions address the immanent dialectic of 
Kracauer’s early work on film (the “contradictions and ambivalences” proposed by 
Hansen in her essay), then Inka Mülder-Bach and Patrice Petro in their texts focus on 
the “historicity” of his late and unfinished theory of historiography in order to 
explore how Kracauer’s historical texts can be utilized as guides for what Hansen 
deems, “the dilemmas of mass culture in a postmodern age”.182 What is interesting 
about Mülder-Bach’s article, “History as Autobiography”, in this context, is not (as 
its title indicates) her repeated conflation on the theoretical and biographical but how 
she incorporates Kracauer’s late work, History: the last thing before the last, into the 
antagonistic symmetry of her previous studies of his corpus.183 For Mülder-Bach, 
Kracauer’s theory of history is the philosophical transformation of a sociological 
concept of “extraterritoriality” into a temporal one. Extraterritoriality, argues 
Mülder-Bach, “means not only a geographic no-mans-land but also and above all a 
historical one”.184 As a consequence, explains Mülder-Bach, “Kracauer’s historian 
proves by example” that the “‘inescapability’ of one’s own time is only ‘seeming’”, 
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that people do not entirely “belong” to their period. 185 The “nonhomogeneous 
structure” of Weimar culture that Kracauer mapped in Die Angestellten, for Mülder-
Bach, becomes the model for understanding our historical reality. Whereas Weimar 
society was presented by Kracauer as the product of the cultural transposition of the 
“middle” and “periphery” classes, so (urges Mülder-Bach), does postmodernity’s 
destabilization of concepts such as  “synchronicity” and “linearity” rehearse a 
comparable dialectical sublation of conventional notions of past and present.186 “On 
his [Kracauer’s] journey’s through the discontinuous times and heterogeneous spaces 
of the historical universe”, concludes Mülder-Bach, “there are always smugglers’ 
paths that lead into the open, coincidences that point to an exit, doors through which 
the improbable enters”.187 Such a path allows Mülder-Bach to connect the work of 
early Kracauer with that of late Kracauer and thus circumvent (and therefore leave 
intact) her negative interpretation of Kracauer’s English language work on film. 
 
3.8  The Two Kracauers Problem 
 
This idea of Kracauer’s late work being the dialectical sublation of the previous 
positive and negative phases of his work is reiterated and developed from an English 
language perspective by Patrice Petro in her exposition of the previously mentioned 
idea of an epistemological shift in his work. For Petro, despite the existence of 
counter arguments (such as Witte’s, who defends the position that “Kracauer’s 
writings exhibit a continuity of concerns”), there is a prevailing consensus in 
contemporary film studies around the notion that there are “two Kracauers”, “two 
successive and autonomous theories of cinema in the corpus of his film theory”.188 
This view, she explains: 
 
assumes that the inconsistencies in Kracauer’s writings constitute 
overwhelming evidence of a schism or epistemological shift in his 
thinking about film – a shift that separates the early, 
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improvisational essays of the 1920s from the later, academically 
imposing, studies of the post-War period.189 
 
In the context of English language film studies, argues Petro, the concept of an 
“epistemological shift” has an established pedigree. For example, David Bordwell’s 
1974 essay in Screen, “Eisenstein’s Epistemological Shift”, argues that Eisenstein’s 
writings on film aesthetics demonstrate a clear change in theoretical influences and 
concerns.190 “In Bordwell’s view,” states Petro; “Eisenstein’s later writings evidence 
a shift toward political conformity as well as a move from a practical engagement 
with film to a stance of isolated self-absorption”.191 For Petro, Elsaesser’s critical 
assessment of Kracauer’s late work operates in a “remarkably similar” way to 
Bordwell’s, in that it is reliant on “assumptions about intellectual responses to 
Stalinism and to communism in the cold war era”.192 The key to understanding the 
critical sustainability of such an assumption, suggests Petro, is to look at the “wider 
theoretical lineage” of the concept of the epistemological shift. 193 
 
The concept (in this context), argues Petro, has a dual origin. Firstly it can be traced 
to Althusser’s structuralist rereading of Marx, Pour Marx [For Marx, 1965] with its 
bifurcation of Marx’s work into a young, humanist phase and a mature, scientific 
phase.194 For Petro, Althusser’s concept of an epistemological shift in Marx, while 
“clearly an intellectual response to Stalinism and its cult of personality also finds 
parallels in assessments of other Marxist thinkers”.195 A notable precursor in this 
respect is the critical convention of splitting the intellectual development of the 
Hungarian philosopher and literary historian Georg Lukács into romantic anti-
capitalist and orthodox Marxist stages.196 Secondly, argues Petro, the idea of a 
biographical / intellectual schism is apparent in early manifestations of “auteur 
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criticism”, “which stresses the negative impact of American culture on various 
European directors’ careers”, for example the German filmmaker Fritz Lang.197 
Considered as “both a critical response to Stalinism and an uncritical embrace of 
American culture”, the idea of a shift in Kracauer's work, she suggests, can therefore 
be read as a composite of “both the Marxist critique and the auteurist legacy” in the 
academic discipline of Film Studies.198 With this shift of emphasis from Kracauer’s 
personal narrative on to that of narrative development of film studies as an academic 
discipline Petro does not deny that there is a definite change in Kracauer’s approach 
after 1941, just that the idea of a schism is equally a product of third party 
interpretation as it is of individual psychological reaction. There is, she states, “some 
question of whether we must speak of Kracauer’s epistemological shift, or rather, of 
an epistemological shift in Kracauer criticism”. 199 
 
What makes Petro’s perspective significant in the context of this review is how it 
appropriates the idea of the “two Kracauers”. For Petro, the “two Kracauers” trope is 
a product of Film Studies’ response to the appearance of English translations of his 
early work and is evidence, through its recourse to Althusser and auteur theory, of 
the “Francophile” character of the discipline.200 Further proof of this epistemological 
bias, she argues, is apparent in how the “revelation” (Elsaesser) of his Weimar texts, 
with their “critique of totality and concern for history” are framed in the context of 
“Baudrillard and Foucault”.201 It is ironic, Petro states: 
 
that the re-evaluation of Kracauer’s career has involved elaborate 
appeals to the authority of French traditions in criticism and theory, 
and that Kracauer’s later work continues to be criticized when it 
seems most overtly or most resolutely ‘German’.202 
 
Petro’s point of reference here is Andrew’s (and in turn Harcourt’s and Kael’s) 
interpretation of  “the formidable and formidably closed system represented by 
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Kracauer’s ponderously Teutonic thought”.203 Paradoxically, she argues, in 
functioning as a caricature, American Kracauer represents Film Studies’ cultural 
resistance to German theory. The proliferation in Film Studies’ of the “two 
Kracauers” trope, concludes Petro, with its retention of Andrew’s “pejorative 
assessment” of Kracauer, 204 is therefore not just the individual “reflection of a 
Francophile sentiment”, but indicative of the specific cultural dynamic that informs 
the “intellectual and historical origins of contemporary film theory”.205 No 
“attentive” reader of film theory since the 1960s, states Petro: 
 
would fail to miss its distinctly French orientation. From auteurism 
to post-structuralism, French traditions of thought have had the 
most significant influence on the development of Film Studies as 
an academic discipline, both in the United States and in Britain. To 
be sure, German theory has been enlisted along the way to expand 
the domain of a critical film theory. But it is Freud as read through 
Lacan, or Marx through Althusser, that has set the terms for the 
reception of German film theory. Even initial attempts to restore a 
phenomenological dimension to film study appealed to existential 
phenomenology rather than to critical theory, Merleau-Ponty and 
Sartre rather than Kracauer or Benjamin, in order to challenge the 
analytic and overtly scientific approach of early film structuralism 
and semiotics.206 
 
For Petro, with no comprehension of German theoretical traditions, it is of no 
surprise that those involved with the development and dissemination of Anglo-
American film theory have difficulty in understanding the connection between 
Kracauer’s final work and Benjamin’s seminal collection of essays on art, history 
and culture, Illuminations.207 It is also of no surprise, she adds, that those who 
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promote the idea of Kracauer’s writings exhibiting a turn away from dialectic 
thinking towards political conservatism cannot see “any relationship” between From 
Caligari to Hitler and Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment. 208 
 
As previously stated, exile plays a significant role in the majority of texts in this 
special edition of NGC and though Petro looks to de-emphasise the narrative aspects 
of enforced emigration through a criticism of approaches (such as Adorno’s) that 
view Kracauer’s “ideas as mere reflections of his time”, it still also plays a pivotal 
conceptual role in her analysis.209 Unlike Mülder-Bach’s Freudian interpretation that 
renders Kracauer a passive victim that sublimates his “fear of inescapability”210 into 
a drive to conform, Petro utilizes the work of the Palestinian–American literary 
theorist Edward Said (who was at Columbia at the time of the symposium) to 
reconfigure Kracauer’s experience of exile into a more “enabling” process.211  
 
Petro looks to Said’s work on the German Jewish literary historian Erich Auerbach, a 
friend of Kracauer’s who spent the war in Istanbul where he wrote his most 
influential work, Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature 
(1946).212 Auerbach’s exile in the “Orient”, argues Said, allowed him to “convert his 
sense of pain and alienation into a work of literary criticism whose insights derive 
not simply from the culture it describes [European] but also and more crucially, from 
a necessary and agonizing distance from it”.213 The same, suggests Petro, can be said 
for Kracauer whose own exile texts (From Caligari to Hitler and Theory of Film) 
share not only Auerbach’s “commitment to a realist aesthetic” but also exhibit “the 
similar effects” of their places of refuge.214 “If Istanbul was a particularly intense 
form of exile for a literary critic like Auerbach”, comments Petro, “so too, was the 
United States a deeply resonant experience for a film theorist like Kracauer”.215 
American cinema, explains Petro, represented “not merely an alternative to European 
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filmmaking but also the very ethos of consumer capitalism that threatened to 
overtake and subsume other national traditions”. 216  
 
In the context of NGC’s previous Kracauer publications and its work on Weimar 
cinema theory, Petro’s espousal of a mode of exile that is not passive but active 
(“enabling”) marks a significant development. As well as working to accentuate the 
machinations of cultural and philosophical homogeneity from a position that 
“transcends national boundaries”, this enabled mode of exile explicated by Petro 
clearly asserts itself as a model for the reconfiguration of German theory and Film 
Studies that goes beyond Elsaesser’s more modest claims for a renewed approach to 
national cinema. “When read separately”, suggests Petro, From Caligari to Hitler 
and Theory of Film “tend to suggest a one-dimensional, one-sided and impoverished 
account of the relationship between institutional constraints and perceptual 
possibilities in the cinema and in history”.217 However, “[t]aken together”, she 
argues, they “constitute a complex dialectical view of the cinema such as one finds 
theorised in his early writings”.218 Kracauer’s late work, History, as Mülder-Bach has 
argued, forces us to reconsider their relationship, not just to each but also in relation 
to the early and mature phases of his work. For Petro, History is the dialectical 
synthesis of immanent antagonisms that inform Kracauer’s early radicalism. 
Kracauer distilled these antithetic tendencies in his exile work with a view to their 
dialectical subsumption in History. This personal intellectual strategy, argues Petro, 
is analogous to film theory’s division of its French and German (aesthetic and social) 
traditions (what Elsaesser identifies as the bifurcation of film and cultural theory). As 
with Kracauer’s approach, concludes Petro, so can these currently antagonistic 
(national) tendencies be dialectically synthesised in the concept an extraterritorial 
cinema theory. 
 
3.9  Revealing the Hidden Legacies of Siegfried Kracauer 
 
Kracauer’s History: the last things before the last, edited by the Renaissance scholar 
(Kracauer’s friend and colleague) Paul Oskar Kristeller, was originally published in 
                                                
216 Petro, 1991, p. 131. 
217 Petro, 1991, p. 138. 
218 Petro, 1991, p. 138. 
 96 
1969, three years after Kracauer’s death. It was published in Germany (translated by 
Witte) in 1971 as part of the first instalment of Suhrkamp’s Kracauer Schriften. With 
the renewed interest in his work initiated by the events organized to commemorate 
his centenary a paperback edition was printed in 1994 with a new preface by 
Kristeller. In this text, Kristeller applauds the work of the archive in Marbach for 
arranging the touring exhibition of Kracauer’s Nachlaß and the initiative of 
Anderson and Huyssen to bring it to Columbia (where Kristeller was based). He also 
mentions the bibliography of Kracauer’s work by Thomas Levin, the full version of 
which was published by the Schiller Museum in Marbach in 1989, and the special 
issue of NGC (1991).219 To this overview of recent activity Kristeller adds the 
following qualification: 
 
While I am pleased with the rediscovery of Kracauer by a new 
generation of scholars, I see a series of problems in their attempts 
to adjust the thinking, writing, and character of Kracauer to their 
own theories. Especially dismaying to this new generation of 
scholars is the notion that Kracauer adopted some of his ideas from 
outside the Frankfurt School. His last work showed a particularly 
clear divergence from the sociological approach of the Frankfurt 
School.220 
 
The two texts that Kristeller picks out as indicative of this adjustment are Koch’s 
article of exile and memory in Kracauer’s late work and Mülder-Bach’s 
autobiographical interpretation of History. Neither of these texts, complains 
Kristeller: 
 
summarize the book nor indicate that its content fundamentally 
differs from his earlier writings. Their footnotes cite only books 
and articles unknown to Kracauer and refer to Kracauer’s earlier 
books as if the book on history were in complete agreement with 
them. They also fail to indicate that Kracauer, in the footnotes and 
bibliography of this book, cites for the most part historical, 
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philological, and philosophical sources, never mentions his earlier 
writings, and very seldom refers to the sociologists that 
predominate in his earlier work. And worst of all, they imply and 
even state that history was not his major concern.221 
 
Koch addresses the relationship between exile and memory and why Kracauer sought 
to break with his past in her monograph on Kracauer published in 1996. In Kracauer 
zur Einführung [Kracauer: an Introduction, 2000], 222  Koch fashions the idea of an 
epistemological shift into a notion of a “dual structure of knowledge” (contemplation 
/ interpretation, passive / active) that from childhood informed his interest in 
“reading the world of objects contemplated as a picture”.223 Koch (like Adorno) 
traces this notion back to his childhood experiences of living simultaneously in two 
households, that of his father and that of his uncle (his father’s brother). For Koch, 
this domestic duplication formulated in Kracauer a sense of belonging to two 
realities that in turn affected how he intellectually approached the adult world. This 
idea of a duality in Kracauer’s critical consciousness, though affording Kracauer an 
element of agency, leaves intact an image of Kracauer being fundamentally 
estranged from any form of reality (physical, social etc.) and again codifies his 
notion of extraterritoriality existentially. 
 
Hansen also explores the concept of a duality in Kracauer’s work in different but 
equally significant ways in her introduction to Theory of Film that examines the early 
manuscript drafts for his study of the cinematic. In Hansen’s text, initially an article 
published in 1993, the idea of a trauma induced epistemological shift and Koch’s 
reading of Kracauer’s work as a “constitutive surface […] which itself has no center” 
is combined in the concept of the “palimpsest”.224 A palimpsest is a manuscript on 
which the original writing has been effaced to make room for new writing but of 
which traces of the previous script remain. 225 In her introduction, Hansen presents 
reproductions of pages of various manuscripts from different phases of Kracauer’s 
                                                
221 Kracauer, 1995, p. ix. 
222 Koch, Gertrud, Kracauer zur Einführung (Hamburg: Junius, 1996).  
223 Koch, Gertrud, Siegfried Kracauer: An Introduction, translated by Jeremy Gaines (Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2000), p. 6. 
224 Hansen, 1997, p. xxxv. 
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 98 
development of his “book on film aesthetics”, ranging from 1940 to 1949.226 From 
the earliest notes and drafts she highlights critical themes and motifs that are 
prominent concerns in his earlier Weimar reviews and then charts their erasure from 
the subsequent versions of the manuscript.  
 
Recently in cultural anthropology, in particular post-colonial studies, the idea of the 
palimpsest has become a key concept for understanding how the past relates to 
contemporary social relations.227 As Ashcroft, Griffiths, and Tiffin explain: 
 
The concept of the palimpsest is a useful way of understanding the 
developing complexity of culture, as previous 'inscriptions' are 
erased and overwritten, yet remain as traces within present 
consciousness. This confirms the dynamic, contestatory and 
dialogic nature of linguistic, geographic, and cultural space as it 
emerges in post-colonial experience.228 
 
Though traceable back to Baudelaire and the Romantic prose of the 19th century, this 
particular model of dynamic exchange between memory and perception is one that to 
an extent is derived from Freud’s development of the palimpsest in an essay from 
1925, “The Mystic Writing Pad”.229 This short text came to the attention of a wider 
scholarly audience through the work of French Algerian philosopher Jacques Derrida 
who argued that Freud’s work provided a model for a fluid conception of 
intertextuality in which the axiom of authorial autonomy is called into question. For 
Derrida, Freud’s version of the palimpsest, as an interplay between potentially 
infinite layers of discourse, was itself discursive proof of the significant role of 
language, and in particular writing, in shaping how we experience the world. From 
here, Derrida went on to argue that our consideration of being is itself one mediated 
                                                
226 Hansen, 1997, p. xiv. 
227 For a critique of the current vogue for memory studies in anthropology see, Berliner, David C., 
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history of ideas about the mind, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 7 – 23. 
 99 
through the act of writing.230  Before her article on Theory of Film, Hansen had 
already argued for a correlation between Derrida’s and Kracauer’s reading of the 
social environment 231 and through the presentation of Theory of Film as a palimpsest 
she promotes a reading of the text as damaged surface (like the cracked photograph 
of Kracauer) through whose fractures and gaps “earlier layers” are now partially 
visible. 232 As it appears today, argues Hansen, Theory of Film is still “fully worth 
reading and fully relevant to a material aesthetics of cinema today”, however it is the 
“virtual” 233 first version that “furnishes a bridge” to his Weimar writings.234 
Hansen’s preference for this “virtual” version of the text is clear and her introduction 
works like an archaeological guide that seeks to shift the reader’s focus past the 
“post-apocalyptic landscape” of the text’s surface towards the remnants of its radical 
precursor hidden below.235 Hansen presents this first Theory of Film, this European 
version as the swan song of Weimar culture, its late work in which (what 
Schlüpmann calls) his “radical love of cinema”236 coexists with the ominous shadow 
of the impending Holocaust. “The eschatological urgency of his early essays”, writes 
Hansen, “gives way to a different temporality: film is no longer the medium of self 
reflecting, self-sublating, self-destructing modernity as the vanishing point of history 
but rather figures as the episteme of a postmodern, post metaphysical, post 
anthropocentric universe of death”.237 
 
Karsten Witte died in 1995, the same year that Thomas Levin published his English 
language translation of Kracauer’s collection of Weimar essays, The Mass 
Ornament.238 NGC’s special issue on “Nazi Cinema”, published in 1998 acts as a 
commemorative issue for the critic and included an article by him as well as a series 
of obituaries by among others Rentschler and Hansen. NGC continued to explore 
issues related to New German Cinema and Weimar visual culture in the period after 
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Witte’s death, though contributions on Kracauer are on the whole absent. This is not 
to say that interest in his work in English language studies was starting to wane. The 
second half of the decade marks a period in which work on Kracauer starts to be 
produced by critics unconnected with Witte and his associates and outside of the 
American English – German critical dichotomy articulated in the pages of NGC.239 
However, regardless of their approach, all of these texts during this period focused 
exclusively on Kracauer’s Weimar period, presenting the German critic as a distinct 
historical entity set apart from the American author of the same name. An English 
translation by Quintin Hoare of Die Angestellten was published in 1997 as The 
Salaried Masses (with an introduction by Mülder-Bach),240 and the entry on 
Kracauer in the British Film Institutes’ Companion to German Film (1999), written 
by Elsaesser, mentions the “frequently criticised” English language texts only briefly 
and focuses instead on Kracauer as “one of Weimar Germany’s major film 
critics”.241 
 
As the influence of cultural studies was broadening the remit of film theory into 
cinema theory, so by 2000 was Kracauer’s reputation as a film theorist becoming 
augmented into that of a more comprehensive cultural critic. In books such as Janet 
Ward’s, Weimar Surfaces (2001) and in articles by Courtney Federle and Jerry 
Zaslove, his film theory, when mentioned, is interpreted as being part of a larger 
cultural philosophy with the cinema afforded no exceptional status amidst the myriad 
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other forms of Weimar visual culture. 242 During this period national distinctions in 
English language Kracauer scholarship also started to become apparent.  
 
In 2002, a conference on Kracauer was organised by the School of Cultural Studies 
at the University of Birmingham. The school was founded by the pioneer of British 
cultural studies, Richard Hoggart as The Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies 
in 1964. Four years later, the cultural theorist and sociologist Stuart Hall became the 
centre’s director. Hall’s 1973 text, Encoding and Decoding in the Television 
Discourse initiated a new critical paradigm in reception theory, and helped to secure 
the Centre’s international reputation as being at the forefront of British scholarship. 
However, by 2002 financial problems prompted the University to restructure its 
academic departments and the school was shut down in June of that year.243 After its 
closure, Jan Campbell, the conference’s organiser, was relocated to the English 
department where the conference finally took place on the 13th and 14th September, 
2002. As Esther Leslie notes in her conference report, this administrative instability 
influenced the character of the event with Miriam Hansen, Gertrud Koch and 
Thomas Levin all withdrawing from proceedings.244 Though adversely affecting the 
impact and visibility of the conference at the time, another consequence of the 
absence of the scholars associated with NGC’s approach to Kracauer, is the 
distillation of the German / American perspective from a larger English language 
approach to his work.  
 
Though the majority of contributions, later printed as articles in a special issue of the 
British based journal New Formations (2007), focus primarily on Kracauer’s Weimar 
period with only a contextualizing nod to the later work, there are a few exceptions 
that look to American Kracauer from a perspective distinct from that associated with 
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NGC.245 What sets these texts apart is that, although the work of Hansen and Koch 
provide definite points of reference in all the published studies, they examine their 
source material (to a varying degree) from outside of the dialectic of 
extraterritoriality. For example, in texts such as Campbell’s psychoanalytical analysis 
of From Caligari to Hitler, Elsaesser’s flattening of theoretical ambitions of 
Kracauer’s 1947 book into a transitional marker is challenged through a reading of 
the text as a critical cipher of Kracauer’s Weimar studies into what she denotes as the 
“hysterical estrangement” and “bodily contingency” of distraction.246 Graeme 
Gilloch and Jaeho Kang’s analysis of the Institute for Social Research’s abandoned 
“test film project” also questions the image of Kracauer’s time in New York as one 
of existential and cultural dislocation. For Gilloch and Kang, From Caligari to Hitler 
is representative of a period of production in which Kracauer was in constant 
dialogue with the Horkheimer and Pollock about the social and critical function of 
film and the need for “urgent political intervention”.247 Where Kracauer’s work in 
German is examined, as with articles by Esther Leslie and Steve Giles, it is done so 
from the perspective of a European modernist tradition that looks to Lukács and 
Brecht before Marcuse and Lowenthal.248 
 
The reverse perspective that New Formation’s special issue represents (its 
interpretation of Kracauer’s Weimar work from the viewpoint of his American 
books) is most clearly presented in Janet Harbord’s text on the critical role of 
contingency in Kracauer’s Theory of Film.249 Sharing Witte’s contention that 
Kracauer’s work demonstrates a continuance of critical concerns, Harbord reads his 
sustained emphasis on “indeterminacy”, “the fortuitous and the accidental” as a 
questioning of “intentionality and individual agency”.250 Like Schlüpmann’s early 
texts, Harbord’s approach is primarily philosophical; initially framing her reading of 
Kracauer’s film theory in the context of the work of Nietzsche she later develops her 
                                                
245 Campbell, Jan (ed.), New Formations, No. 61 (Summer 2007). 
246 Campbell, Jan,  “Are Your Dreams Wishes or Desires? Hysteria as Distraction and Character in the 
Work of Siegfried Kracauer”, New Formations, No. 61 (2007), pp. 132 – 148. 
247 Gilloch, Graeme and Jaeho Kang, “Below the Surface: Siegfried Kracauer's 'Test-film' Project”, 
New Formations, No. 61 (2007), p. 160. 
248 Leslie, Esther, “Kracauer’s Weimar Geometry and Geomancy”, New Formations, No. 61 (2007), 
pp. 34- 48. Giles, Steve, “Making Visible, Making Strange: Photography and Representation in 
Kracauer, Brecht and Benjamin”, New Formations, No. 61 (2007), pp. 64 – 75. 
249 Harbord, Janet, “Contingency's Work: Kracauer's Theory of Film and the Trope of the Accidental”, 
New Formations, No. 61 (2007), pp. 90 – 103. 
250  Harbord, 2007, p. 90. 
 103 
analysis in relation to the work on photography and film by Roland Barthes and Paul 
Virilio. Though these critical models are French, Harbord is not (as Petro has argued) 
looking for academic legitimacy for Kracauer’s work through its acculturation into a 
well established theoretical tradition foreign to it, but looks to present his work on 
film as the expression of an alternative and parallel mode of thought that exists 
alongside but apart from the received narratives of modern philosophy and film 
studies.  
 
What is also significant about the Birmingham conference is that it marks the end of 
the Kracauer renaissance.  By 2002, Leslie reports, “news from Germany […] is not 
good”: 
 
Kracauer’s work is mainly out of print, the future of the selected 
works uncertain (the volumes that have already been published are 
remaindered), and the many unpublished manuscripts and letters – 
are likely to remain there and there alone.251 
 
Although the belated publication in 2007 of the Birmingham conference does not 
mark the complete cessation of interest in Kracauer it does mark a period of 
consolidation in the image of him as an extraterritorial cultural theorist.  Aside from 
Quaresima’s attempt to give the debate about the reception of From Caligari to 
Hitler a definite temporal and geographical perspective (by looking at its impact on 
post-War Italian scholars and critics), NGC’s image of Kracauer as existentially 
exiled continues to influence the majority of published studies of the writer.252 For 
example, Tara Forrest’s 2007 The Politics of Imagination, an examination of 
Benjamin, Kracauer and Kluge, though including a much-needed English language 
introduction to Kluge’s television work, is more exposition than critique of Hansen’s 
texts from the 1980s.253  
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One notable exception to this pattern is Edward Dimenberg’s examination of 
Kracauer’s work in relation to film noir.254 Though a friend and colleague of Jay, 
Frisby, Rentschler and Hansen, his cultural studies approach to urban history as 
represented in Hollywood crime movies of the 1940s demonstrates a critical 
perspective distinct from his peers, not just in content (it looks to Kracauer’s English 
language reviews of the 1940s) but in relation to his spatial (as opposed to temporal) 
concerns and their relationship to the work of the French sociologist Henri 
Lefebvre.255 In a similar way to Harbord, Dimendberg expands the frame of 
reference for Kracauer scholarship beyond the usual Frankfurt school / exile structure 
and in turn presents to those approaching his work for the first time (and not 
necessarily from a film studies perspective) the image of his thought as open and 
dynamic critical process rather than a closed philosophical system.  In the 2006 
collection, Philosophy and Film Noir, Paul A. Cantor adopts a comparable strategy 
by reading Edgar Ulmer’s film Detour (1945) from the perspective of Dialectic of 
Enlightenment. 256 Though Dimendberg’s and Cantor’s interpretation of Kracauer 
and the Frankfurt School may not be as original or radical as Hansen’s or 
Schlüpmann’s (particularly in relation to the German language texts), what their 
work demonstrates (and in this respect I include Harbord’s) is that once again 
Kracauer has become a figure around which a process of intellectual cross 
fertilization is attempting to take place. Where it was film studies and cultural studies 
in the 1980s / 90s now the focus is on a hybridisation of film studies and philosophy. 
 
Hansen acknowledges this latest phase in the reinvention of Kracauer (though 
somewhat obliquely) in her last book, Cinema and Experience (2012). This book, a 
summary of her work on cinema and the Frankfurt School, re-articulates the 
arguments presented previously in NGC. However, towards the end of her chapter on 
Kracauer (in which she restates her idea of Theory of Film as a palimpsest) she 
writes: 
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What Theory of Film offers us today, I contend, is not a theory of 
cinematic realism, but a theory of film experience and, more 
generally, of cinema as a sensory-perceptual matrix of experience – 
a project that links Kracauer on this side of the Atlantic with 
Robert Warshow and Stanley Cavell. His concept of experience, 
though, is still inflected with the debate surrounding the category 
in the German context, in particular in the writings of Benjamin 
and Adorno. It may not be as radically ambivalent as Benjamin’s, 
yet it is just as deeply bound up with the history – and barely 
overcome crisis – of modernity. What is more, the book seeks to 
theorize film as a paradigmatic mode of experiencing, of 
encountering and discovering, the world in the wake of and beyond 
that historical crisis.257 
 
As has been examined in a recent text by Johannes von Moltke, Kracauer was a close 
friend of the American critic Robert Warshow in the early 1950s so a comparison 
between his work on the “immediate experience” of the film spectator and 
Kracauer’s project by Hansen here is not surprising.258 However, what is more 
revealing in this context is the comparison between Kracauer and Cavell. As I will 
examine later in this study, Cavell is often cited as a pioneer of film-philosophy and 
Hansen’s reference here can be read as an acknowledgement of Kracauer’s tentative 
inclusion into a provisional film-philosophy canon. Despite the fact that Hansen’s 
shares an identification of the cinematic as a mode of experience with (certain 
versions) of film-philosophy her assertion of the “German context” of Kracauer’s 
critical (traumatic) experience demonstrates the same fear of acculturation that Petro 
describes in her essay on Kracauer’s epistemological shift. Hansen’s own late work 
in this respect is intellectually defensive, as it looks to protect the advances in the 
relationship between German theory and film theory that she and others associated 
with Karsten Witte worked hard to promote in the previous decades. Such a fear of 
subsumption into an alien critical tradition paradoxically renders her dialectical 
interpretation of Kracauer’s extraterritorial subjectivity into a closed system 
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impervious to external forces, as Adorno said of Kracauer: “The man who had no 
skin grew himself a coat of mail”.259  
 
Evidence of this mixed approach to Kracauer’s work is even more apparent in a 
recent collection of essays Culture in the Anteroom: The legacies of Siegfried 
Kracauer edited by Gerd Gemunden and Johannes von Moltke (2012).260 As the title 
of the publication suggests, its approach (following that of the 2008 conference to 
which it relates) is an evaluation of the multifarious nature of Kracauer’s corpus with 
the “case for both the canonicity and the contemporaneity of Kracauer’s cultural 
critique” being made in relation to each of its many manifestations.261 Though the 
volume includes many interesting examinations into Kracauer’s personal 
relationships and the less well documented aspects of his work (for example his art 
criticism), it maintains a philosophised notion of exile as an axiom. The reason for 
this (and despite the inclusion of a revised version of Robnik’s Kracauer essay) is the 
inclusion of texts by Rentschler, Schlüpmann, Huyssen, Mülder-Bach and Hansen.  
Though admittedly giving the conference and publication a level of authority that is 
lacking from its earlier British counterpart (the Birmingham conference), what the 
inclusion of these Kracauer experts also does is promote the (cinema theory) idea of 
Kracauer as an exceptional subject. What is interesting about aspects of the New 
Formations publication in comparison (and what is also exhibited in Robnik’s 
approach) is how Kracauer, specifically Kracauer’s theory, becomes less 
extraordinary, is less about the power of (to use Mülder-Bach’s phrase) his “magic 
gaze” and how it exists as a theory amongst other theories.262 What is missing in this 
volume is a consciousness of its own reflexivity, that is recognition of the role of 
Hansen et al. in their construction of the contemporary image of Kracauer. As I shall 
discuss in more detail in subsequent chapters, what the film-philosophy approach 
brings to the subject of Kracauer is recognition of the role of the philosopher in 
constructing the object of their study.  
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3.10  Conclusion 
 
The motivation for this study is not to argue against Hansen for Kracauer’s place in 
the canon of film-philosophy but to re-examine her interpretation of Kracauer’s 
cinematic approach (as a “paradigmatic mode of experiencing, of encountering and 
discovering”) using the alternative perspective of film-philosophy as a critical 
framework. In this respect, I am not aiming to refashion Kracauer’s peculiar Weimar 
sociological reportage or his late historiography into a post-Deleuzian hybrid of film 
theory and cinema theory - cinematic-philosophy - but to use the questions that film-
philosophy poses of the cinema experience to look again at his cinematic approach in 
a way that avoids the limitations of an exile narrative.  
 
As previously noted, Elsaesser and Hagener state that any “new” theory “implicitly 
or explicitly” defines itself as such by addressing certain problems that though 
possibly explicated beforehand are shown to have not yet been resolved or at least 
explained “in a satisfactory manner”. 263 As Kracauer’s work becomes of interest to 
those promoting film-philosophy it is imperative that the erroneous conclusions that 
to some degree still exist in film studies in relation to Kracauer’s film theory, and 
which Witte, Hansen, Koch, and Elsaesser (to name a few) have worked to nullify, 
are not repeated and reanimated as another new critical tradition looks to gauge the 
peculiar relationship between Critical Theory and Film Studies. 
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CHAPTER 4:  
 
THE CONTEXT OF FILM-PHILOSOPHY 
 
4.1 Introduction   
 
In this chapter I will introduce and examine the idea of film-philosophy and the 
various perspectives on the critical relationship between film theory and philosophy 
that currently constitute it. I will focus in particular on the work of those that argue 
for a more fluid and interactive correlation between the two traditionally discrete 
modes of critical practice. It is my contention that by reviewing the dialogical 
process that currently informs what Thomas Wartenberg has labelled the “cinematic 
philosophy” debate  - the debate about film’s capacity to be “the original site at, on, 
in, or through which philosophy is done” - that the reflexive character of Kracauer’s 
cinematic approach can be potentially reactivated.1 The function of this examination 
is therefore not to identify film-philosophy’s conceptual origins in the work of 
Kracauer but to use its peculiar destabilisation of the film / theory relationship as the 
impetus with which to review certain aspects of Kracauer’s work outside of the 
existential narratives fashioned and consolidated by previous studies. 
 
4.2 The Provisional Nature of the Term Film-Philosophy 
 
The differences between philosophy and film theory as scholarly disciplines are 
many and various. If or how they can be combined in order to synthesise a new and 
distinct academic field of film-philosophy is a contentious issue for both those who 
accept or reject it as a possibility.  The conflicted nature of film-philosophy’s 
“double inheritance”, suggests Felicity Colman, is evident in the awkwardness of its 
name: 
 
The qualification of how the discipline of film-philosophy has been 
constituted and in its academic usage is to be found in the hyphen: 
the conjoining ‘and’ of film and philosophy. The hyphen represents 
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different meaning in different applications: it can be a proposition 
or a conjunction; it might argue for multiplicity or for singularity; 
or it might be posed as a presumption for or argument against 
various aspects of the two disciplines. How that conjunctive 
hyphen is practised becomes indicative of a particular aesthetic and 
politic of film-philosophy.2 
 
For Colman, the hyphen in film philosophy acts as a form of ellipsis, a neutral 
graphic marker that indicates a relationship without defining it. It is a necessity, she 
argues, that allows the debate to progress beyond the well-rehearsed interdisciplinary 
antagonisms that currently restrict it to a repetitive ontological dispute. In this sense, 
the awkwardness of the term “film-philosophy”- for those who adopt it - acts as a 
reminder of the work still to be done in understanding the relationship between film 
theory and philosophy. Of course, not everybody active in the debate is happy to 
adopt such a provisional term. In this chapter, using Wartenberg’s taxonomy of the 
numerous positions currently active in the film-philosophy debate as a guide, I will 
explore how various philosophers and film theorists have conceptualised the 
relationship between film and philosophy and in turn the critical use of the cinema 
experience.   
 
4.3 Wartenberg’s Tentative Typology of Cinematic Philosophy 
 
The “flourishing of philosophical attention” to film and the cinema since the 1990s, 
argue Murray Smith and Thomas Wartenberg, obscures the debate’s “long 
germination” and previous incarnations.3 “A great deal of philosophical writing on 
film”, they suggest, “has been pursued under the guise of ‘film theory’”.4As Smith 
and Wartenberg explain, starting with Hugo Münsterberg’s psychological study of 
The Photoplay in 1916, philosophical reflections on the “intellectual capacities” of 
film were initially inseparable from concerns relating to the legitimization of film as 
a “distinct art form”.5 Though Münsterberg’s study does not directly address the 
                                                
2 Colman, Felicity, “Introduction: What is Film-Philosophy?” in Felicity Colman (ed.), Film, Theory 
and Philosophy. The Key Thinkers (Durham: Acumen, 2009), p. 3. 
3 Smith, Murray and Thomas E. Wartenberg, “Introduction: Thinking through Cinema: Film as 
Philosophy”, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, Vol. 64, No. 1 (Winter, 2006), p. 1. 
4 Smith & Wartenberg, 2006, p. 1. 
5 Smith & Wartenberg, 2006, p. 1. 
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issue of “film as philosophy”, for Smith and Wartenberg, the historical debate over 
film as an art form (that Münsterberg helped initiate) “gave rise to a question, or 
cluster of questions, which bear a strong resemblance to the debate over film as 
philosophy”.6 For Münsterberg and subsequent film theorists such as Sergei 
Eisenstein who maintained that “art required a strong conceptual component”: 
 
the ability of film to render ideas – and not merely to record a 
moving image of the world – was the key to the claim that film was 
indeed a medium of art.7 
 
Though Eisenstein was not alone in his enthusiasm for demonstrating the intellectual 
capacity of film, argue Smith and Wartenberg, the issue became considerably less 
significant for critics after the development of synchronised sound. By the 1940s, 
when the French critics Andre Bazin and Alexandre Astruc were publishing their 
influential essays on the nature of film and critical film practice, the “battle” over 
film as art, “had been – or had been perceived to have been won” and with it, 
conclude Smith and Wartenberg, any pressing need to tackle overtly the problem of 
identifying film as the site for philosophical inquiry.8 
 
The legacy of Bazin’s critical approach to the medium, suggest Smith and 
Wartenberg, is clear in the development of the work of both Stanley Cavell and 
Gilles Deleuze, the two philosophers whom they identify as initiating the more recent 
phase of the film-philosophy debate.9 However, explain Smith and Wartenberg, 
though they share Bazin as an influence, their distinct perspectives (and those who 
                                                
6 Smith & Wartenberg, 2006, p. 1. 
7 Smith & Wartenberg, 2006, p. 1. 
8 Smith & Wartenberg, 2006, p. 2. For an example of Bazin’s philosophical film criticism see, Bazin, 
André, Bazin at Work: Major Essays and Reviews From the Forties and Fifties, translated by Alain 
Piette and Bert Cardullo (New York & London: Routledge, 1997).  Astruc’s most notable essay in this 
context is, Astruc Alexandre, “The Birth of a New Avant-Garde: La Camera-Stylo” in Peter Graham 
(ed.), The New Wave: Critical landmarks (London: Secker & Warburg and The British Film Institute, 
1968), pp. 17 – 24. 
9 Smith & Wartenberg (2006), p. 2. For evidence of Bazin’s influence of Cavell see: Cavell, Stanley, 
The World Viewed: Reflections on the Ontology of Film (Enlarged Edition), (Cambridge, Mass. & 
London: Harvard University Press, 1979), p. xxiii. For an account of Deleuze’s debt to Bazin, see, 
Beasley-Murray, Jon, “Whatever Happened to Neorealism? Bazin, Deleuze, and Tarkovsky's Long 
Take”, Iris, No. 23 (Spring 1997), pp. 37-52 also Deleuze, Gilles. Cinema 1: the movement image, 
translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (London: Athlone Press, 1992), p. 24 & p. 
153. 
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adopted and developed their approaches) are mutually exclusive and on the whole 
incompatible. For example, write Smith and Wartenberg: 
 
Where the emphasis in the Cavellian tradition lies on the ability of 
film to embody philosophical thought, albeit in distinctive ways, 
on recognised philosophical problems – scepticism and personal 
identity, for example – for Deleuze, the philosophical interest of 
film lies in its purported capacity to generate new philosophical 
concepts and problems. Moreover, while Deleuze does discuss 
individual films [like Cavell], his emphasis is often on the way 
these individual films are said to realize features and implications 
of the technology of film itself.10 
 
With such bifurcation at its conceptual origin it is heterogeneousness that is the 
defining characteristic of contemporary film-philosophy. 11 This is not to say that 
there is some commonality amidst its myriad and often antagonistic constituents. For 
example, what connects the work of Wartenberg to that of Robert Sinnerbrink and 
John Mullarkey (and what makes their approaches relevant in relation to Kracauer) is 
not a shared philosophical model or a common methodology but recognition of the 
destabilising effect film spectatorship has on existing conceptual frameworks. As I 
will demonstrate, for Wartenberg, Sinnerbrink and Mullarkey, none of whom adopt 
the term film-philosophy in their work, the hyphen that connects film-philosophy 
could be extended (film philosophy) in order to put both terms sous rature [under 
erasure – to use Heidegger’s term], and therefore highlight their mutual inadequacies 
as signifiers in relation to the cinema experience.12 
 
“[T]ruly successful criticism”, notes the American cultural critic Robert Warshow, 
starts with the critic acknowledging their “own relation to the object”13 that they 
criticize and Wartenberg’s “anything but disinterested” typology of film-philosophy 
                                                
10 Smith & Wartenberg, 2006, p. 2. 
11 Wartenberg, 2011, p. 9. 
12 For an introduction to Derrida’s usage of Heidegger’s concept in relation to post-structuralism and 
deconstruction see, Sarup, Madan, An Introductory Guide to Post-Structuralism and Postmodernism 
[1988] (Athens, Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 1993), pp. 32 – 56. 
13 Warshow, Robert, The Immediate Experience. Movies, Comics, Theatre and Other Aspects of 
Popular Culture  [1962], revised edition (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 
2002), p. xl. 
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is certainly testament to this approach.14 What Wartenberg seeks to establish in his 
“cinematic philosophy thesis” is the possibility that films are “capable of actually 
doing or being philosophy”.15 However, there are some critics, he concedes, who 
“have objected to this claim on the grounds that films cannot do philosophy, for only 
people can do philosophy”.16 This objection, suggests Wartenberg, “misses the 
point”: 
 
When I or others support the possibility of cinematic philosophy by 
claiming that some films actually do philosophy, that is a 
shorthand way of saying that some filmmakers have philosophized 
by means of their films, so that philosophy has been done in, on, or 
through film, just as it can be done, of course, has been done by 
having a conversation, by presenting a paper, or by writing a book 
or an article.17 
 
In formulating the problem this way Wartenberg’s approach reveals itself as being a 
development of Cavell’s in that he avoids “adopting a contested view of 
philosophy.”18 However, as he goes on to explain, his notion of film’s conceptual 
ability is not as “extreme” as his predecessor’s.19 In his 2007 Thinking on Screen, 
Wartenberg characterizes his more “moderate” approach to the possibility of 
cinematic philosophy as a “local – that is, particular and empirical” procedure whose 
main objective is not the systematic presentation of a cinematic philosophy but to 
simply “stake a claim” for its existence.20 “The metaphor of staking a claim”, he later 
concludes, “is, I think, an apt one, for I saw myself then as one of the first explorers 
of a nearly virgin territory whose outlines were vague at best”.21  
 
For Wartenberg, the self appointed cartographer of this terra nova, there are four 
distinct positions that have been adopted on the issue of the existence of film-
                                                
14 Wartenberg, 2011, p. 9. 
15 Wartenberg, 2011, p. 9. 
16 Wartenberg, 2011, p. 9. 
17 Wartenberg, 2011, p. 10. 
18 Wartenberg, 2011, p. 22. 
19 Wartenberg, 2011, p. 13. 
20 Wartenberg, Thomas E., Thinking on Screen: Film as Philosophy (London & New York: 
Routledge, 2007), p. 28. 
21 Wartenberg, 2011, p. 22. 
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philosophy. Firstly, the one promoted by Cavell and his followers such as Stephen 
Mulhall, which he calls “the extreme pro-cinematic philosophy” position.22 
According to this approach, explains Wartenberg, there is no discernable difference 
between film and “the more traditional linguistic media of conversation and 
writing”.23 For instance, writes Wartenberg, Mulhall asserts that “films embody 
philosophical thinking” in two ways. As well as being able to “deal” with the same 
philosophical issues as more conventional modes of philosophy, films also exist “in 
the state of philosophy”, that is “film exhibits the same self-reflexive concern about 
its own possibility as a cultural form” which, Mulhall argues, is a defining 
characteristic of philosophy as an intellectual discipline.24 As Mulhall states in On 
Film (2002):  
 
films are not philosophy’s raw material, nor a source for its 
ornamentation; they are philosophical exercises, philosophy in 
action – film as philosophizing.25 
 
To Wartenberg’s “extreme pro-cinematic philosophy” position can also be added the 
work of the previously mentioned Daniel Frampton, whose concept of “filmosophy” 
offers a complete synthesis of film and philosophy (negating the provisional 
character of film-philosophy by developing Deleuze’s analogy between the 
technologically mediated processes of filming and thinking) .26 Also that of Simon 
Critchley, whose assertion that to “read from cinematic language to some 
philosophical metalanguage” is to “miss what is specific to the medium of film” 
clearly echoes Mulhall’s identification of filmmaking and philosophical practice.27 
 
At the opposite end of the spectrum, advocating (for Wartenberg) the “extreme anti-
cinematic philosophy” position is the work of Murray Smith and Paisley Livingston. 
In his 2006 article, “Film Art, Argument and Ambiguity”, Smith, though not denying 
a relationship between film and philosophy, takes issue with Mulhall’s bold thesis 
                                                
22 Mulhall, Stephen, On Film (Abingdon & New York: Routledge, 2008). 
23 Wartenberg, 2011, p. 13. 
24 Wartenberg, 2011, p. 13. 
25 Mulhall, 2008, p. 2.  
26 Frampton, Daniel, Filmosophy (London & New York: Wallflower Press, 2006), p. 7. 
27 Critchley, Simon, “Calm – On Terrence Malick’s The Thin Red Line”, in Read, R. and J. 
Goodenough (eds.), Film as Philosophy: Essays on Cinema After Wittgenstein and Cavell, edited 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 139. 
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that “films can inhabit the territory of human self-reflection in the same way as 
philosophy”.28 For Smith, film is an artform and as such has a very different 
character to philosophy. He agrees with Mulhall that film and philosophy can share 
the same issues and themes but argues this similarity is superficial as even if an 
identical trope is adopted by both they would have entirely different functions and 
results. While it can be imagined that philosophy can exhibit the same abstract 
properties as an artwork (for example: complexity, ingenuity, inventiveness, density, 
ambiguity and profundity), Smith questions whether “we would value them in just 
the same way”.29 As he explains in his article on the intellectual capacity of film art, 
the key concept in this regard is ambiguity: 
 
The meaning and experience that works of art typically create is 
one characterized by sufficient complexity and indirection that it 
resists restatement or "paraphrase" in clear and unequivocal terms. 
In other words, no matter how "philosophical" the theme of a 
narrative, to the extent that it is designed as an artwork, it is apt to 
put a spanner in the philosophical works […] Few criticisms are 
more apt to strike terror into the heart of the philosopher than the 
assertion that such-and-such a proposition is "ambiguous," while in 
the world of art the term is more apt to be used as a term of 
praise.30 
 
In parallel to Smith, Paisley Livingston develops a comparable criticism of Mulhall’s 
expansion on Cavell’s approach to film by arguing that the medium has no unique 
ability to present philosophical ideas beyond conventional literary modes and that it 
should only be considered of heuristic interest to philosophers. “Films”, he asserts, 
“can provide vivid and emotionally engaging illustrations of philosophical issues, 
and when sufficient background knowledge is in place, reflections about films can 
contribute to the exploration of specific theses and arguments, sometimes yielding 
enhanced philosophical understanding”.31 For Livingston, the notion that “film’s 
                                                
28 Smith, Murray, “Film Art, Argument, and Ambiguity”, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 
Vol. 64, No. 1 (Winter, 2006), p. 33. 
29 Smith, 2006, p. 40. 
30 Smith, 2006, p. 40. 
31 Livingston, Paisley, “Theses on Cinema as Philosophy, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 
Vol. 64, No. 1 (Winter, 2006), p. 11. 
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philosophically innovative contribution can be made by exclusively cinematic 
devices” is erroneous because it avoids addressing the simple but fundamental 
paradox that underlies the idea of the incommensurability of cinematic philosophy.32 
This “dilemma”, as Livingston presents it, is as follows: 
 
If it is contended that the exclusively cinematic insight cannot be 
paraphrased, reasonable doubt arises with regard to its very 
existence. If it is granted, on the other hand, that the cinematic 
contribution can and must be paraphrased, this contention is 
incompatible with arguments for a significantly independent, 
innovative, and purely "filmic" philosophical achievement, as 
linguistic mediation turns out to be constitutive of (our knowledge 
of) the epistemic contribution a film can make.33 
 
The doubt that Livingston casts on the existence of such a pure form of cinematic 
philosophy therefore relates not just to its supposed transcendence of linguistic media 
but also to the subjective nature of its critical reception. “If the ‘properly cinematic’ 
contribution to philosophy can be referred to but not stated with words”, he 
concludes, “proponents of a bold epistemic thesis have to fall back on appeals to an 
indescribable cinematic je ne sais quoi that they believe they have experienced, in 
the hope that others may have a similar experience and come to agree that 
philosophical insight or understanding has been manifested in a film”.34 
 
Between these two extreme classifications of what constitutes film-philosophy, 
argues Wartenberg, there exist more moderate variants. For example, he suggests, 
Bruce Russell’s work on the “philosophical limits of film” presents a “moderate anti-
cinematic philosophy” position.35  For Russell, film can operate philosophically but 
its contribution to philosophy as an intellectual discipline is limited. In the context of 
philosophy, argues Russell, films are essentially facilitators. Cinema supports 
philosophy, he explains, by presenting “counterexamples to putative necessary 
truths”, re-familiarising philosophers with pre-existing approaches, and motivating 
                                                
32 Livingston, 2006, p. 11. 
33 Livingston, 2006, p. 12. 
34 Livingston, 2006, p. 13. 
35 Wartenberg, 2011, p. 15. 
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“us to find out what we don’t know, or reconsider what we think we know”. 36  For 
Russell, filmmaking is not philosophizing (in Mulhall’s sense of the word) but a tool 
that assists its development. In this regard, the film camera is analogous to that of the 
microscope or telescope in that it not only broadens our experience of the world 
(“philosophy’s raw material” – Mulhall) but also opens up new areas into which the 
intellect can grow. 
 
Wartenberg’s own cinematic philosophy adopts a similarly moderate position but 
from a more pro-cinematic philosophy perspective. Taking elements from the three 
positions previously introduced he argues that though disparate in nature, 
philosophically they all exhibit a curiously narrow understanding of the film medium 
itself. In the first instance, argues Wartenberg, when a film illustrates an existent 
philosophy through a combination of narrative and cinematic techniques it is 
potentially doing philosophy. “Virtually everyone writing on the possibility of 
cinematic philosophy”, states Wartenberg, “no matter what theoretical position they 
endorse, has admitted that films have this capacity while denigrating films that 
‘merely’ illustrate a philosophical theory as not being genuine instances of cinematic 
philosophy”.37 Though this maybe true of films that try only to articulate a theory in 
an objective and dispassionate way, he contests, it is not correct for those examples 
that strive to cinematically interpret and re-contextualize certain aspects of a 
philosophical text. Such films, argues Wartenberg, “should be credited with doing 
philosophy, just as we credit the historian of philosophy with doing philosophy when 
she comes up with a new interpretation of an important philosopher’s views.” 38 
 
Another way in which Wartenberg argues that film is “being the original site at, on, 
in, or through which philosophy is done” is in relation to the philosophical thought 
experiment.39 The thought experiment in philosophy is a long established literary 
device in the Western philosophical tradition. “To perform a thought experiment”, 
explains Tamar Szabó Gendler, “is to reason about an imaginary scenario with the 
                                                
36 Russell, Bruce, “Film’s Limits: The Sequel”, Film and Philosophy, No. 12 (2008), p. 1. 
37 Wartenberg, 2011, p. 17. 
38 Wartenberg, 2011, p. 17. The examples that Wartenberg gives in this context are Eternal Sunshine 
of the Spotless Mind (Michel Gondry, USA, 2004) and Alien (Ridley Scott, USA, 1979). Wartenberg 
develops his argument about interpretive illustrations in Chapter 3 of Wartenberg, 2007, pp. 32 – 54. 
39 Wartenberg, 2011, p. 11. 
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aim of confirming or disconfirming some hypothesis or theory”.40 “The idea here”, 
suggests Wartenberg, is that the “imaginary worlds” presented to us by some fiction 
films can be understood as playing “the same role” as those “conjured” by the 
narratives of philosophical thought experiments.41 An early example of a thought 
experiment is the “Allegory of the Cave” from Plato’s The Republic (380 BCE). 
During the explication of his metaphysics of form, Plato makes an analogy between 
our belief in the reality of physical objects and that of prisoners in a cave who, 
restrained in a peculiar fashion with their backs to a concealed fire, mistake the 
shadows that fall on the opposite wall (cast by others entering and leaving the prison) 
to be wholly substantial and autonomous entities. Plato’s elaborate description of this 
unsettling shadow theatre is an attempt to articulate (amongst other things) his claim 
that the ordinary objects of everyday experience, from a metaphysical point of view, 
are as insubstantial as the shadows perceived by the fictitious prisoners. 42 
 
Wartenberg’s appropriation of the thought experiment looks not only to endow the 
narrative of a film with a critical philosophical function (for example, he argues that 
Woody Allen’s Crimes and Misdemeanours (USA, 1989) presents a counterexample 
to the Socratic thesis “that evildoers cannot attain happiness” 43) but also to remind 
philosophers of the important function they have played in the articulation of abstract 
theory.  For Wartenberg, a film-philosophical thought image does not question the 
nature of the relationship between images and thought (as Plato’s does) but renders a 
humdrum narrative device cinematic; in other words, it enhances the thought 
experiment’s impact by making it more vivacious.  Those that argue against a 
cinematic conception of the thought image (such as Murray Smith), proposes 
Wartenberg, are doing a disservice to the multifarious nature of it as it exists in 
traditional philosophy and the subsequent richness it gives to philosophy’s literary 
form. Wartenberg’s criticism of those who deny the potential merit of interpreting 
films as philosophical thought images focuses on their limited formulation of the 
device as it currently occurs in the written or spoken form. 
                                                
40 Gendler, Tamar Szabó, “Thought Experiments” in The Encyclopaedia of Cognitive Science 
(London: Wiley, 2002), p. 388.  
41 Wartenberg, 2011, p. 18. 
42 For an examination of Plato’s analogy see Watt, Stephen "Introduction: The Theory of Forms 
(Books 5-7)" in Plato, Republic, translated by Desmond Lee (London: Wordsworth, 1997), pp. xiv-
xvi. 
43 Wartenberg, 2011, p. 19. 
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The third mode of cinematic philosophy that he presents directs a similar criticism 
towards its detractors, this time in relation to their understanding of what constitutes 
the cinematic object. Following the example of Noël Carroll’s 1979 article, “Avant-
Garde Film and Film Theory”, Wartenberg shifts focus from commercial feature 
films onto experimental and artist’s film making. Whereas Carroll concludes that 
avant-garde films “are more involved in making references to theories than in 
making theories”, Wartenberg adopts the opposite perspective.44 According to this 
view, writes Wartenberg, certain experimental films (particularly those from the 
“structural” tradition): 
 
are doing philosophy by performing real cinematic experiments. 
These experiments are designed to confirm a thesis about the 
nature of film, normally what the minimum characteristics a work 
must have in order to qualify as a film. By creating works that lack 
many or even most of the features that traditional films have, these 
experimental films […] seek to establish the minimum criteria that 
a work has to have in order to be a film.45 
 
For Wartenberg, a key example in this regard is Andy Warhol’s film Empire. Filmed 
in the summer of 1964 from the 44th floor of the Time-Life building, Warhol’s eight 
hour five minute long film consists of a static shot (photographed by Jonas Mekas) of 
the Empire State building as night falls on Manhattan.46 “What I take the film to 
establish”, argues Wartenberg, “is that films, which are often called moving pictures, 
do not have to”.47 Put another way, he explains, a movie’s “ability to depict motion” 
also affords it the “possibility of depicting stasis, something that surprisingly is not 
possible in static medium such as painting”.48 In Thinking On Screen, Wartenberg 
puts this claim into a more conventional philosophical context. In the Critique of 
                                                
44 Carroll, Noël, “Avant-Garde Film and Film Theory” in Noël Carroll, Theorizing the Moving Image 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 168. 
45 Wartenberg, 2011, p. 21. Wartenberg’s definition of Structural Experimental Film is derived from 
Adams Sitney, P. Visionary Film. The American Avant-Garde 1943 – 1978 [2nd ed.] (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1979), pp. 369 – 397. 
46 Koch, Stephen, Stargazer: Andy Warhol’s World and His Films [1974], second revised edition 
(New York and London: Marion Boyars, 1985), p. 145. 
47 Wartenberg, 2011, p. 21. 
48 Wartenberg, 2011, p. 21. 
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Pure Reason, Wartenberg explains, Immanuel Kant argued for an innate structure of 
the human mind that both defines its nature and that of the objects it perceives. In 
other words, the human mind can only become aware of objects that correspond to 
the features of this structure, what Kant referred to as categories. For Kant, unless 
these categories were universally valid it would be impossible for us to experience an 
object as such. Kant’s transcendental philosophy, as Wartenberg perceives it, was 
concerned with attempting to explain “the possibility of our experience of objects” 
and therefore what is presupposed and necessary to experience.49 Warhol’s Empire, 
claims Wartenberg: 
 
is a philosophically significant film because Warhol has discovered 
an analogue to Kant’s transcendental philosophy. That is, Warhol’s 
film presents an answer to the following question: What are the 
cinematic structures that are necessary in order for an object to 
appear on screen? In virtue of this, we can appropriate Kant’s 
terminology and call Empire a work of transcendental cinema, for 
its concern is establishing the necessary conditions for objects 
appearing to us on a film screen. Empire presents duration, 
celluloid projection, and the ability to present static persistence, as 
well as change, as elements of the categorical structure necessary 
for objects to be depicted on film.50 
 
How experimental films can transcendentally evaluate other (non-cinematic) aspects 
of experience Wartenberg does not say, but his formulation of his own categories for 
cinematic philosophy does reveal the innate structure of his conception of it and in 
turn its limitations. Wartenberg’s reading / viewing of Empire is informed by his 
reading of Arthur Danto’s 1999 analysis of the film.51 Though Wartenberg has issues 
with Danto’s ultimate conclusions (Danto’s emphasis on the film object as opposed 
to the filming / viewing process), what he does fully endorse is Danto’s use of film as 
a way to question what he calls the “philosophical disenfranchisement” of art in 
general. 52 Stemming from Plato’s denigration of transient and local physical reality 
                                                
49 Wartenberg, 2007, p. 127. 
50 Wartenberg, 2007, p. 127. 
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and its visual representation (through surrogate images – the shadows in the cave) as 
suitable vehicles for philosophical truths, this disenfranchisement has “in 
contemporary hands”, argues Wartenberg, “become the notion that art-forms that 
traffic in images cannot produce knowledge”.53   
 
Robert Sinnerbrink develops this questioning of film as an “inferior form of 
knowing” in a more radical way in his exposition of what he terms, “romantic film-
philosophy”.54  Whereas Wartenberg argues for the conceptual / intellectual 
competence of film (the cinematic) in relation to philosophy, Sinnerbrink’s position 
is distinguished by its “questioning of the assumption that conceptual theorisation 
should be privileged over cinema aesthetics”.55 Though, as demonstrated above, 
Wartenberg does address the notion of medium specificity and relational aesthetics in 
his notion of the thought experiment, what Sinnerbrink’s approach works to 
emphasise is how such acts of philosophical rendering (that “translate cinematic 
presentation into recognizable forms of philosophical argumentation” 56) do not 
“overcome this disenfranchisement”.57  
 
4.4 Philosophy’s Intellectual Disenfranchisement of Film  
 
In a manner similar to that expressed by Schlüpmann in her reading of Nietzsche’s 
“aesthetic enlightenment”, 58 Sinnerbrink states that the aim of his “romantic” 
approach is one that asserts the “film is capable of the aesthetic disclosure of novel 
aspects of our experience” in a way that is both “philosophically self-reflective” and 
opens up the “possibility that philosophy might be transformed through its 
encounter”.59 As Sinnerbrink explains: 
 
It is striking that amidst the enormous surge of interest in the film-
philosophy relationship most debate has focused on whether film  
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can be understood philosophically or even as a kind of 
philosophising in its own right. Little attention, however, has been 
given to the question of whether philosophy itself is transformed 
through its encounter with film. Does philosophy remain 
‘philosophy’ once it begins to engage seriously with film? Does the 
cinema provide its own forms of experience, of thinking, which 
might transform philosophy in distinctive ways? If we can speak of 
the becoming-philosophical of film, then perhaps we can also 
speak about the becoming-cinematic’ of philosophy.60 
 
Whereas Wartenberg’s modest claims for cinematic philosophy avoids questioning 
the conceptual nature of philosophy as an academic discipline, Sinnerbrink’s more 
provocative approach looks to “kill” philosophy – to “leave the academy” and 
“forego conceptual mastery”.61 This does not mean that Sinnerbrink promotes the 
idea of the cinematic as the antithesis of the philosophical – opposing forces that 
cancel each other out – but a corrective to philosophy’s intellectual 
disenfranchisement of the arts and humanities (in comparison to its attitude to the 
sciences). “[R]omantic film-philosophy”, states Sinnerbrink, “points the way out of 
the labyrinth that philosophy has constructed to keep film in its place”. 62 It does so, 
he argues, by conceiving film and philosophy as partners in a “thinking dialogue”, a 
“transformative engagement”” that assists in the articulation of the philosophy 
“immanent” within particular films whilst also inducing a creative response in 
philosophy to the cognitive results of the cinematic experience. 63 Following the 
example of both Cavell and Deleuze, Sinnerbrink states that it is only “in the strange 
and novel encounters” between “aesthetic and philosophical forms that new thought 
– creative philosophical though – can emerge”.64  For Sinnerbrink, the programme of 
philosophical romanticism (in relation to the arts and cinema in particular) is 
therefore comprehensible as the “(reflective) disclosure of alternative possibilities of 
thought and action” that circumvents the restrictions of readymade theoretical 
                                                
60 Sinnerbrink, 2011, pp. 28 – 29. 
61 Sinnerbrink, 2011, p. 28. 
62 Sinnerbrink, 2011, p. 36. 
63 Sinnerbrink, 2011, p. 36. 
64 Sinnerbrink, 2011, p. 29. 
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frameworks.65 Key to this, he argues, is a “sustained receptiveness to what film 
aesthetically discloses”, which “resists immediate translation into theoretical 
argument”.66 Significantly, this openness involves not just an appreciation of certain 
narrative aspects or hermeneutic ambiguities but also what Sinnerbrink refers to as 
film’s “audio-visual rhythms”. 67 In this mode, concludes Sinnerbrink, where 
philosophical claims are developed immanently from the particularities of the film, 
the medium is “allowed to show rather than tell; to reveal rather than be reduced; to 
think rather than be analysed” 68 and in doing so presents an alternative way of 
relating “theory and practice, concept and artwork, philosophy and film”.69 
 
Unlike Wartenberg (through his notion of experimental film), Sinnerbrink does not 
present his understanding of the philosophy immanent to film solely in the context of 
the medium’s aptitude for self-reflective practice. Film art, he states, alongside 
philosophy is a form of “world-disclosure (and indeed of world-making)”.70 For 
Sinnerbrink, film’s “vocation” therefore: 
 
lies in its capacity to vividly disclose forgotten or obliterated 
aspects of experience, making us receptive to difference and 
sensitive to possibility, thereby expanding the distinctive aspects of 
the world that we experience and to which we can thoughtfully 
respond. 71 
 
The transformative potential of the aesthetic disclosure of the cinematic experience, 
as Sinnerbrink conceives of it, also has an ethical / political dimension, it reveals not 
only “what modern experience is but also how it might be transfigured and 
reinvented” through the construction of virtual cinematic worlds.72 The role of the 
“romantic” film-philosopher, concludes Sinnerbrink, can therefore be seen as a 
                                                
65 Sinnerbrink, 2011, p. 37. 
66 Sinnerbrink, 2011, p. 37. 
67 Sinnerbrink, 2011, p. 38. 
68 Sinnerbrink, 2011, p. 40. 
69 Sinnerbrink, 2011, p. 41. Sinnerbrink provides numerous examples of his approach in Sinnerbrink, 
Robert, New Philosophies of Film: Thinking Images (London & New York: Continuum, 2011b). 
70 Sinnerbrink, 2011, p. 41. 
71 Sinnerbrink, 2011, p. 41. 
72 Sinnerbrink, 2011, p. 43. 
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“translator” between different “media of thought: cinematic and philosophical, 
aesthetic and conceptual, poetic and political”. 73 
 
4.5 The Non-philosophy of Cinema 
 
Working in parallel to Sinnerbrink’s proposal for a romantic film-philosophy is the 
approach outlined by John Mullarkey in his theory of a “non-philosophy of 
cinema”.74  Though sharing Wartenberg’s rejection of approaches that reduce film to 
a “mere handmaiden to philosophy” and Sinnerbrink’s belief in film’s immanent 
critical potential, Mullarkey’s argument for a non-philosophical approach to the 
medium is equally critical of philosophers who promote the idea that films can 
philosophise. “If film thinks”, states Mullarkey, “it is not in its own way but in 
philosophy’s way”. 75 Even the theories that “purport to be less textual and 
illustrative” [Cavell, Frampton], he argues, “cannot avoid reducing it to illustrations 
of extant philosophy”.76  
 
The problem facing even the most “open” readings of film as philosophy is twofold, 
proposes Mullarkey: firstly, it involves the limited choice of films identified as being 
philosophy / philosophising; secondly, who (and in what capacity) determines the 
“newness” – the innovative nature - of this medium specific mode of thought. As 
with Wartenberg, Mullarkey reads film-philosophy’s continued predilection for 
auteur cinema as weakening rather than supporting the case for film’s immanent 
capability to philosophise. However, whereas Wartenberg suggests incorporating 
avant-garde and experimental films into film-philosophy’s area of interest, 
Mullarkey argues for a more radical democratisation of what constitutes an 
appropriate instance of film philosophising. “Wouldn’t it prove one’s case better”, 
asks Mullarkey, “to use less obvious examples?” Surely, he adds, “if one claims that 
film can think, then all films can think: one doesn’t prove the claim that all humans 
                                                
73 Sinnerbrink, 2011, p. 43. 
74 Mullarkey, John, “Film Can’t Philosophise (and Neither Can Philosophy): Introduction to a Non-
Philosophy of Cinema, in Havi, Carel and Greg Tuck (eds.), New Takes in Film Philosophy 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp.  86- 99. 
75 Mullarkey, 2011, p. 88. 
76 Mullarkey, 2011, pp. 87-88. 
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can do mathematics just by studying the minds of Fermat and Poincaré”.77 There is, 
suggests Mullarkey, what he refers to as the “transcendent choice of film”: 
 
By this I mean the selection of particular films to establish a 
theoretical paradigm of what film is and how it works. Such 
approaches make their selections of these particular films (or film 
elements – of plot over sound, or framing over genre, and so on) in 
the light of an outside: a theory of film that transcends the corpus 
of different films and film elements as a whole. The transcendent 
choice already forms the filmic materials so as to legitimate the 
theory ab inito [from the beginning], and therefore is circular. Such 
pre-emptiveness is double edged, moreover. On the one hand, 
theory must be selective in how it makes film illustrate itself (and 
its theory of film), but, precisely on that account, it always leaves 
remainders – other films or filmic properties that it must 
marginalise in order to save its own integrity.78 
 
Sinnerbrink’s reply to this criticism of his transcendental approach is to argue that 
Mullarkey has conflated (and thereby confused what denotes) the genuinely new 
with the merely novel. “The new”, states Sinnerbrink, “is what can often barely be 
recognised or made intelligible or sensible with reference to existing frameworks or 
representation or interpretation”.79 For Sinnerbrink, un-philosophical films are those 
devoid of any real artistic merit and provide – principally at a sensational (corporeal) 
level – only the semblance of newness (novelty) and difference. This tendency 
towards connoisseurship, suggests Mullarkey, undermines Sinnerbrink’s idea of the 
film-philosopher as neutral translator and reveals it to be a more expert and 
judgemental role. At the heart of Sinnerbrink’s radical approach, agues Mullarkey, is 
therefore a defensive philosophical conservatism. The only thing that the film-
philosophy can recognise as new to philosophy, explains Mullarkey, is done so in the 
context of extant philosophy and is therefore (logically) already philosophy and 
therefore not genuinely new. Like the old joke about the drunk looking for his keys 
                                                
77 Mullarkey, 2011, p. 88. Pierre de Fermat (1601-1665) French mathematician. Jules Henri Poincaré 
(1854-1912) French mathematician and theoretical physicist. 
78 Mullarkey, 2011, p. 89. 
79  Sinnerbrink, Robert, “Fabulations of Reality: John Mullarkey’s Non-Philosophy of Film”, paper 
delivered at the University of Dundee, 6 October 2009, quoted in Mullarkey (2011), p. 97. 
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under a streetlamp at night (because it is the only place he can see), looking for a 
new mode of thought in artforms already considered to be philosophical (the auteur / 
art house film) is (from Mullarkey’s perspective) an equally futile activity. “To de-
philosophise or un-philosophise”, proclaims Mullarkey, “to embrace the insult of 
being ‘unphilosophical’ is warranted because the alternative of being recognised as 
‘proper’ comes at the cost of also being a cliché”.80 It is only “in that moment when 
we fail to see film as orthodox ‘philosophy’”, he explains, when “philosophy 
becomes something unrecognizable to itself”, that film’s transformation of thought 
will actually occur.81  
 
Mullarkey’s use of “we” here is significant and distinct, in fact antithetical to that 
used by Sinnerbrink to denote who experiences the new transformed film-
philosophy. If Sinnerbrink’s use of the subjective pronoun is exclusive to the 
academy then Mullarkey’s conception of a critical collective is ostensibly inclusive. 
As long as we “remain philosophers” argues Mullarkey, the circularity evident in the 
transcendental approach to film-philosophy is inevitable.82 For Mullarkey, as there is 
no “proper” example of a philosophical film, there is also “no single form of proper 
thought (‘philosophical’ or otherwise), but many kinds of thinking, such as that 
shown by film when it resists a certain kind of thinking”.83  
 
The model for Mullarkey’s approach is the “non-philosophy” of the French non-
philosopher Francois Laruelle.84 According to Laruelle, philosophy is “intrinsically 
anti-democratic”, whereas non-philosophy is non-judgmental and promotes a 
“democracy between philosophies, and between philosophy and the sciences, arts, 
ethics, etc.”85 Laruelle’s prefix “non-”, explains Mullarkey: 
 
is neither a dialectical negation, nor even something contrary to 
philosophy: it is an enlargement of the set of things that can count 
                                                
80 Mullarkey, 2011, p. 93. 
81 Mullarkey, 2011, p. 93. My emphasis. 
82 Mullarkey, 2011, p. 89. 
83 Mullarkey, 2011, p. 91. 
84 For Mullarkey’s introduction to the work of Laruelle see, Mullarkey, John, Post-Continental 
Philosophy: An Outline (London & New York: Continuum, 2006), pp. 125 – 156. 
85 Mullarkey, 2011, p. 91. See also, Laruelle, Francois, “Is Thinking Democratic? Or, How to 
Introduce Theory into Democracy”, in Mullarkey, John and Anthony Paul Smith (eds.), Laruelle and 
Non-Philosophy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2012), pp 227 – 237. 
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as thought, a set which includes extant philosophy, but also a host 
of what are often presently deemed (by philosophers) to be non-
philosophies. Just as the non-Euclidian geometries do not negate 
Euclid’s geometry but incorporate it alongside other types of 
geometry, so Laruelle’s non-philosophy integrates extant examples 
of philosophy with example of what those same philosophies 
regard as their opposite.86 
 
A non-philosophy of film is therefore not exclusive to the medium like film theory 
nor does it argue for film’s inclusion into the realm of philosophy because of some 
special ontological factor. For Mullarkey, non-philosophy does not try to think of, on 
or about film, nor does it (as Sinnerbrink argues) think with film, rather it is an 
inclusive “performative practice” that thinks alongside film.87 In a “non-philosophy 
of cinematic thought”, states Mullarkey, “nothing is being said about film (its 
ontology)”, instead its “raw –material” is “what is said about film by ‘theory’”.88 In 
this respect, non-philosophy is “metaphilosophical” in that its focus is on the 
processes (practical and theoretical) that constitute the cinematic rather than on the 
film object as autonomous phenomenon.89 Every theory about film, explains 
Mullarkey, “is also part of and immanent to film, rather than an outside, static image 
representing film as a static whole”.90 
 
In the context of non-philosophy, the only certainty about the relationship between 
subject and object, between audience and film, between theory and practice is that it 
is dynamic. A film’s meaning, it’s philosophical content, its intellectual and critical 
capacity should therefore be understood as a “relational event”.91 As Mullarkey 
concludes: 
 
The relationship of an audience to a film is mobile: hence, 
sometimes it will be open to the radical impact of any film […] but 
at other times the audience can be jaded with and inured to the 
                                                
86 Mullarkey, 2011, p. 91. 
87 Mullarkey, 2011, p. 90. 
88 Mullarkey, 2011, p. 90. 
89 Mullarkey, 2011, p. 90. 
90 Mullarkey, 2011, p. 91. 
91 Mullarkey, 2011, p. 98. 
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effects of both commercial and avant-garde film […] To be more 
precise, the impact of film is not located solely in the film, but in 
the film viewing event, which is inherently relational. What is 
heterogeneous to one spectator, may be formulaic for another. Any 
film can fulfil either role (in the right context for he right viewer), 
but most film viewings only fulfil the latter, routine role, if only by 
sheer dint of the fact that our attention is elsewhere.92 
 
The new – the telos of Sinnerbrink’s transformed future philosophy – does not, 
argues Mullarkey, come from either a transformed notion of film (Wartenberg) nor in 
the hypostatised viewer (be they philosopher, translator, mediator etc.) but is 
apparent only through a consideration of their dynamic and intertwined relation. For 
Mullarkey, the meaning of a film “cannot be our product alone” as every theory of 
film is a “co-production” with the film process.93 In this respect (from the 
perspective of non-philosophy) film (as the locus of a destabilized notion of agency) 
renders Sinnerbrink’s programmatic argument that philosophy is a form of “world-
disclosure (and indeed of world-making)” epistemologically untenable.94  For 
Laruelle, explains Mullarkey:  
 
What philosophy calls ‘reality’ is first and foremost a concept of 
the world. Every philosophy is a ‘mixte’ of reality with a pre-
decided interpretative schema […] A philosopher’s reality can 
never capture and exhaust what Laruelle calls the “real” itself.95 
 
The “Real”, states Mullarkey, is “that which undoes any attempt to define the 
Real”.96 The “Real of film” is “the inexhaustible reserve that thwarts every attempt to 
say ‘what film is’”, and for Mullarkey, is the “one absolute that resists relativism”.97 
Any reading / philosophy of a film which intends to exhaust its object (to state what 
it really is about) is therefore doomed to failure because being “co-generated” by the 
film/ viewer process “each new reading” is immanently part of the process that 
                                                
92 Mullarkey, 2011, p. 98. 
93 Mullarkey, 2011, p. 95. 
94 Sinnerbrink, 2011, p. 41. 
95 Mullarkey, 2011, p. 89. 
96 Mullarkey, 2011, p. 96. 
97 Mullarkey, 2011, p. 91. 
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defines the “Real” of film (that which it cannot define).98 However, explains Andrew 
McGettigan, in comparison to the philosophical approaches to film it criticises, the 
inclusive mixed approach of non-philosophy regards the failure of its critical 
counterparts as being only “partial” as they still contribute to the communal project 
involving theory and its object.99 Any “new aspect a theorist brings to film”, 
Mullarkey explains, “belongs both to the theorist and, in part, to the film: the theory 
is only possible in virtue of, or rather just is, the mereological relation [the relation of 
part and whole] between the two”.100  
 
With a focus resolutely on what theory says about film rather than an essential idea 
of the film object, the proposed function of the non-philosopher of film becomes less 
that of the expert examiner and more the diligent curator.  For Mullarkey, the result 
of this egalitarian assemblage of ideas pertaining to the cinematic can be understood 
as “montage thinking” : 
 
Such a montage must be understood simply at the level of the 
Kuleshov effect whereby subsequent images change the meaning 
of the antecedent ones when cut together. Such emergent effects 
are differential, as is a comparative thought such as non-
philosophy: that is, it builds its effects by mixing the partial 
representational failures of theories together as material forms.101 
 
This mode of “associational thought”, admits Mullarkey, has garnered derision from 
those who have “a clear idea of what philosophy should look like”.102 For example, 
McGettigan asks how Mullarkey’s “meta-theory” is distinct from “the rather less 
grand notion of the literature survey”.103 Mullarkey’s response is to suggest that the 
“montage thinking” presented by non-philosophy “need not be called a thinking at 
all”: 
 
                                                
98 Mullarkey, 2011, pp. 95-96. 
99 McGettigan, Andrew, “Molls: Review of John Mullarkey, Refractions of Reality: Philosophy and 
the Moving Image”, Radical Philosophy, No. 158 (November – December, 2009), p. 67. 
100 Mullarkey, 2011, p. 94. 
101 Mullarkey, 2011, p. 94.  
102 Mullarkey, 2011, p. 97. 
103 McGettigan, 2009, p. 66. 
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In as much as a non-philosophy of film tries to emulate cinema’s 
philosophising through its own method of montage (of theories), it 
should be called montage simpliciter – there is no need to append 
‘thinking’ to it to make it philosophical, for philosophy itself can 
be seen as a kind of montage (or mixte, as Laruelle puts it). This 
montage is not one more essence of philosophy, however, but a 
recipe for a pluralism of philosophies.104 
 
Certainly Mullarkey’s recipe for pluralism makes space for Kracauer’s film theory to 
be considered as philosophy but would such a wholesale subsumption of all critical 
(and non critical) practice simultaneously eradicate the specific nature of Kracauer’s 
cinematic approach to philosophy? Is philosophical difference celebrated and 
sustained by Mullarkey’s and Laruelle’s interdisciplinary openness or is it, as 
Sinnerbrink argues, negated by a covert theoretical paradigm that is as equally 
totalizing as the one that it looks to replace?105 Mullarkey, in his defence, has argued 
that Sinnerbrink’s idea of non-philosophy project attributes it a teleological character 
that is fundamentally alien to its mixed approach.106  
 
As significant as Laruelle’s (and Mullarkey’s) non-philosophical assemblage of 
philosophies is in testing the boundaries of what is culturally acceptable as 
constituting thought there is, as Sinnerbrink identifies, a certain arbitrariness in how 
its montage of thinking is constructed (regardless of their insistence that the two 
activities  - montage and thinking - are identical). In this respect, Mullarkey’s 
statements defending the non-philosophy project from Sinnerbrink’s accusation of 
conceptual circularity reminds me of the Spanish film director Luis Buñuel’s famous 
paradox: “Je suis toujours athée, grâce à Dieu” [I’m still an atheist, thank God].107 
 
 
 
 
                                                
104 Mullarkey, 2011, p. 97. 
105 For an example of Sinnerbrink’s criticism of Mullarkey’s approach: Martin-Jones David, “What is 
Film-Philosophy? Round Table” [Audio Recording], Film Philosophy, Vol. 14, No. 1 (2010):  
http://www film-philosophy.com/index.php/f-p/article/view/260/217  (Accessed 2/2013) 
106 Mullarkey, 2011, pp. 93 – 94. 
107 The original quotation appears in Manceaux, Michèle, “Luis Buñuel: athée grâce à Dieu”, 
L’Express (May 12, 1960), p. 41. 
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4.6 Conclusion: Kracauer in the context of film-philosophy 
 
As Kracauer demonstrates in Theory of Film, editing and montage is only one aspect 
of what constitutes the cinematic approach to film. In fact, like Mullarkey, Kracauer 
also makes various references to Kuleshov’s montage experiments in Theory of Film, 
and the “side-by-side” approach he advocates in History certainly bears a 
resemblance to Mullarkey’s / Laruelle’s notion of philosophical montage.108 
Nevertheless, to draw too direct a comparison between Kracauer’s theory of film and 
the non-philosophy of film (or in fact any current variant of film-philosophy) would 
not only work to devalue the specific historical context of the texts (the conclusions 
of Theory of Film are presented under the heading of “Film in Our Time”) but would 
also act to codify their intentional ambiguities according to an extraneous 
philosophical system, be it by affixing meaning (Cavell) or purpose (Deleuze, 
Laruelle). This is not to say that an association between Kracauer’s work and that of 
Wartenberg, Sinnerbrink and Mullarkey would be entirely fruitless. Though the 
benefit of trying to argue for Kracauer’s posthumous inclusion into the contemporary 
film-philosophy debate or for his establishment as a progenitor of it is dubious what I 
shall do in the following text, is to use the context of film-philosophy to activate (by 
association – in a Kuleshov sense) certain elements of Kracauer’s thinking about the 
film experience. 
 
What connects the disparate work of the writers that Wartenberg would group 
together as being “pro” the idea of a form of cinematic philosophy is the conviction 
that immanent to the cinematic experience are certain elements that are resolutely 
indeterminate and that any attempt to interpret them philosophically has a 
destabilizing effect on the particular mode of thought employed. Identifying the 
nature of this instability is where the diversification in approaches arises. Whether it 
manifests itself as a mapping of Wittgenstein’s sceptical language games onto 
cinematic texts (Mulhall), a phenomenological catalyst for cognitive mutation 
(Frampton & Sinnerbrink) or as an indication of the arbitrary nature of thinking as a 
                                                
108 For Kracauer’s references to Kuleshov in Theory of Film, see Kracauer, Siegfried, Theory of Film. 
The Redemption of Physical Reality [1960] (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), pp. 48, 69 
& 162. Kracauer introduces his notion of a “side-by-side” approach to historiography in chapter 8 of 
Kracauer, Siegfried, History. The Last Things Before the Last, completed after the death of the author 
by Paul Oskar Kristeller (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1995), pp. 200 – 202.  
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cultural process (Mullarkey) what becomes clear from this group’s critical activity is 
that the moving image has the ability to estrange subject / object relations and that 
the resultant indeterminacy is significant. Significant as a new raw material / 
resource for the continuation of philosophical endeavour or as evidence of 
philosophy’s other – its replacement or nemesis, that is the question?  Or is it? What 
Mullarkey argues (articulating Laruelle’s position) is that the theoretical act of 
defining the cinematic is a process that affects its object and is therefore as much part 
of what constitutes the cinematic as the material / technical and social means of film 
production. The film, the cinema, the philosopher, the critic, the filmmaker, the fan, 
the indifferent viewer all work to constitute the cinematic. Identifying the “Real of 
film” (“the inexhaustible reserve that thwarts every attempt to say ‘what film is’”)109 
is a communal on-going process and when considered as such the cinematic becomes 
paradoxically both inherent and acquired by the medium – it is that which reminds 
the philosophising subject that their autonomy (like a movie) is a co-production. It is 
this desire to retain the indeterminacy of the cinematic, the motivation to sustain 
multiple and conflicting narratives and strategies instead of distilling or subsuming 
competing approaches into a universal future philosophy that connects Kracauer’s 
and Mullarkey’s (Laruelle’s) intellectual projects. To return one last time to 
Kuleshov, Kracauer writes in the section of Theory of Film titled “The 
Indeterminate”, that any “filmmaker evolving a narrative is faced with the task of 
simultaneously living up to two obligations which seem difficult to reconcile”: 
 
On the one hand, he will have to advance the action by assigning to 
each shot a meaning relevant to the plot […] In terms of the 
Kuleshov experiment, the filmmaker must therefore insert 
Mosjukhin’s [the actor depicted in Kuleshov’s film] face in such a 
way that it assumes the significance required by the story at this 
particular place […] On the other hand, the filmmaker will wish to 
exhibit and penetrate physical reality for its own sake. And this 
calls for shots not yet stripped of their multiple meanings, shots 
still able to release their psychological correspondences. 
                                                
109 Mullarkey, 2011, p. 91. 
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Accordingly, he must see to it that Mosjukhin’s face retains, 
somehow, its virgin indeterminacy.110 
 
The use of the masculine pronoun here makes it easy for the reader to replace the 
term “film maker” with the name Kracauer – as the task he sets for the former is (as I 
shall subsequently demonstrate) also the one he sets for himself as author of Theory 
of Film. Theory of Film, I will argue, with its attempts to define the nature and 
significance of the cinematic, is as much about theory’s relationship with its object as 
it is to do with the aesthetics of the film medium and as such works to constitute a 
critical idea of the cinematic that resists essentialism by presenting it as a perpetual 
but inconsistent process. In this respect, what the film-philosophy context enables me 
to do in this dissertation is to rehabilitate (to use a term favoured by Kracauer) 
indeterminacy in Kracauer’s cinematic approach.111 I say rehabilitate, because, as I 
have demonstrated in the previous chapter, though previous interpreters of 
Kracauer’s work have identified the significance of the cinematic as a concept in his 
critical practice in doing so they attribute a definite use value to it and in turn assign 
it a specific meaning. The indeterminate is reduced to the not yet defined as opposed 
to that, which resists definition – it is the raw material of philosophy rather than a 
challenge to its totalising impulse. 
 
In the following sections I will examine in detail specific aspects of Kracauer’s 
cinematic approach and explore how it is realised in both his film texts and in his 
non-film writings.  At the beginning of each chapter I will introduce how the 
subsequent text relates to a certain aspect of the film-philosophy debate (as discussed 
above) and how the two projects (Kracauer’s and Film-Philosophy’s) can be seen to 
potentially correspond.  In the final concluding chapter I will again summarise these 
correspondences and formulate a response to the questions asked in the introduction 
to this study.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
110 Kracauer, 1997, p. 69. 
111 Kracauer, 1995, p.4. 
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CHAPTER 5:   
 
CINEMATIC SUBJECT RELATIONS: HOW FILM AFFECTS ITS THEORY 
 
5.1 Introduction. 
 
In their introduction to New Takes in Film-Philosophy (2011), Havi Carel and Greg 
Tuck suggest that: 
 
When considering film and philosophy, the philosopher’s first 
question is: ‘are such mass cultural products philosophically 
productive?’ And if so, what is it about films rather than other 
aspects of culture […] that makes it a worthy site of attention?1 
 
In this chapter I am going to examine how Kracauer understood film to be 
philosophically productive. In order to do this I will focus on Kracauer’s criticism of 
Georg Lukács, the Marxist philosopher whose early work was instrumental in the 
formation and development of Critical Theory.  It will examine how Kracauer 
envisaged film’s intellectual potential in relation to Lukács’ Marxist critical 
interpretation of social processes and their associate cultural forms. In doing so, it will 
demonstrate how Kracauer used the corporeal experience of the cinema to develop his 
understanding of Marxism in a way that resisted and in turn questioned the 
philosophical orthodoxy of Lukács approach. Focusing on his analysis of the films of 
French filmmaker Jean Vigo it describes how Kracauer strove to develop an 
understanding of the philosophical relationship between the philosophical subject and 
object (theory and praxis) not as a dialectical antagonism but as an intertwined and 
relative process. 
 
5.1 Film and Material Dialectics 
 
In a letter written in 1930 to Theodor Adorno, Siegfried Kracauer suggested that the 
critical method that he had developed over the previous decade could be called 
                                                
1 Carel, Havi and Greg Tuck (eds.), New Takes in Film-Philosophy (Basingstoke and New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), pp. 1- 2. 
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“material dialectics”2. It was not, he argued, simply a satirical inversion of the 
dialectical materialism of orthodox Marxism but something more meaningful. It 
denoted his frustration with Marxism’s furtive philosophical conservatism. Dialectic 
materialism, Kracauer argued, especially as it had recently been espoused in the work 
of Georg Lukács3, had revealed itself as “the last offshoot of total philosophy”, in 
other words, it was no different from the 19th century German Idealism it supposedly 
superseded. In contrast, claimed Kracauer, what he sought in his approach was a 
reality divested of Idealism’s metaphysical “guarantee”. 4 Even their mutual friend 
Walter Benjamin, Kracauer contended, demonstrated a certain lack of “élan” for this 
reality. 5 “Criticism”, wrote Benjamin in One Way Street (1928), “ is a matter of 
correct distance”.6 For Kracauer, there was no such thing as a correct distance. 
 
The problem with Benjamin’s method, argued Kracauer, was qualitative not 
quantitative.7 It was not simply a case of Benjamin miscalculating relative spatial or 
temporal positions but how his idea of critical distance worked to construct the 
ontological exclusivity of the subject and object. “Benjamin”, Kracauer noted in his 
review of One-Way Street, “would only breakthrough to reality in its fullness only if 
he were to unravel the real dialectic between the elements of things and their figures, 
between concretions and the abstract, between the meaning of form and the form 
itself”.8  
                                                
2 Letter from Kracauer to Adorno, May 25th, 1930, quoted in Jay, Martin, ‘Adorno and Kracauer: 
Notes on a troubled Friendship’, in Martin Jay, Permanent Exiles. Essays on the Intellectual Migration 
from Germany to America (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), p. 221. 
3 Georg Lukács (1885 –1971), Hungarian literary critic and philosopher. Kracauer is here referring to 
Lukács’ 1923 publication, History and Class Consciousness, see Lukács, Georg, History and Class 
Consciousness: studies in Marxist dialectics, translated by Rodney Livingstone (London: Merlin Press, 
1971). For Kracauer’s critical relation to the text see Barnouw, Dagmar, Critical Realism: History, 
Photography, and the work of Siegfried Kracauer (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1994), 
pp. 37 – 47. 
4 Jay, 1985, p. 221. 
5 Jay, 1985, p. 221. For Benjamin’s review of Kracauer’s Die Angestellten see, Benjamin, Walter, ‘An 
Outsider Makes His Mark’, in Walter Benjamin, Selected Writings Volume 2: 1927 – 1934, edited by 
Michael W.  Jennings, Howard Eiland, and Gary Smith, translated by Rodney Livingstone, et al. 
(Cambridge, Mass. and London: The Belknap Press, 1999), pp. 305 – 311. A second, shorter review is 
also reproduced in the same volume, see, pp. 355 – 357. 
6 Benjamin, Walter, ‘One-Way Street’, in Walter Benjamin, Selected Writings Volume 1: 1913 – 1926, 
edited by Marcus Bullock and Michael W. Jennings, 4th ed. (Cambridge, Mass. and London: The 
Belknap Press, 2000), pp. 444 – 488. 
7 The concept of critical “distance” is addressed by Kracauer throughout History, for example see 
Kracauer, Siegfried, History. The Last Things Before the Last, completed after the death of the author 
by Paul Oskar Kristeller (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1995), pp. 104 – 105. 
8 Kracauer, Siegfried, ‘On the Writings of Walter Benjamin’, in Siegfried Kracauer, The Mass 
Ornament. Weimar essays, translated and edited by Thomas Y. Levin (Cambridge, Mass. and London: 
Harvard U.P.,1995b), p. 264.  
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As Miriam Hansen demonstrates, by 1940 the problem of articulating the critical 
function of the film experience in relation to his anti-Idealist “process of 
materialization” had become Kracauer’s central intellectual concern.9 In a series of 
notebooks written whilst awaiting passage from war-torn Marseilles, Kracauer 
attempted to formulate his ideas on this matter for a prospective “book on film 
aesthetics”. 10 Throughout the multiple drafts of this project, Kracauer maintained 
that, considered alongside other cultural forms, film enacted a peculiar way of 
articulating material relations. It did so, he reasoned, because it could manipulate our 
perception of supposedly fixed spatial and temporal relations at a basic physiological 
level.  “The material elements that present themselves in film directly”, suggests 
Kracauer, “stimulate the material layers of the human being: his nerves, his senses, 
his entire physiological substance”.11 By primarily addressing its viewer as a 
corporeal entity, a human being “with skin and hair [mit Haut und Haar],” the 
distance between spectator and performance, the conceptual space of theatrical 
dramaturgy, collapses and with it (potentially) theatre’s referential subject. 12 In other 
words, explains Hansen, unlike in the theatre, where the fixed perspective of the 
audience has been developed in order to maintain the integrity of a sovereign sense of 
self, the cinema experience, with its “assaults” on the spectator at “the level of 
sensory, bodily perception” disrupts the construction of such a coherent reference 
point.13 “The ‘ego’ [Ich] of the human being assigned to film”, proposes Kracauer, “is 
subject to permanent dissolution, and is incessantly exploded by material 
phenomena”.14 This idea that, integral to the cinema experience is a potential state 
where the “self, as the mainspring of thoughts and decisions, relinquishes control,” is 
readdressed by Kracauer in his final published version of Theory of Film (1960). “ In 
the theatre I am always I,” writes Kracauer, quoting a “perceptive” cinema goer, “‘but 
                                                
9 Hansen, Miriam, ‘“With Skin and Hair”: Kracauer’s Theory of Film, Marseilles 1940’, Critical 
Inquiry, no. 19 (1993), p. 453. 
10 Hansen, Miriam, ‘Introduction’, in Kracauer, Siegfried, Theory of Film. The Redemption of Physical 
Reality [1960] (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997), p. xiv. 
11 Hansen, 1997, p. xviv. 
12 Hansen, 1997, p. xvii. 
13 Hansen, 1997, p. xxi. 
14 Hansen, 1997, p. xxi. An overview of more recent debates concerning the ideological implication of 
maintaining an essentialist concept of self are discussed in Battaglia, Debbora, ‘Problematizing the 
Self: A Thematic Introduction’, in Debbora Bataglia (ed.), Rhetorics of Self Making (Berkeley & 
London: University of California Press, 1995), pp. 1 – 15. 
 136 
in the cinema I dissolve into all things and beings’”. 15 As French author and critic 
René Barjavel claimed in his own wartime reflections on the nature of cinema, 
Cinéma total: Essai sur les formes futures du cinema [Total Cinema: An essay on the 
future forms of cinema] (1944):  
 
In the theatre the spectator attends the spectacle. In the cinema he 
incorporates himself into it.16 
 
As Hansen notes, what Kracauer makes explicit in the Marseilles notebooks is the 
fundamental change in status attributed to the material dimension that occurs as a 
result of its cinematic representation. 17 On screen, agency (an action or intervention 
that produces a particular effect) is no longer a human preserve.  As Kracauer later 
qualified in Theory of Film, the medium has the potential to include the subject in a 
fundamentally non-hierarchical manner. If objects are “assigned the role due to 
them”, argued the French filmmaker Louis Delluc, the actor too “is no more than a 
detail, a fragment of the matter of the world”.18 In a film, remarks Kracauer, the 
theatrical subject is rendered an object “amongst objects”.19 In other words, explains 
Kracauer, cinema’s “subject matter is the infinite flux of visible phenomena - those 
ever changing patterns of physical existence whose flow may include human 
manifestations but need not climax in them”.20 As Kracauer suggests in Theory of 
Film: 
 
From the malicious escalators, the unruly Murphy beds, and the 
mad automobiles in silent comedy to the cruiser Potemkin, the oil 
derrick in Louisiana Story [Figure 2] and the dilapidated kitchen in 
Umberto D., a long procession of unforgettable objects has passed 
                                                
15 Kracauer, 1997, p. 159 
16 Quoted in Kracauer, 1997, p. 326 n.7.  
17 Hansen, 1993, p. 452 
18  Quoted in Kracauer, 1997, p. 45. Louis Delluc (1890 – 1924) French film director, screenwriter, 
journalist, theorist and film-club founder. For an introduction to and examples of Delluc’s work see, 
Abel, Richard, French Film Theory and Criticism: A History/Anthology, Volume I: 1907-1929 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 95 - 124 
1988); 
19 Kracauer, 1997, p. 97. 
20 Kracauer, 1997, p. 97. 
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across the screen – objects which stand out as protagonists and all 
but overshadow the rest of the cast. 21 
 
In contrast, as Kracauer states in the Marseilles notebooks, the  “subject to which the 
theatre refers [das Bezugssubjekt des Theaters]”, remains “the human being in long 
shot [den Menschen der Totale]”.22 As a film scene’s initial framing often seeks to 
establish the subject’s relation to their physical environment so too can formal 
theatrical convention be read as affirming a particular subject position relative to 
predetermined and culturally mediated social context.  
 
 
Figure 2.  The oil derrick in Louisiana Story (1948) 
 
Film’s disjunction of subject / object relations is played out in Theory of Film, 
through a comparison of stage and screen acting. “From the viewpoint of cinema”, 
                                                
21 Kracauer, 1997, p. 45. The films referred to by Kracauer here are: The Floorwalker, directed by 
Charlie Chaplin (USA: Mutual, 1916); One A.M. directed by Charlie Chaplin (USA: Mutual, 1916); 
Battleship Potemkin [Russian: Броненосец «Потёмкин», (Bronyenosyets Potyomkin)], directed by 
Sergei M. Eisenstein (USSR: Goskino, 1925); Louisiana Story, directed by Robert Flaherty (USA: 
Flaherty / Standard Oil, 1948); Umberto D., directed by Vittorio De Sica (Italy: Rizzoli-De Sica-
Amato, 1952). 
22 Hansen, 1997, p. xvii. 
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writes Kracauer,  “the functions of the stage actor are determined by the fact that the 
theatre exhausts itself in representing inter-human relations”.23 However naturalistic, 
for Kracauer, stage imagery always “serves as a foil for stage acting” and does not 
represent an authentic interplay of environmental influences, “unattainable anyway on 
the stage”.24  In the theatre, the human is the absolute measure of a universe whose 
existence is reliant upon them. The theatrical subject asserts itself through theatrical 
form as an “insoluble entity”, the “smallest unit” from which all meaning is derived.25  
 
For Kracauer, film’s irreverence towards such an anthropocentric worldview was 
nowhere more vigorously expressed than in silent film comedy. The “inanimate 
objects” that “held important positions and developed preferences of their own”, in 
these comedies, notes Kracauer, were “[m]ore often than not filled with a certain 
malice towards anything human”. 26 “Instead of serving man”, he suggests, these 
“scheming objects” turned out to be “on the best terms with the very elements they 
were supposed to harness; instead of making us independent of the whims of matter, 
they actually were the shock troops of unconquered nature and inflicted upon us 
defeat after defeat”.27 Any cinematic action, Kracauer subsequently explains in 
Theory of Film,  “is always likely to pass through regions which, should they contain 
human beings at all, […] involve them only in an accessory, unspecified way”.28 For 
example, suggests Kracauer: 
 
Many a film summons the weird presence of furniture in an 
abandoned apartment; whenever we see or hear someone enter, it is 
for a transient moment the sensation of human interference in 
general that strikes you most. In such cases the actor represents the 
species rather than a well-defined individual.29 
 
However, in film, even the ontological stability of a base mode of taxonomic 
identification such as species is rendered problematic.  Parts of the body, argues 
                                                
23 Kracauer, 1997, p. 96. 
24 Kracauer, 1997, p. 96. 
25 Kracauer, 1997, p. 97. 
26 Kracauer, Siegfried, ‘Silent Film Comedy’, Sight and Sound, Vol.  21, No. 1 (August –September 
1951), p. 32. 
27 Kracauer, 1951, p. 31. 
28 Kracauer, 1997, p. 97. 
29 Kracauer, 1997, p. 97. 
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Kracauer, “may fuse” with parts of the environment to produce a “significant 
configuration, which suddenly stands out among the passing images of physical 
life”.30  “This decomposition of the actor’s wholeness”, Kracauer explains, 
“corresponds to the piecemeal manner in which he supplies the elements from which 
eventually his role is built”.31 For corroboration Kracauer turns to the writings of 
Russian filmmaker Vsevolod Pudovkin. “The film actor”, writes Pudovkin in Film 
Acting (1933), is deprived of the “organic connection between the consecutive parts 
of his work […] The whole image of the actor is only to be conceived as a future 
appearance on the screen, subsequent to the editing of the director”. 32 For Pudovkin, 
Kracauer concludes, in film the human being is subject to the “same disintegration” as 
everything else.33 However, warns Kracauer, film’s ability to collapse the distinction 
between subject and object does mean that it cannot be reconfigured by it as before. 
Therefore, he states, if films are to resist reconstructing the relative ontological 
hierarchies of the theatre they must: 
 
set out to explore physical data and, taking their cue from them, 
work their way up to some problem or belief. The cinema is 
materialistically minded; it proceeds from ‘below’ to ‘above.’ The 
importance of its natural bent for moving in this direction can 
hardly be overestimated. 34 
 
In defence of this medium specific dynamic that conceives of the human individual 
(as defined by Idealist philosophy and its associate artforms) as a hindrance to film’s 
critical potential, Kracauer quotes from Erwin Panofsky’s 1937 essay, “Style and 
Medium in the Moving Pictures”: 
  
The processes of all the earlier representational arts conform in a 
higher or lesser degree, to an idealistic conception of the world. 
These arts operate from top to bottom, so to speak, and not from 
bottom to top; they start with an idea to be projected into shapeless 
matter and not with the objects that constitute the physical world.... 
                                                
30 Kracauer, 1997, p. 97. 
31 Kracauer, 1997, p. 97. 
32 Quoted in Kracauer, 1997, p. 97.  
33 Kracauer, 1997, p. 97. 
34 Kracauer. 1997, p. 309.  
 140 
It is the movies, and only the movies, that do justice to that 
materialistic interpretation of the universe which, whether we like it 
or not, pervades contemporary civilization.35 
 
Though clearly not as committed as Kracauer to film’s process of materialisation, 
what Panofsky’s art historical approach to the medium also acknowledges is the 
peculiar nature of film’s mediation between ideas (thought) and the physical world. 
For Kracauer, film’s materialistic interpretation of the universe is not a replacement 
for traditional art’s idealistic conception of the world but a counter to its teleological 
dynamic. In the next two sections of this chapter I will demonstrate how Kracauer, 
through his analysis of the films of Jean Vigo, argued that the film experience has the 
immanent potential to suspend and reconfigure the way philosophy and art constitutes 
our relation to the physical world.  
 
5.2 Relativised Subject Positions: Jean Vigo’s L’Atalante 
 
At the same time Kracauer was in Marseilles drafting what Benjamin referred to as 
“his encyclopaedia of film”,36 Kracauer wrote several short pieces on film that were 
later published by Swiss based German language newspapers. As well as reviews of 
recently released French films and film books; Kracauer completed a series of articles 
that focused on more historical examples.  Titled, “Wiedersehen mit alten Filmen” 
[Reunion with old films], the series appeared in the Basler National-Zeitung between 
13/9/1938 and 1/2/1940.  As well as focusing on the work of specific filmmakers such 
as Pudovkin, Max Linder, Maurice Stiller and Abel Gance, the series also included 
examinations of what had been labelled expressionist and vamp films.37  The last of 
                                                
35 Quoted in Kracauer, 1997, p. 309. Panofsky’s essay is reprinted in Panofsky, Erwin, Three Essays in 
Style, edited by Irving Lavin (Cambridge, Mass. & London: The MIT Press, 1995), pp. 91 – 126. For 
details of the personal and critical relationship between Panofsky and Kracauer see, Levin, T. Y., 
‘Iconology at the Movies. Panofsky’s Film Theory’, Yale Journal of Criticism, Vol. 9, No. 1 (1996), 
pp. 27 – 55. 
36 Quoted in Hansen, 1997, p. xiv. 
37 For bibliographical details see, Levin, Thomas. Y., Siegfried Kracauer: Eine Bibliographie seiner 
Schriften (Marbach am Neckar: Deutsche Schillergesellschaft, 1989), pp. 302 – 305. A “vamp” is a 
women who uses sexual attraction in order to exploit others, see Murray, Bruce, ‘The role of the Vamp 
in Weimar Cinema: An analysis of Karl Grune’s The Street’, in Sandra Frieden, Richard W. 
McCormick, Vibeke R. Petersen, Laurie Melissa Vogelsang.(eds.), Gender and German Cinema: 
Feminist Interventions, Volume 1 (Providence, RI: Berg, 1993), pp. 33 – 41. 
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the series focused on the French director Jean Vigo, and was the very first of 
Kracauer’s works on film to be translated into English.38 
 
For Kracauer, two things distinguish Vigo as a filmmaker. Firstly, he argues, Vigo’s 
“camera does not discriminate between human beings and objects, animate and 
inanimate nature”.39 Secondly, and more importantly, Vigo resists the temptation to 
exploit film’s temporary suspension of material relations. In other words, for 
Kracauer, Vigo’s films are as much a product of what the camera reveals as they are 
illustrations of its maker’s predetermined narrative. Vigo’s sensitivity to the peculiar 
revealing function of the film camera, argues Kracauer, and his subsequent 
willingness to accommodate its fortuitous and indeterminate discoveries in the 
finished work gives his films a peculiar critical potential. In L'Atalante (1934), writes 
Kracauer: 
we experience with all our senses how strongly the fogs of the river, 
the avenues of trees, and the isolated farms affect the mind, and 
how the sailor's relationship to the city is determined by the fact that 
he looks at the lodgings perched on the quay from sea level. Other 
film directors, too, have identified objects as silent accomplices of 
our thoughts and feelings. But Vigo goes still further. Instead of 
simply revealing the role objects may play in conditioning the mind, 
he dwells upon situations in which their influence predominates, 
thus exploring camera possibilities to the full. And since increasing 
intellectual awareness tends to reduce the power of objects over the 
mind, he logically chooses people, who are deeply rooted in the 
material world as leading characters of his two full-length films. 40 
 
Kracauer’s identification of objective distance with social class is doubly revealing. In 
the first instance it demonstrates his background knowledge of Vigo’s radical political 
convictions. As Vladmir Pozner, the Franco-Russian writer and political agitator 
commented, “Vigo was a rebel, on two counts: against screen formulas and, even 
more intensely, against the established order of things. He used the camera as a 
                                                
38 Kracauer, Siegfried, ‘Jean Vigo’, translated by William Melnitz, Hollywood Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 3 
(April 1947), pp.261 – 263. For an introduction to Vigo see, Salles Gomes, P.E., Jean Vigo (Berkeley 
& Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1971).  
39 Kracauer, 1947, p. 262. 
40 Kracauer, 1947, p. 262. L’Atalante, directed by Jean Vigo (France: Jean-Louis Nounez, 1934) 
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weapon, not as an anaesthetic”.41 In the second instance, it is indicative of how 
Kracauer assimilated certain elements of Marxism into his cinematic approach. In 
their 1844 attack on German Idealism, The Holy Family, Karl Marx and Frederick 
Engels observed that the “property-owning class and the class of the proletariat 
represent the same human self-alienation.” However, “the former feels at home in this 
self-alienation and feels itself confirmed by it”.42 The property-owning class, they 
conclude, therefore: 
 
recognises alienation as its own instrument and in it possesses the 
semblance of a human existence. The latter feels itself destroyed by 
this alienation and sees in it its own impotence and the reality of an 
inhuman existence.43 
 
As the Marxist subject is identical to the processes that define its social function, so 
for Pudovkin, the cinematic subject is indistinguishable from the formal techniques 
that define it (e.g. montage, soundtrack, variable framing, lighting, etc.).44 The 
materialism that Kracauer equates with the perspective adopted by Vigo’s camera 
demonstrates a deliberate conflation of these two models.  “The poor,” states 
Kracauer in one of the Marseilles notebooks, “are forced to break down the long-shot 
perspective” as they cannot distance themselves from the material realities of the 
realm they inhabit. 45  
 
Though the identification between film technique and class-consciousness is made 
overtly in his Marseilles drafts, in his Vigo text there is an indication that Kracauer 
was uneasy about maintaining such a direct analogy. “Responding to the 
overwhelming appeal of material phenomena,” notes Kracauer, Vigo “more and more 
withdrew from social criticism” and in L’Atalante it appears “as if he actually had 
wanted to affirm an attitude hostile to intellectual awareness.”46 “Could it be then”, 
                                                
41 Quoted by William Melnitz in the “Introductory Note” of the English translation of Kracauer’s “Jean 
Vigo,” see, Kracauer, 1947, p. 261.  
42 Quoted in Lukács, Georg, History and Class Consciousness: studies in Marxist dialectics, translated 
by Rodney Livingstone (London: Merlin Press), 1971, p. 149. 
43 Lukács, 1971, p. 149. 
44 For Kracauer’s espousal of Marxist social / economic determinates see, Frisby, David, Fragments of 
Modernity: Theories of Modernity in the work of Simmel, Kracauer and Benjamin (Cambridge, Mass.: 
The MIT press, 1988), pp. 121 – 123. 
45 Hansen, 1993, p. 450. 
46 Kracauer, 1947, p. 263. 
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asks Kracauer, “that Vigo’s career had taken a retrogressive course?”.47 Perhaps, he 
answers: 
[Vigo] indulged in the magic of mute objects and dark instincts only 
in order, some day, to pursue more thoroughly and knowingly the 
task of disenchantment.48 
 
Vigo’s impulse to disenchant was at its’ most explicit in his first film À propos de 
Nice. Released in May 1930, Vigo intended his film to show “a way of life is put on 
trial”.49 As soon as “the atmosphere of Nice and the kind of life lived there” has been 
documented on screen, explains Vigo:  
 
the film develops into a generalized view of the vulgar pleasures 
that come under the sign of the grotesque, of the flesh, and of death 
[…] These pleasures are the last glimpse of a society so lost in its 
escapism that it sickens you and makes you sympathetic to a 
revolutionary solution.50  
 
Vigo was not alone in wanting to expose the perniciousness of this desire to escape 
the cataclysmic economic and political reality of inter-war Europe.  A few weeks after 
À propos de Nice was shown in Paris, Kracauer published in the Frankfurter Zeitung 
an equally scathing attack on Weimar’s “neubürgerliche” [new bourgeoisie]. 51 In an 
essay titled, “Die Biographie als neubürgerliche Kunstform” [The Biography as an 
Art Form of the New Bourgeoisie] he writes: 
 
Just as, thanks to Einstein, our spatio-temporal system has become a 
limit concept, the self-satisfied subject has become a limit concept 
thanks to the object lesson of history. In the most recent past, people 
have been forced to experience their own insignificance – as well as 
that of others – all too persistently for them to still believe in the 
sovereign power of any one individual. 52  
                                                
47 Kracauer, 1947, p. 263. 
48 Kracauer, 1947, p. 263. 
49 Vigo quoted in Salles Gomes, 1971, p. 68. About Nice [French: À Propos de Nice], directed by Jean 
Vigo (France: Vigo, 1930). 
50 Salles Gomes, 1971, p. 68. 
51 Kracauer, Siegfried, “The Biography as an Art Form of the New Bourgeoisie”, in Kracauer, 1995b, 
pp. 101 – 106. 
52 Kracauer, 1995b, p. 102. 
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As physicist Albert Einstein had questioned the validity of the Newtonian model of 
the universe in his 1915 paper on “General Relativity” 53, so too for Kracauer had 
recent historical events called into the question the belief structures that governed 
social reality. By 1930, those who had survived the mechanized slaughter of the Great 
War and the subsequent hyper-inflation caused by the payment of war reparations, 
were in the grips of yet another devaluation of their existence; the Great Depression.  
After the Wall Street Crash in October 1929 America stopped the financial aid it 
provided to the republic. The subsequent collapse of the German economy resulted in 
unemployment levels increased to unprecedented levels.54  In response to the 
catastrophic homogenization of the widespread poverty, Kracauer noted a reactionary 
trend in the literature favoured by the German middle-class. As international social 
and economic forces dissipated the sovereign power of the individual so the middle-
class turned to the literary genre of the biography as a refuge for their notions of the 
autonomous human subject. Those wishing to address the reality character of the 
historical situation, Kracauer explained, would have to dispense with such an ersatz 
idea of subjectivity. In his essay on the middle classes’ appetite for biographies, 
Kracauer argues that: 
 
Today the creative artist has once and for all lost faith in the 
objective meaning of any one individual system of reference. But 
when this fixed coordinate grid disappears, all the curves plotted on 
it lose their pictorial form as well. The writer can no more appeal to 
his self than he can depend on the world for support, because these 
two structures determine each other. The former is relativized, and 
the contents and figures of the latter have been thrown into an 
opaque orbit. 55 
 
Vigo, in Kracauer’s view, was such an artist. His work demonstrated an 
understanding of this relative nature of the self-satisfied subject. For the spectator, 
                                                
53 In 1916 Einstein wrote an introductory guide to his theory, the success of which accounts for his 
subsequent popular appeal, see, Einstein, Albert, Relativity. The Special and General Theory [1916], 
translated by Robert W. Lawson (New York: Pi Press, 2005). 
54 For an introduction to the events of this period see, Mann, Golo, The History of Germany since 1789 
[1958], translated by Marian Jackson (London: Pimlico, 1996), pp. 342 – 419. A more detailed 
examination of the period of hyperinflation in the Weimar republic is available in Fergusson, Adam, 
When money dies: the nightmare of the Weimar collapse (London: Kimber, 1975). 
55 Kracauer, 1995b, p. 102. My emphasis. 
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nestled amidst the flotsam and jetsam of L’Atalante’s fog-cloaked canals, a different 
form of subjectivity gradually makes itself apparent. “Instead of using the objects at 
his disposal”, writes Kracauer about Michel Simon’s character Père Jules, “he has 
become their property.”56 “To evoke this impression”, Kracauer explains, Vigo 
depicts the “piled-up treasures which crowd his cabin” from “various sides and on 
many levels without ever clarifying their spatial inter-relationship – using nothing but 
the medium shots and close-ups made necessary by the narrowness of the cabin”.57 In 
contrast to the ontological stability of theatrical space (the actor and spectator know 
where they are in relation to the stage and the auditorium), the disorientation 
experienced by the audience during the scenes filmed below deck on the L’Atalante 
suggests a less coherent relationship [Figure 3].  
 
 
Figure 3. Below deck of L’Atalante (1934) 
 
No longer definable as a fixed reference point in time and space, the observer position 
in Vigo’s film is (as Kracauer describes in his critique of the art forms of the 
neubürgerliche) “relativized”.58 In other words, we are observing the events of the 
film from a simultaneously human and non-human perspective. In the next section I 
will explain how Kracauer uses film as a means to question the objectivity of the 
                                                
56 Kracauer, 1947, p. 263. 
57 Kracauer, 1947, p. 263. 
58 Kracauer, 1995b, p. 102. 
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philosophical viewpoint. Focusing this time on Vigo’s earlier film Zéro de conduite 
(1933), it will show how Kracauer developed Lukács’ Marxist critique of bourgeois 
philosophy into a theory of film that questioned theory’s role in the production of the 
reality it tries to comprehend. 
 
5.3 The Peculiar Reality of Jean Vigo’s Zéro de Conduite. 
 
For Kracauer, the “process of materialization” was not identical with film’s ability to 
consolidate an illusion of objective reality. For example, he read the coming of 
synchronized sound to film comedy as a regressive step.59 Instead, Kracauer related it 
to the medium’s ability to demonstrate the arbitrary nature of fixed object and subject 
relations. Using the precariousness of the subject position to expose the historical 
nature of this relationship, Kracauer’s work demonstrates another point of 
correspondence with Lukács’ History and Class Consciousness.  
 
In a letter to a mutual friend, the philosopher Ernst Bloch, written in June 1926, 
Kracauer concludes a tirade against Lukács’ Communist Party orthodoxy with a 
positive appraisal of Lukács’ essay on “Reification and the Consciousness of the 
Proletariat” in History and Class Consciousness. 60 In the essay Lukács states that the 
“irrational chasm between the subject and object of knowledge” is grounded “in a 
theoretical approach based upon unmediated contemplation”.61 “When nature 
becomes landscape – e.g. in contrast to the peasant’s unconscious living within 
nature”, argues Lukács, “the artist’s unmediated experience of the landscape (which 
has of course only achieved this immediacy after undergoing a whole series of 
mediations) presupposes a distance (spatial in this case) between the observer and the 
landscape”.62 As Lukács explains: 
 
The observer stands outside the landscape, for were this not the case 
it would not be possible for nature to become a landscape at all. If 
he were to attempt to integrate himself and the nature immediately 
surrounding him in space within ‘nature-seen-as-landscape’, 
without modifying his aesthetic contemplative immediacy, it would 
                                                
59 Kracauer, 1951, p. 32. 
60 Quoted in Jay, Martin, “The Extraterritorial Life of Siegfried Kracauer”, in Jay, 1985, p. 163.  
61 Lukács, 1971, p. 157. 
62 Lukács, 1971, p. 157. 
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then at once become apparent that landscape only starts to become 
landscape at a definite (though of course variable) distance from the 
observer and that only as an observer set apart in space can he relate 
to nature in terms of landscape at all.63 
 
Though this idea of an arbitrary partition between the observer and the observed 
proffers a moment of concord between Kracauer’s and Lukács work, their own 
disparity becomes equally apparent in their subsequent attitudes towards art’s ability 
to resolve this disjunction. For Lukács, art’s relationship to the “pernicious chasm”, 
between the man and unmediated nature, subject and material context, was 
superficial.64 “Art can do no more,” concluded Lukács, “than shape this problematic 
without however finding a real solution to it.”65 Kracauer, however, considered film 
an “art with a difference.”66 
 
For Kracauer, what coloured Lukács consideration of agency was related to the fact 
that instead of “penetrating Marx with realities,” his concept of a totality, a 
reconciliation of subject and object,  “returns” to the “metaphysics of exhausted 
idealism”, which in turn “allows the materialist categories to fall on the way”. 67  As 
Susan Buck-Morss notes, when Lukács “analysed the structure of bourgeois theory 
and found within it the commodity structure of the social totality”, he demonstrated 
not just a model for critical theory but also his own “impatience with details and his 
unmistakable preference for totalistic visions”.  68 As Bloch himself commented, what 
Lukács “so frightfully lacked,” was an eye “for the unusual, the disruptive, the 
individual being (Einzelsein) which doesn’t fit into the mold”.69 However, it would be 
a mistake to read the top down perspective adopted by Lukács as the expression of an 
indifference to the lessons of experience, it was more a distrust of the allure of its 
immediacy, a distrust that was to shape Adorno’s consideration of cinema and in turn 
affect how Kracauer argued his own position. 
 
                                                
63 Lukács, 1971, pp. 157 – 158. In the text Lukács states that Bloch supplied the illustration of the 
“landscape” to him. 
64 Lukács, 1971, p. 158. 
65 Lukács, 1971, p. 158.  
66 Kracauer, 1997, p. l. 
67 Kracauer letter to Bloch, May 27th 1926. Quoted in Jay, 1985, p.162. 
68 Buck-Morss, Susan, The Origin of Negative Dialectics. Theodor W. Adorno, Walter Benjamin, and 
the Frankfurt Institute (New York: The Free Press, 1977), p. 242 n.83. 
69 Quoted in Buck-Morss, 1977, p.74. 
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The “antinomies”, writes Lukács in History and Class Consciousness, between 
“subject and object, freedom and necessity, individual and society, form and content, 
etc.” exist as the result of “the systematic limitations” of bourgeois thought.70  Though 
“bourgeois thought only landed in these antinomies after the very greatest mental 
exertions”, it “accepted their existential basis as self-evident, as a simply 
unquestionable reality”.71 In other words, “bourgeois thought entered into an 
unmediated relationship with reality as it was given”.72 “Seen methodologically”, 
explains Lukács, this approach to reality “makes of every historical object a variable 
monad which is denied any interaction with other – similarly viewed – monads and 
which possess characteristics that appear to be absolutely immutable essences”.73  An 
object, in this respect, “does indeed retain an individual uniqueness but this is only the 
uniqueness of mere facticity”.74 But, Lukács adds, this “facticity” is “an illusion 
which is itself the product of the habits of thought and feeling of mere immediacy 
where the immediately given form of the objects, the fact of their existing here and 
now and in this particular way appears to be primary, real and objective, whereas their 
“relations seem to be secondary and subjective”.75 If a change in this situation is to be 
comprehensible, Lukács argues, then “it is necessary to abandon the view that objects 
are rigidly opposed to each other, it is necessary to elevate their interrelatedness and 
the interaction between these ‘relations’ and the objects to the same plane of 
reality”.76 Lukács concludes that: 
 
Immediacy and mediation are therefore not only related and 
mutually complementary ways of dealing with objects of reality. 
But corresponding to the dialectical nature of reality and the 
dialectical character of our efforts to come to terms with it, they are 
related dialectically. That is to say that every mediation must 
necessarily yield a standpoint from which the objectivity it creates 
assumes the form of immediacy.77 
 
                                                
70 Lukács, 1971, p. 156. 
71 Lukács, 1971, p. 156. 
72 Lukács, 1971, p. 156. 
73 Lukács, 1971, p. 153. 
74 Lukács, 1971, p. 153. 
75 Lukács, 1971, p. 154. 
76 Lukács, 1971, p. 154. 
77 Lukács, 1971, p. 155 – 156. 
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As Kracauer notes, Lukács’ route out of this mise-en-abyme of false consciousness, 
demonstrated a regression from the materialism of Marx to the idealism of Hegel.  For 
Lukács, the “essence of history” lies precisely in the structural changes that occur at 
“the focal points of man’s interaction with environment at any given moment, and 
which determine the objective nature of both his inner and his outer life”.78 “But this 
only becomes objectively possible (and hence can only be adequately 
comprehended)”, states Lukács, “when the individuality, the uniqueness of an epoch 
or an historical figure, when it is discovered and exhibited in them and through 
them”.79 Here, at this moment of paradox, is the point at which Lukács and 
Kracauer’s critiques converge. However, this convergence marks only a brief 
intersection, as Lukács’ approach takes a diametrically different route from the 
diligent receptiveness towards phenomena espoused by Kracauer. “[N]either the 
people who experience it”, concludes Lukács, “nor the historian has direct access to 
the immediate reality” of these “true structural forms”. Therefore, it “is first necessary 
to search for them and to find them – as the path to their discovery is the path to a 
knowledge of the historical process in its totality”.80  For Lukács, when it came to 
determining the genuine constituents of social change the evidence of immediate 
experience was not to be trusted. The only certainty in this respect was Marx’s model 
for historical change. 
 
How Kracauer’s notion of the materialization of the cinematic subject intervenes in 
the dialectic of immediacy and mediation (with which Lukács delimits the objects of 
bourgeois reality) is demonstrated in his interpretation of the opening scene of Vigo’s 
1933 film Zéro de conduite.81 Here, through moments of diegetic (plot) 
indeterminacy, Vigo presents a subjective standpoint from which objects and their 
“relations” can be seen to interact, as Lukács’ proposed, on “the same plane of 
reality”.82 The scene [Figure 4] involves two schoolboys travelling at night in a third 
class train compartment. It is, suggests Kracauer: 
 
                                                
78 Lukács, 1971, p. 153. 
79 Lukács, 1971, p. 153. 
80 Lukács, 1971, p. 153. 
81 Zero for Conduct [French: Zéro de conduite], directed by Jean Vigo (France: Franfilmdis / Argui-
Film, 1933) 
82 Lukács, 1971, p. 156. 
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as if they were left to themselves in a wigwam that imperceptibly 
fuses with their dreams. We see a man’s legs on one of the benches, 
and then, on the other bench, we see the upper half of a sleeping 
traveller. This halving of the sleeper, marking him as an inanimate 
being, increases the impression of isolation from the world, an 
impression already aroused by the smoke, which shuts out the world 
behind the car window. The partition of the compartment lies 
somewhat obliquely in the picture, an angle which points to the fact 
that this entire sequence cannot be located within real space and 
time. Their adventurous ride stimulates the two boys to pranks. 
From unfathomable pockets they produce alternately a spiral with a 
little ball springing out of it, a flute, shrivelled toy balloons blown 
up by the younger boy, a bunch of goose quills with which the older 
one adorns himself, and finally cigars a yard long. Photographed 
from below, they squat exaltedly as the smoke of the locomotive 
mingles with the smoke of the cigars, and in the haze the round 
balloons float to and fro, in front of their pale faces. It is exactly as 
if the two in their magic wigwam were riding through the air.83 
 
As with the cramped environment of Père Jules’ cabin in L’Atalante, the various 
unconventional camera positions adopted by Boris Kaufman (Vigo’s director of 
photography) combine to confuse the location of any singular spatial or temporal  
 
 
Figure 4. The train compartment in Zéro de conduite (1933) 
                                                
83 Kracauer, 1947, p. 262.  
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viewpoint. It is not from the perspective of a person that we see the events in the 
carriage but from the perspectives of the things around them. Even the paradoxical 
observer position of the sleeping passenger is, as Kracauer suggests, frustrated by an 
oblique truncation that transmogrifies him from man to object.  It is only from the 
multiple positions of such objects that an observer position can be assumed to exist at 
all.  This is a standpoint that exists as an epiphenomenon rather than an Archimedean 
point from which the objectivity of the camera “assumes the form of immediacy”.84 
As Vigo’s biographer, P.E. Salles Gomes notes: “If one had to select a single 
sequence from Vigo’s work representative of his style for an anthology, one ought to 
choose this opening of Zéro de conduite”. This is because, argues Salles Gomes: 
 
Three key elements of his method can be seen in it. First, everyday 
reality full of carefully selected details (a third class compartment, 
school-boys with skinny legs in frayed uniforms); then it moves 
through the bizarre (the children’s objects and toys), to develop into 
fantasy (the hazy atmosphere of the compartment).85   
 
It is the immediacy of Vigo’s materialism, the spatial and temporal pattern it weaves 
that suggests the dialectical form of its reality, not vice-versa.  For Salles Gomes, 
what this scene on the train and the later sequence in the school dormitory show is 
“Vigo in a moment of complete control over the cinema, which bends obediently to 
his desire to re-create the sense of delicious intimacy he had dragged out of his 
childhood memories”. In this scene, he argues: 
 
editing, the camera movements, the composition and inner rhythm 
of the images, the dialogue, the lighting, all fused into a harmonious 
whole which was probably one of Vigo’s most ambitious dreams.86  
 
However, this is not an exclusively private experience.  As the smoke of the train 
mingles with the smoke of the cigars, blurring the boundary between the boy’s private 
world and that outside the carriage, so the demarcation between Vigo’s dreams and 
memories and our own becomes indistinct. Vigo’s technique is as intent on frustrating 
                                                
84 Lukács, 1971, p. 155 – 156. 
85 Salles Gomes, 1971, p. 111. 
86 Salles Gomes, 1971, p. 113. 
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temporal relations, as it is keen to disrupt conventional spatial ones. Past experience is 
denied the finitude of recollected memory by imbuing its reproduction with some of 
the same puzzling indeterminacy of the initial event. “Films may try to direct our 
attention more forcefully than a play or a novel”, suggests Hansen, “but they may also 
afford us an opportunity to meander across and away from it, into labyrinths of our 
own imagination, memories, and dreams”. 87  
 
In a review of the film that appeared in Paris-Cinéma to mark the film’s re-release in 
1945, Jacques Loew remarked that, “Jean Vigo has given his scenes from life an 
authenticity which is at times hallucinatory; we are faced by the ghosts and shadows 
of our own childhood”.88 P.F. Lacome echoes the same sentiment in a slightly later 
review.  “These images from childhood which have wandered into film from our 
memories”, writes Lacome, “are unforgettable”.89 This is not to say that, for Kracauer, 
the effectiveness of this scene from Vigo’s film relates to its ability to induce a sense 
of nostalgia. What Kracauer is suggesting in his article on Vigo, and what he later 
elucidates in Theory of Film, is that somehow Vigo’s attempt to translate his own 
experience into film produces a peculiar resonance between the subject position on 
screen and that occupied by the spectator in the auditorium.  The overall effect of 
Vigo’s and Kaufman’s strange composite of slanted and tilted camera angles, argues 
Kracauer, is both comic and emancipatory.  In this cinematic space, objects emerge 
(like the balloons in the smoke) from what Kracauer calls “the abyss of nearness.” 90 
As their “boasts and pranks”, transforms the school boys’ train carriage into “a magic 
wigwam  […] floating through the air”, so too do the tricks that the cinema pulls from 
its own “unfathomable pockets” transform, for the spectator, the ordinary into the 
fantastic.91  
 
5.4 Conclusion 
 
The film experience for Kracauer does not just provide a novel means for the audio 
and visual enunciation of a philosophical position but through its peculiar 
relativisation of the viewer’s subject position questions the legitimacy of maintaining 
                                                
87 Hansen, 1997, p. xxxiv. 
88 Paris-Cinéma review dated November 28th, 1945, quoted in Salles Gomes, 1971, p. 223. 
89 Gavroche review dated December 6th, 1945, quoted in Salles Gomes, 1971, p. 223. 
90 Kracauer, 1997, p. 55. 
91 Kracauer, 1997, p. 55. 
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(like Lukács) Idealism’s teleological perspective. What is interesting about 
Kracauer’s initially Marxist reading of Vigo’s work is how the object of his study (the 
film) starts to undermine and destabilise the conceptual framework of his 
interpretation. The film object performs this subversion not by a rational process of 
analysis, explication and exposition (like conventional literary modes of critique) but 
by blurring the boundaries between subject and object through its facilitation of the 
cinematic process. This process though initiated by the formal compositional 
decisions of filmmakers is not entirely immanent to the film but exists 
epiphenomenally between its intention and effect. As I shall demonstrate in the 
subsequent chapters of this study, the ontological indeterminacy of the cinematic 
effect increasing informs Kracauer’s critical practice.  
 
“Despite Kracauer’s intentions,” writes Temenuga Trifonova, “his materialist 
aesthetic is actually an aesthetic of the fantastic in as much as it is precisely in the 
fantastic object that the desire for an absolutely autonomous, self-signifying object is 
fulfilled.”92 Trifonova is correct in suggesting that, for Kracauer, the cinematic object 
(the components of what he refers to in Theory of Film as “camera reality”93) have 
paradoxically a closer relationship to actuality than phenomena not mediated by the 
film process.  However, as I will show in the next chapter, the question as to what (for 
Kracauer) constitutes a cinematic object and its relationship to materiality is a 
complex and dynamic process and one not easily divided into the subsets of fantasy 
and reality. As Kracauer states in his 1930 book Die Angestellten, “[r]eality is a 
construction”, a “mosaic” whose observable patterns and forms are the creations of 
those who observe them. 94 Anyone wishing to understand the interactive nature of 
this process, suggests Kracauer nearly forty years later in his last book History (1969), 
should heed the philosopher Schopenhauer's “advice to the art student” and: 
 
                                                
92 Trifonova, Temenuga, ‘The Fantastic Redemption of Reality’, Quarterly Review of Film and Video, 
no. 23 (2006), p. 58. 
93 Kracauer, 1997, p. 28. 
94 Kracauer, Siegfried,  The Salaried Masses. Duty and Distraction in Weimar Germany, translated by 
Quintin Hoare (London and New York: Verso, 1998), p. 32. 
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behave as if he were in the presence of a prince and respectfully 
wait […] for were he to talk first he would only be listening to 
himself. 95 
 
In order to avoid such circularity, explains Kracauer, the student of reality must 
therefore maintain an idea of themselves as “both passive and active, a recorder and a 
creator”.96  In the next chapter I shall explore how Kracauer uses the idea of dreaming 
as a way of understanding our relationship to camera reality and in particular how we 
as film spectators are simultaneously both active and passive in the construction of its 
meaning. 
 
 
                                                
95 Kracauer, Siegfried, History. The Last Things Before the Last, completed after the death of the 
author by Paul Oskar Kristeller (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1995), p. 84. Arthur 
Schopenhauer (1788 – 1860), German philosopher. 
96 Kracauer, 1995, p. 47. 
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CHAPTER 6:   
 
FEEDBACK LOOPS: DEFINING CINEMATIC AGENCY 
 
6.1 Introduction. 
 
In this chapter I will examine how Kracauer envisaged his film theory as belonging 
(as Mullarkey suggests) “both to the theorist and, in part, to the film”.1 It will focus on 
how he developed a critical correspondence between film spectatorship and dreaming 
not as a means of decrypting a film’s latent meaning (as in psychoanalysis) but in 
order to investigate the peculiar nature of cinematic agency as a mutually modifying 
process between subject and object (a feedback loop). Through a comparison of his 
film analysis and his literary prose I will examine how Kracauer defines spectatorship 
as consisting of two antinomic processes. With reference to his and Benjamin’s work 
on childhood imagination and mimesis, I argue that Kracauer conceives of the 
cinematic approach not as a synthesis of this antinomy but as a complementarity. 
Using Kracauer’s own recourse to post-Newtonian physics as a starting point, this 
chapter will then demonstrate how Kracauer incorporates the idea of how the 
spectator / observer influences (co-generates) the object of study. The last section of 
this chapter proposes a comparison between Kracauer’s dynamic and interactive 
concept of spectatorship and Jacques Rancière’s notion of the emancipated spectator 
in order to demonstrate how both work to collapse the antithetical dialectic of passive 
and active modes of behaviour that is immanent to philosophy’s notion of agency. 
 
6.2 A Dream That Makes You Dream 
 
Though much has been made of Kracauer’s identification of film spectatorship and 
dreaming, on the whole this has been done in order to align his thought with the more 
psychoanalytical models adopted by his Weimar associates, Adorno and Benjamin.2 
                                                
1 Mullarkey, John, “Film Can’t Philosophise (and Neither Can Philosophy): Introduction to a Non-
Philosophy of Cinema, in Havi, Carel and Greg Tuck (eds.), New Takes in Film Philosophy 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 94. 
2 For a psychoanalytical interpretation of Kracauer’s ideas of spectatorship see, Campbell, Jan,  ‘Are 
Your Dreams Wishes or Desires?: Hysteria as Distraction and Character in the Work of Siegfried 
Kracauer’, New Formations, No. 61 (2007), pp. 132 – 148. Campbell also argues for the consideration 
of a common Freudian critical model in Kracauer and Benjamin in Campbell, Jan, Film and Cinema 
Spectatorship. Melodrama and Mimesis (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005). For a detailed account of 
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However, such an alignment with Freudian theory obscures important and 
fundamental differences between his usage of the term and that espoused by 
Benjamin in particular. In a letter to Adorno in 1930, Kracauer refutes Adorno’s 
assertion that he has accepted Benjamin’s “formula of buildings as the dreams of the 
collective”. “This is not the case at all”, proclaims Kracauer: 
 
I referred to certain spatial images as society’s dreams because they 
represent a level of this society’s existence which has been 
concealed from it consciousness. That is, I meet Benjamin – who, 
by the way, is of the same opinion – only in the word dream. It is 
like meeting at a street crossing and then continuing in a different 
direction. 3 
 
What is interesting here about Kracauer’s protest is that as well as stating definitively 
the disjunction between Benjamin’s and his own understanding of dreaming, the 
analogy employed by Kracauer gives the concept a decidedly dynamic character. The 
word dream acts as a junction, the incidence of contradictory processes that would 
thwart the application of a predetermined symbolic cipher. It is this idea of dreaming 
as a mutable complex that forms the conceptual basis for his 1959 essay “The 
Spectator” and its subsequent revision as a chapter in Theory of Film.   
 
“Film is a dream”, states Kracauer (quoting the French psychoanalyst Serge 
Lebovici), “which makes (one) dream.”4  However, though it is “fairly evident”, 
writes Kracauer, “that the spectator’s condition has something to do with the kind of 
spectacle he watches”, insights such as Lebovici’s raise “the question as to what 
elements of film may be sufficiently dream-like to launch the audience into reveries 
and perhaps even influence their course”.5 For Kracauer, cinema’s dream quality has 
little to do with its Hollywood portrayal of itself as a “dream factory,” its capability to 
                                                                                                                                      
how Freud’s psychoanalytical theory influenced those associated with the Frankfurt school see, 
Wiggershaus, Rolf, The Frankfurt School. Its History, Theories and Political Significance, translated 
by Michael Robertson (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), in particular pp. 52 – 60 & pp. 265 – 273. 
3 Barnouw, Dagmar, Critical Realism: History, Photography, and the work of Siegfried Kracauer 
(Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1994), p. 293 n.33. Barnouw’s monograph is the only 
English language text to systematically attempt to discredit what she refers to as the “fictitious 
intellectual closeness to Adorno, Bloch, and especially Benjamin”, p. 308. 
4 Kracauer, Siegfried, ‘The Spectator’, in Robert Hughes (ed.), Film: Book 1. The Audience and the 
Filmmaker (New York: Grove Press, 1959), p. 10.   
5 Kracauer, 1959, p. 10.   
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satisfy “the alleged desires and daydreams of the public at large,” but rather its role in 
the technological mediation between the spectator and the “stark reality” of their 
predominantly metropolitan environment.6 If film has the ability to “resemble dreams 
at intervals”, it is, Kracauer asserts,  “a quality so completely independent of their 
recurrent excursions into the realms of fantasy and mental imagery that it shows most 
distinctly in places where they concentrate on real-life phenomena”.7  
 
The film Kracauer cites as demonstrating the analogous relationship between 
dreaming and film spectatorship is Sidney Meyer’s 1949 documentary film The Quiet 
One [Figure 5]; a film that chronicles the contemporary plight of an emotionally 
disturbed African American boy in and around the Harlem neighbourhood of New 
York.8  
 
 
Figure 5. The stark reality of The Quiet One (1949) 
 
Here, as in his description of Vigo’s Zéro de Conduite, Kracauer suggests a 
relationship between the experience of the film spectator and the subjectivity of the 
juvenile protagonist. However, this should not be understood as an identification of 
subject positions but a far more elusive resonance between particular indeterminate 
manifestations of subject / object relations. Note Kracauer’s use of the possessive 
                                                
6 Kracauer, 1959, p. 11. 
7 Kracauer, 1959, p. 12. 
8 The Quiet One, directed by Sidney Meyers (USA: Film Documents, 1948). 
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adjective “our” in the following account of a sequence from Meyer’s film, as it works 
to confuse the attribution of cause and effect in the cinema experience: 
 
Women are standing, all but motionless, in house doorways and 
nondescript characters are seen loitering about. Along with the 
dingy facades, they might as well be products of our imagination, as 
kindled by the narrative. To be sure, this is an intended effect, but it 
is brought about by a clear-cut recording of stark reality. Perhaps 
films look most like dreams when they overwhelm us with the crude 
and un-negotiated presence of natural objects so that it is as if the 
camera had just now extricated them from the womb of physical 
existence and as if the umbilical cord between image and actuality 
had not yet been severed. There is something in the abrupt 
immediacy and shocking veracity of such pictures that justifies their 
identification as dream images. 9 
 
This description of Meyer’s film is reminiscent in its mood of two prose poems, 
“Zwei Flächen” [Two Planes] and “Analyse eines Stadtplans” [Analysis of a City 
Map], that Kracauer wrote in 1926 as he travelled around France (often with 
Benjamin). However, the relationship between these texts goes beyond a superficial 
similarity between their desolate tone and urban subject matter. In conjunction with 
“Knabe und Stier [Lad and Bull], also written in 1926, their importance as an 
indicator of Kracauer’s dialectical understanding of subject / object relations is 
affirmed by their use as an introduction to The Mass Ornament, the collection of 
Kracauer’s Weimar essays that he edited and published in 1963.10  In these pieces, as 
well as in the Vigo text and “The Spectator”, Kracauer introduces into his work the 
notion of observation’s complex and active engagement with its object. In other 
words, as stressed in the subtitle of “Knabe und Stier”, “Bewegungsstudie” (A Study 
in Movement), what Kracauer attempts to articulate is a dynamic interchange. These 
are not descriptions of static scenes, photographic snapshots in prose, nor are they 
                                                
9 Kracauer, 1959, p. 12.  
10 Kracauer, Siegfried, The Mass Ornament. Weimar essays, translated and edited by Thomas Y. Levin 
(Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard U.P., 1995b), pp. 33 – 39. Kracauer edited the first edition of 
this collection himself in 1963 see, Levin, T, ‘Translator’s Note’, in Kracauer, 1995b, p. x. For details 
of Benjamin’s and Kracauer’s European travels in 1926 see, Benjamin, Walter, Briefe an Siegfried 
Kracauer, edited by Rolf Tiedemann (Marbach am Neckar: Deutsche Schillergesellschaft, 1987), p. 36. 
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simply convoluted reportage of past events.11 They are about the process of 
observation itself, and in particular the complexes of material relations that facilitates 
a peculiar dream-like consciousness of the dissolution of what demarcates the subject 
and the object. “Two planes,” concludes with a description of a “deserted square,” 
chanced upon by Kracauer and Benjamin, as they explored the small backstreets of 
Marseilles. Here, though not explicit, the analogy Kracauer makes between this and 
the experience of going to the cinema is clear. Kracauer writes: 
 
In this tangle of pictorial alleys no one seeks the quadrangle. But 
once its observers have settled into their chairs, it expands toward 
the four sides of the world, overpowering the pitiful, soft, private 
parts of the dream.12 
 
Though the last image of “Two planes” is one in which the observer is overwhelmed 
by the experience of the expanding horizontal plane of the deserted town square in his 
examination of the vertical plane of the cinema screen Kracauer is careful to describe 
the process as a two way process. In the following section I will look at how Kracauer 
uses the notion of dreaming to explore how the cinematic object is (to use 
Mullarkey’s term) “co-generated”.13 
 
6.3       Film Spectatorship and the Two Directions of Dreaming 
 
In an attempt to articulate this idea of the object as an active agent in experience 
Kracauer in “The Spectator”, breaks down the “dream character” of film into two 
discrete processes that proceed “in two all but opposite directions.”14 Paraphrasing the 
French Marxist philosopher, Lucien Sève, Kracauer introduces the first category of 
dreaming “[t]oward the object” by suggesting that on a basic phenomenological level 
the film image disturbs rather than affirms our  preconceptions of objects. Film 
images “arouse disquiet rather than certainty in the spectator, and thus prompt him to 
embark on an inquiry into the being of the objects they record – an inquiry which 
                                                
11 For a consideration of Kracauer’s texts as “snapshots” of urban experience see, Federle, Courtney, 
‘Picture Postcard: Kracauer Writes from Berlin’, in Kenneth S. Calhoon (ed.), Peripheral Visions: the 
hidden stages of Weimar cinema (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2000), pp. 39 – 55. 
12 Kracauer, 1995b, p. 39. 
13 Mullarkey, 2011, pp. 95. 
14 Kracauer, 1959, p. 12. 
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does not aim at explaining them but tries to elucidate their secrets”.15 The spectator, 
suggests Kracauer: 
 
drifts toward and into the objects - much like the legendary Chinese 
painter who, longing for the peace of the landscape he had created, 
moved into it, walked toward the faraway mountains suggested by 
his brush strokes, and disappeared in them never to be seen again. 
Yet the spectator cannot hope to apprehend, however incompletely, 
the being of any object that draws him into its orbit unless he 
meanders, dreamingly, through the maze of its multiple meanings 
and psychological correspondences. Material existence, as it 
manifests itself in film, launches the moviegoer into unending 
pursuits.16 
 
Here, the illustration provided by Kracauer of the Chinese artist moving into the 
landscape stands in contrast to that used by Bloch and Lukács to explain the 
“irrational chasm between the subject and object of knowledge”.17 The bourgeois 
consciousness, as Lukács comprehended it, is challenged on a physiological level by 
the experience of watching a film in the cinema. For evidence of the public nature of 
this “diffuse, unorganized, and self-unconscious” sensibility as a “genuine first hand 
experience” Kracauer quotes a 1928 essay by French novelist Michel Dard, “Valeur 
humaine du cinéma” [The human value of the cinema]. Dard, explains Kracauer, was 
one of the first to remark upon the historical peculiarity of the sensibility of “the 
young people haunting movie houses, which he described as being ‘like an amoeba; 
deprived of an object, or rather attached to all of them, like fog; penetrant, like rain; 
heavy to bear, easy to satisfy, impossible to restrain; displaying everywhere, like a 
roused dream, that contemplation of which Dostoyevsky speaks and which 
incessantly hoards without rendering anything’”.18 It is however not to Dostoyevsky 
that Kracauer looks for a model of a peculiar cinematic awareness, but to the work of 
avid moviegoer, Franz Kafka.19 
                                                
15 Kracauer, 1959, p. 12. 
16 Kracauer, 1959, p. 13. 
17 Lukács, Georg, History and Class Consciousness: studies in Marxist dialectics, translated by Rodney 
Livingstone (London: Merlin Press, 1971), p. 158. 
18 Kracauer, 1959, p.13. 
19 For Kafka’s movie going activity see, Zischler, Hanns, Kafka goes to the Movies, translated by Susan 
H. Gillespie (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003). 
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In his 1927 essay “Photography”, Kracauer develops the idea that once inducted in 
the “process of materialization” it becomes “incumbent on consciousness to establish 
the provisional status of all given configurations, and perhaps even to awaken an 
inkling of the right order of the inventory of nature”.20 For example, explains 
Kracauer: 
 
In the works of Franz Kafka, a liberated consciousness absolves 
itself of this responsibility by destroying natural reality and 
scrambling the fragments. […] The capacity to stir up the elements 
of nature is one of the possibilities of film. This possibility is 
realized whenever film combines parts and segments to create 
strange constructs […] the game that film plays with the pieces of 
disjointed nature is reminiscent of dreams in which the fragments of 
daily life become jumbled. This game shows that the valid 
organization of things remains unknown.21 
 
It is after the “spectator’s organized self has surrendered”, to the “game” and 
immersed themselves in the stirred up elements of nature that the dream processes 
identified by Kracauer in “The Spectator”, as operating away from the object come to 
the fore. “Owing to their indeterminacy”, suggests Kracauer, “film shots are 
particularly fit to function as an ignition spark”, that prompts the spectator’s 
“subconscious or unconscious experiences, apprehensions and hopes” to impose an 
alternative organization of the film elements. Any film sequence, argues Kracauer: 
 
may touch off chain reactions in the moviegoer a flight of 
associations which no longer centre around their incidental source 
but arise from his agitated inner environment. This movement leads 
the spectator away from the given image into subjective reveries; 
the image itself recedes after having mobilized his previously 
repressed fears or induced him to revel in a prospective wish 
fulfilment.22 
 
                                                
20 Kracauer, 1995b, p. 62. 
21 Kracauer, 1995b, pp. 62 – 63. 
22 Kracauer, 1959, p. 14. 
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To illustrate this process as a product of psychological influences, Kracauer looks to 
the Swiss poet Blaise Cendrars.23 Cendrars recalled in interview held in 1925 how 
when watching a film some years previous a relatively innocuous scene provoked in 
him a peculiar response: 
 
The screen showed a crowd, and in this crowd there was a lad with 
his cap under his arm: suddenly this cap which was like all other 
caps began, without moving, to assume intense life; you felt it was 
all set to jump, like a leopard! Why? I don't know.24 
 
“Perhaps”, suggests Kracauer, “the cap transformed itself into a leopard because the 
sight of it stirred involuntary memories in the narrator […] sense memories of 
inarticulate childhood days when the little cap under his arm was the carrier of 
tremendous emotions which in a mysterious way involved the spotted beast of prey in 
his picture book”. 25 Again, as demonstrated by his focus on Vigo’s Zéro de conduite 
and Meyer’s The Quiet One, Kracauer seems drawn to examples of the cinema 
spectatorship that evoke this “sense memory” of childhood.26 The French poet, 
Charles Baudelaire in “The Painter of Modern Life,” (1863) states that artistic “genius 
is nothing more nor less than childhood recovered at will – a childhood now equipped 
for self-expression with manhood’s capacities and a power of analysis which enables 
it to order the mass of raw material which it has involuntarily accumulated”.27 It is 
such a mode of reception, “the deep and joyful curiosity that we may explain the fixed 
and animally ecstatic gaze of a child confronted with something new,” that Cendrars, 
an empathic advocate of Baudelaire, attempted to encapsulate in his work. 28   
 
Kracauer’s tentative invocation of Proust in this context brings into relief the 
importance of his distinctly fluid conception of the temporal relationship between 
                                                
23 Blaise Cendrars (born, Frédéric Louis Sauser), (1887 – 1961). 
24 Kracauer, 1959, p. 14. 
25 Kracauer, 1959, p. 14. 
26 In this regard, see also Kracauer’s references to the film, Little Fugitive, directed by Ray Ashley, 
Morris Engel and Ruth Orkin (USA: Little Fugitive Production Company, 1953) in Kracauer, 
Siegfried, Theory of Film. The Redemption of Physical Reality [1960] (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1997), p. 45, p. 252 & illus. 51  
27 Baudelaire, Charles, ‘The Painter of Modern Life’, in Charles Baudelaire, The Painter of Modern 
Life and Other Essays, translated and edited by Jonathon Mayne (London: Phaidon, 2001), p. 8. 
28 Baudelaire, 2001, p. 8. Cendrars provided the preface for the first post-war edition of Baudelaire’s 
poems, The Flowers of Evil [1857] see, Charles Baudelaire, Les Fleurs du mal, with preface by Blaise 
Cendrars  (Paris: Union Bibliophile de France, 1946).  
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“inarticulate” formative experiences, the process of materialization and the cinematic 
dreaming processes he later describes in Theory of Film.  “Proust’s work”, writes 
Kracauer, “rests throughout upon the conviction that no man is a whole and that it is 
impossible to know a man because he himself changes while we try to clarify our 
original impressions of him”.29 It is this mutability, this formal indeterminacy that 
characterises Kracauer’s conception of dream phenomena as incompatible with 
symbolic interpretation.30 On a fundamental level, it is the recognition of the 
influence of observation on the mental phenomenon being recorded which 
distinguishes it from the hermeneutics (textual interpretation) of orthodox 
psychoanalytical models.  As he wrote in a letter to Bloch in 1926, “nothing 
remembered may remain unchanged […] transformation plays a decisive role for 
me”.31 In Theory of Film Kracauer makes this distinction more overtly: 
 
Indeed, no sooner do we try to get in touch with mental entities than 
they tend to evaporate. In reaching out for them, we reduce them to 
abstractions as colourless as the noise to which radio music is 
commonly being reduced. […] Freud and depth psychology in 
general, voids all kinds of mental phenomena of their substance by 
passing them off as derivatives of psychological dispositions […] 
Thus the specific content of the values surrounding us is 
psychologized away and the realm to which they belong sinks into 
limbo. 32 
 
As Trifonova states in her reading of Theory of Film, Kracauer’s approach should not 
be read as an “attack on signification”, a call for its “terminal neutralization […] for 
the sake of a purely indexical relation to phenomena”, but a “warning against over 
signification.” For Kracauer, the “task of cinema,” she concludes, “is not to strip 
phenomena from signification but rather to render their signification indeterminate.”33 
 
                                                
29 Kracauer, 1997, p. 298. Kracauer develops his reading of Proust in Kracauer, Siegfried, ‘Time and 
History’, History and Theory, Beiheft 6, 1966,  p. 65-78. 
30 See the section “Problematic Symbolism” in Kracauer, 1997, pp. 189 – 191. 
31 Quoted in Barnouw, 1994, pp. 42 – 43. 
32 Kracauer, 1997, p. 293. 
33 Trifonova, Temenuga, “The Fantastic Redemption of Reality”, Quarterly Review of Film and Video, 
no. 23 (2006), p. 77. 
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In order to articulate more clearly his thoughts on the dreaming spectator’s ability to 
redeem the potential of the material environment from the constraint of symbolic 
abstraction, Kracauer identifies it with the mimetic immersion that characterizes 
children’s play. In this regard, Kracauer’s persistent recourse to the formative stages 
of childhood, rather than affirm it as a Freudian axiom, provides an interesting 
intersection with a non-Freudian element of Walter Benjamin’s work. In the 
following section I will examine how Benjamin’s and Kracauer’s ideas of how 
children’s imagination and memories of childhood suggest a more interactive 
relationship with physical reality (compared to adults) and how Kracauer 
subsequently develops these ideas to question the role of the spectator in the 
generation of the industrial film object. 
 
6.4 On the Mimetic Faculty of the Spectator  
 
In a small article titled, “Old Toys” published in 1928 (in the section of the 
Frankfurter Zeitung of which Kracauer was editor), Benjamin writes that when “the 
urge to play overcomes an adult, this is not simply a regression to childhood”.34 “To 
be sure”, he concludes, “play is always liberating”.35 In On the Mimetic Faculty, an 
unpublished text written in 1933, Benjamin describes how children have better 
utilization of the whole of their innate mimetic faculty, and such a relationship 
enables them to transcend the usual anthropocentric conception of semblance. For 
example, he writes: 
 
Children’s play is everywhere permeated by mimetic modes of 
behavior, and its realm is by no means limited to what one person 
can imitate in another. The child plays at being not only a 
shopkeeper or teacher, but also a windmill and a train. 36 
 
Central to Benjamin’s idea of mimesis is the concept of non-sensuous similarity. 
“This concept”, explains Benjamin, “is obviously enough, a relative one: it indicates 
                                                
34 Benjamin, Walter, ‘Old Toys’, in Benjamin, Walter, Selected Writings Volume 2: 1927 – 1934, 
edited by Michael W.  Jennings, Howard Eiland, and Gary Smith (Cambridge, Mass. & London: The 
Belknap Press, 1999), p. 100. For Kracauer’s involvement with the publication of the text see, 
Benjamin, 1999, p. 829. 
35 Benjamin, 1999, p. 829. 
36 Benjamin, 1999, p. 720. 
 165 
that we no longer possess in our perception whatever once made it possible to speak 
of a similarity which might exist between a constellation of stars and a human”.37  
 
Though the specifically historical dynamic that Benjamin attributes to the mimetic 
faculty in his Doctrine of the Similar (1933), is not directly corroborated by Kracauer 
in Theory of Film, Tara Forrest sees affirmation of it in a five page “thematic sketch 
(Ideen–Entwurf) for a short film,” called Dimanche that Kracauer wrote sometime 
between 1933 and 1936.38  Dimanche is what Dagmar Barnouw terms, “a study of 
visual perspective and knowledge”. 39 It consists of two visual accounts of an 
unexceptional Sunday outing, the first from a child’s perspective, Bébé (a three or 
four year old boy) and the second from his parents’. When seen from the perspective 
of the child the outing is transformed into what Kracauer describes as a “magnificent 
adventure”.40 The space beneath the tables and chairs of a café becomes a “primeval 
forest”, and a ride on a merry-go-round becomes a magical journey through “the 
landscapes of coloured children’s books”. “The joke”, Kracauer notes, “lies in the 
correction of the imaginings of the child”. 41 In other words, the juxtaposition of the 
two accounts would together formulate a picture puzzle and its solution. The 
phenomena that constitute the fantastic disorientation of the child’s journey would be 
qualified and explained by its subsequent conventional representation.  The point of 
this “film-specific exploration of the interpretive character of perception”, suggests 
Barnouw, was to “shed light on the epistemologically interesting discrepancies 
between the child’s verbal and visual acculturation”. 42 For Forrest, the significance of 
Dimanche is that “its exploration of the child’s capacity for perception and 
imagination” is a model for the “promise” of cinema to “rejuvenate the way in which 
we both perceive, and conceive of the possibilities and limitations of the world around 
                                                
37 Benjamin, 1999, p. 696. 
38 Forrest, Tara, The Politics of Imagination: Benjamin, Kracauer, Kluge. (Biefeld: Transcript Verlag. 
2007), p. 104. Kracauer, Siegfried, “Dimanche” in Zum Werk des Romanciers, Feuilletonisten, 
Architekten, Filmwissenschaftlers und Soziolgen, edited by Andreas Volk (Zurich: Seismo Verlag, 
1996), pp. 209 - 212. For an account of Kracauer’s attempts at film making see, Gilloch, Graeme, 
‘Orpheus in Hollywood: Siegfried Kracauer’s Offenbach film’, in Mari Hvattum and Christain 
Hermansen (eds.), Tracing Modernity. Manifestations of the Modern in Architecture and the City  
(London and New York: Routledge, 2004), pp. 307 – 324. Also, Gilloch, Graeme and Jaeho Kang, 
‘Below the Surface: Siegfried Kracauer's 'Test-film' Project’, New Formations, no. 61 (2007), pp. 149 
– 160. 
39 Barnouw, 1994, p. 335 n. 43. 
40 Quoted in Forrest, 2007, p. 105. 
41 Quoted in Forrest, 2007, p. 105. 
42 Barnouw, 1994, p. 335 n. 43. 
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us and, in doing so, fundamentally transform our conception of the possibilities of the 
future”.43 
 
Informed by her reading of the relationship between child and adult perspective in 
Kracauer’s sketch for a film, Forrester’s critical rejuvenation of the mimetic faculty 
presents itself as the dialectical resolution of antithetical passive and active spectator 
positions. The passive acceptance of bourgeois material relations characterized by the 
socialized adult perspective, through an exposure to alternative film making practice, 
becomes sublated into a progressive synthesis with its diametrically opposed 
counterpart, the autonomous subject of the child’s imagination.  However, as even 
Forrest tentatively admits, her decidedly Benjamin influenced perspective sits 
awkwardly with what, she believes, is prescribed by Kracauer in Theory of Film. 
 
Though she quotes the Cendrar’s passage in its entirety, the focus of her critique rests 
entirely on her identification of Kracauer’s foregrounding of  “memories of 
childhood,” with that of another cinephile poet, Hugo von Hofmannsthal. 44 Both 
Cendrars and Hofmannsthal, states Forrest, “argue that film is at its best when it aids 
the spectator in reviving memories of ‘childhood days, which have sunk into his 
unconscious’”.45   The quotation is from Hofmannsthal’s 1921 article Der Ersatz fuer 
Traeume (The Substitute for Dreams), and it is this text, suggests Forrest, which 
provides the model for Kracauer’s subsequent approach. This text, argues Forrest, 
claims “not only that film has the capacity to revive childhood memories, but that – in 
doing so – it provides the spectator with a taste of that ‘fuller life’ which he had 
dreamed of in his childhood, but which has been denied to him by society”.46  
 
Hofmannsthal was born in 1874, twenty-one years before Auguste and Louis Lumière 
publicly presented their first films in Paris. Hofmannsthal’s childhood preceded the 
invention of cinema. Kracauer, on the other hand, was almost its contemporary and 
their childhoods (so to speak) concurred.47 Kracauer even introduces Theory of Film 
                                                
43 Forrest, 2007, p. 106. 
44 Forrest, 2001, p. 103. Hugo von Hofmannsthal (1874 – 1929). 
45 Forrest, 2001, p. 104. 
46 Forrest, 2001, p. 104. 
47 Kracauer gives an account of the early days of cinema in Germany in Kracauer, Siegfried, From 
Caligari to Hitler. A psychological history of the German film [1947], revised edition edited by 
Leonardo Quaresima (New York: Princeton University Press, 2004), pp. 15 – 27. 
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with a “personal reminiscence” of when he was “young boy” when he saw his first 
film and the “intoxicating” effect it had on him.48 Significantly, Hofmannsthal is 
referencing a perceived state of grace before cinema, before the mediation of the 
apparatus that characterizes, for him, the experience of modernity. For Kracauer, there 
is no such prelapsarian moment, no time of genuine unmediated experience. 
Kracauer’s dreams of childhood include the movies. As Lebovici declared, “film is a 
dream which makes (one) dream”.49 This leaves Forrest’s idea of a substitute for 
childhood dreams of a “fuller life” somewhat devoid of content. In the section of “The 
Spectator” that focuses on the spectator’s sense of  “child-like omnipotence”, 
Kracauer adopts a negative stance towards any consideration of film as the vicarious 
fulfilment of childhood fantasies. For Kracauer, films where “the moviegoer again 
becomes a child in the sense that he magically rules the world through dreams which 
replace stubborn reality” do no more than affirm their passivity in relation to the 
intrigue presented. 50 
 
Understanding this feedback loop is essential and Kracauer goes to some length in 
explaining how, as with the cinematic subject / object dialectic, the cinematic dream 
is not just a distorted reflection of a genuine, real dream but an active component in 
the process of dreaming. Since almost all commercial films are “produced for mass 
consumption”, explains Kracauer, it would be justifiable to “assume that there exists a 
certain relationship between their intrigues” and the “daydreams” of their patrons.51 In 
other words, “the events on the screen can be assumed to bear, somehow, on actual 
dream patterns, thereby encouraging identifications”.52 However, Kracauer proclaims: 
 
this relationship is necessarily elusive. Because of their vagueness 
mass dispositions usually admit of diverse interpretations. People 
are quick to reject things that they do not agree with, while they feel 
much less sure about the true objects of their leanings and longings. 
There is, accordingly, a margin left for film producers who aim at 
satisfying existing mass desires. Pent-up escapist needs, for 
instance, may be relieved in many different ways. Hence the 
                                                
48 Kracauer, 1997, p. li.  
49 Kracauer, 1959, p. 10. 
50 Kracauer, 1959, p. 20. 
51 Kracauer, 1959, p. 11. 
52 Kracauer, 1959, p. 11. 
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permanent interaction between mass dreams and film content. Each 
popular film conforms to popular wants; yet in conforming to them 
it inevitably does away with their inherent ambiguity. Any such film 
evolves these wants in a specific direction, confronts them with one 
among several meanings. Through their very definiteness films thus 
define the nature of the inarticulate from which they emerge.53 
 
It is this analogy between the immanent dynamics of ideology and film production 
and reception, with the latter acting as a cipher for the former, that Adorno came to 
regard as Kracauer’s “un-stated hypothesis.”54 For Kracauer, wrote Adorno, “when a 
medium desired and consumed by the masses transmits an ideology that is internally 
consistent and cohesive, this ideology is presumably adapting to the needs of the 
consumers as much as, conversely, it is progressively shaping them”.55  In Philosophy 
and the Moving Image: Refractions of Reality, John Mullarkey adopts and develops 
this notion of a self-perpetuating feedback loop in an attempt (like Adorno) to try and 
describe philosophy’s (thinking’s) relationship to commercial film practice. Quoting 
the Hollywood screenwriter William Goldman, Mullarkey suggests: 
 
that the secret behind Hollywood’s commercial success could be 
reduced to one golden rule: ‘Nobody Knows Anything’. When it 
comes to the reason why one film succeeds at the box office and 
another fails, there is no secret knowledge at all (other than 
Hollywood’s own ignorance of why it works when it does). 56 
 
The same, argues Mullarkey, is true for the philosophy of film: 
 
When it comes to what film fundamentally is, and also thereby what 
any one film essentially means, Nobody Knows Anything, or rather 
Nobody Knows Everything. This might sound like simply another 
form of (nihilistic) relativism, but it is actually a claim for 
something positive, for its corollary is not that everybody knows 
                                                
53 Kracauer, 1959, p. 11. 
54 Adorno, Theodor W., ‘The Curious Realist: On Siegfried Kracauer’, New German Critique, no. 54 
(1991), pp. 167 – 168. 
55 Adorno, 1991, p. 167. 
56 Mullarkey, John, Philosophy and the Moving Image: Refractions of Reality (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 
2009), p. 3. 
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nothing (an obviously self-contradictory position), but that there is 
more to film than any one transcendent theory (one telling us what 
film is) can exhaust. This not-knowing is not only an epistemic 
stance but also an aspect of the ontology of film, perhaps the only 
thing about it that we can know for sure.57 
 
It is this consideration of “not-knowing” as a positive epistemic stance that also 
informs (as Trifonova suggests) Theory of Film’s “warning against over 
signification”. 58 In this respect Mullarkey’s and Laruelle’s idea of a “mixte” 
interpretive scheme like Kracauer’s cinematic approach works to render signification 
indeterminate not as an act of nihilistic relativism but in order to emphasize the active 
role of theory in constructing reality. In the next section I will look at how Kracauer 
expands his cinematic model of dynamic subject / object relations and its questioning 
of the role of the spectator in the generation of the cinematic object into a broader 
examination of philosophical objectivity. It will argue that Kracauer’s cinematic 
approach, like Mullarkey’s critique of transcendent theory, is characterised by a “side-
by-side” assemblage of antinomic theories rather than a synthesis of fundamental 
principles.  It will also demonstrate how Kracauer sought analogies between the 
experiences of the film spectator and other forms of intellectual endeavour.   
 
6.5      Complementarity and the Challenge of Content Analysis 
 
“In this treatise”, wrote Kracauer in History: The Last Things before the Last, “I 
consider it my task to do for history what I have done for the photographic media in 
my Theory of Film - to bring out and characterize the peculiar nature of an 
intermediary area which has not yet been fully recognized and valued as such”. 59 This 
parallel is particularly evident in the final chapter, where he addresses the problem of 
how to reconcile the relativity of knowledge with the quest of reason for significant 
truths of general validity. As with the psychological aspect of film spectatorship, 
Kracauer suggests a reconsideration of the relationship between the two opposing 
theoretical models (the “transcendental” and the “immanentist”) that create the 
                                                
57 Mullarkey, 2009, p. 3. 
58 Trifonova, 2006, p. 77. 
59 Kracauer, Siegfried, History. The Last Things Before the Last, completed after the death of the 
author by Paul Oskar Kristeller (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1995), p.192.  
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“dilemma confronting contemporary thought”.60 Significantly (as with his reference 
to Einstein in his 1930 article on autobiographies) for the sake of clarification 
Kracauer again draws an analogy between his approach and that advanced in post-
Newtonian physics, this time the quantum theory of physicist Niels Bohr. “From the 
angle of my proposition”, states Kracauer, “philosophical truths have a double aspect 
[…] relating to each other in ways which I believe to be theoretically undefinable”.61 
Therefore, suggests Kracauer: 
 
we are forced to assume that the two aspects of truths exist side by 
side […] Something like an analogy may be found in the 
"complementarity principle" of the quantum physicists. 62 
 
Bohr devised the idea of the “complementarity principle,” around 1927 in order to 
negotiate a particular theoretical stalemate. The problem of whether the fundamental 
nature of matter could be described better as a wave or a particle.  According to the 
dictates of classical physics, as the two descriptions were mutually exclusive then one 
of them must be wrong. Bohr’s resolution of this antimony involved a consideration 
of wave / particle duality as complementary rather than antithetical paradigms.  
Though maintaining their absolute autonomy from each other Bohr contested that 
both were necessary for a full understanding of an object’s properties. Whether an 
object behaved as a particle or a wave, he concluded, depends on the choice of 
apparatus for observing it.63 As Werner Heisenberg, a close colleague of Bohr’s, 
explained: “In classical physics science started from the belief – or should one say the 
illusion? – that we could describe the world or at least parts of the world without any 
reference to ourselves”.64 To an extent this is actually possible, for example “we know 
that London exists whether we see it or not”. “It may be said”, suggests Heisenberg, 
that classical physics is just the “idealization” of that mode of thought that eliminates 
the observer from the observed. “Its success”, he adds, “has led to the general ideal of 
an objective description of the world”, where objectivity has become “the first 
                                                
60 Kracauer, 1995, p. 200. 
61 Kracauer, 1995, p. 200. 
62 Kracauer, 1995, p. 200. 
63 For Bohr’s explanation of complementarity see, Bohr, Niels. ‘Causality and Complementarity’. 
Philosophy of Science, Vol. 4, No. 3 (July 1937), pp. 289-298. For a concise explanation of Bohr’s 
complex theory see Gribbin, John, In Search of Schrödinger’s Cat. Quantum Physics and Reality 
[1984] (London: Black Swann. 1996), pp. 81 – 88. 
64 Heisenberg, Werner, Physics and Philosophy. The Revolution in Modern Science [1958], new edition 
(London: Penguin Classics, 2000), p. 22. 
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criterion for the value of any scientific result”. 65 “We have to remember”, concludes 
Heisenberg, “that what we observe is not nature in itself but nature exposed to our 
method of questioning”.66 For example, explains Heisenberg: 
 
Our scientific work in physics consists in asking questions about 
nature in the language that we possess and trying to get an answer 
from experiment by the means that are at our disposal. In this way 
quantum theory reminds us, as Bohr has put it, of the old wisdom 
that when searching for harmony in life one must never forget that 
in the drama of existence we are ourselves both players and 
spectators. It is understandable that in our scientific relation to 
nature our own activity becomes very important when we have to 
deal with parts of nature into which we can penetrate only by using 
the most elaborate tools.67 
 
For Kracauer, the cinema was one such tool. In Theory of Film, Kracauer describes 
how the various technical devices available to film, such as the “close-up” enable the 
film camera to reveal “material phenomena which elude observation under normal 
circumstances”.68 Paraphrasing Benjamin, Kracauer writes: 
 
huge close-up reveals new and unsuspected formations of matter; 
skin textures are reminiscent of aerial photographs, eyes turn into 
lakes or volcanic craters. Such images blow up our environment in a 
double sense: they enlarge it literally; and in doing so, they blast the 
prison of conventional reality.69 
 
“How”, asks Kracauer in the final section of History, can we “take cognizance of 
these hidden possibilities?” 70 Certainly not, he asserts, by trying to deduce them from 
extant doctrines of high generality. Any such action, he explains, would compromise 
                                                
65 Heisenberg, 2000, p. 22. 
66 Heisenberg, 2000, p. 25. 
67 Heisenberg, 2000, p. 25. 
68 Kracauer. 1997, p. 48. 
69 Kracauer. 1997, p. 48. Compare Kracauer’s text to Benjamin, Walter, “Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter 
seiner technischen Reproduzierbarkeit” [The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction 
Reproducibility] in Walter Benjamin, Selected Writings Volume 4. 1938 – 1940, edited by Howard 
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London: The Belknap Press, 2003), pp. 265 – 6. 
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their integrity and allow them to be “disparaged as eclectic syncretism”.71 “Yet if the 
truths in the interstices cannot be won by way of deduction from an established 
conception or principle”, states Kracauer, “they may well arise out of absorption in 
configurations of particulars”. 72 An example, he suggests, can be found in the 
writings of Marx: 
 
who, in his Pariser Commune, does not confine himself to a general 
definition of petty bourgeoisie on which he then bases his whole 
analysis, but tries to characterize the petit bourgeois of the period 
independently of, and beyond, the general theoretical concept. 73 
 
Objections to Marx’s dialectic conception of history, writes Kracauer, rightly 
concentrate on “the rather high-handed manner” in which it deals “with the given 
data”.74 In his eagerness to apply his theory to all of the past, writes Kracauer, Marx 
actually overstretches his concepts of class and class conflict. As a result of this 
disjunction in the formalism of his theory and the “configurations of particulars”, 
Marx has been “proved abysmally wrong in predicting that under industrial capitalism 
pauperism is bound to grow and that its growth will increasingly revolutionize the 
proletariat”.75 However, argues Kracauer: 
 
The very economic and technological evolution he foresaw gave 
rise, in advanced capitalistic countries, to political changes, which 
effectively altered its predicted course. Most certainly, these 
changes - strong labour unions, democratization of governments, 
etc.-also owed something to the widespread apprehensions called 
forth by Marxist augury itself. It was "self-frustrating".76 
 
It is clear from the above that in History, Kracauer had deviated little from the 
position he had adopted towards dialectic materialism in the late 1920’s. As 
demonstrated by his allusion to Bohr’s and Heisenberg’s criticism of classical 
science, his identification of the failings of Marxism stemmed from his rejection of it 
                                                
71 Kracauer, 1995, p. 214. 
72 Kracauer, 1995, pp. 214 – 215. 
73 Kracauer, 1995, pp. 215 – 216. 
74 Kracauer, 1995, p. 37. 
75 Kracauer, 1995, p. 38. 
76 Kracauer, 1995, p. 38. 
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as an interpretative strategy that maintained its immanent dynamic without 
recognizing its effect on the material in question. The same applies to his 
denouncement of Freudian depth psychology, which “voids all kinds of mental 
phenomena of their substance by passing them off as derivatives of psychological 
dispositions”.77 The proliferation of pseudo-scientific approaches that focused on 
objective assessments of data, argued Kracauer, risked negating the “elusive” way in 
which reception and practice are intertwined. “Accuracy in the approximate,” 
Kracauer writes in History, “is apt to exceed statistical elaborations in precision”. 78  
 
The “concern with shades and approximations” that Kracauer exhibits throughout 
History is prefigured in an earlier article The Challenge of Qualitative Content 
Analysis.79 In this text, published in the winter of 1952, Kracauer criticises the 
“pseudo-scientific methodological strictness” of the quantitative content analysis 
techniques that were prevalent in American social science at the time. Its then doyen, 
Harold Lasswell rigorously promoted this approach.80 Kracauer argues that, rather 
than being evidence of a lack of discipline, qualitative elements are necessary for an 
accurate analysis of the complexity of materials under investigation, especially in the 
field of international communications research on which his article focused. As in 
physics, where the notion of complementarity has enabled researchers to increase the 
predictive accuracy of their theoretical models, so too the social sciences could 
benefit from adopting such a “side by side” approach. However, adopting such an 
approach would call into question the discipline’s maintenance of an objective reality 
distinct from the influence of any deductive method. “Documents which are not 
simply agglomerations of facts”, asserts Kracauer, “participate in the process of 
living, and every word in them vibrates with the intentions in which they originate 
and simultaneously foreshadows the indefinite effects they may produce”.81 Their 
content, explains Kracauer: 
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is no longer their content if it is detached from the texture of 
intimations and implications to which it belongs and taken literally; 
it exists only with and within this texture a still fragmentary 
manifestation of life, which depends upon response to evolve its 
properties. Most communications are not so much fixed entities as 
ambivalent challenges. They challenge the reader or the analyst to 
absorb them and react to them. Only in approaching these wholes 
with his own whole being will the analyst be able both to discover 
and determine their meaning-or one of their meanings-and thus help 
them to fulfil themselves. 82 
 
“Far from being an obstacle”, suggests Kracauer, “subjectivity is in effect 
indispensable for the analysis of materials which vanish before our eyes when 
subjected to a treatment confounding them with dead matter”.83 However, he adds, 
any quantitative analysis of material culture “is not free of such nihilistic influence”.84 
In fact, explains Kracauer, such critical procedures “mark the spot where a misplaced 
desire for objectivity has failed to reveal the inner dynamics of an atomized content”. 
85 What is relevant, he concludes: 
 
are the patterns, the wholes, which can be made manifest by 
qualitative exegesis and which can throw light upon a textual 
characteristic which is allergic to quantitative breakdowns.86 
 
It is important to remember that Kracauer (like Laruelle) does not construct his 
conception of mixed qualitative analysis as an exclusive method. Throughout the text 
he asserts that in “small scale” or pilot communication studies the quantitative 
approach does provide important insight into the configuration of the document under 
analysis. What he does argue against is the “basic assumption that, due to its 
quantifications and counts, quantitative analysis is the only possible objective 
systematic and reliable analysis of content.”87 It is this axiomatic consideration of the 
apparent objectivity of its conclusions, Kracauer complains, that have enabled the 
                                                
82 Kracauer, 1952 – 3, p. 641. 
83 Kracauer, 1952 – 3, p. 642. 
84 Kracauer, 1952 – 3, p. 642. 
85 Kracauer, 1952 – 3, p. 642. 
86 Kracauer, 1952 – 3, p. 640. 
87 Kracauer, 1952 – 3, p. 634. 
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erroneous extrapolation of its method in larger scale projects designed to inform 
social policy. In this regard, social science’s supposed objectivity is entirely an 
ideological construct reliant on (paraphrasing Heisenberg,) its arbitrary disjunction of 
nature from the method of questioning. The “emancipation” of the spectator, states 
the French philosopher Jacques Rancière, begins, “when we challenge the opposition 
between viewing and acting; when we understand that the self evident facts that 
structure the relations between saying, seeing and doing themselves belong to the 
structure of domination and subjection”. 88  Though not an advocate of Rancière’s 
philosophical approach, Mullarkey’s insistence that “one can’t privilege any one form 
of thinking other than by sheer fiat” demonstrates a productive correlation between 
their two approaches and in turn Kracauer’s.89  In the final section I shall close the 
conceptual loop introduced at the beginning of this chapter and explore how 
Kracauer’s philosophical “side-by-side” approach feeds back into a critical notion of 
film spectatorship. This time using Rancière’s idea of the “emancipated spectator” as 
a model I shall look at how a theoretical collapse in the distinction between the 
philosophical subject and object can be developed into an alternative notion of agency 
in which conventional notions of active and passive are themselves suspended. Also, 
using Rancière as a perspective, argues Robnik, “we can frame” Kracauer’s thinking 
“politically”, in other words conceive of this suspension of philosophical certainty as 
the basis for social reconfiguration.90 “Read politically”, suggests Robnik, 
“Kracauer’s philosophy of non-solution offers a concept of cinema as a mode of 
theorizing through self-thwarting and waiting that diagnoses how power emerges 
where no one expected it”.91 
 
6.6  The Emancipated Spectator 
 
In their critique of the culture industry in Dialectic of Enlightenment, Adorno and 
Horkheimer argue that ideological supremacy is reliant on cultural institutions 
cultivating particular reward and punishment strategies. The purpose of these 
strategies, they assert, is to negate the individual’s consciousness of a genuine 
                                                
88 Rancière, Jacques, The Emancipated Spectator, translated by Gregory Elliott (London: Verso. 2009), 
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89 Mullarkey, 2011, p. 92. 
90 Robnik, Drehli, ‘Siegfried Kracauer’, in Felicity Colman (ed.), Film, Theory and Philosophy. The 
Key Thinkers (Durham: Acumen, 2009), p. 50. 
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alternative to devalued collective forms of Capitalist society. In other words, by 
constantly being presented with an image of themselves as atomistic components of a 
homogenous crowd individuals start to behave as “monads” (an indivisible and hence 
ultimately simple entity) thus negating the potential of any meaningful communal 
action. 92 As Adorno and Horkheimer state: 
 
The culture industry has sardonically realized man’s species being. 
Everyone amounts only to those qualities by which he or she can 
replace everyone else: all are fungible, mere specimens. As 
individuals they are absolutely replaceable, pure nothingness.93 
 
For Adorno and Horkheimer this process followed an orthodox Marxist dynamic, 
which rendered the mass passive to the ideological factors that determined their 
existence as such. However, as I have shown, through his exegesis of the material 
dialectics of film, Kracauer argued for a more intertwined conception of the 
individual’s relationship to their material / social environment, one that blurred the 
ontological distinction between active and passive components. In his essay “The 
Spectator”, Kracauer articulates this relationship in a manner reminiscent of Bohr’s 
summation of the principle of complementarity. Kracauer suggests that: 
 
What redeems the film addict from his isolation is not so much the 
spectacle of an individual, which might again isolate him, as it is the 
sight of people mingling and communing with each other according 
to ever-changing patterns. He seeks the opportunity of drama rather 
than drama itself.94 
 
Here, Kracauer (partially) inverts Adorno and Horkheimer’s negative assessment of 
the atomized subject by defining individuality not entirely as an antagonism to an 
abstract mass group but also as a relative and dynamic process. Also, significantly, 
Kracauer attributes to the camera reality of the cinematic community (as it is co-
generated by the image and spectator) a value equal to that filmed and that projected. 
However, if the spectator position is neither exclusively passive nor active, how does 
                                                
92  Adorno, Theodor, W. and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, translated by John 
Cumming, 2nd ed. (London and New York: Verso, 1986), p. 112. 
93 Adorno & Horkheimer, 1986, pp. 116 – 117. 
94 Kracauer, 1959, p. 20. 
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this effect a practical consideration of the cinematic subject as a social agent both on 
screen and in the auditorium? As Jacques Rancière has recently argued, it is the 
immediate experience of subject / object relations rendered obscure that provides an 
alternative to the eternal problem of overcoming “the gulf separating activity from 
passivity”.95 
 
The “oppositions - viewing / knowing, appearance / reality, activity / passivity,” states 
Rancière, “are quite different from logical oppositions between clearly defined 
terms”.96 What they “specifically define”, he suggests, is a “distribution of the 
sensible, an a priori distribution of the positions and capacities and incapacities 
attached to these positions”.97 As “embodied allegories of inequality”, he concludes, 
attempts to collapse the “distance” between this antagonism merely reaffirms its 
existence.98  For Rancière, the “emancipation” of the spectator begins: 
 
when we understand that viewing is also an action that confirms or 
transforms this distribution of positions. The spectator also acts, like 
the pupil or scholar. She observes, selects, compares, and interprets. 
She links what she sees to a host of other things that she has seen on 
other stages, in other kinds of place. She composes her own poem 
with the elements of the poem before her. She participates in the 
performance by refashioning it in her own way by drawing back, for 
example, from the vital energy that it is supposed to transmit in 
order to make it a pure image and associate this image with a story 
which she has read or dreamt, experienced or invented. They are 
thus both distant spectators and active interpreters of the spectacle 
offered to them. 99 
 
For Rancière emancipation does not just mean a collapse in the distinction between 
“those who look and those who act” but also (as with Kracauer’s notion of cinematic 
community) between individuals and members of a collective body distinct from that 
defined by an orthodox Marxist taxonomy.100 “The collective power shared by 
                                                
95 Rancière, 2009, p. 12. 
96 Rancière, 2009, p. 13. 
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98 Rancière, 2009, p. 13. 
99 Rancière, 2009, p. 13. 
100 Rancière, 2009, p. 19. 
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spectators”, explains Rancière, “does not stem from the fact that they are members of 
a collective body or from some specific form of interactivity”.101 It is, he argues: 
 
the power each of them has to translate what she perceives in her 
own way, to link it to the unique intellectual adventure that makes 
her similar to all the rest in as much as this adventure is not like any 
other. This shared power of the equality of intelligence links 
individuals, makes them exchange their intellectual adventures, in 
so far as it keeps them separate from one another, equally capable of 
using the power everyone has to plot her own path. What our 
performances - be they teaching or playing, speaking, writing, 
making art or looking at it - verify is not our participation in a 
power embodied in the community. It is the capacity of anonymous 
people, the capacity that makes everyone equal to everyone else. 
This capacity is exercised through irreducible distances; it is 
exercised by an unpredictable interplay of associations and 
dissociations.102 
 
The anonymous people that constitute Rancière’s spectating collective are the same 
corporeal entities, the same dreaming human beings “with skin and hair [mit Haut und 
Haar]”, that occupy the seats of the cinema auditorium in Kracauer’s Marseilles 
notebooks.103 As with Kracauer’s identification of the peculiar nature of cinematic 
spectatorship with a complementarity between the “two-directions of dreaming”, the 
movement towards and away from the object, Rancière also postulates a “power of 
associating and dissociating” as the basis of “emancipation”.104 “Being a spectator is 
not some passive condition”, Rancière states, “that we should transform into activity”. 
“It is”, he declares, “our normal situation”105, or as Kracauer states in Theory of Film, 
its immanent dynamic “parallels the ‘flow of life’”.106 All of us, argues Rancière: 
 
learn and teach, act and know, as spectators who all the time link 
what we see to what we have seen and said, done and  dreamed. 
                                                
101 Rancière, 2009, p. 16. 
102 Rancière, 2009, p. 17. 
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There is no more a privileged form than there is a privileged starting 
point. Everywhere there are starting points, intersections and 
junctions that enable us to learn something new if we refuse, firstly, 
radical distance, secondly the distribution of roles, and thirdly the 
boundaries between territories […] We do not have to transform 
spectators into actors, we have to recognize the knowledge at work 
in the activity peculiar to the spectator. Every spectator is already an 
actor in her story; every actor, every man of action, is the spectator 
of the same story. 107 
 
Reminiscent in both style and intent to Bohr’s summation of quantum theory (quoted 
in the previous section) Rancière’s idea of agency is also as much about how we 
denote difference as we codify notions of transformation and progress. This renders 
Rancière’s radicalism somewhat paradoxical. In other words, what Sinnerbrink’s 
approach to film-philosophy would recognise as philosophically new (as opposed to 
being merely theoretically novel) about Rancière’s notion of emancipation is that the 
new (as it is defined as different from what already exists) is relative, pluralistic and 
inclusive and therefore as a term philosophically devalued. What Rancière’s spectator 
is emancipated from is the social devaluation of what is considered un-philosophical 
activity. For some, notes John Mullarkey, the idea that thinking (and therefore 
philosophy) is everywhere “will be unacceptable”, for others, he continues: 
 
The true philosophical horror is not that we are not (yet) thinking 
[Heidegger], but that we have always been thinking. Given the view 
that philosophy must have an essence and so an exclusivity, then 
what is (philosophically) unthinkable is that thinking might be 
found all about us.108 
 
What, in the end, connects the disparate projects of Kracauer, Rancière and Laruelle is 
a questioning of what constitutes a philosophically emancipated critical practice or 
put slightly less prosaically, is a belief in the potential of a liberated consciousness to 
conceive of a genuinely different relationship between people and things. However, 
the way Kracauer conceives of this utopian function of the cinematic approach is 
                                                
107 Rancière, 2009, p. 17. 
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distinct from his French counterpart’s rejection of Idealism and will be dealt with in 
greater detail in a later chapter. 
 
 
6.7 Conclusion. 
 
In the context of Rancière’s idea of the emancipated spectator and Laruelle’s non-
philosophy, the cinematic approach proposed by Kracauer in Theory of Film can be 
seen less of a defeated and defensive withdrawal from an earlier more radical 
philosophical position (as Hansen and Koch argue) and more of a questioning of how 
the simultaneously mundane and extraordinary experience of film spectatorship has 
effectively undermined (on an epistemological level) the merit of maintaining such a 
singular perspective. In this respect, Theory of Film’s redemption of physical reality, 
with its identification of agency with the cinematic object (as it exists in a co-
generated camera reality), seems a logical progression from Rancière’s emancipation 
of the philosophical subject. It also seems equally fitting that such a development 
should paradoxically precede its critical antecedents. If, as Kracauer states in his 1927 
essay “Photography” (quoted above), film’s “capacity to stir up the elements of 
nature” facilitates a consciousness of the “provisional status of all given 
configurations” then essentialist notions of medium specificity or the exclusivity of 
philosophical practice (or indeed a relationship between the two) become entirely 
arbitrary.109 In turn, the cinematic approach though conceived through the experience 
of film spectatorship cannot be identified solely with the medium that fostered its 
inception. To reiterate the assertion with which Kracauer introduces his Theory of 
Film, the cinematic approach denotes “a mode of human existence”.110 
 
In the following chapter I will analyse how Kracauer develops the notion of 
communal agency that he alludes to in his essay on the spectator and how he works to 
define it in both his film and non-film texts. It will explore in greater detail the critical 
influence of Kafka’s work on the development of his cinematic approach and how it 
helps facilitate for Kracauer a re-imagining of communal practice separate from that 
of orthodox Marxism. 
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CHAPTER 7:   
 
THE CINEMATIC AS SOCIAL PRACTICE 
 
7. 1 Introduction 
 
Prompted by the paradigm shift that occurred in twentieth century physics, Kracauer’s 
consideration of the role of the observer in relation to reality sought to challenge 
preconceived ideas about theory’s relationship to praxis and in turn the individual’s 
capacity to “generate self-enlightenment” through established social and cultural 
forms. 1 This chapter will develop a consideration of how this shift in perspective 
affects an understanding of how the individual relates to the collective social body 
through its image. In particular, it will examine how Kracauer read contemporary 
incidences of massed social participation as the aesthetic reflex of a presiding 
ideological complex and how the experience of cinema relates to such activity. As 
Adorno and Horkheimer argue in Dialectic of Enlightenment, the instrumental 
reasoning of modernity strives to affirm the dichotomy of individual and group action 
with a view to dissipating (through a process of abstraction) the effectiveness of the 
latter to affect actual social change. This chapter will also focus on how Kracauer read 
the peculiar modes of subjectivity presented in the work of Franz Kafka and Charlie 
Chaplin as alternative models of human and material relations. In doing so it will re-
examine Kracauer’s critical use of the idea of the “outmoded” and how he understood 
the practical relationship between his theory and the patterns of social activity to 
which it referred.  
 
“Film,” suggests Robert Sinnerbrink, “is essential to promoting new forms of 
meaning-making; of aesthetic world-disclosure that shift and expand our horizons of 
meaning, generating forms of aesthetic experience that both reflect and transform our 
subjective orientation in the world”. 2 By establishing parallels between Kracauer’s 
critical notion of community and the work of Georg Lukács, Giorgio Agamben and 
                                                
1 Schlüpmann, Heide, “Re-reading Nietzsche through Kracauer: towards a feminist perspective on film 
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2 Sinnerbrink, Robert, “Re-enfranchising Film: Towards a Romantic Film-Philosophy”, in Havi Carel 
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Jacques Rancière I will demonstrate how Kracauer’s cinematic approach exhibits the 
“ethico-political possibilities” that Sinnerbrink identifies with the “meaning-
disclosing potential of film”.3  
 
7.2         Emancipated Communities 
 
“Plato”, writes Rancière,  “wanted to replace the democratic, ignorant community of 
the theatre with a different community, encapsulated in a different performance of 
bodies.”4 For Rancière, twentieth century reformers of the theatre (such as Bertolt 
Brecht, Vsevolod Meyerhold or Luigi Pirandello) instead of replacing Plato’s idea 
have only reformulated it. For them, argues Rancière, the theatre remains the place 
where the passive audience must be transformed into an active community. 
Regardless of modernism’s formal reconfiguration of its constituent parts, argues 
Rancière, theatre remains “a mediation striving for its own abolition”.5 As Rancière 
explains:  
 
Theatre accuses itself of rendering spectators passive and thereby 
betraying its essence as community action. It consequently assigns 
itself the mission of reversing its effects and expiating its sins by 
restoring to spectators ownership of their consciousness and their 
activity. The theatrical stage and performance thus become a 
vanishing mediation between the evil of spectacle and the virtue of 
true theatre. They intend to teach their spectators ways of ceasing to 
be spectators and becoming agents of a collective practice.6 
 
For Rancière, the reason for this philosophical circularity is the historical persistence 
of the notion that theatre is “an exemplary community form”.7 Since German 
Romanticism, he suggests, the concept of theatre has been identified  “with this idea 
of the living community”.8 It is this specific notion of community that has in turn 
                                                
3 Sinnerbrink, 2011, p. 43. 
4 Rancière, Jacques, The Emancipated Spectator, translated by Gregory Elliott (London: Verso. 2009), 
p. 5. 
5 Rancière, 2009, p. 8. 
6 Rancière, 2009, pp. 8 – 9. 
7 Rancière, 2009, p. 6. 
8 Rancière, 2009, p. 6. 
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predicated the aesthetic and “sensible constitution” of its form.9 This is why, for 
Rancière, it is historically the theatre, rather than any other art form, that identifies 
itself as the vanguard of an “aesthetic revolution”, intent on “changing not the 
mechanics of the state and laws, but the sensible forms of human experience.”10 But 
why is the theatre regarded as such a privileged site? What, asks Rancière: 
 
occurs among theatre spectators that cannot happen elsewhere? 
What is more interactive, more communitarian, about these 
spectators than a mass of individuals watching the same television 
shows at the same hour?11 
 
For Rancière, the answer relates to the erroneous identification of community with a 
notion of a physical assembly of people. A genuine alternative to theatre’s 
hierarchical model of active and passive participants, he argues, is one in which all 
activity (including that previous defined as passive) is considered as equal in terms of 
performance. The resultant community is therefore not defined in relation to a specific 
performance (as in theatre) or with a particular mode of activity (as in Plato’s concept 
of the living community) but with a notion of performance as a non-localized process.  
The “emancipated community”, argues Rancière, is therefore to be understood, as one 
liberated from a notion of objective status whose attributes can be reconfigured at 
will.12 In such a community there is no stupefying antagonism between active and 
passive constituents (that need to be dialectically resolved), only the dynamic 
interaction of heterogeneous modes of narration and translation. In all these 
performances, explains Rancière: 
 
what is involved is linking what one knows with what one does not 
know; being at once a performer deploying her skills and a spectator 
observing what these skills might produce in a new context among 
other spectators.13 
 
                                                
9 Rancière, 2009, p. 6. 
10 Rancière, 2009, p. 6. 
11 Rancière, 2009, p. 16. 
12 Rancière, 2009, p. 22. 
13 Rancière, 2009, p. 22. 
 184 
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, what Rancière’s idea of the emancipated 
spectator shares with Kracauer’s cinematic approach is a multifarious notion of 
participation that does not define itself solely in opposition to a passive and devalued 
mode of reception. What I will explore in the following text is how Kracauer uses the 
cinema experience in order to define this complementarity and how its meaning-
disclosing function affects the objective status of the social activity that it observes 
and depicts. 
 
7.3  The Individual Spectator and the Mass Ornament 
 
In 1803, an English scientist, Thomas Young, observed that when light passes around 
an obstacle or through an aperture in a barrier the resultant pattern of shadow and 
light was indicative of its behaviour as wave type phenomenon.14 However, 
subsequent experimentation revealed that the addition of a second aperture in the 
barrier facilitated results that confirmed light to behaviour as if it were composed of 
discrete particles. It was the coexistence of these paradoxical interference patterns that 
Bohr and Heisenberg used a century later to demonstrate how the mode of 
observation must be taken into account when trying to work out what “happens” in an 
atomic event. 15 
 
For Kracauer, understanding the role of the observer as co-generating social patterns 
is equally important; especially as it helps establish alternative outlets for creative 
self-affirmation in an increasingly administrated public sphere. This ontological 
perspective that Kracauer gives to the “process materialization” is confirmed in the 
epilogue of Theory of Film. The motion picture camera, Kracauer writes: 
 
renders visible what we did not, or perhaps even could not see 
before its advent. It effectively assists us in discovering the material 
world with its psychophysical correspondences. We literally redeem 
this world from its dormant state, its state of virtual non-existence, 
                                                
14 Thomas Young (1773 –1829), English scientist and polymath. For explanation of the double slit 
experiment see, Gribbin, John, In Search of Schrödinger’s Cat. Quantum Physics and Reality [1984] 
(London: Black Swann. 1996), pp. 7 – 18.  
15 Heisenberg, Werner, Physics and Philosophy. The Revolution in Modern Science [1958], New 
Edition (London: Penguin Classics, 2000), p. 22. 
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by endeavouring to experience it through the camera […] Its 
imagery permits us, for the first time, to take away with us the 
objects and occurrences that comprise the flow of material life.16 
 
Kracauer’s use of the first person plural pronouns in this context is significant. As the 
double slit experiment demonstrated that what was previously considered as 
autonomous particles of matter behaved as waves, so too the film camera can show 
how the atomized human subject (of Adorno and Horkheimer’s Dialectic of 
Enlightenment) also exists as complex interrelating processes. What defines the 
human individual can be shown to behave as either a discrete entity (a particle) or as a 
non-localized process of change (a wave). This communal aspect of the process of 
materialization is one derived from an understanding of it as a complementarity rather 
than a progenitive dialectic of antithetical elements. In other words, the “us” and “we” 
that Kracauer employs do not exist as conceptually exclusive to the “I” – an apparent 
antagonism that is neither dialectically resolved through the totality of communist 
praxis or forever irreconcilable as in Adorno’s work.17 As a complementary duality 
the communal group is not a limiting concept that devalues individuality but affirms it 
as a necessary component in the understanding of what constitutes the individual 
subject on a fundamental level. 
 
A proposed synthesis of the essence and appearance of a genuine form of human 
community is demonstrated in what Steve Giles has called Kracauer’s 
“methodological manifesto”; his 1927 essay, Das Ornament der Masse [The Mass 
Ornament]. 18 As well as formulating some of his previous reflections on the 
theoretical foundations of a materialist cultural analysis, what Kracauer does in this 
text is show how the modern collective subject understands its objective reality 
through how it appears to itself.  
 
 
                                                
16 Kracauer, Siegfried, Theory of Film. The Redemption of Physical Reality [1960] (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 300. 
17 For example see, Adorno, Theodor, Negative Dialectics, translated by E.B. Ashton (New York: 
Seabury Press, 1973). 
18 Giles, Steve, ‘Cracking the Cultural code - Methodological reflections on Kracauer's “The Mass 
Ornament”’, Radical Philosophy, No. 99 (2000), p. 33. 
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Kracauer’s essay focuses on the “extravagant spectacles” created by and for large 
groups of people, ranging from well-drilled lines of high kicking chorus girls [Figure 
6] to the gigantic living mosaic formed by a choreographed stadium crowd [Figure 
7]. Though collective actions, argued Kracauer, the bearers of the ornamental  
 
 
Figure 6. The Tiller Girls in Berlin (1926) 
 
 
Figure 7. The Opening Ceremony of the 1936 Berlin Olympics 
 
appearance of these performances, are essentially distinct from the spontaneous 
patterns that occur as a result of genuine communal interaction. “A current of organic 
life”, asserts Kracauer, “surges from these communal groups - which share a common 
destiny - to their ornaments, endowing these ornaments with a magic force and 
Copyrighted Image
Copyrighted Image
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burdening them with meaning to such an extent that they cannot be reduced to a pure 
assemblage of lines”.19 In contrast, argues Kracauer, the “patterns seen in the 
stadiums and cabarets betray no such origins”.20 These manifestations, suggests 
Kracauer: 
 
are composed of elements that are mere building blocks and nothing 
more. The construction of the edifice depends on the size of the 
stones and their number. It is the mass that is employed here. Only 
as parts of a mass, not as individuals who believe themselves to be 
formed from within, do people become fractions of a figure. 21 
 
However, though “community and personality perish” under the demands of 
“calculability”, those who have “withdrawn from the community and consider 
themselves to be unique personalities with their own individual souls” fail to learn 
from the example of mass ornaments.22 By castigating it as a base cultural form, those 
who “judge anything that entertains the crowd to be a distraction of that crowd”, are 
not defending legitimate cultural practice from a pernicious influence but denying its 
essential recourse to an actual historical and material context.23 The “aesthetic 
pleasure gained from ornamental mass movements is legitimate”, declares Kracauer, 
as such “movements are in fact among the rare creations of the age that bestow form 
upon a given material”.24 As Kracauer explains: 
 
When significant components of reality become invisible in our 
world, art must make do with what is left, for an aesthetic 
presentation is all the more real the less it dispenses with the reality 
outside the aesthetic sphere. No matter how low one gauges the 
value of the mass ornament, its degree of reality is still higher than 
that of artistic productions which cultivate outdated noble 
                                                
19 Siegfried Kracauer, The Mass Ornament. Weimar essays, translated and edited by Thomas Y. Levin 
(Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard U.P.,1995b), p. 76. 
20 Kracauer, 1995b, p. 76. 
21 Kracauer, 1995b, p. 76. 
22 Kracauer, 1995b, p. 78 & p. 76. 
23 Kracauer, 1995b, p. 79. 
24 Kracauer, 1995b, p. 79. 
 188 
sentiments in obsolete forms-even if it means nothing more than 
that.25 
 
The “fate” of such “hopeless attempts to reach a higher life from out of mass 
existence” is a perpetual “irreality”.26  “In their desire to once again give man a link 
to nature that is more solid than the one he has today”, Kracauer goes on to explain, 
“they discover the connection to the higher sphere, not by appealing to a still 
unrealized reason in this world but by retreating into mythological structures of 
meaning”.27 Here the reason to which Kracauer refers, as in his later recourse to the 
complementary relationship between qualitative and quantitative research (discussed 
in the previous chapter), is one that does not abstract man from its computations, but 
encompasses a definite historical and social human in its analysis. However, founding 
a system of thought on “the basis of man” does not mean the cultivation of “man as a 
historically produced form such that it ought to allow him to go unchallenged as a 
personality and should satisfy the demands made by his nature”.28  Adherents of such 
an existential position, argues Kracauer, “reproach capitalism’s rationalism for raping 
man,” and in turn “yearn for the return of a community that would be capable of 
preserving the allegedly human element much better than capitalism”.29 “Leaving 
aside the stultifying effect of such regressive stances,” he concludes, “they fail to 
grasp capitalism’s core defect: it rationalizes not too much but rather too little”.30    
 
Though Kracauer concedes that a phenomenological approach does effectively 
identify the limits of capitalist thinking’s abstractness (“that it is incapable of grasping 
the actual substance of life and therefore must give way to concrete observation of 
phenomena”), its objection must be qualified.31 “As an objection”, writes Kracauer, 
“it is premature” when it is “raised in favour of that false mythological concreteness 
whose aim is organism and form”.32 “A return to this sort of concreteness would 
sacrifice the already acquired capacity for abstraction, but without overcoming 
                                                
25 Kracauer, 1995b, p. 79. 
26 Kracauer, 1995b, p. 81. 
27 Kracauer, 1995b, p. 81. 
28 Kracauer, 1995b, p. 81. 
29 Kracauer, 1995b, p. 81. 
30 Kracauer, 1995b, p. 81. 
31 Kracauer, 1995b, p. 81. 
32 Kracauer, 1995b, p. 81. 
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abstractness”.33 The “Capitalist epoch” is not a thing, a phenomenon that can be 
extensively defined by a matrix of binary oppositions, argues Kracauer, but a “stage 
in the process of demystification”.34 This process, he explains: 
 
leads directly through the centre of the mass ornament, not away 
from it. It can move forward only when thinking circumscribes 
nature and produces man as he is constituted by reason. Then 
society will change. Then, too, the mass ornament will fade away 
and human life itself will adopt the traits of that ornament into 
which it develops, through its confrontation with truth, in fairy 
tales.35 
 
Kracauer’s critique of existentialism’s regressive conception of communal activity is 
to an equal extent a reconsideration of communism and socialism’s calls for a 
functional transformation [Umfunktionierung] of mass culture.36  In this respect, his 
argument against orthodox notions of collective praxis can be understood as a 
systematic appropriation of Marxism against itself. In the introduction of History, 
Kracauer declared his interest in the subject was limited to “the nascent state of great 
ideological movements, that period when they were not yet institutionalized”.37  As a 
consequence, suggests Kracauer, his work centres “not so much on the course 
followed by triumphant ideologies,” but primarily “on the issues in dispute at the time 
of their emergence”. “This interest”, he concludes, “is intimately connected with an 
experience which Marx once pithily epitomized when he declared that he himself was 
no Marxist”.38 
 
As David Frisby has demonstrated, Kracauer’s critique of the ontological basis of 
phenomenology (an approach that concentrates on the study of consciousness and the 
objects of direct experience) derives much of its impetus from his developing 
                                                
33 Kracauer, 1995b, p. 81. 
34 Kracauer, 1995b, p. 80. 
35 Kracauer, 1995b, p. 86. 
36 See Benjamin, Walter, ‘The Author as Producer’, in Walter Benjamin, Selected Writings Volume 2: 
1927 – 1934, edited by Michael W.  Jennings, Howard Eiland, and Gary Smith, translated by Rodney 
Livingstone, et al. (Cambridge, Mass. and London: The Belknap Press, 1999), p. 774. 
37 Kracauer, Siegfried, History. The Last Things Before the Last, completed after the death of the 
author by Paul Oskar Kristeller (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1995), p. 6. 
38 Kracauer, 1995, p. 7. 
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understanding of Marxism’s relation to social action.39 Marxism, Kracauer writes to 
Bloch, “especially in the hands of official Soviet philosophers”, has become “no 
longer actual,” and can only be rejuvenated through a confrontation with its “genuine 
truth contents”.40  For example, Kracauer suggests: 
 
Its concepts of the human being and of nature, its elimination of 
ethics, its fleeting dream-like glance at the anarchism of the fairy-
tale – these are all signs which point to the truth in still uninhabited 
cellars and attics,41 
 
“I am”, concludes Kracauer in response to Bloch’s call for left wing solidarity, “in the 
last instance, an anarchist, though of course sceptical enough to hold anarchism as it 
exists to be a distortion of its intentions”.42 Significantly, Kracauer ultimately defines 
this ideal “dream” a form of “genuine anarchism,” using Marx’s phrase, “the 
association of free human beings”.43  However, the “question is”, Kracauer continues, 
“whether and how the approach to reality intended by anarchism is possible?”44 “Here 
what inspires me”, he writes. “is an unbelief that is Kafka’s too and it seems to me as 
if the truth in its reality always rests precisely on the spot over which we have just 
stepped”.45  
 
7.4  Kafka’s Model of a Non-Human Community 
 
Kracauer expands upon this qualification of the utopian impulse inherent in Marx’s 
conception of “genuine anarchism” in his 1931 essay on Kafka. As in the later 
History, Kracauer uses Kafka in his argument against the belief in the incremental 
historical progress of humanity towards salvation, or a return to a prelapsarian state of 
grace. “The light of olden times”, writes Kracauer, streams “into the present era, not 
in order to direct us back to its shimmer, but rather in order to illuminate our utter 
                                                
39 Frisby, David, Fragments of Modernity: Theories of Modernity in the work of Simmel, Kracauer and 
Benjamin (Cambridge,  Mass.: The MIT press, 1988), pp. 120 - 123 
40 Kracauer letter to Bloch, 27th May 1926 quoted in Frisby, 1988, p. 124. 
41 Frisby, 1988, pp. 124 – 125. 
42 Frisby, 1988, p. 125. 
43 The phrase appears in various forms throughout Marx’s work, for example, Marx, Karl, Grundrisse 
der Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie [Outlines of the Critique of Political Economy, 1858] (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1973), p. 158. 
44 Frisby, 1988, p. 125. 
45 Frisby, 1988, p. 125. 
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darkness just enough so that we can take the next step”. 46 In Kafka’s short story 
“Investigations of a Dog”, notes Kracauer, “one reads that ‘our generation may be 
lost’” but “this weak ‘may be’ leaves a trace of hope”.47 However, Kracauer adds, 
when Kafka “gets more specific on the subject of this hope”, he betrays an 
“uncertainty” that “corresponds precisely to the immeasurable distance” we are from 
it.48 Nevertheless, Kracauer continues, “this uncertainty is juxtaposed to the certainty 
with which the reflections of diabolical reason appear and lose their footing”.49 For 
example, suggests Kracauer: 
 
Just as Kafka neither acknowledges nor entirely rejects progress, he 
links together the far and the near in a similarly ambiguous fashion. 
"The true way goes over a rope which is stretched out not at any 
great height but just above the ground. It seems designed more to 
make people stumble than to be walked upon.” 50 
 
Kafka’s view that  “the sought-after solution is unattainable, yet at the same time 
attainable here and now” is also apparent, for Kracauer, in his only reference to “the 
events of the [October] revolution” in Russia. Though Kafka’s maintenance of a 
“state of suspension” between hope and despair, belief and unbelief deters him from 
“attributing revolution to this true path outright”, Kafka does, “clarify his inkling at 
various points”.51 One such occasion, claims Kracauer, occurs in “Investigations of a 
Dog”, where Kafka proposes the idea that “only the community possesses the 
explosive power capable of lifting the roof off the low life”. The canine protagonist of 
the story, writes Kracauer: 
 
recognises that what he shares with his fellow dogs is not only 
blood but also knowledge, and not only knowledge but also the key 
to knowledge. "Bones hard as iron, containing the richest marrow, 
can be gotten at only by a united crunching of all the teeth of all 
dogs”. 52 
                                                
46 Kracauer, 1995b, p. 276. 
47 Kracauer, 1995b, p. 276. 
48 Kracauer, 1995b, p. 276. 
49 Kracauer, 1995b, p. 276. 
50 Kracauer, 1995b, p. 277. 
51 Kracauer, 1995b, p. 276. 
52 Kracauer, 1995b, p. 277. 
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The fact that Kafka’s utopian epistemology here paradoxically manifests itself 
through animal behaviour is revealing because, as with Kracauer’s (and to a degree 
Benjamin’s), it affirms a corporeal and pre-conscious relationship to the material 
environment. This is the knowledge separate from a metaphysical “guarantee”.53 
“Here and there” in Kafka’s work, writes Kracauer, “the individual who is lost 
together with the community is advised to save himself along with that community, 
but without any guarantee of redemption”.54 Kracauer concludes: 
 
There is no safeguard, and the fact that alongside the belief in a 
redemption to come in this world there is another belief that the 
confusion of the world is ineradicable.55 
 
As Kafka’s ambiguous linkages between the temporally near and far work to thwart 
any affirmation of the idea of historical progress (or in turn its negative inversion), so 
too do the links he makes between the human and the non-human agency succeed in 
frustrating the autonomy of the subject from its material context. Comprehending how 
Kracauer sought to transpose Kafka’s epistemological model into the public sphere is 
key to understanding how he envisaged his work on cinema engaging with social 
phenomena and in turn influencing contemporary forms of social being.  
 
7.5 The Objective Status of Communal Appearance  
 
An identification of a historically peculiar epistemological mode as a contributing 
factor in the practical process of materialization offers up another mutually 
illuminating critical resonance between the material dialectics of Kracauer’s project 
and the dialectical materialism of Lukács’ History and Class Consciousness.  
“When the worker knows himself as a commodity his knowledge is practical”, states 
Lukács in History and Class Consciousness, “this knowledge brings about an 
                                                
53 Jay, Martin, ‘Adorno and Kracauer: Notes on a troubled Friendship’, in Martin Jay, Permanent 
Exiles. Essays on the Intellectual Migration from Germany to America (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1985), p. 221, also see chapter 5.1 of this study. 
54 Kracauer, 1995b, p. 277. 
55 Kracauer, 1995b, p. 277. 
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objective structural change in the object of knowledge”.56 As Slavoj Žižek has argued, 
for Lukács “consciousness (ideological appearance) is also an “objective” social fact 
with an effectivity of its own”, and the bourgeois consciousness “is not simply an 
‘illusion’ masking actual social processes but a mode of organisation of the very 
social being”, that is “crucial to the actual process of social (re)production”.57 
“Lukács here”, Žižek continues, ”can be said to participate in the great ‘paradigm 
shift’ at work also in quantum physics, and whose main feature is not the dissolution 
of ‘objective reality’, its reduction to a ‘subjective construction’, but, on the contrary, 
the unheard-of assertion of the ‘objective’ status of the appearance itself”.58 It is not 
enough, argues Žižek: 
 
to oppose the way things ‘objectively are’ to the way they ‘merely 
appear to us’: the  way they appear (to the observer) affects their 
very ‘objective being’. This is what is so path breaking in quantum 
physics: the notion that the limited horizon of the observer (or of the 
mechanism that registers what goes on) determines what effectively 
goes on. We cannot say that self-awareness (or colour or material 
density or …) designates merely the way we experience reality, 
while ‘objectively’ there are only subatomic particles and their 
fluctuations: these ‘appearances’ have to be taken into account if we 
are to  explain what ‘effectively is going on’. In a homologous way, 
the crux of Lukács notion of class-consciousness is that the way the 
working class ‘appears to itself’ determines its ‘objective’ being.59 
 
Though Lukács’ communist stratification of society held no sway over Kracauer in 
his own investigation into the ‘false consciousness’ that prevailed amongst the new 
salaried employees of Berlin, Žižek’s defence of it does provide an interesting way to 
rethink Kracauer’s idea of community. 60 
 
                                                
56 Lukács, Georg, History and Class Consciousness: studies in Marxist dialectics, translated by Rodney 
Livingstone (London: Merlin Press, 1971), p. 169 
57 Žižek, Slavoj, ‘Postface: Georg Lukács as the philosopher of Leninism’,  in Georg Lukács, A defence 
of History and Class Consciousness. Tailism and the dialectic,  translated by Esther Leslie (London: 
Verso, 2000), p. 173. 
58 Žižek, 2000, p. 173. 
59 Žižek, 2000, p. 173. 
60 Kracauer, Siegfried, The Salaried Masses. Duty and Distraction in Weimar Germany, translated by 
Quintin Hoare (London and New York: Verso, 1998), pp. 81 – 82. 
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“[C]ommunity”, writes Kracauer in The Salaried Masses, “is never formed as a 
substitute for the collapse of psychic energies – it consists of human individuals 
whose existence is crucially defined by true knowledge”.61 For Kracauer, close 
observation of the social activities of employee unions suggested that they “tend to 
regard the collectivism in itself as a source of their energy”.62 To this effect, Kracauer 
offers the following example: 
 
I once attended the performance of a free trade union's speech-and-
movement chorus. The young people, girls and boys, with drooping 
arms and shoulders bemoaned their lot as slaves to the machine, 
then drew themselves upright and rejoiced in a kind of triumphal 
procession towards the realm of freedom. A spectacle whose good 
intention was no less moving than its aesthetic clumsiness. It was 
supposed to represent the community of like-minded people, but in 
reality expressed not so much collectivity as the will to it. This will 
is based on the belief that collectivity can embody, or even generate, 
a meaning - whereas, in reality, knowledge founds collectivity.63 
 
This somewhat poignant observation acts as the conclusion of Kracauer’s The 
Salaried Masses.  In accordance with Kafka, hopelessness becomes the locus of hope 
and the knowledge to which Kracauer here refers is the knowledge that Kafka 
attributes to the investigating dog. As Kafka’s dog “recognizes that what he shares 
with his fellow dogs is not only blood but also knowledge”, so too does Kracauer, 
(and subsequently Rancière), identify genuine community as extant on an 
epistemological level.  
 
It is from here that the binary opposition between individual and the group becomes 
increasingly untenable. As Kracauer later qualifies in his refutation of objective 
quantitative analysis, it is the patterns made by the interaction of complex processes 
that enables particular elements to function as distinct wholes. As a consequence, 
when considered as analogous to interference patterns, the difference between 
individual and the mass cannot be maintained as exclusive and therefore cannot be 
                                                
61 Kracauer, 1998, p. 105. 
62 Kracauer, 1998, pp. 105 – 106. 
63 Kracauer, 1998, p. 106. 
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dialectically resolved in a totality. The actuality of individual and the mass, like the 
particle and the wave, are observed incidents of interaction in a common process of 
materialization.  “If we want to describe what happens in an atomic event”, explains 
Heisenberg, “we have to realize that the word ‘happens’ can only apply to the 
observation, not to the state of affairs between two observations”. 64 Therefore, 
Heisenberg concludes, the “transition from the ‘possible’ to the actual takes place 
during the act of observation”.65 “Reality is a construction,” wrote Kracauer in The 
Salaried Masses, one that must be “observed for it to appear.”66 
 
As Žižek realised in his reading of History and Class Consciousness, what is 
proposed here at the end of The Salaried Masses is not the dissolution of “objective 
reality”, its reduction to a “subjective construction”, but the “objective” status of 
appearance itself. In other words, what Kracauer is arguing here, as in The Mass 
Ornament, is that the way the society appears to itself determines its objective being. 
“The human individual”, explains Kracauer: 
 
who confronts death alone, is not submerged in the collectivity 
striving to elevate itself into a final purpose. He is formed not by 
community as such but by knowledge, from which community too 
may arise. The doctrinaire attitude with which the employee unions 
frequently fail to meet human reality indirectly confirms that 
collectivity as such is a false construction. What matters is not that 
institutions are changed, what matters is that human individuals 
change institutions.67 
 
Kracauer reiterates this conclusion in an unpublished text entitled, Zwei Arten der 
Mitteilung [Two Types of Communication], where he contrasts the relationship 
between theology and Marxism in a way that pre-empts Benjamin’s famous exegesis 
of materialist theology in his On the Concept of History (1940).68 In this more 
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biographical text, written in parallel to The Salaried Masses in 1929, Kracauer 
explains how during the years of inflation after the First World War he advanced in 
his work the thesis that “change of circumstances is unavoidably dependent upon 
human beings”.69 “‘The way to salvation’, I said, ‘leads only through the narrow 
gateway of inwardness.’”70 This he did in deliberate contrast to the “thoroughly 
Marxist characterization” of revolution that dictated, “first the circumstances must be 
changed and only then can human beings themselves change”.71  However, admits 
Kracauer, experience has made him reconsider. “Over the years”, he suggests, “I have 
increasingly come round to the view that at least nowadays the form of our economy 
determines the form of our existence”.72 As Kracauer explains: 
 
Politics, law, art and morality are as they are because capitalism is 
there. It is not from within that the outside world derives its 
character but rather the circumstances of society condition those of 
the individuals. For this reason, for precisely those who are 
concerned with the reintroduction of the contents intended by 
theology into reality there is only one way: to work for the 
transformation of the dominant social order. This is the small 
gateway through which they must pass.73 
 
In the following section, with reference to the work of Italian philosopher and 
Benjamin scholar Giorgio Agamben74, I will explore how Kracauer worked to 
develop his notion of a positive function of the mass ornament in relation to film 
spectatorship and how this informed his critical appropriation of Charlie Chaplin’s 
character of the little tramp as an example of the embodiment of an emancipated 
mode of being. 
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72 Frisby, 1988, p. 122. 
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7.6 Charlie Chaplin and The Coming Community 
 
Though instrumental reason (“ratio”) has “made possible the domination and use of 
nature as a self-contained entity”, Kracauer argues in The Mass Ornament, that it has 
also fostered an “ever greater independence from natural conditions”. As a result it 
has created “a space for the intervention of reason”.75 “Ratio”, he goes on to explain 
“is cut off from reason and bypasses man as it vanishes into the void of the abstract”.  
Whereas, reason “speaks wherever it disintegrates the organic unity and rips open the 
natural surface (no matter how cultivated the latter may be); it dissects the human 
form here only so that the undistorted truth can fashion man anew”.76  
 
In his 1990 collection of essays titled La comunità che viene [The Coming 
Community, 1990], Giorgio Agamben uses Kracauer’s refunctioning of Capitalism’s 
dehumanisation of the bourgeois subject as the basis of his own concept of the post-
commodified body, the “whatever being” [quodlibet ens].77 “In the 1920s”, writes 
Agamben, “when the process of capitalist commodification began to invest the human 
body, observers who were by no means favourable to the phenomenon could not help 
but notice a positive aspect to it”. 78 “Siegfried Kracauer's observations”, argues 
Agamben, demonstrated how the “commodification of the human body, while 
subjecting it to the iron laws of massification and exchange value, seemed at the same 
time to redeem the body from the stigma of ineffability that had marked it for 
millennia”.79 For Agamben, freed from the dual restraints of “biological destiny and 
individual biography” the bodies that formed Kracauer’s mass ornament were 
emancipated from their  “theological foundations” and thus “appeared for the first 
time perfectly communicable”.80 Taking stock of Kracauer’s critical insight Agamben 
concludes: 
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To appropriate the historic transformations of human nature that 
capitalism wants to limit to the spectacle, to link together image and 
body in a space where they can no longer be separated, and thus to 
forge the whatever body, whose physis [nature] is resemblance - this 
is the good that humanity must learn how to wrest from 
commodities in their decline. Advertising and pornography, which 
escort the commodity to the grave like hired mourners, are the 
unknowing midwives of this new body of humanity.81 
 
As previously discussed in Chapter Two, realising the “revolutionary energies that 
appear in the ‘outmoded’” (to use Benjamin’s phrase) was integral to Kracauer’s 
explication of the cinematic approach.82 For example, in Theory of Film Kracauer 
notes “the peculiar, often traumatic effect” of films that confront us with “objects, 
which are familiar to us for having been part and parcel of our early life”.83 A 
common source of these “peculiar” encounters, suggests Kracauer, is the old newsreel 
compilation films (such as The Golden Twenties (1950), 50 Years Before Your Eyes 
(1950), and Paris 1900 (1947) [Figure 8]). Designed primarily as entertainment, 
these films often lampoon the “patterns of custom and fashion which we once 
accepted unquestioningly”. In these incidences, reports Kracauer, the spectator 
“cannot not help laughing at the ridiculous hats, overstuffed rooms, and obtrusive 
gestures”. However, Kracauer continues: 
 
As he laughs at them, however, he is bound to realize, shudderingly, 
that he has been spirited away into the lumber-room of his private 
self. He himself has dwelt, without knowing it, in those interiors; he 
himself has blindly adopted conventions, which now seem naïve or 
cramped to him. In a flash the camera exposes the paraphernalia of 
our former existence, stripping them of the significance, which 
originally transfigured them so they changed from things in their 
own right into invisible conduits.84 
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Switching from the singular to the plural personal pronoun Kracauer offers the 
following conclusion. “The thrill of these old films”, he writes “is that they bring us  
 
 
Figure 8. “Ridiculous hats, overstuffed rooms”, Paris 1900 (1947) 
 
face to face with the inchoate, cocoon-like world whence we come – all the objects, or 
rather sediments of objects, that were our companions in a pupa state.” “The most 
familiar”, he concludes, “that which continues to condition our involuntary reactions 
and spontaneous impulses is thus made to appear as the most alien”.85 In his 1927 
essay “Photography”, Kracauer writes of the alien “ghost-like reality” of an antique 
photograph whose image: 
 
consists of elements in space whose configuration is so far from 
necessary that one could just as well imagine a different 
organization of these elements. Those things once clung to us like 
our skin, and this is how our property still clings to us today. 
Nothing of these contains us, and the photograph gathers fragments 
around a nothing [Fragmente um ein Nichts].86 
 
The “outmoded object”, argues Graeme Gilloch, “defetishizes and demythifies the 
commodity and the processes of its production, exchange and consumption”, its ”truth 
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content” is therefore revealed “at the moment of its extinction”.87 The same is true, 
argues Agamben, for the human subject when rendered photographically distinct from 
its biographical and biological destiny and its existence as a theological conceived 
entity is extinguished.88 It is from this “nothing” described by the photographic 
image’s disintegration of “organic unity” that a new embodiment of the human form 
can be fashioned anew.89 As Kracauer states in his 1926 review of Chaplin’s The 
Gold Rush (1925):  
 
Out of the hole the purely human emanates disconnectedly. It is 
always disconnected, in fragments only, scattered in the organism - 
the human that otherwise suffocates below the surface, that cannot 
shine through the layers of ego consciousness.90  
 
Kracauer’s recourse to Chaplin’s character of the little tramp [Figure 9] in order to 
elucidate his idea of an alternative mode of human existence is one that persists 
throughout his work.91 As Adorno notes: “Kracauer projected his self-understanding  
 
 
Figure 9. Chaplin’s little tramp in The Gold Rush (1925) 
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of the individual onto Chaplin”.92 This identification for Adorno was the product of 
Kracauer’s image of himself as a non-conformist, as “an irritant by the criteria of the 
prevailing universal”.93 “In evading philosophy”, Adorno suggests, “the existential 
becomes clowning”.94 However, Kracauer’s identification of Chaplin’s comic 
portrayal of a social anomaly as the manifestation of (what Agamben refers to as) the 
“new body of humanity” further illustrates the critical function of the outmoded in 
“the age of the complete domination of the commodity form over all aspects of social 
life”.95  Obsolescence, Gilloch explains: 
 
is the pitiful fate, or comic final condition, of the commodity. The 
outmoded thing is an object of scorn and ridicule. No longer the 
stimulator of sexual desire, the old-fashioned is nothing other than, 
as Benjamin astutely points out, the ultimate anti-aphrodisiac. The 
obsolete object reveals the truth of the fetishized commodity; the 
old-fashioned discloses the reality of the fashionable.96 
 
Chaplin’s tramp in this respect is the embodiment of what Benjamin referred to in his 
essay on Surrealism as “the revolutionary energies that appear in the ‘outmoded’”.97 
In Agamben’s terms, Chaplin’s clowning not only redeems “the body from the stigma 
of ineffability”98 but also (as Gilloch suggests) “defetishizes and demythifies” the 
human subject.99 For Kracauer, in Chaplin’s acrobatic, mimetic, redundant fool that is 
constantly spurned and never desired is the possibility of making real the actually 
new. His “pantomimic language”, argues Kracauer, is “difficult to describe in words” 
but “comprehensible to children and adults of every country” because it stems “from 
an exemplary, human foundation”.100 
 
                                                
92 Adorno, Theodor W., “The Curious Realist: On Siegfried Kracauer”, New German Critique, No. 54 
(1991), p. 164. 
93 Adorno, 1991, p. 164. 
94 Adorno, 1991, p. 164. 
95 Agamben, 2007, pp. 48 - 49. 
96 Gilloch, 1996, pp. 122 – 123. 
97 Quoted in Cohen, 1995, p. 190. 
98 Agamben, 2007, p. 47. 
99 Gilloch, 1996, p. 111. 
100 Kracauer, Siegfried, “Two Chaplin Sketches”, translated by John MacKay, The Yale Journal of 
Criticism, Vol. 10, No. 1 (1997b), p. 115. 
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In a 1931 article about Chaplin’s triumphant return to “his home city of London”, 
Kracauer asks: “Who is this man, who can become such common property without 
getting worn out?” He is, Kracauer answers, “a tramp, a have-not; his homeland is 
everywhere and nowhere.” The “fact that he lacks what others have”, suggests 
Kracauer, is “one of the mysteries of his power”. As Kracauer clarifies: 
 
Denomination, nationality, wealth and class affiliations erect 
barriers between people, and only the outcast, the person on the 
outside, lives untrammeled by restriction. Wherever he can he 
forces himself though pores and cracks and settles, like dust off the 
street.101 
 
“But what remains behind”, Kracauer asks, “when the characteristics, through whose 
adoption persons in general convert into specific individuals, cease to exist?” In the 
case of Chaplin’s little tramp, argues Kracauer, what remains “is the person as such” 
or rather: 
and herein lies the special truth of his representations – the person 
as he/she is to be realized, everywhere. Only by the removal of 
those attributes which are the property of some but not of others can 
the person as such, the person who is a possibility for all people, 
become manifest. Perhaps Chaplin's triumph rests in conclusively 
demonstrating, for the first time in recent memory, that this "person 
as such" is not an abstraction but walks among us, in the flesh. 
Through him the pariah-figure familiar from fairy tales achieves 
existence. Lacking a survival instinct, a craving for power, or even a 
proper sense of self, he stumbles through an illegible world; he is 
entirely helpless, and wherever he goes gets caught in the hunter's 
net. Yet we repeatedly see in him that which makes people, people. 
The Chaplin of the films is kind and gentle and has respect for every 
creature; he smiles at children, and thanks the chicken who lays 
eggs for him with a tip of his hat. In so many ways he resembles 
that hero of the fairy tales, who is able to fight his way through a 
hostile world precisely because he is powerless. He is in truth the 
                                                
101 Kracauer, 1997b, p. 118. 
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king of this world, of course, and fairy tales wouldn't be fairy tales 
if they failed to reveal this splendid truth at the end.102 
 
“One kind of word domination imposes itself on the world from above”, states 
Kracauer, “concentrating all power within itself”, as one who “represents nothing, 
Chaplin rules the world from below”.103  With an equal emphasis on the notion of 
“Chaplin’s body” as a process, Tom Gunning, comes to a comparable conclusion: 
 
Chaplin’s physical nature also exceeds his human identity and 
transforms itself into the mechanical, the animal and even the 
vegetable. His body seems at points to disaggregate itself, with 
limbs operating independently of each other, or to merge with other 
bodies and create new creatures. Chaplin slides up and down the 
great chain of being, achieving a plastic ontology in which 
inanimate objects become bodily appendages, and the body itself 
suddenly seems inert.104 
 
“Neither generic nor individual”, writes Agamben, “neither an image of the divinity 
nor an animal form, the body now became something truly whatever.”105 The 
“whatever” in this context, explains Agamben: 
 
is the figure of pure singularity. Whatever singularity has no 
identity, it is not determinate with respect to a concept, but neither 
is it simply indeterminate; rather it is determined only through its 
relation to an idea, that is, to the totality of its possibilities.106 
 
Kracauer’s Chaplin is the idea of a plastic ontology manifested by film’s ability to 
realise the emancipatory potential of the mass ornament as an absolutely 
communicable (and therefore entirely translatable) form distinct from any 
metaphysical considerations. “Using Ranciere as a perspective”, suggests Robnik, 
“we can frame Kracauer’s hole-thinking politically”: 
                                                
102 Kracauer, 1997b, p. 119. 
103 Kracauer, 1997b, p. 118. 
104 Gunning, Tom, “Chaplin and the Body of Modernity”, Early Popular Visual Culture, Vol. 8, No. 3 
(2010), p. 238. 
105 Agamben, 2007, p. 47. 
106 Agamben, 2007, p. 66. 
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Rather than last things – Utopia to achieve, a world to regain – 
politics presupposes only equality, which designates the fact that 
every social order is contingent, every power relation can be 
changed: subordination can at any time dissolve into the side-by-
side relation that gives it no secure foundation. The holy is a hole: 
miracles can always happen.107 
 
For Kracauer, suggests Robnik, the “mass ornament’s promise might be to make 
Chaplins of all of us”.108 However, as Kracauer’s interpretation of Kafka’s work 
demonstrates, “the sought-after solution is unattainable, yet at the same time 
attainable here and now”.109 In other words, if Chaplin is a manifestation of the 
human as he/she is realized everywhere then we are all already this emancipated 
mode of being. However, if Chaplin is that which resists commodification (the “real” 
of the human – to use Laruelle’s non-philosophical term) or as Kracauer describes 
him - “a hole” - then there is no content to this emancipated form. Emancipation is 
unattainable as it is identical to nothing. Nevertheless, as Agamben concludes: 
 
instead of continuing to search for a proper identity in the already 
improper and senseless form of individuality, humans were to 
succeed in belonging to this impropriety as such, in making of the 
proper being-thus not an identity and an individual property but a 
singularity without identity, a common and absolutely exposed 
singularity-if humans could, that is, not be-thus in this or that 
particular biography, but be only the thus, their singular exteriority 
and their face, then they would for the first time enter into a 
community without presuppositions and without subjects, into a 
communication without the incommunicable.110 
 
For Agamben, in order to act upon this knowledge (the knowledge imparted by the 
mass ornament) we must forget about ourselves (as we are culturally constructed) and 
                                                
107 Robnik, Drehli, “Siegfried Kracauer”, in Felicity Colman (ed.), Film, Theory and Philosophy. The 
Key Thinkers (Durham: Acumen, 2009), p. 50. 
108 Robnik, 2009, p. 49. 
109 Kracauer, 1995b, p. 276. 
110 Agamben, 2007, p. 64. 
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let the images of our fungible (commodified) being affect the objective status our 
physical individuality. 
 
7.7 Conclusion 
 
What is important to remember, and what Kracauer emphasises in the texts discussed 
above, is that what he is proposing when he draws a parallel between the cinematic 
approach and Chaplin’s little tramp or Kafka’s inquisitive dog is not a straightforward 
illustration of his ideas. In his 1921 essay on Georg Simmel, Kracauer wrote that, a 
reader can come to “a far reaching conclusion about the essence of thinkers who live 
either primarily in analogies or predominantly in metaphors”.111 Kracauer explains: 
 
The analogy person never gives an explanation of the world, since 
he is not driven by a preconceived idea; he is content to identify the 
laws of the event and, by observing the many facets of the event 
itself, to pair together those things that have the same form. He 
restrains his self at all times. The metaphor person has a much less 
objective attitude. He allows the world to affect him; it has a 
meaning for him that he wants to convey. His soul is filled with the 
absolute, toward which his self yearns to emanate.112 
 
Kracauer’s writings, like Simmel’s, are full of analogies and understanding their 
function (in relation to his work) is a significant aspect not just of comprehending the 
philosophical nature of his project as a whole but also the role of film in that project. 
In this regard, the previously discussed relationship that film-philosophy attempts to 
demarcate between film and philosophy (Chapter 4) is particularly informative. 
Kracauer’s philosophical use of Chaplin’s films demonstrates that his cinematic 
approach is not a philosophy of, on or about film, nor does it attempt to think with 
film as Sinnerbrink’s philosophically re-enfranchised film theory does. Kracauer’s 
approach (with its commitment to propagating rather than eliminating the 
indeterminate) is in this respect closer to non-philosophy’s “performative practice” 
                                                
111 Kracauer, 1995b, p. 238. 
112 Kracauer, 1995b, p. 238. 
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that thinks alongside film.113  No meaning is being sought or attributed to the 
narratives of Chaplin’s films by Kracauer nor is any metaphorical role being assigned 
to its images. With their critical emphasis on the heterogeneous and intertwined 
processes (of narration and translation) that occur between Chaplin and the spectator 
(with the little tramp existing as a form of co-generated epiphenomenon) the ““raw –
material” of Kracauer’s thought (to paraphrase Mullarkey) is not essentially film but 
the mediation of the film experience by philosophy. 114 As a consequence of this 
approach, the “ethico-political” dimension of Kracauer’s work is different from that 
envisaged by Sinnerbrink in his version of film-philosophy. Whereas Sinnerbrink 
looks to specific films to provoke (either through the unsettling nature of their images 
or through stylistic experimentation) a full or partial re-engagement with established 
political philosophies or ethical considerations, Kracauer’s texts work to avoid (or at 
least confuse) such an instrumental approach.115 As Rancière states in The Politics of 
Aesthetics, the idea of politics should not be “tied to a determined historical project, 
as it is declared to be by those who identify its end with the end of the project of 
emancipation begun by the French Revolution”. “Politics”, argues Rancière, “exists 
when the figure of a specific subject is constituted, a supernumerary subject in 
relation to the calculated number of groups, place, and functions in a society”.116 As a 
co-generated entity (existing between Chaplin and Kracauer) the little tramp is such a 
political subject. 
 
As this chapter examined how Kracauer critically explored social constructs (through 
the work of Chaplin and Kafka) the next will look to how Kracauer’s idea of temporal 
relations is formulated in correspondence to his experience of films.  
                                                
113 Mullarkey, John, “Film Can’t Philosophise (and Neither Can Philosophy): Introduction to a Non-
Philosophy of Cinema, in Havi, Carel and Greg Tuck (eds.), New Takes in Film Philosophy 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 90. 
114 Mullarkey, 2011, p. 90. 
115 Sinnerbrink, Robert, “Re-enfranchising Film: Towards a Romantic Film-Philosophy”, in Havi, 
Carel and Greg Tuck (eds.), New Takes in Film Philosophy (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 
p. 43. 
116 Rancière, Jacques, The Politics of Aesthetics, translated by Gabriel Rockhill (London and New 
York: Continuum, 2007), p. 51. 
 207 
CHAPTER 8:  
 
THEORY AND ITS CINEMATIC ILLUSTRATION 
 
8. 1 Introduction 
 
“No sooner do we try to get in touch with mental entities”, writes Kracauer in the 
conclusion of Theory of Film, “than they tend to evaporate”: 
 
In reaching out for them, we reduce them to abstractions as 
colourless as the noise to which radio music is commonly being 
reduced. 1 
 
In this chapter I will examine further how Kracauer articulates the relationship 
between thought and cinema. In particular it will investigate how Kracauer suggests 
in Theory of Film a correspondence between cinematic film narratives and the 
“constitution of the historical universe”.2 I will argue that, like Wartenberg, Kracauer 
comprehends film’s capacity to illustrate existent philosophy as compatible with (as 
opposed to antithetical to) an idea of genuine cinematic philosophy. 3 However, as I 
will demonstrate, unlike Wartenberg who also argues for their synthesis in the 
concept of the cinematic “thought experiment”, Kracauer comprehends the 
relationship between the cinematic approach and philosophy as a complementarity. In 
parallel to examining Kracauer’s appraisal of film’s theoretical capabilities this 
chapter will also look at how he criticises the notion of films being “philosophical 
exercises” and the identification of auteur directors as film philosophers (as Stephen 
Mulhall argues). 4 Its central focus will be on how, through the cinematic “disclosure 
of novel aspects of our experience” (to use Sinnerbrink’s phrase), Kracauer introduces 
                                                
1 Kracauer, Siegfried, Theory of Film. The Redemption of Physical Reality [1960] (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1997), p. 293. 
2 Kracauer, Siegfried, History. The Last Things Before the Last, completed after the death of the author 
by Paul Oskar Kristeller (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1995), p. 48. 
3 Wartenberg, Thomas E., “On the Possibility of Cinematic Philosophy”, in Havi Carel and Greg Tuck 
(eds.), New Takes in Film Philosophy (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 17.  
4 Mulhall, Stephen, On Film (Abingdon & New York: Routledge, 2008), p. 2.  
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in Theory of Film the “possibility that philosophy might be transformed through its 
encounter with film”.5 
 
Using comparisons with the work of Walter Benjamin, the French philosopher Michel 
Serres, the anthropologist and art historian George Kubler and the Marxist 
philosopher (and friend of Kracauer’s) Ernst Bloch, I will demonstrate how 
Kracauer’s historiography can be considered as a philosophy of time.  By arguing 
how ideas such as Bloch’s concept of “non-simultaneity” and Kubler’s notion of 
“shaped time” correspond to aspects of Kracauer’s thought I will establish how 
Kracauer develops a theory of temporal extraterritoriality distinct from that proposed 
by the psychological readings of his work that dominated the previous phase of his 
critical reception (see Chapter 3). It will also show how Kracauer uses film to 
illustrate his ideas as well as how film resists such intellectual subordination. It will 
conclude by arguing that, for Kracauer, the cinematic experience operates alongside 
philosophy as a repository of knowledge and as such exercises a potential to 
circumvent the limitations of readymade theoretical frameworks. 
 
8.2 The Manifold Shapes of Now: Kracauer’s Philosophy of Time. 
 
Though occasionally it is useful to think of time as operating in a linear fashion, 
suggests the French philosopher of science Michel Serres, it is fundamentally wrong 
to consider it as constantly uniform or laminar (without turbulence). “Time”, he 
argues, “is paradoxical; it folds or twists; its as various as the dance of flames in a 
brazier – here interrupted, there vertical, mobile, and unexpected”. 6 For Serres, all of 
our “difficulties with the theory of history” come from the fact that we think of time 
in an “inadequate way”.7  Serres writes: 
 
The French language in its wisdom uses the same word for weather 
and time, le temps. At a profound level they are the same thing. 
Meteorological weather, predictable and unpredictable, will no 
                                                
5 Sinnerbrink, Robert, “Re-enfranchising Film: Towards a Romantic Film-Philosophy”, in Havi Carel 
and Greg Tuck (eds.), New Takes in Film Philosophy (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 26. 
6 Serres, Michel and Bruno Latour, Conversations on Science, Culture and Time, translated by 
Roxanne Lapidus (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1998), pp. 58 – 59. 
7 Serres & Latour, 1998, p. 49. 
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doubt some day be explainable by complicated notions of 
fluctuations, strange attractors… Someday we will perhaps 
understand that historical time is even more complicated.8 
 
An image of the historical process as “a crumpling, a multiple, foldable diversity”, 
argues Serres, explains more “than one that imposes a constant distance between 
moving objects”. For example, he suggests: 
 
Everyone is amazed that after 1935 the Nazis, in the most 
scientifically and culturally advanced country, adopted the most 
archaic behaviour. But we are always simultaneously making 
gestures that are archaic, modern, and futuristic […] An object, a 
circumstance, is thus polychromic, multi-temporal, and reveals a 
time that is gathered together, with multiple pleats. 9 
 
There is a notable similarity between the language Serres uses to describe his 
polychromic conception of time and that chosen by Kracauer to articulate the form of 
the temporal continuum in Theory of Film and History. For example, in History 
Kracauer suggests that the historical process “is no process at all but a hodgepodge of 
kaleidoscopic changes-something like clouds that gather and disperse at random”.10 
However, the similarity between their two approaches is not just stylistic. As I will 
demonstrate in the following text, like Serres, Kracauer proposes a temporal model 
for the cinematic approach that consists of a complementarity of two antithetical 
interpretative schemes. Time, argues Kracauer in History, is an “antinomy” between 
an “incoherent series of shaped times,” and “chronological time as a homogeneous 
flow.” 11 
 
The American art historian and anthropologist George Kubler introduced the idea of 
shaped time in his 1962 book, The Shape of Time: Remarks on the History of 
Things.12 The historical manifestation of an artwork, argues Kubler, should be 
                                                
8 Serres & Latour, 1998, p. 58. 
9 Serres & Latour, 1998, p. 60. 
10 Kracauer, 1995, p. 160. 
11 Kracauer, 1995, p.144.   
12 Kubler, George, The Shape of Time. Remarks on the History of Things (New Haven & London: Yale 
University Press, 1962).   
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understood as a composite of numerous formal problems in various stages of being 
solved. The date of a specific art object is therefore less important for its 
interpretation than the aggregate “age” of the miscellaneous temporary solutions it 
represents. “The fact”, explains Kracauer: 
 
that related consecutive solutions are often widely separated in 
terms of chronological time further suggests that each sequence [of 
solutions] evolves according to a time schedule all of its own. Its 
time has a peculiar shape. This in turn implies that the time curves 
described by different sequences are likely to differ from each other. 
In consequence, chronologically simultaneous artistic achievements 
should be expected to occupy different places on their respective 
time curves, one appearing early in its series, a second being far 
remote from the opening gambit. They fall into the same period but 
differ in age.13 
 
In a letter to the French historian Henri I. Marrou, Kracauer makes it quite clear how 
he considered that favouring either the idea of time as “various existing peculiar time 
sequences” or as a “homogeneous chronological” flow was unjustifiable.14 By 
“assigning” to both notions “the same reality character”, Kracauer affirmed both his 
belief in their complementary relationship, and his hesitance in identifying history as 
a uniform or consistent process.15 “Hegel’s [and in turn Marx’s] error”, Serres states, 
is “claiming that contradiction produces time, whereas only the opposite is true: time 
makes contradictions possible.16 “As Walter Benjamin judiciously observes”, notes 
Kracauer in History, “the idea of a progress of humanity is untenable mainly for the 
reason that it is insolubly bound up with the idea of chronological time as the matrix 
of a meaningful process”.17 However, adds Kracauer, Benjamin “drives home the 
nonentity of chronological time without manifesting the slightest concern over the 
                                                
13 Kracauer, 1995, pp. 144 – 145. For Kubler’s assessment of Kracauer’s understanding of shaped time 
see, Kubler, George, The Shape of Time Reconsidered in Thomas F. Reese (ed), Studies in Ancient 
American And European Art. The Collected essays of George Kubler (New Haven & London: Yale 
University Press, 1985), p. 429. 
14 Kracauer Letter to Marrou, May 18th, 1964. Quoted in in Jay, Martin, Permanent Exiles. Essays on 
the Intellectual Migration from Germany to America (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), p. 
191.  
15 Jay, 1985, p. 191. 
16 Serres & Latour, 1998, pp. 49 – 50. 
17 Kracauer. 1995, p. 14. 
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other side of the picture”.18 The result is that Benjamin’s philosophy of history (which 
purports to be the exposition of dialectical materialism) indulges in a decidedly “un-
dialectical approach”.19  
 
Kracauer’s retrospective criticism of his friend’s dialectical method should not 
however obscure the fact that Benjamin’s critical insight into the nature of the 
temporal continuum (especially in relation to chronology) provides an important 
component of Kracauer’s own mixed theoretical approach. This positive reading of 
his friend’s method is evident in Kracauer’s review of Benjamin’s Ursprung des 
deutschen Trauerspiels [The Origin of German Tragic Drama, 1928].20 “The 
difference between traditional abstract thinking and Benjamin’s manner of thinking”, 
writes Kracauer in his review of the book, is that “the former drains objects of their 
concrete plenitude, the latter burrows into the material thicket in order to unfold the 
dialectic of essentialities”. 21 In Benjamin’s work, argues Kracauer: 
 
Where meanings come together under the sign of an idea, they jump 
to one another like electric sparks rather than being ‘sublated’ into a 
formal concept. In the course of history, they eventually also 
undergo dialectical separation, and each acquires a subsequent 
history of its own, on its own.22 
 
For Kracauer an exemplar of Benjamin’s approach is his explication of the concept of 
“origin” in the book’s “Epistemo-Critical Prologue”. “The term origin”, Benjamin 
explains, “is not intended to describe the process by which the existent came into 
being, but rather to describe that which emerges from the process of becoming and 
disappearance”.23 “Origin”, explains Benjamin: 
 
is an eddy in the stream of becoming, and in its current it swallows 
the material involved in the process of genesis. That which is 
                                                
18 Kracauer. 1995, p. 150. 
19 Kracauer. 1995, p.155. 
20 Benjamin, Walter, Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels (Berlin: Rowohlt, 1928). Benjamin, Walter. 
The Origin of German Tragic Drama, translated by John Osborne (London: New Left Books, 1977). 
21 Kracauer, Siegfried, The Mass Ornament. Weimar essays, translated and edited by Thomas Y. Levin 
(Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard U.P., 1995b), p. 260. 
22 Kracauer, 1995b, p. 260. 
23 Benjamin, 1977, p. 45 
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original is never revealed in the naked and manifest existence of the 
factual; its rhythm is apparent only to a dual insight. On the one 
hand it needs to be recognized as a process of restoration and 
reestablishment, but, on the other hand, and precisely because of 
this, as something imperfect and incomplete. There takes place in 
every original phenomenon a determination of the form in which an 
idea will constantly confront the historical world, until it is revealed 
fulfilled, in the totality of its history.24 
 
As well as prefiguring (to a certain extent) Kubler’s notion of shaped time, what 
Benjamin’s concept of origin also demonstrates is the necessity of a “dual insight” in 
understanding the non-homogenous nature of the time and therefore historical change 
and development. The idea of a non-synchronous now (a critical notion of the present 
being a mix of discordant temporal sequences) was one that had been proposed in the 
work of Kracauer and Benjamin’s mutual friend the Marxist philosopher Ernst 
Bloch.25 
 
Bloch’s primary formulation of the idea of  “non-simultaneity” and the “non-
synchronous” appears in the 1932 text “Ungleichzeitigkeit und Pflicht zu ihrer 
Dialektik” [Nonsimultaneity and Obligation to Its Dialectic]. 26 “Not all people exist 
in the same Now”, states Bloch:  
 
They do so only externally, through the fact that they can be 
seen today. But they are thereby not yet living at the same 
time with the others. They rather carry an earlier element with 
them; this interferes.27 
 
                                                
24 Benjamin, 1977, pp. 45 – 46. My emphasis. 
25 For a detailed analysis of the influence of Benjamin’s work on Adorno and the development of 
Critical Theory see, Buck-Morss, Susan, The Origin of Negative Dialectics: Theodor W. Adorno, 
Walter Benjamin, and the Frankfurt Institute (New York: The Free Press, 1979). For an overview of 
Bloch’s work see, Geoghegan, Vincent. Ernst Bloch (London: Routledge, 1996). 
26 Bloch, Ernst, “Nonsynchronism and the Obligation to Its Dialectics”, translated by Mark Ritter, New 
German Critique, No. 11 (1977), p. 22 – 38, this essay has also been translated as “Non-
contemporaneity and its obligation to the dialectic”, in Bloch, Ernst, Heritage of Our Times, translated 
by Neville and Stephen Plaice (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), pp. 97 – 148. For the problem of 
translating the term “Ungleichzeitigkeit”, see Mark Ritter’s note on translation in Bloch, 1977, p. 22. 
27 Bloch, 1991, p. 97. 
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In a letter to Bloch written in February 1935, Kracauer stated his appreciation for the 
“Ungleichzeitigkeit” essay.28 However, though he applauded Bloch’s insight into 
what Dagmar Barnouw describes as the “anachronistic presence” in “the middle of 
accelerated modernization of the work world, of old desires and modes of behaviour”, 
(as with his criticism of Benjamin) he felt that it maintained too much of an 
intellectual distance from the actuality of everyday life.29 When Kracauer readdresses 
the concept of “Ungleichzeitigkeit” in History, it is interesting to note that he 
acknowledges the Marxist pedigree that Bloch attributes to it in Heritage of Our 
Times, but adds a significant caveat to the construction of this particular lineage. “As 
might be expected,” he writes,  “there is no lack either of statements acknowledging 
the nonhomogeneous character of the historical period”. 30 But, states Kracauer: 
 
it is two different things to notice a phenomenon and to realize its 
potential meaning. None of these statements testifies to an 
awareness of what the divergence of the elements that comprise a 
period may imply for the significance of chronology. Even though 
Marx, for instance, is enough of a realist to perceive, and codify, 
"Ungleichzeitigkeit," he nevertheless clings to Hegel's idea of a 
dialectical historical process, which involves the conventional 
identification of homogeneous linear time as the time of history.31 
 
In parallel to Kracauer’s writing of History, Bloch had published Tübinger Einleitung 
in die Philosophie [The Tübingen Introduction in Philosophy, 1963]. In a letter of 
congratulations, Kracauer wrote, “[y]ou are to my knowledge the only one who 
presents the problem of time. And what you say about it strongly touches my own 
ideas on the antinomy at the center of the chronological concept of time”.32  
 
Kracauer’s characterization of  “modern man’s intellectual landscape”, as a composite 
of multifarious, non-simultaneous nows is also evident in the epilogue to Theory of 
                                                
28 For a detailed account of the relationship between Kracauer, Bloch, and Adorno see Barnouw, 
Dagmar, Critical Realism: History, Photography, and the work of Siegfried Kracauer (Baltimore: John 
Hopkins University Press, 1994), pp. 33 – 52. Bloch left Germany in 1933, moving first to Switzerland 
and then to the United States. In 1948 he returned to East Germany, where he stayed until his defection 
to the west in 1961, see Geoghegan, 1996, pp.  9 – 46. 
29 Barnouw, 1994, p. 102. 
30 Kracauer, 1995, p. 148. 
31 Kracauer, 1995, p. 149.   
32 Letter dated June 17th 1963, quoted in Jay, 1985, p. 195. 
 214 
Film.  “We not only live among the ‘ruins of ancient beliefs’”, writes Kracauer, “but 
live among them with at best a shadowy awareness of things in their fullness”. So, 
asks Kracauer in History, how should we deal with “the dilemma in which we find 
ourselves?” On the one hand, suggests Kracauer: 
 
measurable time dissolves into thin air, superseded by the bundles 
of shaped times in which the manifold comprehensible series of 
events evolve. On the other, dating retains its significance in as 
much as these bundles tend to coalesce at certain moments, which 
then are valid for all of them.33 
 
These “relatively uniform periods” of confluence, explains Kracauer, “is an antinomic 
entity embodying in a condensed form the two irreconcilable time conceptions”. 34 
However, the way in which we experience such uniform historical periods, explains 
Kracauer, “may not be identical with the experiences of chronologically earlier or 
later periods”.35 As a consequence, Kracauer concludes, “transitions between 
successive periods are problematic”, to get from one to another you must “jump”.36  
 
Marx’s dialectical philosophy of history, Kracauer argues, is predicated on the 
inevitability of such convulsive disruptions to historical fluency.  In this view, “all 
histories featuring the ‘March of Time’ are mirages – paintings on a screen which 
hides the truth they pretend to render”.37 Successive “paintings thus produced cover, 
layer after layer, the ever expanding screen” of history.38 This process, Kracauer 
writes, is “perfectly illustrated” by Henri-Georges Clouzot's documentary film, Le 
mystère Picasso [The Mystery of Picasso, 1956]”.39 This film, writes Kracauer: 
 
shows the artist in the act of creation. We see: once Picasso has 
outlined what he appears to have in mind, he immediately 
superposes upon his initial sketch a second one which more often 
than not relates only obliquely to the first; and in this way it goes on 
                                                
33 Kracauer, 1995, pp. 154 – 155. 
34 Kracauer, 1995, p. 155. 
35 Kracauer, 1995, p. 155. 
36 Kracauer, 1995, p. 155. 
37 Kracauer, 1995, p. 155. 
38 Kracauer, 1995, p. 155. 
39 Le mystère Picasso [The Mystery of Picasso, 1956], directed by Henri-Georges Clouzot. 
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and on, every new system of lines or color patches all but ignoring 
its predecessor.40 
 
Watching Clouzot’s film [Figure 10], it becomes clear that Picasso’s over-painting 
does not completely obliterate the previous layers of drawing etc. In the final image 
evidence of previous activity or its absence remain visible in pockets on the surface of 
the artwork. These blank pieces of canvas and fragments of earlier designs compete 
for our attention upon its surface, like exposed archaeology in a landscape. In History, 
Kracauer writes of the “puzzling problem” of the “‘limited’ relativity of certain ideas 
emerging from such pockets”, as “they must be thought of as lying both inside and 
outside flowing time”. They must be thought of, Kracauer concludes, as existing in a 
state of  “temporal extraterritoriality”.41  
 
 
Figure 10.  Temporal transitions. Le mystère Picasso (1956) 
  
Kracauer’s insights into the “co-existence of the simultaneous and the un-
simultaneous”, suggests the literary historian and theorist Hans Robert Jauss, “far 
from leading historical knowledge into a dilemma, emphasize the possibility and 
necessity of uncovering the historical dimension of literary appearances in synchronic 
cross-sections”.42 What is true for literary appearances is also true for cinematic ones. 
As Kracauer’s recourse to Clouzot’s film demonstrates is that for Kracauer the 
                                                
40 Kracauer, 1995, p. 156. 
41 Kracauer, 1995, p. 156. 
42 Jauss, Hans Robert, “Literary History as a Challenge to Literary Theory,” in Ralph Cohen (ed.) New 
Directions in Literary History (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1974), p. 33.   
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medium’s ability to render communicable such temporal “cross-sections” was an 
integral part of his approach.   
 
In the following sections, developing the ideas proposed in the previous chapters, I 
shall examine in detail how Theory of Film can be interpreted as an illustration of 
Kracauer’s philosophy of time and the different ways Kracauer uses literary and 
cinematic images in order to articulate his cinematic approach as a mode of being. 
 
8.3  The Nature of Cinematic Narratives   
 
So how does this non-linear temporal complexity, the pleating to which Serres refers, 
present itself in Theory of Film? One way is narrative indeterminacy. For a film to 
achieve this, Kracauer argues, it must avoid the finality of theatrical tragedy, where 
all “the incidents contingent on it are made to figure as elements of a forcedly 
significant composition”.43 “The main thing”, suggests Kracauer, “is that the ending 
does not mark the end.”44 An example of this indeterminacy is the last scene of 
Federico Fellini’s Nights of Cabiria (1957) [Figure 11].45 Kracauer writes: 
 
As the heart-broken Cabiria walks through the nocturnal wood 
where young people are making music and dancing and drifting 
about in a Dionysian mood, we do not know what will happen to 
her; we only learn from a change of her facial expression that she 
will walk on and that there is no end to her story.46 
 
Read in the context of his exposition of the idea of the “found story”, the analogy 
Kracauer is making here between this scene and the temporal continuum, the flow of 
life is clear. The notion of a “found story”, Kracauer explains, “covers all stories 
found in the material of actual physical reality”.47 “When you have watched for long 
enough the surface of a river or a lake you will detect pattern in the water which may 
                                                
43 Kracauer, 1997, p. 258. 
44 Kracauer, 1997, p. 258. 
45 The Nights of Cabiria [Italian: Le Notti di Cabiria], directed by Federico Fellini (Italy / France:  
Dino de Laurentiis Cinematografica / Les Films Marceau, 1957). 
46 Kracauer, 1997, p. 269. 
47 Kracauer. 1997, p. 245. 
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have been produced by a breeze or some eddy”.48 “Found stories,” Kracauer states, 
“are in the nature of such patterns.”49  As well as invoking the imagery of Benjamin’s 
Trauerspiels study, the fluid dynamics of Kracauer’s temporality of cinematic  
 
 
Figure 11. The final scene is not the end. Nights of Cabiria (1957) 
 
narratives offer another parallel to the work of Serres.  “Yes”, argues Serres, “time 
flows” like a river, but not in the uniform way envisaged by conventional philosophy. 
Those who draw the analogy in order to fix the idea of time’s inexorable progress 
demonstrate a certain naivety towards how rivers actually function”.50  
 
In order to substantiate his position Kracauer draws upon an interview given by 
Fellini to Gideon Bachmann and published alongside his own essay on “The 
Spectator” in Robert Hughes’ 1959 Film Book 1: The Audience and the filmmaker. “I 
think it is immoral”, Fellini argues, “to tell a story that has a conclusion”: 
 
Because you cut out your audience the moment you present a 
solution on the screen […] Conversely, by not serving them the 
happy ending on a platter, you can make them think, you can 
                                                
48 Kracauer. 1997, p. 245. 
49 Kracauer. 1997, p. 246. 
50 Serres & Latour, 1995, p. 58. 
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remove some of the smug security. Then they’ll have to find their 
own answers.51 
 
Fellini’s “existentialist argument”, suggests Kracauer, “is by itself insufficient”.52 “It 
is not just the lack of a ready–made ending which challenges the spectator; rather he 
becomes “engaged” because of the nature of the qualities and processes which do not 
end”.53 For Kracauer, the “beautiful finale of Cabiria with its enchanted woods in 
which tears and music, grief and the joy of living fuse into each other,” stands apart 
from films whose imagery “exhausts itself in trying to project what its creator 
believes to have put into it.” 54  
 
What is interesting here is the limited amount of cinematic agency (ability to produce 
cinematic content) that Kracauer credits to Fellini (as compared to that he attributes to 
Chaplin). For Kracauer, what makes Fellini’s, De Sica’s and Rossellini’s work 
distinct is not their artistic acumen, their skill as artists, but a cinematic sensibility that 
resists transforming the raw material of camera reality into art.“[A]ll of them”, 
suggest Kracauer, “are imprecise in that they fail to connect the elements or units of 
their narratives in a rational manner”.55 However, it is not entirely down to chance 
that their films contain moments that engage the spectator.  It is, concludes Kracauer, 
as “if they possessed a divining rod enabling them to spot, on their journey through 
the maze of physical existence, phenomena and occurrences which strike us as being 
tremendously significant”.56 The “divining rod” to which Kracauer refers is the film 
camera and like the supernatural knowledge that provides the inert stick with 
divinatory potential so too does knowledge of the interrelationship between the 
temporal and material continuum, for Kracauer, provide the cinematic apparatus with 
a comparable revelatory function. Incidences of this peculiar cinematic disclosure, 
                                                
51 Quoted in Kracauer, 1997, pp. 269 -270. See also, Bachmann, Gideon, ‘Federico Fellini: An 
Interview’, in Robert Hughes (ed.) Film: Book 1. The Audience and the Filmmaker (New York: Grove 
Press, 1959), pp. 97 – 105. 
52 Kracauer, 1997, p. 270. 
53 Kracauer, 1997, p. 270. The concept of “engagement” was central to Sartre’s existentialist idea of 
praxis, see Adorno, Theodor W., ‘Commitment”, translated by Francis McDonagh, New Left Review, 
Nos. 87-88 (September-December 1974), pp. 75 – 89. 
54 Kracauer, 1997, p.191. Parallels can also be made between Kracauer’s reading of the intervention of 
the jovial youths in the last scenes of Fellini’s film and Mikhail Bakhtin’s concepts of polyphony and 
unfinalizability as they occur in his notion of carnival see, Bakhtin, Mikhail, Problems of Dostoevsky’s 
Poetics, edited and translated by Caryl Emerson (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984). 
55 Kracauer, 1997, p. 257. 
56 Kracauer, 1997, p. 257. 
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suggests Kracauer, are characterised by the unsettling effect they have not just on the 
film’s narrative but also on the spectator. Alongside the example of Nights of Cabiria, 
Kracauer lists: 
 
The lone horse passing by the abandoned Gelsomina at dawn and 
the sick child with the eyes of a scared small animal which has 
never left its cave (LA STRADA) [Fellini]; the street invading the 
rooming house and the rows of Roman facades, as seen from a 
moving streetcar (UMBERTO D.) [De Sica] [Figure 12]; the group 
of German-speaking priests in the rain (THE BICYCLE THIEF) 
[De Sica] [Figure 13]; the Naples marionette theatre where the 
drunken American Negro soldier mistakes the puppets for real 
warriors and joins in the battle (PAISAN) [Rossellini] - these scenes 
and images, found in the world around the story proper, are singled 
out with unrivalled precision. Selected from among the many 
incidents with which the environment teems, they are very special 
samples indeed. They are beckoning us with great urgency, like the 
three trees in the Proust novel.57 
 
Kracauer’s qualifying reference to Proust here is significant because it suggest a 
framework with which to interpret these cinematic phenomena “which strike us as 
being tremendously significant”. 58  
 
The passage concerning the trees in Proust’s À la Recherche Du Temps Perdu [In 
Search of Lost Time, 1913 - 1927] provides an image that recurs in many guises 
throughout Theory of Film and History.59 However, unlike his recourse to Kafka, 
Kracauer is careful to qualify his utilization of the French writer. Proust, notes 
Kracauer, was “a contemporary of the rising new medium”, and acknowledged the 
influence of cinema in various ways but at the same time he completely ignored it “in 
                                                
57 Kracauer, 1997, p. 257. The Road [Italian: La Strada], directed by Federico Fellini (Italy: Ponti-De 
Laurentiis Cinematografica, 1954); Umberto D., directed by Vittorio De Sica (Italy: Rizzoli-De Sica-
Amato, 1952; Bicycle Thieves [Italian: Ladri di biciclette], directed by Vittorio De Sica (Italy: De Sica, 
1948); Paisan [Italian: Paisà], directed by Roberto Rossellini (Italy: Organizzazione Film 
Internazionali, 1946). 
58 Kracauer, 1997, p. 257. 
59 See Kracauer, 1997, pp. li, 23, 27 & 238. See also, Kracauer, 1995, pp. 57 & 68. Proust, Marcel, 
Remembrance of Things Past. Volume One: Swann’s Way and Within a Budding Grove, translated by 
C.K. Scott Moncrieff and Terence Kilmartin (London. Penguin Books, 1989). 
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his capacity as a writer”.60 His “affinity for the cinema”, suggests Kracauer, made him 
“sensitive to transient impressions, such as the trees which look familiar to him”, but 
“when he identifies the trees as yet un-deciphered phantoms of the past ‘appealing to 
me to take them with me, to bring them back to life’, he exchanges the world of the 
cinema for dimensions alien to it”. 61 
 
However, even considering his reservations regarding Proust’s symbolic development 
of the image of the trees, what remains significant for Kracauer is Proust’s attempt (in 
its first instance) at the articulation of the immediacy of a particular kind of material 
experience in a form that does not either completely consume it nor negate its future 
potential. “Note”, Kracauer writes in History, “Proust leaves open whether or not the 
massage of the three trees bears on his infancy and through it on his present self”. 62 It 
is this quality (Proust’s consideration for the preservation of the intermediate), that 
draws the comparison from Kracauer between the novel and the enigmatic sequences 
that intervene in the cinematic stories of Fellini, De Sica, and Rossellini. As Kracauer 
suggests:  
Any attempt at an allegorical interpretation would drain these 
ideograms of their substance. They are propositions rather than 
rebuses. Snatched from transient life, they not only challenge the 
spectator to penetrate their secret but, perhaps even more insistently, 
request him to preserve them as the irreplaceable images they are.63 
 
The cinematic narrative, as Kracauer envisions it, is therefore not totally identifiable 
with a particular open ended or circular format. The cinematic quality of a narrative is 
determined by its “porosity”, its capacity to host elements antithetic to its linear 
continuation and a receptiveness to their influence.64  This is why Fellini’s existential 
explanation for the structure of his open-ended narrative is for Kracauer inadequate. It 
is also why Proust’s narrative exhibits a cinematic quality only up until he 
retrospectively attributes meaning (and therefore a narrative function) to the 
indeterminate phenomena that have until then populated his circuitous text.65 
                                                
60 Kracauer, 1997, p. 238. 
61 Kracauer, 1997, p. 239. 
62 Kracauer, 1995, p. 78. 
63 Kracauer, 1997, p. 257. 
64 Kracauer, 1997, p. 258. Kracauer also discusses “porosity” in Kracauer, 1995, p. 181. 
65 Kracauer discusses Proust’s narrative devices in more detail in Kracauer, 1995, pp. 166 – 163. 
 221 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12. The view from the moving streetcar in Umberto D. (1952) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13. The German priests in the rain. The Bicycle Thief (1948) 
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If Proust supplies a (not entirely successful) literary precedent for Kracauer’s idea of 
cinematic narrative in Theory of Film then the work of D.W. Griffith offers an 
“admirable non-solution” 66 for what Kracauer perceives as the antinomy of narrative 
determinacy and “prototypes of cinematically significant imagery”.67 In the following 
section I will look at how Kracauer develops Griffith’s “non-solution” as a critique of 
the consideration of film as an art form and how cinematic imagery resists 
subsumption into art’s associate philosophical frameworks. 
 
8.4  Griffith’s Admirable Non-Solution  
 
“Griffith”, writes Kracauer, “is generally recognized as the first to narrate a given 
story – mostly a theatrical one – in cinematic terms”. 68 Nevertheless, Kracauer adds, 
perhaps the most significant characteristic of his approach is that “unlike many of his 
successors, he remains keenly aware of the gulf which separates the theatrical story 
from the cinematic narrative”.69 Griffith’s films, explains Kracauer, “are full of 
fissures traceable to his cinematic instinct rather than technical awkwardness”. As 
Kracauer explains: 
 
On the one hand, he certainly aims at establishing dramatic 
continuity as impressively as possible; on the other, he invariably 
inserts images which do not just serve to further the action or 
convey relevant moods but retain a degree of independence of the 
intrigue and thus succeed in summoning physical existence. This is 
precisely the significance of his first close-up. And so do his 
extreme long shots, his seething crowds, his street episodes and his 
many fragmentary scenes invite us to absorb them intensely. In 
watching these pictures or pictorial configurations, we may indeed 
forget the drama they punctuate in their own diffuse meanings.70 
 
                                                
66 Kracauer, 1997, p. 47. 
67 Kracauer, 1997, p. 62.  
68 Kracauer, 1997, p. 231. 
69 Kracauer, 1997, p. 231. 
70 Kracauer, 1997, p. 231. 
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“Eisenstein”, argues Kracauer, “criticizes the close-ups in Griffith films precisely for 
their relative independence of the contexts in which they occur”.71 Calling them 
“isolated units which tend ‘to show or to present”, Kracauer suggests, Eisenstein 
insisted that “to the extent that they indulge in isolation they fail to yield the meaning 
which the interweaving process of montage may elicit from them”.72 The function of 
the close up, for Eisenstein, is to ”signify, to give meaning, to designate”.73 In 
contrast, Griffith’s magnification of  “small material phenomena are not only integral 
components of the narrative but disclosures of new aspects of physical reality”.74 For 
Kracauer, Griffith’s approach to filmmaking: 
 
seems to have been guided by the conviction that the cinema is all 
the more cinematic if it acquaints us with the physical origins, 
ramifications, and connotations of all the emotional and intellectual 
events which comprise the plot; that it cannot adequately account 
for these inner developments unless it leads us through the thicket 
of material life from which they emerge and in which they are 
embedded.75 
 
The example Kracauer provides as an illustration of this indelible affinity between 
Griffith’s aesthetic sensibility and the material environment from which it was 
gleaned comes from the modern episode of Intolerance.76 During a sequence that 
depicts the actress Mae Marsh in the midst of a courtroom trial, Griffith inserts a close 
up of the distressed character wringing her hands [Figure 14]. “As we are watching 
them”, suggests Kracauer, “something strange” happens: 
 
we will forget that they are just ordinary hands. Isolated from the 
rest of the body and greatly enlarged, the hands we know will 
change into unknown organisms quivering with a life of their own.77  
 
                                                
71 Kracauer, 1997, p. 47. 
72 Kracauer, 1997, p. 47. 
73 Kracauer, 1997, p. 47. 
74 Kracauer, 1997, p. 47. 
75 Kracauer, 1997, p. 48. 
76 Intolerance: Love's Struggle Throughout the Ages, directed by D.W. Griffith (USA: Triangle Film 
Corporation, 1916). 
77 Kracauer, 1997, p. 48. 
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For Kracauer, extreme close-ups “metamorphose their objects by magnifying them,” 
and in doing so open up “expanses which we have explored at best in dreams 
before”.78 
 
In order to give some credence to his assertions in relation to Griffith’s imagery, 
Kracauer looks to the previously critical Eisenstein. “Years after having seen 
Intolerance”, recounts Kracauer, Eisenstein admitted that he “no longer remembered 
who is who in the street sequences of this film's ‘modern story’; but the figure of a 
passer-by visible only ‘for a flashing glimpse’ still stood vividly before his inner 
eye”.79 Though there is a similarity between this reference to Eisenstein’s  
 
 
Figure 14. Mae Marsh’s hands in Intolerance (1916) 
 
recollection and the one previously discussed by the poet Cendrars, Eisenstein’s 
anecdote plays a distinctive role in Theory of Film (a fact affirmed by Kracauer’s 
repeated use of it as an example).80 For Kracauer, Eisenstein, and in particular the 
Eisenstein of Alexander Nevsky (1938) onwards, stands as the doyen of a particular 
                                                
78 Kracauer, 1997, p. 48. 
79 Kracauer, 1997, p. 231. Kracauer’s quotation is from Eisenstein, Sergei, Film Form: Essays in Film 
Theory, edited and translated by Jay Leyda (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1949), p. 199. 
80 Kracauer. 1997, p. 63. 
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formalist approach to film making. This is a formalism that “obstinately sticks to the 
harmony of a film’s various elements”.81 “The zeal with which he forces all aural and 
visual components of a film into the service of its leading ideas,” Kracauer writes in a 
1943 review of Eisenstein’s book The Film Sense, “recalls somewhat the Wagnerian 
conception of the ‘total work of art’”.82 However, this was not always the case. At the 
beginning of his career, explains Kracauer, “Eisenstein left the theatre to become a 
film director, because he recognized that only the cinema would allow him to express 
the specific notions and revolutionary ideas he had in mind”.83 For Kracauer, the most 
significant of these was Eisenstein’s realization that the “screen is better able than the 
stage to represent masses and collective actions.”84  As the confluence of such myriad 
processes the “seething” crowd becomes, for Kracauer, a genuine cinematic object.85 
 
This affinity, that Eisenstein recognized, between an amassed population and its 
filmic representation is readdressed in Theory of Film. “At a time of its emergence”, 
writes Kracauer, “the mass, this giant animal, was a new and upsetting experience” 
that the traditional arts proved unable to “encompass and render”: 
 
Where they failed, photography easily succeeded; it was technically 
equipped to portray crowds as the accidental agglomerations they 
are. Yet only film, the fulfilment of photography in a sense, was 
equal to the task of capturing them in motion. In this case the 
instrument of reproduction came into being almost simultaneously 
with one of its main subjects. Hence the attraction which masses 
exerted on still and motion picture camera from the outset. It is 
certainly more than sheer coincidence that the very first Lumiére 
films featured a crowd of workers and the confusion of arrival and 
departure at a railway station.86 
 
The urban mass as it was presented to a collective spectatorship in early non-narrative 
films was not an entity with a fixed cultural meaning, an ideological pictogram (as 
                                                
81 Kracauer, Siegfried, ‘In Eisenstein’s Workshop’, Kenyon Review, Vol. 5, No.1 (1943), p. 152. 
82Kracauer, 1943, p.153. 
83 Kracauer, 1943, p. 152. 
84 Kracauer, 1943, p. 153. 
85 Kracauer, 1997, p. 231. My emphasis. 
86 Kracauer, 1997, pp. 50 – 51. 
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Eisenstein argues), but as kinetic phenomenon with a peculiar visceral appeal.87 A 
characteristic it maintains (albeit fleetingly) even in its later, more staged 
manifestations (Kracauer cites the flood episode in Fritz Lang’s Metropolis as an 
example [Figure 15].88  
 
 
Figure 15. The giant animal mass. Metropolis (1927) 
 
As with amorphous “unknown organism” that was Mae Marsh’s hands, the accidental 
agglomeration of human crowd as it appears in Lang’s film presents itself to the 
spectator (Kracauer) as a genuine cinematic entity. Its identification as such relates 
both to its analogous formal relationship with the non-laminar complex of temporal 
relations (like Serre’s analogy between time and the “the dance of flames in a 
brazier”)89 but also its contextual relationship with the linear narrative that 
accommodates it.  However, Kracauer’s reference to Lumiére’s non-narrative films 
suggests a relationship between cinematic imagery and the temporal continuum that 
exists in parallel to (but distinct from) that exhibited by an individual film’s 
configuration of its narrative and visual constituents.  
 
                                                
87 For example the “factory gate” genre of films popular c. 1900 such as Employees Leaving Vickers 
and Maxim's in Barrow, directed by James Kenyon and Sagar Mitchell (UK: Mitchell & Kenyon, 
1901). 
88 Kracauer, 1997, pp. 61 – 62. Metropolis, directed by Fritz Lang (Germany: Universum Film (UFA), 
1927). 
89 Serres & Latour, 1998, pp. 58 – 59. 
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In the following sections I will look at how Kracauer’s use of the remembered film 
sequence (such as the previously discussed examples of Cendrars and Eisenstein) 
gives his notion of cinematic imagery a “reality character” beyond that of the film to 
which it initially relates.90 
 
8. 5  Saturated Images 
 
The final image of Theory of Film is an intriguing one in both terms of content and in 
relation to its critical function.  It is a scene from Satyajit Ray's 1956 film Aparajito 
(The Unvanquished), the second part of Ray’s Apu trilogy [Figure 16].91 This is how 
Kracauer describes the sequence:  
 
The camera focuses on the ornamental bark of an old tree and then 
slowly tilts down to the face of Apu's sick mother who yearns for 
her son in the big city. In the distance a train is passing by. The 
mother walks heavily back to the house where she imagines she 
hears Apu shout “Ma”: Is he returning to her? She gets up and looks 
into the empty night aglow with water reflections and dancing will-
o’-the-wisps. India is in this episode but not only India.92 
 
 
Figure 16. The dancing will-o’-the-wisps in Aparajito (1956) 
                                                
90 Jay, 1985, p. 191. 
91 Aparajito / The Unvanquished [Bengali: Ôporajito], directed by Satyajit Ray (India: Epic, 1955) 
92 Kracauer, 1997, p. 311. 
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This passage comes at the end of a short section titled “The Family of Man” (a 
reference to Edward Steichen’s 1955 photography exhibition at The Museum of 
Modern Art in New York). In this section Kracauer briefly describes how the 
photographic medium has the potential to “record the material aspects of common 
daily life” and therefore, through its exhibition, has the potential of facilitating an 
“actual rapprochement between the peoples of the world”. 93  In order to contextualize 
his choice of Aparajito, Kracauer quotes from a New York Times review of the film 
by Frederick Laing that gives testament to the universality of Ray’s humanism:  
 
What seems to me remarkable about Aparajito [writes Laing] is that 
you see this story happening in a remote land and see these faces 
with their exotic beauty and still feel that the same thing is 
happening every day somewhere in Manhattan or Brooklyn or the 
Bronx.94 
 
In relation to its context (The Family of Man) Kracauer’s choice of scene is somewhat 
strange, as it does not really corroborate its argument by means of an appropriate 
illustration. In Laing’s review the point of commonality (between Bengal and the 
Bronx) is a narrative one. The implication being that, no matter where it takes place, 
the story of human life’s struggle to survive is a common one. However, the sequence 
in Aparajito where Apu’s mother watches the fireflies in the forest has a definite 
extra-narrative quality to it. Its dreamlike nature gives its peculiar content an 
indeterminate meaning.  Its enigmatic function in Theory of Film is amplified by 
Kracauer’s concluding statement: 
 
Much as these propositions differ in terms of content, they all 
penetrate ephemeral physical reality and burn through it. But once 
again, their destination is no longer a concern of the present 
inquiry.95 
                                                
93 For details of the exhibition see, Steichen, Edward, and Carl Sandberg, The Family of Man [1955] 
(New York: The Museum of Modern Art, 1996). For an overview of recent criticism of Steichen’s 
project see, Stimson, Blake, The Pivot of the World: photography and its nation (Cambridge, Mass. 
:The MIT Press, 2006), pp. 59 – 103. 
94 Kracauer, 1997, p. 311. 
95 Kracauer, 1997, p. 311. 
 229 
 
As with the end of his essay of “The Spectator”, the reader is left guessing the 
meaning of the imagery Kracauer employs in relation to his philosophical 
intentions.96 As with Kracauer’s earlier reference to Proust, the critical function of the 
symbolic indeterminacy in the conclusion of Theory of Film also has a literary 
precedent, this time the Victorian Art critic John Ruskin’s autobiography Præterita. 
Like Kracauer’s Theory of Film, Ruskin’s “outlines of scenes and thoughts perhaps 
worthy of memory in my past life” ends with an image of the fireflies “among the 
scented thickets.” “How they shone!” writes Ruskin, “moving like fine-broken 
starlight through the purple leaves” in the “still undarkened air”.97   
 
Ruskin’s Præterita exerted a strong influence on Proust’s work and is mentioned 
twice in Theory of Film. The first is in the introductory survey of the historical 
development of photography. The second forms part of his exposition of film’s “shift 
of emphasis from the meanings of speech to its material qualities”.98 In the former, he 
relates Ruskin’s enthusiasm over the “sensational realism”, of some small glass plate 
photographs of Venice; “it is, said he, ‘as if a magician had reduced the reality to be 
carried away into an enchanted land’”.99  
 
Kracauer’s reference to Ruskin’s idea of a “sensational realism,” suggests an 
intriguing relationship between it and Kracauer’s own notion of physical reality. What 
the two texts have in common is what William Arrowsmith identifies in Ruskin’s 
work as “saturated images”, visual motifs endowed with a “kind of special 
intensity”.100 For such phenomenon, “obscurity is a quality to be respected, a 
guarantee of emotional complexity and wholeness, of the poet’s respect for the 
organic, germinal mystery, which could be revealed only by the suggestion of its 
intricating products”.101 Like the undecipherable film images “[s]natched from 
transient life”, described by Kracauer, “they not only challenge the spectator to 
                                                
96 Kracauer, Siegfried, “The Spectator”, in Robert Hughes (ed.), Film: Book 1. The Audience and the 
Filmmaker (New York: Grove Press, 1959), p. 22. 
97 Ruskin, John, Praeterita and Delicta, Vol. 3 (London: Georg Allen, 1907), p. 148. 
98 Kracauer, 1997, pp. 109 – 110. For the bibliographical reference to Ruskin see p. 348. 
99 Kracauer, 1997, p. 4. 
100 Arrowsmith, William, “Ruskin’s fireflies”, in John Dixon Hunt (ed.), The Ruskin Polygon, 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1982), p. 199. 
101 Arrowsmith, 1982, p. 199. 
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penetrate their secret but, perhaps even more insistently, request him to preserve them 
as the irreplaceable images they are”. 102 
 
Arrowsmith’s concept of the saturated image is one derived from the poet T.S. Eliot’s 
1919 interpretation of Shakespeare’s Hamlet (also the subject of Benjamin’s 
Trauerspiels study). For Eliot, what marks Hamlet out as distinct from the rest of 
Shakespeare’s work as a whole, is that in it he “tackled a problem which proved too 
much for him […] to express the inexpressibly horrible”.103 “The only way of 
expressing emotion in the form of art”, states Eliot: 
 
is by finding an ‘objective correlative’; in other words, a set of 
objects, a situation, a chain of events which shall be the formula of 
that particular emotion; such that when the external facts, which 
must terminate in sensory experience, are given, the emotion is 
immediately evoked.104  
 
However, in Hamlet, explains Eliot, Shakespeare is intent on trying to express: 
 
an emotion which is inexpressible, because it is in excess of the 
facts as they appear. The intense feeling, ecstatic or terrible, without 
an object or exceeding its object is something, which every person 
of sensibility has known.105 
 
Eliot concludes that, “Hamlet’s bafflement at the absence of objective equivalent to 
his feelings is a prolongation of the bafflement of his creator in the face of his artistic 
problem”. 106 Under “compulsion of what experience,” asks Eliot, “he attempted it at 
all is an insoluble puzzle”. In order to answer this we would have “to know 
something, which is by hypothesis unknowable, for we assume it to be an experience 
which, in the manner indicated, exceeded the facts. We should have to understand 
                                                
102 Kracauer, 1997, p. 257. 
103 Eliot, T.S. “Hamlet”, in T.S. Eliot. Selected Prose, edited by John Hayward (London: Penguin 
Books, 1953), p. 109. 
104 Eliot, 1953, p. 108. 
105 Eliot, 1953, p. 109. 
106 Eliot, 1953, p. 108. 
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things which Shakespeare did not understand himself ”.107 Eliot returned to the 
subject of saturated images fourteen years later in a lecture given at Harvard 
University in 1933. In this lecture Eliot states: 
 
Only part of an author’s imagery comes from his reading. It comes 
from the whole of his sensitive life since early childhood. Why, for 
all of us, out of all that we have heard, seen, felt, in a lifetime, do 
certain images recur, charged with emotion, rather than others […] 
such memories may have symbolic value, but of what we cannot 
tell, for they come to represent the depths of feeling into which we 
cannot peer.108 
 
One such image, saturated with an indeterminate symbolic value, which recurs in 
Theory of Film, is one gleaned from the Georges Franju's documentary about Parisian 
abattoirs, The Blood of the Beasts [Le Sang des Bêtes, 1949] [Figure 17]. In one 
instance, Kracauer describes how in Franju’s film: 
 
puddles of blood spread on the floor while horse and cow are killed 
methodically; a saw dismembers animal bodies still warm with life; 
and there is the unfathomable shot of the calves' heads being 
arranged into a rustic pattern which breathes the peace of a 
geometrical ornament. It would be preposterous to assume that 
these unbearably lurid pictures were intended to preach the gospel 
of vegetarianism; nor can they possibly be branded as an attempt to 
satisfy the dark desire for scenes of destruction.109 
 
How Kracauer subsequently chooses to qualify Franju’s unsettling imagery is 
particularly revealing when considered in relation to Eliot’s proposal concerning the 
emotional origin of a symbolically indeterminate “objective correlate”.110 For 
Kracauer, “Franju's dread of the abyss that is everyday life,” is identified as “the kind 
of dread which befalls an adolescent who awakes by night and suddenly realizes the 
presence of death, the togetherness of pleasure and slaughter ….” – the ellipsis here is 
                                                
107 Eliot, 1953, p. 109. 
108 Eliot, T.S. “Poetic Imagery” in Eliot, 1953, p. 95. 
109 Kracauer, 1997, p. 305. 
110 Eliot, 1953, p. 108. 
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significant.111 As with his reference to Ray’s Aparajito, this unfinished sentence 
denies Kracauer’s line of reasoning (like Fellini’s Cabiria) a resolution so that its 
elements (unlike the trees in Proust’s novel) retain their contingent nature as prompts 
instead of meaningful revelations.  
 
 
Figure 17. The abyss of everyday life, Le Sang des Bêtes (1949) 
 
In the final section of this chapter I will explore further the idea that certain images in 
Theory of Film have a function in addition to their role as illustrations. Returning once 
more to the work of Kafka, Adorno and Benjamin it will suggest that the ambiguous 
imagery Kracauer uses in Theory of Film suggest film can perform an experimental 
function in relation to philosophy. This function, though distinct from that of a 
philosophical thought experiment is integral (as Wartenberg argues) rather than 
merely an ornamental addition to Kracauer’s film theory.112 
 
 
 
 
                                                
111 Kracauer, 1997, p. 310. 
112 See chapter 4.3 of this study. 
Copyrighted Image
 233 
8.6  The Wish to be a Red Indian: The Cinematic as Felt Reality. 
 
What the ambiguous images that recur in Kracauer’s text have in common is (to use a 
phrase of the novelist Ian McEwan’s) a sense of the “microscopic lattice work of 
consciousness”  - they are “third person accounts that contain a pearl of first person 
experience”.113 Kracauer’s analogy between the experience of watching Franju’s film 
and “the kind of dread which befalls an adolescent who awakes by night” certainly 
suggests a particular first person experience not immediately comprehensible to the 
average reader. However, in his 1964 essay on Kracauer, Adorno relates a childhood 
memory of his friend’s that sheds some light on its intellectual provenance. Adorno 
writes: 
Kracauer once told a story from his childhood about being so 
obsessed with Indian stories that they overflowed into reality. One 
night he awoke abruptly from a dream, saying, "A foreign tribe has 
robbed me." This outlines his rebus, the horror that became literal in 
the deportations, along with a yearning for the unpunished and more 
innocent barbarism of the natives he envied. 114 
 
The model for Adorno’s subsequent analysis of Kracauer’s dream of being an Indian 
is Benjamin’s 1934 essay, “Franz Kafka. On the Tenth Anniversary of His Death”.115 
In the course of interpreting a formal childhood photograph of Kafka, Benjamin 
juxtaposes the precisely controlled environment of a nineteenth century photographic 
studio with a short prose piece by Kafka called “Wunsch, Indianer zu werden [The 
Wish to be a Red Indian]. In this text Kafka writes: 
 
If one were only an Indian, instantly alert, and on a galloping horse, 
leaning into the wind, kept on quivering briefly over the quivering 
ground, until one shed one’s spurs, for there were no spurs, throw 
away the reins, for there were no reins, and barely saw the land 
                                                
113 McEwan, Ian, “Am I really a believer”, The Guardian Review (16th February 2013), p. 4. 
114 Adorno, Theodor W., “The Curious Realist: On Siegfried Kracauer”, New German Critique, No. 54 
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German cinema audiences see, Koepnick, Lutz P., ‘Unsettling America: German Westerns and 
Modernity’, Modernism/Modernity, Vol. 2, No. 3 (1995), pp. 1 - 22. 
115 Benjamin, Walter, “Franz Kafka. On the Tenth Anniversary of His Death”, in Walter Benjamin. 
Selected Writings. Volume 2: 1927 – 1934 (Cambridge, Mass. and London: The Belknap Press, 1999), 
pp. 794 – 818. 
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before one as a smoothly mown plain, with the horse’s neck and 
head already gone.116 
 
According to Benjamin’s interpretation, Kafka’s yearning to be free, like the Indian, 
expresses not just the immediate desire to get out of the stuffy formal surroundings of 
the studio, but links the child’s wistful daydream with a deferral of identification that 
he associates with the mimetic faculty. “A great deal is contained in this wish”, 
Benjamin concludes, and its “fulfilment, which he finds in America, yields up its 
secret”.117 Of course, Kafka never went to America; he died in 1924 from tuberculosis 
aged 40, having never left Europe. The America to which Benjamin refers here is 
Kafka’s unfinished novel Der Verschollene [The Missing / The Man Who 
Disappeared] that was posthumously published in 1927 with the title, Amerika.  
 
For Benjamin, the most significant aspect of this Kafka’s Amerika is encompassed in 
the section pertaining to the protagonist’s encounter with the “Nature Theatre of 
Oklahoma”. For it is here, argues Benjamin, that Kafka demarcates the spatial and 
temporal context to which much of his corpus relates.  A “good number of Kafka’s 
shorter studies and stories”, states Benjamin, “are seen in their full light only when 
they are, so to speak, put on as acts in the ‘Nature Theatre of Oklahoma’”. “Only 
then”, Benjamin explains: 
 
will one come to the certain realization that Kafka’s entire work 
constitutes a code of gestures which surely had no definite symbolic 
meaning for the author from the outset; rather, the author tried to 
derive such a meaning from them in ever-changing contexts and 
experimental groupings. The theatre is the logical place for such 
groupings 118 
 
Here, alongside Kafka’s “Red Indian” in one such experimental grouping can be 
placed the cinematic images that recur throughout Theory of Film. Both Kafka’s and 
Kracauer’s images share a certain kinetic energy, which, as Kafka scholar Ronald 
                                                
116 Kafka, Franz, In the Penal Settlement: Tales and Short Prose Works (London: Secker and Warburg, 
1949), p. 37. 
117 Benjamin, 1999, p. 800. 
118 Benjamin, 1999, p. 801. 
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Gray suggests, “does much to bring it home as a felt reality”.119 It is this sense of 
movement that is atrophied by Adorno by burdening it with the fixed meaning of a 
rebus. As suggested in his essay 1927 “Photography”, for Kracauer, cinema provides 
another suitable context for Kafka’s “experimental groupings”. 120  
 
Benjamin develops the analogy between Kafka’s work and film made by Kracauer in 
Photography in the section titled, “Sancho Panza” of his Kafka essay. “The invention 
of motion pictures and the phonograph”, argues Benjamin: 
 
came in an age of maximum alienation of men from one another, of 
unpredictably intervening relationships, which have become their 
only ones. Experiments have proved that a man does not recognize 
his own gait on film or his own voice on the phonograph. The 
situation of the subject in such experiments is Kafka's situation; this 
is what leads him to study, where he may encounter fragments of 
his own existence-fragments that are still within the context of the 
role. 121 
 
So, as with Kracauer’s interpretation of the Griffith’s close-up, Benjamin’s reading of 
Kafka’s galloping horse is similarly freed from the burden of a designated purpose. It 
is the resultant “puzzling indeterminacy” of it’s meaning that affords it the potential to 
disclose “new aspects of physical reality”.122 As the moving image of Mae Marsh’s 
hands on screen invites us to “deepen our insight into the bodily components of the 
whole of her existence,” so too do the fragments of existence that present themselves 
in the “Nature Theatre of Oklahoma” offer to perform a similar role.123  For it is on 
these occasions, amidst the ever-changing contexts and experimental grouping of a 
“fragmentized reality”, that Kafka’s theatre becomes reconstituted on Kracauer’s 
screen.124 It is then that “unknown organisms” emerge from their “dormant state, its 
state of virtual non-existence”,125 and present themselves to the spectator “quivering 
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with a life of their own”. 126 “It is no great distance”, writes the French Surrealist poet 
Paul Eluard, “through birds, from clouds to men; it is no great distance, through 
images, from man to what he sees, from the nature of reality to the nature of the 
imagined. They have the same value.” 127 
 
8.7  Conclusion 
 
“The Age of Enlightenment”, suggests Michel Serres, “was very instrumental in 
categorizing as irrational any reason not formed by science”.128 However, argues 
Serres, “there is as much reason in the works of Montaigne or Verlaine as there is in 
physics or biochemistry and, reciprocally, that often there is as much unreason 
scattered through the sciences as there is in certain dreams”.129 “Reason”, Serres 
concludes (with a statement reminiscent of Kracauer’s critique of quantative 
analysis),130 “is statistically distributed everywhere; no one can claim exclusive rights 
to it”.131 
 
It is clear from the above examination of the film sequences that Kracauer refers to in 
Theory of Film that some are considered by the author as acting in a capacity beyond 
that of mere illustration.  Their role is not just to corroborate certain elements of 
Kracauer’s theoretical propositions as they are articulated in the text but also to 
contribute (as Serres suggests) something philosophically distinct alongside them. As 
with Serres, the cinematic for Kracauer does not represent (to use Sinnerbrink’s 
phrase) an “inferior form of knowing” when compared to science or philosophy but 
an alternative to their modes of reason.132 Though intellectually ambiguous, cinematic 
images are philosophically significant, argues Sinnerbrink, because they cast doubt on 
“the assumption that conceptual theorisation should be privileged” over other modes 
of human activity.133  Film’s significance in this regard, argues Sinnerbrink, “lies in 
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its capacity to vividly disclose forgotten or obliterated aspects of experience, making 
us receptive to difference and sensitive to possibility”. 134  
 
A key component of Murray Smith and Paisley Livingstone’s criticism of film-
philosophy involves the exclusivity of what Livingston refers to as “cinematic 
insight” and its subsequent incommensurability in relation to traditional modes of 
philosophy. 135 If the cinematic contribution to philosophy can be communicated by 
conventional literary means, argues Livingston, this negates any claims for its 
“significantly independent, innovative, and purely "filmic" philosophical 
achievement”. 136 On the other hand, suggests Livingston, if it cannot be 
“paraphrased” then “reasonable doubt arises with regard to its very existence”. 137 
 
Incommensurability, as Adorno notes in his essay on Kracauer, was the “central 
theme” of his friend’s work and, as demonstrated in this chapter, it was certainly a 
primary concern in Theory of Film. 138 It would be a mistake though to consider (as 
Adorno does) the ambiguous images that pervade Kracauer’s theory as philosophical 
rebuses (picture puzzles) that Kracauer (in the role of film-philosopher) has 
personally identified as being vehicles for “cinematic insight”. As such, Livingston’s 
criticism of these insights as expression of a wishful thinking on behalf of a medium 
whose philosophical significance is solely in the mind of the individual philosopher 
would be valid. However, as argued above in relation to Kafka’s wish image, their 
ambiguity relates not to a hidden meaning but to a continuous deferral of one. The 
cinematic approach identifies prompts, triggers for the initiation of alternative modes 
of reason, it does not attribute meaning to things. Film can and does contribute 
something that philosophy cannot and that is provide (to use Eliot’s phrase) an 
objective correlation between elements of our experience that have until its 
development evaded our attention by resisting philosophical inquiry that has in turn 
either ignored or disparaged their existence. In the forward to his 1964 book on 
compilation films, Films Beget Films, Jay Leyda writes: “Siegfried Kracauer once 
boasted to me that he specialized in all the subjects that were too common to have 
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invited anyone else’s analysis.”139 The cinematic approach therefore can be 
understood as relating to the commonplace rather than extraordinary. It is not a 
privileged “cinematic insight” that it provides but the democratization (to paraphrase 
Laruelle) of revelatory experience.140 
 
In the next chapter I will look in detail at how the fundamentally kinetic nature of the 
examples identified by the cinematic approach addresses the criticism of the 
subjectivity of film-philosophy and how Kracauer uses the private and public 
experience of film to suggest an alternate perspective on the relationship between film 
and its peculiar theory. 
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CHAPTER 9:   
 
THE CRITICAL EXPERIENCE OF CINEMATIC ANALOGIES 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
As previously discussed in Chapter 4, though philosophy can exhibit the same 
abstract properties as an artwork (for example: complexity, ingenuity, inventiveness, 
density, ambiguity and profundity), Murray Smith questions whether we should 
“value them in just the same way”.1 “Few criticisms”, argues Smith, “are more apt to 
strike terror into the heart of the philosopher than the assertion that such-and-such a 
proposition is "ambiguous," while in the art world the term is more likely to be used 
as a term of praise”. 2 As Wartenberg defends cinematic philosophy by suggesting that 
those cynical of its contribution often have a very limited idea of what constitutes a 
film, so can a similar criticism be levied at Smith’s understanding of what constitutes 
philosophy.3 In this chapter I will introduce the concept of the thought-image 
[Denkbild] as a form of critical theory that is reliant on ambiguity in its critique of 
Idealist philosophy. The thought-image, I argue, provides an alternative perspective 
for interpreting the evanescent cinematic motifs that recur in Kracauer’s Theory of 
Film.  
 
With reference to the work of Georg Simmel I will demonstrate the various critical 
functions that Kracauer’s illustrations and film references in Theory of Film fulfill. In 
particular I will focus on the kinetic nature of certain cinematic motifs that recur 
throughout the text and how Kracauer uses them to explore the relationship between 
the spectator’s physiological and intellectual response to film. These motifs, I 
conclude, are not ciphers for the decoding of the ambiguous elements of Kracauer’s 
theory – they are not keys to the films’ or the theory’s hidden meanings  - but prompts 
(invitations) to reconfigure the relationship between film and theory in a different 
way. 
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9.2 Cinematic Thought-Images 
 
The “Denkbild”, explains Gerhard Richter, “is a brief aphoristic prose text typically 
ranging in length between a few sentences and a couple of pages that both illuminates 
and explodes the conventional distinctions among literature, philosophy, journalistic 
intervention, and cultural critique”.4 Two important pioneers of the format were the 
philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche and the French poet, Charles Baudelaire. Their 
aphoristic prose styles and focus on the perplexing experience of urban life exerted a 
significant influence upon early twentieth century proponents of the thought-image 
such as Stefan George, Karl Krauss, Robert Musil and Berthold Brecht. Though 
disparate in manner and style, what the work of these writers had in common was a 
concern for the specificity of a quotidian object or the seemingly negligible 
phenomenon. However, in the context of philosophy, the most influential exponent of 
the thought-image was the German sociologist Georg Simmel. For Simmel and his 
students, the microscopic focus of thought-image proved an innovative way of 
deciphering the surface phenomena of modernity as the expressions of larger covert 
social processes. As discussed in Chapter 3, Kracauer, Bloch and Benjamin all studied 
under Simmel and it is through the influence of their work that the thought-image 
became the modus operandi for Adorno in the development of Critical Theory. 
Benjamin’s Einbahnstraße [One Way Street, 1928], Adorno’s Minima Moralia 
[1951], Bloch’s Spuren [Traces, 1930] and Kracauer’s numerous Feuilleton pieces 
from the 1930s (later collected in Straßen in Berlin und anderswo [Streets in Berlin 
and elsewhere, 1964] are all key texts in the development of the Denkbild.   
 
For the Frankfurt School and its associates, “Denkbilder”, argues Richter, “are neither 
programmatic treatises nor objective manifestations of a historical spirit, neither 
fanciful fiction nor mere reflections of reality”.5 Rather, suggests Richter: 
 
The philosophical miniatures of the Denkbild can be understood as 
the conceptual, hovering between philosophical critique and 
aesthetic production. The Denkbild encodes a poetic form of 
condensed, epigrammatic writing in textual snapshots, flashing up 
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as poignant meditations that typically fasten upon a seemingly 
peripheral detail or marginal topic, usually without a developed plot 
or a prescribed narrative agenda, yet charged with theoretical 
insight.6 
 
For Benjamin (who was the first amongst the Frankfurt group to use the term in the 
1920s) the Denkbild represented a reconfiguration of the relationship between the 
conceptual classifications of philosophy and the aesthetic categories of art. “Art”, 
Adorno writes in Aesthetic Theory, “requires philosophy, which interprets it in order 
to say what it is unable to say, whereas art is only able to say it by not saying it”.7 In 
other words, for Benjamin and Adorno, what a philosopher communicates cannot be 
considered independently of how they communicate it; both style and content are 
identical to meaning. The reason for this conflation of the aesthetic and philosophical, 
Adorno explains in his introduction to Benjamin’s One Way Street, is as a result of 
the perceived conceptual limitations of the philosophical idea: 
 
The pieces in One-Way Street […] are not images like the Platonic 
myths of the cave […] Rather they are scribbled picture-puzzles, 
parabolic evocations of something that cannot be said in words [des 
in Worten Unsagbaren]. They do not want to stop conceptual 
thought so much as to shock through their enigmatic form and 
thereby get thought moving, because thought in its traditional 
conceptual form seems rigid, conventional, and outmoded.8 
 
In contrast to Wittgenstein’s proposition “Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber 
muss man schweigen” [Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent], the 
Denkbild (in Benjamin and Adorno’s understanding of it) works to articulate through 
a specific literary image and its reception that which resists communication in 
conceptual terms.9 As its reception, its effect is essential to its meaning, the Denkbild, 
argues Richter, “cannot be paraphrased”. The “presentation of philosophy”, he 
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 242 
concludes, “is not an external matter of indifference to it but immanent to its idea”. 10  
As Adorno states in Negative Dialectics, in a section titled “Fragility of Truth”: 
 
Essentially […] philosophy is not expoundable. If it were, it would 
be superfluous; the fact that most of it can be expounded speaks 
against it.11 
 
“What prevents a Denkbild from being superfluous”, concludes Richter, “even when 
it addresses philosophical issues”: 
 
is its resistance to being fully translatable into philosophical truth-
claims or formal propositions. Indeed, its very resistance to such 
translation and paraphrase is part and parcel of what it signifies and 
of what it gives us to think philosophically.12 
 
Adorno’s idea of the aesthetically constructed thought-image as being not the 
receptacle for philosophical truth but a catalyst for an act of philosophical translation 
anticipates Sinnerbrink’s proposal for a mutually transformational relationship 
between film and philosophy. In this respect, Adorno’s Critical Theorist and 
Sinnerbrink’s “romantic” film-philosopher both assume the role of a  “translator” who 
mediates critically between different “media of thought: cinematic and philosophical, 
aesthetic and conceptual, poetic and political”. 13 Like Plato, Adorno’s negative 
intellectual assessment of representational art forms (such as photography) would 
exclude the cinematic from contributing to a notion of an aesthetically informed 
critical theory but could the same be said of Kracauer’s approach?14 Can the 
ambiguous images that recur in Theory of Film be understood philosophically as 
cinematic Denkbild?  
 
                                                
10 Richter, 2007, p. 19. 
11 Adorno, Theodor, Negative Dialectics, translated by E. B. Ashton (New York: Continuum, 1973), pp 
32 – 33. 
12 Richter, 2007, p. 19. 
13 Sinnerbrink, Robert, “Re-enfranchising Film: Towards a Romantic Film-Philosophy”, in Havi, Carel 
and Greg Tuck (eds.), New Takes in Film Philosophy (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 43. 
14 Adorno’s dismissal of film as a genuine art form is discussed in Hansen, Miriam. “Introduction to  
Adorno, ‘Transparencies on Film’ (1966), New German Critique, Nos. 24/25 (1981 - 1982), pp. 186-
198. 
 243 
In considering the Denkbild as a genre of philosophy, argues Richter, “one runs the 
risk of eliding the resistance that the Denkbild itself mounts against such taxonomic 
and classificatory impulses”.15 Therefore, the role of the reader identifying what 
qualifies as a thought-image is as much part of the philosophical process as the act of 
creating the text itself. For Richter, what connects the work of Adorno, Bloch, 
Benjamin and Kracauer is not a common philosophy but a belief “that any 
philosophical truth-content their writing may contain invariably is tied to, and 
mediated by, its specific and potentially unstable figures of presentation”.16 
Identifying what constitutes a thought-image in Kracauer’s work is therefore a matter 
of philosophical perspective. Richter (following Adorno) limits his analysis of 
Kracauer’ Denkbilder to his Weimar period, in particular his Feuilleton pieces from 
the Frankfurter Zeitung. Though Richter does not discuss Kracauer’s film pieces, he 
does not (in relation to the work of Simmel) reject film as an appropriate subject for a 
Denkbild.17 However, Adorno and Bloch do not match Richter’s accommodation of 
Simmel’s work in this respect. Both consider the ambivalence Simmel displays in 
relation to the social and political processes his work helps identify as demonstrating 
a fundamentally regressive ideological character.18 
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, what motivates Kracauer’s interest in film (what 
Schlüpmann identifies as his “love of the cinema”),19 Adorno argues, is also what 
stops his thought from becoming philosophy. 20  Kracauer’s work, he suggests, “is 
tinged with a kind of amateurish thinking on his feet, just as a certain slackness 
damped self-criticism in favor of a playful pleasure in felicitous insights”.21 The 
source of this attitude, Adorno argues was Simmel: 
 
Not only did Simmel train Kracauer's capacity to interpret specific 
objective phenomena in terms of the general structures that, 
according to this view, appeared in them; Kracauer was also 
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indebted to Simmel for a style of thought and presentation that 
connects one element to another with a gentle carefulness, even 
where the movement of thought could dispense with many such 
intermediate parts, where the tempo could become quicker: thinking 
with the pencil in hand. Later, during his activities as an editor, this 
moment of carefulness protected Kracauer from journalism. It was 
hard for him to get rid of the circuitousness that always had to find 
everything for itself, even what was familiar, as though it were 
freshly discovered.22 
  
Though Adorno adds that Simmel's influence on Kracauer “lay more in the gesture of 
his thought than in any affinity with the irrationalist philosophy of life”, the 
implication of this debt is clear. “Philosophy had not been Kracauer's major at the 
university”, states Adorno, “and the power of its great constructions […] remained 
alien to him”.23 For Adorno, Kracauer was an insightful writer, a novelist, a poet but 
not a philosopher; he could construct a thought-image but could not translate one into 
philosophy. It is this inability to complete the process that, for Adorno, made 
Kracauer erroneously identify the cinematic as a potentially charged with “theoretical 
insight”. 24  
 
In relation to the ambiguous images that recur in Kracauer’s Theory of Film I agree 
with Adorno on two counts. Firstly, I do not think that they constitute thought-images 
(in the way Adorno and Benjamin conceive them). Secondly, I concur with Adorno 
that it is Simmel’s influence that sets them apart. However, where I differ from 
Adorno is in arguing that “the circuitousness” of Kracauer’s approach, “that always 
had to find everything for itself, even what was familiar” is exactly what stops 
Kracauer’s cinematic approach from becoming a matter of subjective judgement; an 
act of exclusive philosophical connoisseurship. As I will demonstrate in the following 
text, the identification of Kracauer’s work as a meaningful constellation specific 
“thought-images” has distorted the kinetic nature of the cinematic images he refers to 
in Theory of Film. As Thomas Levin suggests, the “physiognomic essayistics” 
practiced by Kracauer whilst at the Frankfurter Zeitung, exercises a “minute decoding 
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of the surface phenomena of modernity as complex historical ciphers” in a fashion 
closer to Simmel’s Momentbilder than Benjamin’s Denkbilder.25 The contemporary 
“ubiquity” of Benjamin’s term in contemporary literary studies has, argues Levin (in 
conjunction with Adorno’s derisory interpretation of Momentbilder as an inferior 
inchoate form of the Denkbild) negated their differences.26 
 
As David Frisby explains, at the time of Simmel’s adoption of the term Momentbild 
(1900 – 1903) it was the word used to describe photographic snapshots. “It still 
retained”, writes Frisby, “the literal meaning of a fleeting or momentary image or 
picture”.27 What interested Simmel, suggests Frisby, was “not merely the fleeting 
image that the snapshot provides but also what can be seen as enduring about the 
image”.28  None of the social phenomena examined by Simmel, argues Kracauer (in 
his unpublished monograph on his former teacher), “live in historical time”: 
 
Rather, everything that is interwoven in the past and future he 
transposes into eternity, that is the sole form of existence in which it 
can exist as pure essentiality and can also be contemporary with us 
at any time.29 
 
Kracauer’s criticism of the peculiar temporality of Simmel’s approach bears a 
significant similarity with his later reproach of Adorno’s “infinite dialectics” (and 
Benjamin’s non-dialectic approach) as proceeding from a mistaken belief in the 
“unity of the historical period”. Adorno’s assumption, argues Kracauer, “alienated” 
him from all the “substances, intellectual or social” that “he pretends to penetrate and 
set moving”.30 Movement is the key to understanding Kracauer’s cinematic approach, 
it is, he states in Theory of Film, “the alpha and omega of the medium”.31 Whereas 
Simmel’s static snapshots transposed everything into the non-time of “eternity”, the 
                                                
25 Levin, Thomas Y., “Introduction” in Kracauer, Siegfried, The Mass Ornament. Weimar essays, 
translated and edited by Thomas Y. Levin (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard U.P., 1995b), p. 6. 
26 Kracauer, 1995b, p. 6. 
27 Frisby, David, Sociological Impressionism: a reassessment of Georg Simmel’s social theory (London 
and New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 102. 
28 Frisby, 1992, p. 102. 
29 Quoted in Frisby, 1992, p. 103. 
30 Quoted in Jay, Martin, Permanent Exiles. Essays on the Intellectual Migration from Germany to 
America (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985).p. 230.  
31 Kracauer, Siegfried, Theory of Film. The Redemption of Physical Reality [1960] (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1997), p. 158. 
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motion picture camera, argues Kracauer, can sustain the interwoven dynamic of the 
past and the future in its moving image. 
 
In the rest of this chapter I will argue that the kinetic nature of Kracauer’s cinematic 
images is crucial not in decoding (or translating) the philosophical meaning of Theory 
of Film’s animated Momentbilder but in comprehending their function as a 
democratized form of the thought-image. These evanescent images, like Benjamin’s 
abstruse Denkbild, are cogenerated by the interaction of the object and the subject; 
they are a product of what Kracauer refers to in Theory of Film as “psychophysical 
correspondences”.  
 
The term “psychophysical correspondences”, explains Kracauer, describes the “fluid 
interrelations between the physical world and the psychological dimension”.32 The 
cinematic shot, as a product of this correspondence, states Kracauer (quoting French 
philosopher Lucien Sève), “delimits without defining” and in doing so is unique 
amongst the arts by “offering not much more explanations than reality itself”.33  
The Denkbild can be understood as representing the critical moment of aesthetic 
(subjective) and philosophical (objective) correspondence frozen in perpetuity (less 
like a snapshot and more like in a fairy tale) so that its potential remains intact until it 
is later deciphered and translated by philosophy. In comparison, the cinematic 
Momentbild is a record of the dynamic processes that (to appropriate Adorno’s 
phrase) gets “thought moving” by means of induction. 34 To release its critical 
potential requires not a special philosophical sensibility but a film projector (or some 
other form of digital media player). 
 
Neither unique and cryptic like the literary thought-image nor expoundable and 
instrumental like its antithesis the thought experiment, the cinematic image exists 
somewhere between the two. In this state of being in-between it has the potential to 
meet the spectator psychologically and physiologically (psychophysically?) halfway 
and thus make the challenge of becoming an artist and/or philosopher a less 
extraordinary activity. If Adorno’s aesthetic theory interprets (his mentor) Arnold 
                                                
32 Kracauer, 1997, p. 69. 
33 Kracauer, 1997, p. 69. 
34 Quoted in Richter, 2007, p. 12. 
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Schoenberg’s dictum that, “if it is art, it is not for all, and if it is for all, it is not art” as 
a justification for the specialist roles of the philosopher and artist then Kracauer’s 
belief in popular film as “art with a difference” stems from a desire to collapse their 
social exclusivity and democratize their insights. 35 
 
In the following section I will examine how Kracauer articulates the significance of 
movement to the cinematic approach in Theory of Film. I will also demonstrate how 
consideration of the cinematic imagery that Kracauer describes in Theory of Film as 
Denkbilder codifies their content in relation to an existential interpretation of his 
work. 
 
9.3  The Unthinking Resonance Effect 
 
Kracauer concludes his preface to Theory of Film with a personal reminiscence. It 
describes a childhood memory of going to the cinema for the first time. The images 
on the screen, he explains, have since haunted him and like Proust’s trees these “un-
deciphered phantoms of the past” have held sway over the temporal topology that 
informs Theory of Film. “The impression it made upon me”, writes Kracauer,  “must 
have been intoxicating, for I there and then determined to commit my experience to 
writing”.36 “What thrilled me so deeply”, Kracauer explains: 
 
was an ordinary suburban street, filled with lights and shadows 
which transfigured it. Several trees stood about, and there was in the 
foreground a puddle reflecting invisible house facades and a piece 
of the sky. Then a breeze moved the shadows, and the facades with 
the sky below began to waver. The trembling upper world in the 
dirty puddle – this image has never left me.37 
 
What is significant here and what has been overlooked by recent scholarship is that 
what Kracauer is describing is a moving image. Its kinetic nature cannot be stressed 
enough. For example, there is nothing in Tara Forrest’s interpretation of this image as 
                                                
35 Schoenberg, Arnold, "New Music, Outmoded Music, Style and Idea" [1946], in Style and Idea 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 124. 
36 Kracauer, 1997, p. li. 
37 Kracauer, 1997, p. li. 
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a metaphor of its author’s “alienated mode of perception” that distinguishes it from a 
reading of a photographic still.38 As with Hansen, Schlüpmann and Koch, there is no 
attempt in Forrest’s work to comprehend the kinaesthetic effect of the moving image 
in Kracauer’s film theory. As the cryptic nature of the thought-image forces the reader 
to address how the presentation of philosophy is (to quote Richter) “not an external 
matter of indifference to it but immanent to its idea” so should the kinetic nature of 
Kracauer’s cinematic imagery be considered as immanent to his theory. 39  In negating 
movement from her analysis, Forrest does no more than confirm Adorno’s assertion 
that as reflections (perfect illustrations) of extent reality, photography affirms 
established conceptual frameworks rather than prompting the discovery of possible 
alternatives. Read erroneously as thought-images, Kracauer’s cinematic 
Momentbilder are rendered subservient to philosophy rather than allowed to act 
alongside it as (to paraphrase Sinnerbrink) a comparable rather than an “inferior form 
of knowing”.40   
 
Returning to the image of the “trembling upper world in the dirty puddle”, its 
interpretation as an ambiguous symbol or allegory attributes it a specific function in 
relation to philosophy. Distilling movement from the image and rendering it static 
allows a fixed meaning to be attributed to it. Key to this process in Forrest’s, Koch’s 
and Mülder-Bach’s work is the identification of Kracauer’s use of “extraterritoriality” 
in History with a form of existential displacement.41 As previously discussed in the 
context of Lukács’ and Bloch’s image of the bourgeois subject’s contemplation of 
nature as landscape (Chapter 5), ontological exclusivity requires a uniformly laminar 
temporality in order to demarcate it as an autonomous historical phenomena. Such 
distinct ontological delineation is irreconcilable with Kracauer’s turbulent and non-
homogenous conception of time (Chapter 7).  
 
                                                
38 Forrest, Tara, The Politics of Imagination: Benjamin, Kracauer, Kluge (Biefeld: Transcript Verlag. 
2007), p.106. The film that Kracauer refers to is unknown but an example of such a photograph is Ilse 
Bing’s Puddle, rue de Valois, Paris, 1932, a copy of which is in the V&A collection, London: 
http://www.vam.ac.uk/content/articles/i/ilse-bing-queen-of-the-leica/ [accessed 14/2/2013] 
39 Richter, 2007, p. 19. 
40 Sinnerbrink, 2011, p. 26. 
41 Kracauer, Siegfried, History. The Last Things Before the Last, completed after the death of the 
author by Paul Oskar Kristeller (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1995), p. 83. See also: Forrest, 
2007, p. 117 and Koch, Gertrud. "Not Yet Accepted Anywhere": Exile, Memory, and Image in 
Kracauer's Conception of History”, translated by Jeremy Gaines, New German Critique, No. 54 
(Autumn, 1991), p. 105. 
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Kracauer states the significance of movement to the cinematic approach in the section 
on the spectator in Theory of Film. “Different kinds of pictures call forth different 
reactions”, explains Kracauer: 
 
some address themselves directly to the intellect, some function 
merely as symbols or such. Let us assume that, unlike the other 
types of pictures, film images affect primarily the spectator's senses, 
engaging him physiologically before he is in a position to respond 
intellectually.42 
 
In order to support this assumption, Kracauer breaks his argument up into three parts. 
Firstly, suggests Kracauer, the “reality character” of film, the verisimilitude of the 
photographic representation of physical objects, provokes an automatic response to its 
images comparable to that caused by the objects themselves (“nature in the raw”).43 
This “appeal” to the spectator’s “sensitivity”, he concludes, urges them “through their 
sheer presence unthinkingly to assimilate their indeterminate and often amorphous 
patterns”.44 
 
Secondly, and most significantly for Kracauer, “film renders the world in motion”. 
“Take any film you can think of”, states Kracauer: 
 
by dint of its very nature it is a succession of ever-changing images 
which altogether give the impression of a flow, a constant 
movement. And there is of course no film that would not represent-
or, rather, feature-things moving. Movement is the alpha and omega 
of the medium. Now the sight of it seems to have a "resonance 
effect," provoking in the spectator such kinesthetic responses as 
muscular reflexes, motor impulses, or the like. In any case, 
objective movement acts as a physiological stimulus.45 
 
In contrast to its usual description as primarily a story telling medium, the effect of a 
film’s kinetic nature offers, for Kracauer, an insight into its appeal distinct from its 
                                                
42 Kracauer, 1997, p. 158. 
43 Kracauer, 1997, p. 158. 
44 Kracauer, 1997, p. 158. 
45 Kracauer, 1997, p. 158. My emphasis. 
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function as a narrative vehicle. “We cannot turn our eyes away from the film”, writes 
the French philosopher and psychologist Henri Wallon: 
 
whose images supersede each other not only because we would then 
drop the thread of the story and no longer understand what will 
follow but also because there is in the flow of the successive images 
a sort of attraction, a sort of inducement [induction] enjoining us, 
our attention, our senses, our vision, not to lose anything [of that 
flow].46 
 
Wallon’s observation demonstrates for Kracauer how film appeals to our “deep bodily 
layers” and that its “attractiveness” in this respect is automatic and compulsive.47 
Though Kracauer is reluctant to speculate on the reason for our automatic response to 
moving images, he does (with reference to the educational psychologist Friedrich 
Copei) suggest that the universality of the reaction probably indicates that it relates to 
our “biological heritage”. 48  
 
If the first two elements of Kracauer’s explication of film’s “impact on the senses” 
relates to the medium’s recording function then the third concerns its ability to reveal 
“hidden provinces” of physical reality.49 Due to the dynamic nature of these cinematic 
discoveries about “spatial and temporal configurations”, argues Kracauer, there is an 
“increased demand on the spectator’s physiological make-up”. “The unknown shapes 
he encounters”, concludes Kracauer (adopting a personal perspective): 
 
involve not so much his power of reasoning as his visceral faculties. 
Arousing his innate curiosity, they lure him into dimensions where 
sense impressions are all-important.50 
 
                                                
46 Quoted in Kracauer, 1997, p. 158 
47 Kracauer, 1997, p. 158. 
48 Kracauer, 1997, p. 158. For an introduction to contemporary research into the “biological heritage” 
of film’s kinesthetic appeal see, Gallese, Vittorio and Michele Guerra, “Embodying Movies: Embodied 
Simulation and Film Studies”, Cinema, No. 3(2012), pp. 183 – 210. 
49 Kracauer, 1997, p. 158. 
50 Kracauer, 1997, p. 159. 
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In the following section I will examine in detail some specific examples of these 
visceral cinematic images as they occur in Theory of Film and how Kracauer 
interprets them as communicating an aspect of the manifold nature of time. 
 
9.4 Pferdegalopp: The Motif of the Galloping Horses. 
 
Motion, for Kracauer “is the alpha and omega” of the film medium and is the source 
of a “resonance effect” in the cinema spectator. 51 For Kracauer, films that juxtapose 
moving images with motionless photographic elements demonstrate the potency of 
cinema’s peculiar kinaesthetic effect. For example, writes Kracauer, the Ukrainian 
film director, Alexander Dovzhenko:  
 
in both ARSENAL and EARTH frequently stops the action to 
resume it after a short lull. The first phase of this produces a shock 
effect, as if all of a sudden we found ourselves in a vacuum. The 
immediate consequence is that we acutely realize the significance of 
movement as an integral element of the external world as well as 
film.52 
 
Whereas Wartenberg’s Kantian reading of Warhol’s Empire attributes an instrumental 
rationale to film’s unique ability to depict “stasis”, for Kracauer such transcendental 
categorisation would render it subordinate to an extent philosophical system (which 
would in turn strip it of its historical novelty). As John Mullarkey suggests, rather 
than harnessing the transformative power of film (in relation to philosophy), the 
Structuralist approach to film making (as proposed by Wartenberg and Carroll) “aped 
the subtractive gestures of modernism in painting, literature and theatre, in the hope 
that this would somehow reveal the essence of cinema lying beneath”.53 However, 
argues Mullarkey, what lies beneath: 
 
                                                
51 Kracauer, Siegfried, “The Spectator”, in Robert Hughes (ed.), Film: Book 1. The Audience and the 
Filmmaker (New York: Grove Press, 1959), p. 4. 
52 Kracauer, 1997, p. 44. Alexander Dovzhenko (1894 – 1956). Arsenal or January Uprising in Kiev in 
1918 [Russian: Арсенал], directed by Alexander Dovzhenko  (USSR: VUFKU, 1928/9); Earth 
[Russian: Зeмля (Zemlya)], directed by Alexander Dovzhenko  (USSR: VUFKU, 1930) 
53 Mullarkey, John, Philosophy and the Moving Image: Refractions of Reality (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 
2009), p. xv. 
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is not a fixed essence but a shifting process. What film converges 
on, with its various inheritances from the other arts and its 
increasingly convoluted technology, is not a singular reality but 
diverging, plural realities.54 
 
In contrast to Wartenberg’s choice of experimental artist’s film or Sinnerbrink’s 
transcendental preference for the work of the auteur director, Kracauer cites the 
“genuine Western” as the sight for a potentially transformative philosophical activity. 
A “genuine” Western, explains Kracauer, is one that includes a pursuit or a race on 
horseback. Quoting Robert Flaherty, Kracauer writes, “people never get tired of 
seeing a horse galloping across the plains”.55 “Its gallop”, Kracauer suggests, “seems 
still to gain momentum by contrast with the immense tranquility of the faraway 
horizon” [Figure 18]. 56  
 
 
Figure 18. A “genuine” western. The Iron Horse (1924) 
 
From its earliest stages, the image of the galloping horse operated as an important 
phenomenological axiom in Theory of Film. The draft table of contents Kracauer 
wrote in Marseilles on the 19th November 1940 (included as an illustration to 
                                                
54 Mullarkey, 2009, p. xv. 
55 Kracauer, 1997, p. 42. 
56 Kracauer, 1997, p. 42. Kracauer review of John Ford’s “The Iron Horse” appeared in the Frankfurter 
Zeitung Jg. 70 (10th March 1926), p. 4, see Levin, Thomas Y., Siegfried Kracauer: Eine Bibliographie 
seiner Schriften (Marbach am Neckar: Deutsche Schillergesellschaft, 1989), p. 151. 
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Hansen’s 1997 introduction to Theory of Film) illustrates this. 57 Here, Kracauer gives 
the title Pferdegalopp [Horses Galloping] to both the introduction and conclusion of 
his proposed book on film. 58  Hansen credibly identifies its inclusion as the initial 
chapter heading for the first section of the manuscript as demarcating the historical 
starting point of a brief discursive history of cinema technology and technique 
(ending with Griffith), possibly using Benjamin’s Little History of Photography as a 
model. 59 Following what was by 1941 already a convention in the writing of film 
history, the horse Hansen assumes Kracauer intends to start his study with is the one 
photographed by Eadweard Muybridge in 1878 [Figure 19].60 Though drafts of what 
was to eventually become Theory of Film do contain references to various early and 
proto-forms of Lumiére’s cinematograph, in the final published version Kracauer 
allocates relatively little space to Muybridge’s “instantaneous photography” and no 
reference is made to his galloping horse. 61 Though omitted as a title in Theory of 
Film, the image of the Pferdegalopp remains however a significant motif in the final 
version of the text. 
  
 
Figure 19. “Sallie Gardner”, Eadweard Muybridge (1878)  
                                                
57 Kracauer, 1997, p. xvi 
58 Hansen, Miriam, “Introduction” in Kracauer, 1997, p. xiv.  
59 Hansen, 1997, p. xvii. Benjamin’s ‘Kleine Geschichte der Photographie’ [Little History of 
Photography] essay was published in Die literarische Welt in 1931, see Walter Benjamin, Selected 
Writings Volume 2: 1927 – 1934, edited by Michael W.  Jennings, Howard Eiland, and Gary Smith, 
translated by Rodney Livingstone, et al. (Cambridge, Mass. and London: The Belknap Press, 1999), 
pp. 507 – 530. 
60 Sallie Gardner at a Gallop or The Horse in Motion, photographed by Eadweard Muybridge (USA: 
Leland Stanford, 1877). Early examples of film history that start with Muybridge are: Hampton, 
Benjamin B., A History of the Movies (New York: Covivi Friede, 1931) and Ramsaye, Terry, A Million 
and One Nights: A History of the Motion Picture Through 1925 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1926). 
61 Kracauer, 1997, p. 27. 
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The question of why it persists as a motif throughout the versions of Theory of Film is 
perhaps best answered by looking at how Kracauer uses another equine example to 
differentiate between a physiognomic and intellectual reaction to cinematic images 
and the significance of that distinction. The example this time is from Fred Niblo’s 
1925 version of Ben Hur [Figure 20]. In the chariot race episode of the film, 
Kracauer describes how the “manes of the galloping horses” appear as “flying threads 
or streamers rather than manes”. 62  
 
 
Figure 20. The “manes of the galloping horses”, Ben Hur (1925) 
 
For Kracauer, these moving images, through their cinematic transmogrification into 
“indeterminate and often amorphous patterns”, attain significance beyond that given 
to them by the film’s narrative.63 “Evanescent, like dream elements,” Kracauer writes, 
“such impressions may haunt the moviegoer long after the story they are called upon 
to implement has sunk into oblivion”.64 This haunting quality, Kracauer explains, is 
indicative of these sequences resistance to interpretation; they stay with us as mental 
phenomena because they cannot be fully rationalised (or categorised – to use a 
Kantian notion) and so remain philosophically unresolved (an active). Therefore, in 
                                                
62 Kracauer, 1997, p. 52. Ben-Hur: A Tale of the Christ, directed by Fred Niblo (USA: Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer, 1925). Kracauer reviewed the film for the Frankfurter Zeitung on the 23rd October 
1926, see Kracauer, Siegfried, Kino: Essays, Studien, Glossen zum Film, edited by Karsten Witte 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1974), pp.  163 – 165. 
63 Kracauer, 1997, p. 158. 
64 Kracauer, 1997, p. 52. 
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order to comprehend the critical function that Kracauer attributes to them in Theory of 
Film it is perhaps better to start by looking at what function they do not provide in 
relation to the cinematic approach. 
 
For instance, the image of the horses’ tangled manes can be interpreted as a visual 
representation of Kracauer’s (and Serres’) idea of the turbulent temporal continuum. 
This symbolic interpretation of the recurring imagery in Theory of Film is given 
further credence when the printed illustrations that Kracauer includes are also 
considered. For example, Kracauer’s notion of history as an intermittent and non-
laminar complex of heterogeneous narratives appears to be perfectly illustrated by 
Kracauer’s choice of a still from the British propaganda film Desert Victory (1943) 
[Figure 21].65 The visual similarity between the “fiery traces of the projectiles that 
tear the night” and the drawings Laurence Sterne includes to illustrate the tortuous 
timelines of the various narratives in his novel Tristram Shandy (1759 – 1767) 
[Figure 22] are indeed remarkable.66  Though Sterne’s work (alongside Proust’s) 
provides an important literary reference point in Kracauer’s History, identifying the 
examples as they appear in the text with those that appear as still photographs in the 
book robs the former of their kinetic nature and in turn their philosophically 
transformative potential.67  This does not mean that the images Kracauer includes in 
his book do not perform among other tasks a simple illustrative function. However, 
regarding them all solely as illustrations of Kracauer’s film theory diminishes film’s 
significance as active agent in (to use Mullarkey’s term) the co-generation of 
Kracauer’s cinematic approach to philosophy.68 As Sinnerbrink suggests, when 
considered as incidences of peculiar aesthetic disclosure (peculiar as in belonging to 
the medium of film) these elements become examples of when film is “allowed to 
show rather than tell; to reveal rather than be reduced”.69 In other words, the recurring 
cinematic motifs of Theory of Film (such as the horses) should be understood not just 
as manifestations of the “thinking dialogue” maintained by Kracauer between his 
philosophy of time and his experience of film but as evidence of the importance he 
                                                
65 Desert Victory, directed by David MacDonald (UK: Office of War Information, 1943) 
66 Kracauer, 1997, p. 52.  
67 Kracauer was a keen reader of Sterne’s work, see Kracauer, 1995, p. 189. 
68 See Chapter 4.5 
69 Sinnerbrink (2011), p. 40. 
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assigned to the kinetic nature of the cinematic as the source of philosophy’s and 
aesthetics mutually “transformative engagement” in film. 70  
 
 
Figure 21. Images of the North African campaign, Desert Victory (1943) 
 
 
Figure 22. The tortuous course of Sterne’s narrative, Tristram Shandy (1759 – 1767) 
 
                                                
70 Sinnerbrink (2011), p. 36. 
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In the following section I will analyse how Kracauer uses the audio-visual rhythms of 
dance films to articulate, explore and render communicable the nature of this 
“transformative engagement” as a felt experience and in turn how Kracauer envisaged 
their critical function in relation to Simmel’s Momentbilder. 
 
9.5   Identifying Cinematic Analogies 
 
“Perhaps the most loveable side of Kracauer”, writes Pauline Kael: 
 
is his desperate attempt to make musicals, which he obviously 
adores, fit his notion of cinema as nature in the raw. A man who 
likes Fred Astaire can’t be all pedant. How touching he becomes 
when he tries to explain that it is Astaire’s dancing “over tables and 
gravel paths into the everyday world […] from the footlights to the 
heart of camera-reality” that makes him acceptable. He’s like a man 
trying to sneak his dear – but naughty – friends into heaven. 71 
 
Kracauer’s enthusiasm for song and dance numbers may appear relatively odd to 
those with an image of him either as an austere German casuist or as an existentially 
exiled philosopher. However, when considered in relation to Theory of Film’s 
explication of non-synchronous nature of temporal events these musical interventions 
can be seen as performing a specific and important critical function.  
  
Astaire’s dance routines, though contained within the chronology of the film 
narrative, operate according to their own temporal criteria; one derived from the 
rhythm of the music not the story. In a temporal sense the dances act extraterritorially, 
but this does not mean that they are removed from their physical context. “Astaire’s 
consummate dancing”, writes Kracauer, “is meant to belong among the real-life 
events with which he toys in his musicals; and it is so organized that it imperceptibly 
emerges from, and disappears, in the flow of these happenings” [Figure 23].72 This 
                                                
71 Kael, Pauline, ‘“Is There a Cure for Film Criticism?' Or, Some Unhappy Thoughts on Siegfried 
Kracauer’s Theory of Film: The Redemption of Physical Reality’, in I Lost it at The Movies (Boston: 
Atlantic Monthly Press, 1965), p. 277. 
72 Kracauer, 1997, p. 213. In Theory of Film Kracauer references two Astaire films: Top Hat, directed 
by Mark Sandrich (USA: RKO Radio Pictures, 1935) and Swing Time, directed by George Stevens 
(USA: RKO Radio Pictures, 1936) see Kracauer, 1997, p. 318, n. 5. 
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antinomic movement “away from the story and again back to it” that “materializes in 
the very form of the musical,” is analogous to the dialectic of spectatorship itself, with 
the alienating effect of the photographic reproduction intertwining with its visceral 
appeal of the moving image.73 As Kracauer explains: 
 
No sooner does the real-life intrigue of a musical achieve a certain 
degree of consistency than it is discontinued for the sake of a 
production number which often has already been delineated at a 
prenatal stage, thereby corroding the intrigue from within. Musicals 
reflect the dialectic relation between the story film and the non-
story film without ever trying to resolve it. This gives them an air of 
cinema. Penelope fashion, they eternally dissolve the plot they are 
weaving. The songs and dances they sport form part of the intrigue 
and at the same time enhance with their glitter its decomposition.74  
 
For Kracauer, the “glitter” of the dance routines, their immediate appeal as animated 
conglomerations of audio and visual stimuli is as significant as any information 
gleaned by analysis of their narrative content. As with Adorno’s explication of the 
Denkbild, the kinetic nature of their aesthetic form is immanent and not extraneous to 
their philosophical function.  
 
 
Figure 23. Fred Astaire toying with real life. Top Hat (1935) 
                                                
73 Kracauer, 1997, p. 213. 
74 Kracauer, 1997, p. 213. The reference to Homer’s Penelope echoes that of Benjamin’s in his Proust 
essay, see Benjamin, 1999, p.238. 
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The appeal of Astaire’s dance routine is not discrete from its function as an analogy 
with temporal continuum; it is, for Kracauer, partially appealing because of this 
correspondence. The analogy has, for Kracauer, a very specific intellectual character 
and an equally distinct critical function in relation to thought. As Kracauer explains in 
his essay on Simmel, the analogy “brings together two phenomena that in some way 
manifest the same behavior”, in contrast the metaphor “tries, by means of an image, to 
give sensuous expression to the meaning that a certain phenomenon has for us”.75 In 
contrast, an analogy, Kracauer explains: 
 
never refers to that specific being of a thing (its value, its makeup) 
which is available only through experience. […] The value of an 
analogy depends exclusively on its objective validity, since the only 
processes it compares are those that really operate according to one 
and the same schema. When you have an authentic analogy, the 
parallelism of events that it claims must actually exist. Their 
synonymy is free of all subjective arbitrariness; we discover it, but 
we do not constitute it. 76 
 
For Kracauer, the metaphor attributes a meaning to an object or situation, whilst an 
analogy offers no such judgment. Subsequently, the processes compared in an 
analogy have parity of status, whereas in a metaphor one component is always 
subordinate to the essence of the other. “What takes on form in the metaphor”, 
explains Kracauer, “is precisely the incomparability of an object, its internal 
makeup”. Analogy, Kracauer concludes: 
 
is either true or false, whereas metaphor is either beautiful or ugly. 
In other words, no matter how ingenious and surprising the analogy 
may be, it stands and falls with its factual verification. We 
recognize if, it is a feature of the phenomena themselves. The 
metaphor, however, is a creation of fantasy, of the imaginative 
power of the psyche; we evaluate it aesthetically and furthermore 
require that it be striking and illuminating—that it render visible, in 
a complete and unadulterated way, everything we have projected 
                                                
75 Kracauer, 1995b, p. 235. 
76 Kracauer, 1995b, p. 236. My emphasis. 
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intellectually or emotionally onto the object. It is not a type of 
knowledge like the analogy, but is rather a receptacle for our 
thoughts about things, an expression of our interior, a mirroring of 
the self in the world of appearances. The analogy: a relationship 
between objects. The metaphor: a representation of the relationships 
between subject and object.77 
 
For Kracauer, the significance of drawing comparisons between cinematic 
phenomenon and the material and temporal processes that delimit our physical 
existence has a philosophical function that goes beyond merely enriching our literary 
activity. Using Simmel’s work as an example, Kracauer argues that, what is “at stake 
for the thinker” in this process of recognising the analogous, “is the liberation of the 
thing from its isolation”. 78  “[S]hallow, everyday understanding obliterates all fluid 
transitions between phenomena”, states Kracauer, it “rips apart the texture of 
appearance, and incarcerates its henceforth isolated parts, each on its own within a 
concept”. 79 “In their rigid conceptual housings”, Kracauer argues: 
 
things become univocal; only one of their facets is ever facing us, 
and we grasp them in whatever way they are useful to us. No 
wonder they are lying about next to each other, unreconciled! Their 
commonalities fade, and of their many meanings only the one that 
indicates their intended use has survived. 80 
 
Subsequent to their liberation from such an unreconciled state, Kracauer explains, 
things can once again be woven “into an extensive net of relations” and “our 
consciousness of the world's manifold” can in some part be restored. 81 “The more 
reality opens itself up to man”, Kracauer concludes: 
 
the more foreign to him the average world with its distorted 
conceptual petrifications becomes. He recognizes that a boundless 
plenitude of qualities inhabits each phenomenon, and that each is 
                                                
77 Kracauer, 1995b, p. 236. 
78 Kracauer, 1995b, p. 235. 
79 Kracauer, 1995b, p. 234. 
80 Kracauer, 1995b, p. 234. 
81 Kracauer, 1995b, p. 235. 
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subject to widely differing laws. But the more he becomes aware of 
the many-sidedness of things, the more it becomes possible for him 
to relate them to each other:- Among the many determinations of 
some phenomenon that are unveiled to him, one of them can also be 
attributed to another phenomenon: everywhere he looks, relations 
between phenomena impose themselves upon him.82 
 
What distinguishes Kracauer’s explication of the philosophical function of the 
analogy in his 1920 / 21 monograph on Simmel and the film’s revealing function as it 
is presented in Theory of Film is the subjective role of the philosopher in the process 
of liberating the object from the conceptual framework that currently defines it. As 
discussed in the previous chapter, Kracauer in Theory of Film presents agency in the 
cinematic approach as being coproduced by the philosophical subject and the film 
camera. The ersatz objectivity of the Enlightenment subject is replaced by the 
mechanical objectivity of the cinematic apparatus. What this shift enables the 
cinematic approach to do is to open the singular philosophical perspective of the 
philosopher into one substantially more pluralistic. The consciousness of the world's 
manifold itself become manifold, (like Rancière’s emancipated community) a non-
localized process. The objective nature of film’s rendering strange of our material 
environment (as discussed in chapter 5) lends its liberated objects (liberated by their 
absolute commodification as image) a commonality that therefore allows them (as 
Agamben argues) to appear “for the first time perfectly communicable”.83 For 
Kracauer, cinematic analogies by their kinetic nature do not just impose themselves 
more emphatically upon an already receptive consciousness they also go someway 
(through the dynamic process of their reception) in inducing in the spectator the 
conditions for that consciousness to manifest. “Film is a dream”, Kracauer states in 
his essay “The Spectator”, “which makes (one) dream.”84   
 
“In many an otherwise insignificant story film”, writes Kracauer in Theory of Film, 
“the continuity is suddenly disrupted, and for a short moment it is as if all clocks 
ceased to tick; summoned by a big close-up or a shot of heterogeneous fragments, 
                                                
82 Kracauer, 1995b, p. 234. 
83 Agamben, Giorgio, The Coming Community, translated by Michael Hardt (Minneapolis and London: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2007), p. 47. 
84 Kracauer, 1959, p. 10.   
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strange shapes shine forth from the abyss of timelessness”.85 This shining forth is 
because, as Ronald Gray suggests (in relation to Kafka’s image of the Red Indian 
discussed in the previous chapter), we experience them as a “felt reality” whose 
character is comparable to that of phenomena we experience outside of the cinema.86 
“[S]truck by the reality character” of these images, states Kracauer, “the spectator 
cannot help reacting to them as he would to the material aspects of nature in the 
raw”.87 However, as with Griffith’s extra-narrative excursions, the cinematic nature of 
these images is relative to their narrative context, their “reality character” exists only 
in relation to their specific film context. The cinematic can therefore be considered as 
an epiphenomenon peculiar to the processes of film production and reception. 
Therefore, the cinematic is not an attribute of a transposable component of a film but 
occurs as part of the process where the two antinomic elements (the narrative and 
visually peculiar – what Kracauer refers to as “deviant images”) co-exist as a 
complementarity.88 This is why, for Kracauer, the cinematic resides in a genuine 
Western that includes a horse chase and not in an experimental film that comprises of 
just such sequences assembled together.  In Theory of Film, Kracauer discusses this 
relative nature of the “reality character” of the cinematic in relation to Roger Tilton’s 
1954 documentary film, Jazz Dance [Figure 24].89 
 
 
Figure 24. The Dancer’s Frenzy, Jazz Dance (1954) 
                                                
85 Kracauer, 1997, p. 235. 
86 Gray, Ronald D. Franz Kafka (London & New York: Cambridge University Press. 1973), p. 53. 
87 Kracauer, 1997, p. 158. 
88 Kracauer, 1997, p. 49. 
89 Jazz Dance, directed by Roger Tilton (USA: Tilton, 1954). 
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For Kracauer, the “deviant images” presented to the spectator by film, such as the 
weird organisms that were once Mae Marsh’s hands, occupy “a reality of another 
dimension” that he calls “contrived reality”.90 “Contrived reality pictures”, explains 
Kracauer, are more often than not “ambiguous” and as such “they may or may not 
bear on physical reality as commonly perceived”.91 This is not to say, he argues, that 
they have no “relation to physical existence proper”. “If they form part of an 
otherwise realistic film”, states Kracauer, “they are likely to affect us as an outgrowth 
of the same realism, which animates the rest of the picture; they will be conceived, 
that is, as disclosures of hidden aspects of the world about us”.92 In Tilton’s Jazz 
Dance, Kracauer writes, there are certain shots: 
 
which, taken out of the context, would hardly resemble any known 
real-life objects, initiate us into the secrets of a material universe set 
afire by the dancers' frenzy. If, on the other hand, pictures 
constituting reality of another dimension are used as elements of 
creative compositions unconcerned about physical reality, they lose 
their reality character and often impress one as freely invented 
shapes. Many an experimental film plays upon the ambiguity of 
these deviant pictures by transforming them, before our eyes, from 
representations of reality into patterns completely disengaged from 
the latter.93 
 
Alongside the big close-up, writes Kracauer, significant contributors to the production 
of film’s “deviant images” are the “correlated techniques” of accelerated and slow 
motion. For example, Kracauer suggests: 
 
Pictures of stalks piercing the soil in the process of growing open up 
imaginary areas; and racing legs shown in slow-motion do not just 
                                                
90 Kracauer, 1997, p. 49. 
91 Kracauer, 1997, p. 49. 
92 Kracauer, 1997, p. 49. 
93 Kracauer, 1997, p. 49. 
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slow down but change in appearance and perform bizarre evolutions 
– patterns remote from reality as we know it.94 
 
“As contrived-reality pictures”, concludes Kracauer, “the deviant images gained by 
both techniques [slow and accelerated motion], may well figure in non-realistic 
experimental films [but] they live up to the cinematic approach only if they are made 
to fulfil a revealing function within contexts focusing on physical existence”.95 
“Referring to waves in slow-motion and clouds in accelerated motion”; concludes 
Kracauer, the filmmaker Jean Epstein “declared that for all their ‘startling physics and 
strange mechanics’ they ‘are but a portrait – seen in a certain perspective – of the 
world in which we live’”.96 This is why the “racing legs” of Muybridge’s horse, 
though contributing to the development of cinema, are themselves not cinematic as 
they are without context and so inhabit a realm too far “from reality as we know it”.  
 
“Like science”, Kracauer concludes, film “breaks down material phenomena into tiny 
particles, thereby sensitizing us to the tremendous energies accumulated in the 
microscopic configurations of matter. These analogies may well be related to the 
nature of film”.97 With reference to the “Filmology” approach to cinema espoused by 
Gilbert Cohen-Séat, Kracauer defines the experimental nature of the film – science 
analogy as follows: 
 
Science postulates principles bearing on the nature of the universe 
or some dimension of it, deduces their implications, and tries to 
verify them by experiment and observation. The physical universe 
being indefinable, this is an endless process, involving ever-new 
hypotheses, ever-new verifications. Facts emerge which do not 
conform to the original propositions; consequently, more fitting 
propositions must be evolved and again tested, and so on. It is a 
                                                
94 Kracauer, 1997, p. 53.  The idea of the close up as spatio-temporal rupture is examined in the context 
of the work of Béla Balázs and Gilles Deleuze in Doane, Mary Ann, ‘The Close-Up: Scale and Detail 
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95 Kracauer, 1997, p. 53. 
96 Kracauer, 1997, p. 53. Although Kracauer does not give any examples of this revealing function in 
this section about slow motion, two examples do spring to mind from films Kracauer references 
elsewhere in the text: the dormitory scene in Vigo’s Zéro de Conduite (1933) and the dream sequence 
in The Forgotten Ones / The Young and the Damned [Spanish: Los Olvidados], directed by Luis 
Buñuel (Mexico: Ultramar Films, 1950). 
97 Kracauer, 1997, p. 50. 
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process, which can also be, described as a continuous to-and-fro 
movement between the hypothesized qualities of complex entities 
and the observed qualities of their elements (which partly elude 
direct observation, though). The similarity between this movement 
and the editing sequence long shot  - close shot - long shot, etc., 
consists precisely in their common aspiration to comprehend, each 
in its way, large ensembles and eventually nature itself. 98 
 
In contrast to the abstruse Denkbild, Kracauer’s concern for the “reality character” of 
the film indicates that he considers communicability as an essential attribute of the 
cinematic approach. This is not to say that Kracauer, as Kael complains, is asserting 
that only realistic films – films that adopt a supposedly objective and non-stylised 
naturalism – are cinematic.99 Though Kracauer displays a preference for the work of 
directors associated with Italian Neo-Realism (Rossellini, De Sica, Fellini etc.) he 
does so, not because he shares their ideological convictions (which he dismisses in 
Theory of Film),100 but because these filmmakers’ initial inquisitiveness regarding the 
material environment manifests itself in the film’s open narrative structure and their 
penchant for visual ambiguity.  
 
The model for such an approach, argues Kracauer is Griffith, whose influence in the 
development of the long shot - close shot - long shot editing technique helped extend 
photography’s innate capacity to reveal hidden material relations into a temporal 
context. This is why, no matter how stylised a film sets out to be, whether a 
Hollywood musical or an Eisenstein historical epic, for Kracauer, if it uses a camera 
and / or employs a style of editing related to that established by Griffith’s “admirable 
non-solution” it contains within it the potential to exercise the medium’s peculiar 
revealing function. As Kracauer states in Theory of Film:  
 
                                                
98 Kracauer, 1997, p. 52. 
99 Kael, 1965, pp. 291 – 292.  
100 Kracauer, 1997, pp. 309 – 310. For an introduction to the ideology of Italian Neorealism see, Shiel, 
Mark, Italian Neorealism: Rebuilding the Cinematic City (New York: Columbia University Press, 
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Many a commercial film or television production is a genuine 
achievement besides being a commodity. Germs of new beginnings 
may develop within a thoroughly alienated environment.101 
 
However, appreciating occurrences of film’s insight into the material and temporal 
complex of physical reality has, unlike science’s experimental method, a problem 
when it comes to replication of results. As Livingston argues: “proponents of a bold 
epistemic thesis have to fall back on appeals to an indescribable cinematic je ne sais 
quoi that they believe they have experienced, in the hope that others may have a 
similar experience and come to agree that philosophical insight or understanding has 
been manifested in a film”.102 
 
As science is the result of application of the scientific method, so Kracauer’s notion of 
the cinematic should be understood not as a quality immanent to the individual image, 
shot, or narrative but as that which results from the practice of the cinematic 
approach. Admittedly, as demonstrated in Chapter 2, the philosophical circularity of 
such an intellectual activity can be interpreted as entirely subjective and intentionally 
obfuscatory (Kael, Andrew and Perkins). However, as argued in this chapter, the 
kinetic nature of the cinematic images identified by Kracauer suggests that their 
capacity to generate novel analogous relationships (the fostering of which is the 
function of the cinematic approach) is experienced (in part) intuitively - as a common 
“felt reality” – not solely as the product of individual judgement or quasi-rational 
deduction.  
 
Like Serres’, Kracauer’s cinematic approach can therefore be comprehended as one 
which (in contrast to Enlightenment Idealism) considers reason as having an 
emotional component which in turn is fundamentally related to an individual’s 
subjective physiological experience (as opposed to a Hegelian notion of a trans-
historical objective spirit).103 As the neuroscientist Antonio Damasio has recently 
argued, emotion is not “the evil twin of reason”, but is rather “a very natural and 
inextricable component of the nature of being rational, for better and for worse”. “It is 
                                                
101 Kracauer, 1997, pp. 217 – 218. 
102 Livingston, Paisley, “Theses on Cinema as Philosophy, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 
Vol. 64, No. 1 (Winter, 2006), p. 13. 
103 See Chapter 8.6 
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not the case”, he concludes, “that we should reason with emotion alone but rather that 
we cannot reason without it.”104  
 
Though the cinematic approach is indisputably reliant on the immediate experience of 
the individual, Livingston’s criticism of film-philosophy’s fundamentally 
idiosyncratic nature is however inapplicable in relation to Kracauer’s consideration of 
the medium’s peculiar revealing function.  If, as argued above, the revealing function 
of film is identical to that of the analogy (as espoused by Kracauer in his Simmel text) 
then though it has been discovered partially by means peculiar to the individual (the 
cinematic approach) what is revealed (the “parallelism of events that it claims”) is 
“either true or false”.105 “No matter how ingenious and surprising the analogy may 
be”, Kracauer states, “it stands and falls with its factual verification”.106 We 
“discover” an analogy, claims Kracauer, “we do not constitute it”. 107 For Kracauer, 
the marvels that film discovers in everyday life are not exclusive rewards for having 
faith in an individual philosophical position (or its technological mediation) but the 
knowledge of the many-sidedness of things or (to use Mullarkey’s phrase) that there 
“is not a singular reality but diverging, plural realities”. 108 
 
Though the significance Kracauer places on the intuitive component of the cinematic 
approach has in the past been erroneously identified as being analogous to mystic 
divination, Kracauer is careful in Theory of Film to distinguish the medium’s 
revealing function from the extraordinary experience of theological insight. Instead, 
as I shall demonstrate in the following section, Kracauer exhibits the pluralist 
intentions of the cinematic approach by identifying it exclusively with the habitual 
and commonplace.109 
 
 
                                                
104 Damasio, Antonio, ‘Emotion and reason in the future of human life’, in Mind, brain and the 
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9.6 Rehabilitating Everyday Vision 
 
Photography’s “unique capacity”, writes Kracauer, quoting Lewis Mumford’s 
Technics and Civilization (1934), is its ability to depict the “complicated, inter-related 
aspects of our modern environment”, and “where photography ends, film, much more 
inclusively, takes over”.110 “Without any conscious notion of its destination”, writes 
Mumford, “the motion picture presets us with a world of interpenetrating, 
counterinfluenceing organisms: and it enables us to think about that world with a 
greater degree of concreteness”.111 “This is not all”, adds Kracauer: 
 
In recording and exploring physical reality film exposes to view a 
world never seen before, a world as elusive as Poe’s purloined 
letter, which cannot be found because it is within everybody’s 
reach. What is meant here is of course not any of those extensions 
of the everyday world which are being annexed by science but our 
ordinary physical environment itself. Strange as it may seem, 
although streets, faces, railway stains, etc., lie before our eyes, they 
have remained largely invisible so far. Why is this so?112 
 
“For one thing”, Kracauer argues, “it should be remembered that physical nature has 
been persistently veiled by ideologies relating its manifestations to some total aspect 
of the universe”.113 However, in the contemporary context, admits Kracauer, this 
theological explanation of our failure to notice the world around us is no longer 
convincing. Today, Kracauer suggests: 
 
The truly decisive reason for the elusiveness of physical reality is 
the habit of abstract thinking we have acquired under the reign of 
science and technology. No sooner do we emancipate ourselves 
from the ‘ancient beliefs’ than we are led to eliminate the qualities 
of things. So things continue to recede. And, assuredly, they are all 
the more elusive since we usually cannot help setting them in the 
                                                
110 Kracauer, 1997, pp. 298 - 299. Lewis Mumford (1895 – 1990), American historian and philosopher. 
111 Mumford, Lewis, Technics and Civilization (Harcourt, Brace & Company: New York, 1934), p. 
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perspective of conventional views and purposes which point beyond 
their self-contained being.  
 
“Just as consciousness finds itself confronting the unabashedly displayed mechanics 
of industrial society”, writes Kracauer in Photography, “it also faces, thanks to 
photographic technology, the reflection of the reality that has slipped away from 
it.”114 For Kracauer, technology presents us (Europeans / Americans) with a reality 
that we are as yet unable to fully comprehend so we shape it to fit what we already 
know.115 As Kracauer notes in his 1925 essay, Die Reise und der Tanz [Travel and 
Dance]:  
 
We are like conquistadors who have not yet had a quiet moment to 
reflect on the meaning of their acquisition. Technology has taken us 
by surprise, and the regions that it has opened up are still glaringly 
empty.116 
 
In Art and Illusion, published in the same year as Theory of Film, E.H. Gombrich 
writes: 
The current idea that we look lazily into the world only as far as our 
practical needs demand it while the artist removes this veil of habits 
scarcely does justice to the marvels of everyday vision.117 
 
Doing justice to everyday vision (what Kracauer describes in History as rehabilitating 
“objectives and modes of being which still lack a name and hence are overlooked or 
misjudged”) is the common thread that connects all the work in his disparate oeuvre. 
The fundamental role of film in this project, Kracauer explains in the preface of 
Theory of Film, is borne out by the title of his earliest literary project, “Film as the 
Discoverer of the Marvels of Everyday Life”. 118 In the epilogue of Theory of Film, 
under the heading of  “Moments of everyday life”, Kracauer ventures to give some 
                                                
114 Kracauer, 1995b, p. 62. 
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examples of, what he deems in The Salaried Masses, “the exoticism of a 
commonplace existence”.119 This “dimension”, Kracauer writes, “is made up of 
moments within everybody’s reach, moments as common as birth and death, or a 
smile, or ‘the ripple of the leaves stirred by the wind.’”120 
 
Along with the image of the galloping horses, the image of “the trembling leaves” is 
one that recurs time and again in Theory of Film and like its animal equivalent relates 
to the oldest layers of Kracauer’s project.121 Excluding mentions of their literary 
counterpart (Proust’s trees), the cinematic image of the leaves is initially introduced to 
the reader as a quotation from Henry Cook’s and Gaetano Bonelli’s description of 
their “Photobioscope”(1867) and its effect on established forms of “photographic art”. 
“We will see […] landscapes”, they announced, “in which the trees bow to the whims 
of the wind, the leaves ripple and glitter in the rays of the sun”.122 However, like the 
galloping horse in Muybridge’s zoopraxiscope, for Kracauer, the image only attains 
cinematic significance in relation to the Lumiéres’ work. The critical point of 
reference in this respect is the Parisian journalist Henri de Parville’s contemporary 
account of the Lumiéres’ 1895 film Repas de bébé (Feeding the Baby.) 123 This short 
film (it is only 41 seconds long – compared to the potentially infinite running time of 
Muybridge’s circular zoopraxiscope disk) depicts [Figure 25] a domestic garden 
scene of a mother and father (Marguerite and Auguste Lumière) feeding a baby (their 
daughter, Andrée Lumière) and was shot by Louis Lumière. Ordinary domestic scenes 
such as this, explains Kracauer, concern “in a very personal way the individuals who 
live in it, but it also (and for that reason) concerns the elementary things which men in 
general have in common”.124 Here Kracauer is quoting from Erich Auerbach, whose 
consideration of the comparative autonomy of certain aspects of “daily life” in 
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Mimesis (1946), allows Kracauer to ground his own speculations on their 
significance. The “small random moment”, writes Kracauer: 
 
which concern things common to you and me and the rest of 
mankind can indeed be said to constitute the dimension of everyday 
life, this matrix of all other modes of reality.125 
 
 
Figure 25.  The “trembling leaves” in Repas de bébé (1895) 
 
What concerns Kracauer here is not so much the trans-cultural nature of basic 
domestic routines demonstrating (as discussed in the previous chapter) the potential 
for an “actual rapprochement between the peoples of the world” 126, but something 
more basic even than that, something that attests to our shared “biological heritage”. 
127 The  “trembling leaves” belong to a dimension that “extends, so to speak, beneath 
the superstructure of specific story contents”, their kinetic nature triggering an innate 
and automatic neurological response.128 What film does is re-discover these marvels 
of everyday life, which have (until their cinematic rendering) receded from our 
attention. The review of Repas de bébé is testament to film’s ability to rescue these 
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aspects of physical reality from the background and in turn reacquaint us (the film 
audience) with them. The cinema, suggests Kracauer (quoting the French philosopher 
Gabriel Marcel), helps us to see anew what we have grown tired of seeing out of 
habit, its  “power peculiar” in this respect is “literally redeeming [salvatrice]".129  
“Hence”, Kracauer concludes, “were it not for the intervention of the film camera, it 
would cost us an enormous effort to surmount the barriers which separate us from our 
everyday surroundings”.130 
 
However, the kinesthetic experience of being presented with such cinematic 
phenomena, suggests Lucien Sève, “… requires of the spectator a new form of 
activity: his penetrating eye moving from the corporeal to the spiritual”.131 For 
Kracauer, film’s true philosophical potential (its capacity as a facilitator of a non-
instrumental mode of reason132) is not entirely identical to its capacity to demonstrate 
or test complex philosophical propositions (its aptitude as a cognitive device) but is 
also connected to its immediate sensory appeal. “No doubt”, Kracauer argues, in 
Theory of Film: 
 
a major portion of the material, which dazes and thrills the 
moviegoer consists of sights of the outer world, crude physical 
spectacles and details. And this emphasis on externals goes hand in 
hand with a neglect of the things we usually consider essential […] 
The cinema seems to come into its own when it clings to the surface 
of things. 133  
 
For Kracauer, such an overt ontological characteristic has led many philosophers to 
conclude that films “divert the spectator from the core of life”.134 For example, 
suggest Kracauer, French poet and philosopher, Paul Valéry argues, “by featuring the 
outer aspects of inner life, the cinema all but compels us to copy the former and desert 
the latter. Life exhausts itself in appearances and imitations, thus losing the 
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uniqueness which alone would make it worthwhile”.135 In other words, because of 
film’s peculiar interest in physical appearance, it hinders us from paying attention to 
spiritual concerns. The “life of the soul”, for philosophers such as Valery, writes 
Kracauer, “is smothered by our immersion in the images of outer life on the 
screen”.136 “Perhaps”, Kracauer adds: 
 
contrary to what Valery assumes, there is no short-cut to the evasive 
contents of inner life whose perennial presence he takes for 
granted? Perhaps the way to them, if way there is, leads through the 
experience of surface reality? Perhaps film is a gate rather than a 
dead end or a mere diversion?137 
 
If film is a gateway, then the cinematic approach that Kracauer maps out in Theory of 
Film is a route to it. However, this approach is no “highway through the void” but a 
combination of many, often divergent, paths that “wind through the thicket of 
things”.138 It is film itself, not Kracauer or his theory that is our guide to this gateway. 
The illumination the cinema screen casts upon our route is like “the light of olden 
times” that Kracauer writes about in his essay on Kafka, which streams through “the 
gap-riddled construction” of the Great Wall of China.139 This light, streams from the 
past “into the present era, not in order to direct us back to its shimmer, but rather in 
order to illuminate our utter darkness just enough so that we can take the next step”. 
140 As Kracauer states in his 1926 essay Die Bibel auf Deutsch [The Bible in 
German]: “Today, access to truth is by way of the profane”.141  
 
9.7 Conclusion 
 
If cinematic insight, argues Livingston, can be communicated by literary means this 
negates any claims for its “significantly independent, innovative, and purely "filmic" 
philosophical achievement”. 142 However, he adds, if it cannot be “paraphrased” then 
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“reasonable doubt arises with regard to its very existence”. 143 As I have demonstrated 
in this chapter, the inability to be “paraphrased” does not necessarily exclude 
something from being considered philosophy. In fact, in relation to the Denkbild, 
Adorno argues that it is philosophy’s ability to resist being expounded that essentially 
keeps it from being superfluous. However, such essentialist disagreements about the 
nature of philosophy (or film), as Felicity Coleman suggests (in Chapter 4), suspends 
the critical potential of film-philosophy in a circular ontological debate. By 
emphasising the kinetic nature of the imagery it generates, Kracauer’s work looks to 
present film not as a fixed object, to which theory relates itself, but as an array of 
relational processes. “If film is to think, if film is to philosophize”, Mullarkey argues, 
“then we must get away from any definition of film, as well as any definition of 
thinking and philosophy”.144   Film’s essence, argues Mullarkey, is its “processual 
complexity” which in itself is the negation of essence. To assert any one property of 
film (be it cognitive or metaphysical) as its essence constitutes a refusal to “see how 
film’s complexity resists one’s theory”.145 As Laruelle’s “democracy of thought” 
strives through its aggregation of theories to demonstrate the part that theory plays in 
constituting its object, then so does the pluralism inherent to Kracauer’s cinematic 
approach work to erase the necessity of its own personalism.  In other words, the 
redemption of reality that Kracauer identifies with the cinematic approach will 
manifest itself as the collapse of distinction between theory and its (film) object. 
The “pure individuality” to which Kracauer “seemed to adhere so obstinately”, 
suggests Adorno, manifests itself “as an aversion to anything uniform, anything that 
was one hundred percent what it was”. I propose, that this unwillingness “to grant the 
concept of solidarity much significance” includes his film theory.146 A favourite adage 
of Kracauer’s, and one he includes in History, is Marx’s declaration “that he himself 
was no Marxist”.147 If the concept of the cinematic is the essence of Kracauer’s film 
theory then the cinematic represents an infinite permeability: the ability to neither 
exhaust itself or be exhausted by conceptual categorisation. The cinematic approach is 
therefore not a concept nor an idea but the beginning of their transformation into 
                                                
143 Livingston, 2006, p. 12. 
144 Mullarkey, 2009, p. 12.  
145 Mullarkey, 2009, p. 10. 
146 Adorno, 1991, p.164. 
147 Kracauer, 1995, p. 6. 
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something different. In a letter to Bloch, Kracauer articulates this sceptical 
relationship with philosophy: 
 
You know my fearful mistrust in big dreams that are not marginal 
annotations but allowed to interfere to the extent of making 
radically transparent what is closest to us in experience that we are 
almost left incapable of seeing that and how it is […] There is so 
much in-between and things themselves are so tenacious and of so 
many shapes. In short, my attitude is not unlike that figure identified 
by Kafka as Sancho Panza.148 
 
As I will explain in the concluding chapter of this study, the relationship between 
Kracauer’s and Bloch’s work provides not just a clarification of the utopian function 
that Kracauer identifies with the cinematic but also provides in the figure of Sancho 
Panza an analogy for the relationship between philosophy and film. 
                                                
148 Quoted in Barnouw, Dagmar, Critical Realism: History, Photography, and the work of Siegfried 
Kracauer (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1994), p. 153. 
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CHAPTER 10:  
 
CONCLUSION: UTOPIA OF THE INBETWEEN 
 
10.1 Introduction 
 
As mentioned in the conclusion of the previous chapter, Adorno suggests that 
Kracauer exhibited “an aversion” to anything that was “100 percent what it was” 
including his own philosophy. 1 For Adorno, Kracauer’s “reluctance to become the 
vassal of either his own theory or that of others” relates to what he considered was a 
personal obligation to “the inexplicable residue”: that which is left over by 
philosophy’s subsumption of its object.2 The film camera, argues Kracauer in Theory 
of Film, like “a rag-picker” shows no “inhibitions” when it comes to depicting what 
“most people turn their backs on” or ignore out of habit.3 Taking its cue from the film 
camera, the cinematic approach likewise operates not in opposition to convention but 
alongside it with an “inborn curiosity” about what other theories have disregarded and 
left behind. 4 
 
In this final chapter, before offering a summary of Kracauer’s peculiar philosophical 
mediation between film theory and its object I will look at the relationship between 
the cinematic approach and the utopian quotient of his critical project as a whole. 
Doing so, I argue, enables the contemporary reader of Kracauer’s work to get a better 
idea of how Kracauer set about answering the question that he poses in Theory of 
Film: “what is the good of film experience?” 5 Central to this examination of 
Kracauer’s utopian impulse is Bloch’s identification of the “inexplicable residue” as 
having a specific critical potential. Unpacking Bloch’s notion of the utopian in 
relation to Adorno’s derision of it and then relating that to Kracauer’s final and 
unfinished work on History provides an important critical perspective on the 
philosophical function of Kracauer’s film theory. As Rancière criticises modernist 
                                                
1 Adorno, Theodor W., “The Curious Realist: On Siegfried Kracauer”, New German Critique, No. 54 
(1991), p.164. 
2 Adorno, 1991, p.164. 
3 Kracauer, Siegfried, Theory of Film. The Redemption of Physical Reality [1960] (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1997), p. 54. 
4 Kracauer, 1997, p. 54. 
5 Kracauer, 1997, p. 285. 
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theatre as “a mediation striving for its own abolition”, so too can Kracauer’s theory 
also be interpreted as being an equally self-annulling activity.6  However, Kracauer’s 
cinematic approach is not motivated (like modernist theatre) by desire for a synthetic 
reconstitution of a prelapsarian state of grace. As he reiterates in Theory of Film, 
“nature”, “physical existence” and “camera reality” all constitute reality as we 
experience it.7 In the epilogue of Theory of Film, Kracauer states that: 
 
there are different realities or dimensions of reality, and our 
situation is such that not all of these worlds are equally available to 
us. Which of them will yield to our advances? The answer is, 
plainly, that we can experience only the reality still at our disposal.8 
 
For Kracauer, philosophy’s ersatz “nostalgia for perfect immediacy” 9 (that it 
propagates though the binary opposition of subject and object) provides the impetus 
for a circular reasoning that hinders our relationship with actuality and allows us to 
experience it “only with the fingertips”.10 In contrast, argues Kracauer, the mongrel 
plural realities that present themselves through performative cinematic analogies 
enables us to “seize” and “shake hands” with the things around us.11 
 
10.2 Last Things Before the Last – Utopian Residues 
 
On August 12, 1960 in the Hotel Sonnenheim in Berguen, Switzerland Kracauer and 
Adorno met up in order to discuss their current projects. After their meeting Kracauer 
transcribed their discussion in his notebook. In this unpublished text Kracauer 
describes a bad tempered debate about (what Jay refers to as) Adorno’s “ontological 
agnosticism”.12 
 
On the subject of the “concept of utopia”, Kracauer writes: 
                                                
6 Rancière, Jacques, The Emancipated Spectator, translated by Gregory Elliott (London: Verso. 2009), 
p. 8. 
7 Kracauer, 1997, p. 28. 
8 Kracauer, 1997, p. 297. 
9 Kracauer, Siegfried, History. The Last Things Before the Last, completed after the death of the author 
by Paul Oskar Kristeller (Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 1995), p. 10. 
10 Kracauer, 1997, p. 297. 
11 Kracauer, 1997, p. 297. 
12 Jay, Martin, Permanent Exiles. Essays on the Intellectual Migration from Germany to America (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1985), p. 229. 
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I cited Benjamin against Teddie [Adorno]. Does not Benjamin time 
and again feel himself bound by visions of partial ontological 
truths? And does he not orient his presentations of concrete entities 
toward these messianic visions, which are rich in content, as indeed 
utopian ideas should be in order to carry meaning? Here I had 
Teddie trapped. True, he tamely criticized Benjamin for not being 
the perfect dialectian a la Hegel and Teddie himself (who invokes 
the Hegel of his making as a sort of protective cover and shield), but 
on the other hand, he could not well deny Benjamin’s strength as an 
autonomous thinker and undermine his position. 13 
 
“Both Benjamin and I”, Kracauer continues in a later section of the transcript, “in not 
accepting immanent dialectics” are “engaged in terms of substances”:  
 
We think under a sort of ontological compunction, utopian or not, 
whereas Adorno is “free-hovering and does not feel any such 
compunction. At this point, I believe, Teddie was at the end of his 
rope. 14 
 
Kracauer later formalized his critique of Adorno’s “unfettered dialectics which 
eliminates ontology altogether” in the last unfinished chapter of History. Adorno’s 
“rejection of any ontological stipulation in favor of an infinite dialectics”, writes 
Kracauer: 
 
seems inseparable from a certain arbitrariness, an absence of 
content and direction in these series of material evaluations. The 
concept of utopia is then necessarily used by him in a purely formal 
way, as a borderline concept which at the end invariably emerges 
like a deus ex machina. But Utopian thought makes sense only if it 
assumes the form of a vision or intuition with a definite content of a 
sort. 15 
 
                                                
13 Quoted in Jay, 1985, p. 229.  
14 Quoted in Jay, 1985, p. 229. 
15 Kracauer. 1995, p. 201. 
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From this, Kracauer concludes, that Adorno’s intention was to show that “the concept 
of utopia is a vanishing concept when besieged; it vanishes if you want to spell it 
out”.16  
 
In 1964 Bloch and Adorno took part in a radio programme where they discussed in a 
rigorous but convivial manner the contradictions inherent in the historical 
manifestations of Bloch’s “utopian longing”. 17  In the published version of their 
dialogue, Adorno’s critique of utopia presents itself as less hostile than in his earlier 
encounter with Kracauer. However, for all his arcane maneuvering around Bloch’s 
position, Adorno remained adamant that, epistemologically, utopia could only be 
conceived in a negative way. For Adorno, this meant a “prohibition” against “casting 
a picture of utopia […] for the sake of utopia”.18 As with the Biblical commandment, 
“thou shalt not make a graven image”, this prohibition, Adorno explains, is a 
“defense” for the “utopian consciousness” against “the cheap utopia, the false utopia, 
and the utopia that can be bought”.19  
 
Understanding technology’s function in the commodification of the utopian plays an 
important role in Adorno’s account of the datedness of the utopian consciousness. As 
Adorno reminds Bloch at the very beginning of their discussion: 
 
numerous so-called utopian dreams – for example, television, the 
possibility of travelling to other planets, moving faster than sound – 
have been fulfilled. However, insofar as these dreams have been 
realized, they all operate as though the best thing about them has 
been forgotten […] the fulfillment of the wishes takes something 
away from the substance of the wishes.20 
 
                                                
16 Jay, 1985, p. 230. The “analytical versatility” of Utopia as a concept is explored in, Levitas, Ruth, 
The Concept of Utopia (New York and Oxford: Peter Lang, 2011).  
17 Bloch, Ernst. Gesprache mit Ernst Bloch, Rainer Traub and Harald Wieser (eds.) (Frankfurt am 
Main: Suhrkamp Verlag. 1975). The English language translation appears as Bloch, Ernst. 
“Something’s Missing: A discussion between Ernst Bloch and Theodor W. Adorno on the 
Contradictions of Utopian Longing (1964)”, in The Utopian Function of Art and Literature, translated 
by Jack Zipes and Frank Mecklenburg (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1988), pp. 1 – 17. 
18 Bloch, 1988, p. 11. 
19 Bloch, 1988, p. 11. 
20 Bloch, 1988, p. 1. 
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Though in agreement with Adorno’s conjecture that wish fulfillment negates the 
substance of wishes, Bloch’s understanding of the process deals in less absolute 
terms: “There is a great deal”, replies Bloch: 
 
that is not fulfilled and made banal through the fulfillment – 
regardless of the deeper viewpoint that each realization brings a 
melancholy of fulfillment with it.  So the fulfillment is not yet real 
or imaginable or postulatable without a residue. 21 
 
It is this “residue”, the something left over from the technological fulfillment of a 
false utopian consciousness, which Bloch identifies as a refuge for the genuine 
utopian impulse. Therefore, argues Bloch, “I believe that we live not far from the 
topos of utopia, as far as the contents are concerned, and less far from utopia”: 
 
When Bloch speaks of utopia as  “not yet in the sense of possibility; that it could be 
there if we could only do something for it”, he posits its existence not in the realm of 
fantasy but in a concrete reality whose “registration” as actuality (as opposed to 
mathematical possibility) awaits the appropriate epistemological conditions. 22 In the 
meantime, as Bloch explains in the conclusion to his discussion with Adorno, all that 
is necessary to redeem utopia from the false consciousness that prevails in the 
technologically mediated second nature of advanced capitalism is the insistence that, 
to quote Brecht,  “something’s missing” [Etwas fehlt].  
 
The phrase, “something’s missing”, comes from the Bertolt Brecht / Kurt Weill epic 
opera, Rise and Fall of the City of Mahagonny [Aufstieg und Fall der Stadt 
Mahagonny], where it functions, argues Frederic Schwartz, as an indicator “for a kind 
of thinking that is perpetually to come”. 23 However, Bloch’s usage of it here suggests 
a proximity to utopia, which in turn suggests a finite rather than an infinite quest. 
“‘Something’s missing’”, writes Bloch, “is one of the most profound sentences that 
Brecht ever wrote”, but what is this “‘something’”? 24 “If it is not allowed to be cast 
                                                
21 Bloch, 1988, p. 3.  
22 Bloch, 1988, p. 3.  
23 Schwartz, Frederic. J. Blind Spots: critical theory and the history of art in twentieth-century 
Germany (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005), p. 90. 
24 Bloch, 1988, p. 15. 
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in a picture”, (as Adorno argues) states Bloch, “then I shall portray it as in the process 
of being [seined]”. 25   
 
It was not long after Adorno’s critique of the affirming function of a false utopian 
consciousness that Kracauer had his own opportunity to explain his critical approach 
in relation to Bloch’s. In 1965 Kracauer was asked by the then head of the publishers 
Suhrkamp, Siegfried Unseld, to contribute to an edited volume called, Ernst Bloch zu 
Ehren; Beiträge zu seinem Werk [Contributions in honour of Ernst Bloch].26 
Kracauer’s text consists of two distinct parts. The first is in the form of a personal 
letter to Bloch written in German. The second, written in English, consists of an 
exegesis of the work of the 16th century Christian scholar and friend of Thomas More 
(the author of Utopia (1516)), Erasmus.27 Though the text on Erasmus was composed 
as a discrete work (it was to form part of the introduction to History) its pairing with 
the letter enabled Kracauer to triangulate his utopianism relative to Bloch’s and to 
“reflect on what connects and divides” their thinking. 28 
 
“[O]ne who is not caught up in the here”, states Kracauer in his letter to Bloch, “can 
never reach the there.”29 For Kracauer, it is Bloch’s “entanglement with ‘the here’”, 
that gives his “utopian thought its distinctive character”, and what in the end unites 
their thinking. In History, Kracauer stresses the proximity of “the here” to its 
corresponding utopian “there” through the identification of the former as an 
“anteroom area”.30 An anteroom, or antechamber (from the Latin ante camera, 
meaning “room before”), exists as such only in relation to another room to which it is 
connected. A room cannot be an anteroom if the other chamber to which it relates 
does not yet exist. In other words, the spatial temporal complex that delimits 
“historical reality” is analogous to an anteroom in that its relationship to a utopian 
other is concrete not speculative. In this regard, Kracauer suggests, “historical reality” 
                                                
25 Bloch, 1988, p. 15. 
26 Unseld’s role in getting the disparate protagonists of critical theory together during this period 
should not be underestimated. See Unseld’s obituary in The Guardian, Friday 1st November, 2002. 
Available online  http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/2002/nov/01/guardianobituaries.germany (accessed 
18/2/2010) 
27 Kracauer, Siegfried, “Zwei Deutungen in zwei Sprachen” in Ernst Bloch zu ehren. Beitrage zu 
seinem Werk, (ed) Siegfried Unseld (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1965), pp. 145 – 155. Desiderius 
Erasmus Roterodamus (1466 –1536), Dutch Renaissance humanist, Catholic priest, and theologian. 
28 Kracauer, 1965, p. 145.  
29 Kracauer, 1965, p. 145.  
30 Kracauer, 1995, p. 191. 
 282 
relates to utopia in the same way as “photographic reality” relates to physical world, 
as both “realities are of a kind, which does not lend itself to being dealt with in a 
definite way”. Kracauer explains further: 
 
The peculiar material in these areas eludes the grasp of systematic 
thought; nor can it be shaped in the form of a work of art. Like the 
statements we make about physical reality with the aid of the 
camera, those which result from our preoccupation with historical 
reality may certainly attain to a level above mere opinion; but they 
do not convey, or reach out for, ultimate truths, as do philosophy 
and art proper. They share their inherently provisional character 
with the material they record, explore, and penetrate. 31 
 
For Kracauer, Bloch’s idiosyncratic approach, unlike Adorno’s, did not seek a 
synthesis of art and philosophy (in the Denkbild) but exercised an unsystematic 
intertwining of aesthetic and critical practice that enabled him to grasp the elusive 
nature of the “peculiar material” that defines history’s anteroom (the present – now).32 
Bloch’s theory, states Kracauer, “is not a system that existed in isolation” from him, 
but is a “perpetual effort to objectify a vision” of a “utopia that comprises of man and 
the universe”. In this respect, Kracauer adds, it is not philosophy “in the usual sense 
of the word but something else, something utterly incommensurable. It belongs in the 
lineage of the historic utopias; it is a revolutionary manifesto.”33 Kracauer continues: 
 
Your willingness to look the contrary facts in the eye, is indicative 
of your being at home in the uncanny, which threatens to question 
your theoretical concepts. You apportion as much weight to the 
manifoldness of historical periods, which endanger the notion of 
historical progress as to the fact that there are ideas and ideologies, 
which not so much confirm the economic substructure as condition 
it. 34 
 
                                                
31 Kracauer, 1995, p. 191. 
32 Kracauer’s positive assessment of Bloch’s methodological intertwining of antinomic approaches can 
be read as a response to Adorno’s recent criticism of his own idiosyncratic method. See Adorno, 
Adorno, 1991, pp.161 – 164. 
33 Kracauer, 1965, pp. 148 – 149. 
34 Kracauer, 1965, p. 146. 
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With this approach, Kracauer suggests, Bloch’s writing style (like Griffith’s “non-
solution”) articulates a complementarity, which combines “utopian impatience with 
the German storyteller’s ability to dwell upon something at length”.35 It is an 
expression of a “desire not to tell just what is needed, but capture the unsayable” in “a 
narrative manner so that it can be experienced however imperfectly”. 36 “ Even your 
most abstract explanations”, Kracauer concludes, “are full of life and curious objects. 
You preserve something of the magic of the things that you disenchant 
[entzauberst]”.37 For Bloch, argued Kracauer, art is “pre-appearance [Vor-Schein] of 
the utopian”.38  
 
In the accompanying “utopian excursion” on Erasmus, Kracauer postulates that at the 
root of the Renaissance theologian’s “personal leanings” and “intellectual pursuits” 
was an unerring “fear of all that was definitely fixed”. 39 “Everything falls into a 
pattern”, suggests Kracauer, “once you think of this fear as the prime mover behind 
the scenes”.40 Subsequently, in parallel to Adorno’s and Bloch’s negative assessment 
of wish fulfillment, Kracauer characterizes Erasmus’ philosophy as being essentially 
motivated by the conviction that the truth ceases to be true as soon as it becomes a 
dogma, thus forfeiting the ambiguity that marks it as truth. “Utopian visionaries”, 
writes Kracauer, “condemn those who stick to the middle of the road on the ground 
that they callously betray mankind by trying to perpetuate a state of imperfection”. In 
“the case of Erasmus”, concludes Kracauer, “the middle way was the direct road to 
utopia” but his “message pointed into an abyss: did he fathom its depths?” 41 
 
In relation to this “abyss” Kracauer concedes both in the Bloch / Erasmus text and the 
final chapter of History, that the essential ambiguity that defines the “intermediary 
area” of Erasmus’ “middle way” and his own “side-by-side” approach, does court 
misinterpretation. Evoking the cinematic memories of Cendrars and Eisenstein, 
Kracauer suggests: 
 
                                                
35 Kracauer, 1965, p. 147. 
36 Kracauer, 1965, p. 146. 
37 Kracauer, 1965, p. 146. 
38 Kracauer, 1965, p. 149. 
39 Kracauer, 1965, p. 150. 
40 Kracauer, 1995, p. 10. 
41 Kracauer, 1995, p. 14. 
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The difficulty of deducing the truths in the interstices from the high-
level statements, principles, or doctrines under whose rule they fall 
does not imply that they were sheer mirages. Sometimes that which 
is buried under an imposing either-or may shine forth from a casual 
apercu, written at the margin of a close-up.42 
  
Therefore, Kracauer argues, any enquiry into the ambivalent nature of this area 
requires, a “constant effort […] on the part of those inhabiting it to meet the 
conflicting necessities with which they are faced at every turn of the road.”  “They 
find themselves”, he concludes, “in a precarious situation which even invites them to 
gamble with absolutes, all kinds of quixotic ideas about universal truth.”43 
 
10.3  Conclusion:  The Truth about Sancho Panza – a Film-Philosophy Analogy. 
 
As the figures of animals gradually appear and disappear in the layers of paint that 
Clouzot filmed in Le Mystère Picasso, so too can certain images be seen to emerge 
and submerge in the theoretical complex that constitutes Kracauer’s work. One image 
in particular persists through the layers:  the figure of Sancho Panza from Cervantes’ 
Don Quixote. For example, Kracauer argues in his debate with Adorno that an 
individual can live free from ideology in a way that parallels “the relation of Sancho 
Panza to Don Quixote” 44 and in his letter to Bloch he compares his approach (with its 
distrust of the intoxicating effect of big ideas and the sober diligence towards things) 
with “Kafka’s Sancho Panza”.45  The significance of Sancho Panza for Kracauer, 
specifically Kafka’s interpretation of the character, is confirmed by the quotation, in 
its entirety, of Kafka’s short prose work, “The Truth about Sancho Panza”, at 
conclusion of History: 
 
Without making any boast of it Sancho Panza succeeded in the 
course of years, by devouring a great number of romances of 
chivalry and adventure in the evening and night hours, in so 
diverting from him his demon, whom he later called Don Quixote, 
that his demon thereupon set out in perfect freedom on the maddest 
                                                
42 Kracauer, 1995, p. 216.  For the Cendrars reference see Chapter 6.3, for the Eisenstein, Chapter 8.4 
43 Kracauer, 1995, p. 216. 
44 Memorandum by Kracauer dated July, 1964, quoted in Martin Jay, 1985, p. 231. 
45 Kracauer, 1965, p. 145. 
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exploits, which, however, for the lack of a preordained object, 
which should have been Sancho Panza himself, harmed nobody. A 
free man, Sancho Panza philosophically followed Don Quixote on 
his crusades, perhaps out of a sense of responsibility, and had of 
them a great and edifying entertainment to the end. 46 
 
Robert Sinnerbrink also finishes his book New Philosophies of Film with a “coda” 
about Don Quixote and Sancho Panza.47 Sinnerbrink’s frame of reference however is 
not Kafka’s take on the story but Giorgio Agamben’s. Though aware of the Kafka text 
(through his work on Benjamin), Agamben’s reference in his short text is to another 
Kafka acolyte, the American filmmaker Orson Welles.48 Agamben’s text, which 
appears as chapter 10 in his 2005 book Profanazioni [Profanations] with the title, “I 
sei minuti più belli della storia del cinema” [The Six Most Beautiful Minutes in the 
History of Cinema] is a lyrical description of a fragment from Welles’ unfinished film 
of Cervantes’ novel.49 The sequence involves the characters transported from the 17th 
century of Cervantes’ novel into contemporary (20th century) Spain where they enter a 
crowded provincial cinema. Quickly realizing what is happening, Sancho Panza sits 
down in the auditorium next to a little girl and starts to watch the film. However, 
distressed by the images on screen, Don Quixote jumps onto the stage and sets about 
the screen with his sword. As the crowd heckles and jeers, Don Quixote continues to 
fight the characters on the screen until it is torn to shreds. Some children on a balcony 
cheer him on but the little girl next to Sancho Panza (identified by Agamben as 
“Dulcinea” – after Don Quixote’s imaginary lady love) “stares at him in 
disapproval”.50 Agamben ends his description of Welles’ film with the following 
conclusion: 
                                                
46 Kracauer, 1995, p. 217. 
47 Sinnerbrink, Robert, New Philosophies of Film: Thinking Images (London & New York: Continuum, 
2011), pp. 194 – 196. 
48 Benjamin, Walter, “Franz Kafka. On the Tenth Anniversary of His Death”, in Walter Benjamin. 
Selected Writings. Volume 2: 1927 – 1934. (Cambridge, Mass. and London: The Belknap Press, 1999), 
pp. 794 – 818. For Agamben’s use of Kafka’s essay see, Agamben, Giorgio, Profanations, translated 
by Jeff Fort (New York: Zone Books, 2007b), pp. 29 – 36. 
49 Agamben, 2007b, pp. 93 – 94. For a detailed appraisal of Welles’ unfinished film see, Stainton, 
Audrey, "Don Quixote: Orson Welles’ Secret", Sight and Sound Vol. 57, No. 4 (1988), pp. 252 - 260. 
A version of the film assembled by the director Jesús Franco (that does not include the scene in the 
cinema) was released in 1992, Don Quixote [Spanish: Don Quijote de Orson Welles], directed by 
Orson Welles (Jesús Franco) (Spain: El Silencio Producciones, 1992). The scene is available on watch 
on YouTube:  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GU9xJVnFy9M (assessed 8/10/2012). 
50 Agamben, 2007b, p. 93. 
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What are we to do with our imaginations? Love them and believe in 
them to the point of having to destroy and falsify them (this is 
perhaps the meaning of Orson Welles' films). But when, in the end, 
they reveal themselves to be empty and unfulfilled, when they show 
the nullity of which they are made, only then can we pay the price 
for their truth and understand that Dulcinea - whom we have saved - 
cannot love us.51 
 
In drawing attention to “our paradoxical love of images”, argues Sinnerbrink, 
“Agamben renders Welles' scene as though it were a parable by Kafka”.52 The 
“fictional power and wonder of the movies”, that which attracts and entices the 
spectator to unravel their meanings is also, explains Sinnerbrink, what leads to their 
“moral or aesthetic dismemberment”. 53 In other words, the element of the film 
experience that invites critical investigation is the very thing that such analysis 
nullifies. As Sinnerbrink explains: 
 
The price of revealing the truth about the 'nullity' of images, 
exposing their imaginative power, is that we destroy the very object 
of our love. Should we take this as an ironic allusion to the film-
philosophy relationship?54 
 
If Agamben’s “transformative hermeneutics”, suggests Sinnerbrink, renders this scene 
from Welles’ film allegorical then it does so ironically in order to “to show, even 
stage: the limits and ambiguities of the film-philosophy relationship”.55 The problem, 
as Sinnerbrink sees it, is that though “film-philosophy invites us to consider whether 
philosophical writing on film can be something other than always explanatory, 
argumentative or theoretical” it has “its own rhetorical and conceptual risks”. In this 
respect, Agamben’s ironic allegory can therefore be understood as an attempt to 
“avoid the trap of philosophical allegory that seems to beckon as soon as image meets 
concept”.56 In other words, Agamben’s parable is an allegory demonstrating the 
conceptual limitations (the destructive nature) of philosophical allegory.  It is, to 
                                                
51 Agamben, 2007b, pp. 93 – 94. 
52 Sinnerbrink, 2011, p. 196. 
53 Sinnerbrink, 2011, p. 196. 
54 Sinnerbrink, 2011, p. 196. 
55 Sinnerbrink, 2011, p. 195. 
56 Sinnerbrink, 2011, p. 195. 
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quote Rancière, “a mediation striving for its own abolition”.57 Is Welles’ film 
sequence “beautiful” to Agamben, asks Sinnerbrink, “because of its staging of the 
philosophical destruction of the image”? “Its modest beauty”, he suggests, “makes us 
bear witness to how film, in an ironic gesture of self-sacrifice, invites philosophy, 
which would rather dominate the image, to relinquish its mastery and learn to see”.58 
 
For Rancière, such philosophical circularity, however ironic its application is 
indicative of one set of conceptual principles (in this case philosophy) identifying 
itself as an “exemplary” form of activity and therefore indispensible. 59 As Laruelle 
argues, in this respect philosophy is “intrinsically anti-democratic” as it presides over 
a cultural hierarchy of thought and action.60 A way out of this ontological mise-en-
abyme, Mullarkey suggests, is to not conceptualise film’s “unphilosophical” aspects 
as catalysts for the aesthetic mutation of philosophy (whose future form will be able 
to accommodate such anomalies in a less inimical fashion) but to consider them as 
already philosophy’s equal that requires no such synthesis. 61  
 
Though Sinnerbrink’s certainly convincing interpretation of Agamben’s reflexive 
parable provides insight into how he conceives the provisional nature of film-
philosophy it does not fit quite so comfortably with Mullarkey’s and Laruelle’s 
attempt to decentre philosophy’s critical relationship with the film experience. With 
its insistence that it does not try to think of, on or about film but rather alongside it, 
non-philosophy like Kracauer’s cinematic approach adopts Sancho Panza’s 
perspective. 62 If in Agamben’s text, as Sinnerbrink suggests, Don Quixote represents 
the philosophising subject (“the philosopher-knight errant”) then in Kafka’s text, 
where the roles of master and servant are reversed, it is Sancho Panza that is 
attributed the critical agency. However, as with Agamben’s interpretation of 
Kracauer’s image of the mass ornament, Kafka’s character’s mutual emancipation 
comes as a result of being freed from the dual restraints of “biological destiny and 
                                                
57 Rancière, 2009, p. 8. 
58 Sinnerbrink, 2011, p. 195. 
59 Rancière, 2009, p. 6. 
60 Mullarkey, John, “Film Can’t Philosophise (and Neither Can Philosophy): Introduction to a Non-
Philosophy of Cinema, in Havi, Carel and Greg Tuck (eds.), New Takes in Film Philosophy 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 91. 
61 Mullarkey, 2011, p. 93. 
62 Mullarkey (2011), p. 90. 
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individual biography”.63 Whether Don Quixote here plays the part of philosophy (the 
“demon” invoked by Sancho Panza’s consuming desire for narrative), film 
(philosophy’s phantom tormentor) or reality itself (the fear of which is placated by 
fantasy) is, unlike in Sinnerbrink’s parable, insignificant. What is important is that 
they no longer exist solely as a binary antagonism but define themselves through a 
performative practice that does not seek to negate their autonomy but demonstrates 
their relationship as existing “side-by-side”.64 As Kracauer concludes in History: 
 
The definition which Kafka here gives of Sancho Panza as a free 
man, has a utopian character. It points to a utopia of the in-between, 
a terra incognita in the hollows between the lands we know.65  
 
As with Bohr’s complementarity principle in quantum mechanics, in which 
antithetical interpretive systems are required to explain the behaviour of single 
phenomenon, so is the reality of the film (“camera reality”) accessible only by the 
consideration of it being both a discrete object and a process. For Kracauer, 
fundamental to this understanding, and what Kafka’s Sancho Panza demonstrates, is 
the function of our observation and its record (in whatever form it is articulated: 
philosophy, theory, criticism, conversation or interior monologue) in determining the 
manner in which it behaves. The cinematic approach is therefore not identical to a 
single theory or philosophy but a mixture of many (it is a non-hierarchical aggregate); 
it is not essentialist but operates under an “ontological compunction”66 to demonstrate 
the “many-sidedness of things”. 67 Kracauer’s Theory of Film is not a theory of the 
cinematic; it does not intend to construct a standard for its identification and 
reproduction. Like Kafka’s Sancho Panza text, Kracauer’s text describes the 
relationship between a subject and its “preordained object” as a performance. 68 This 
performance, that he calls the cinematic, is not the transmission of the philosopher’s 
knowledge to the reader or the artist’s inspiration to the spectator, it is, as Rancière 
describes, “a third thing that is owned by no one, whose meaning is owned by no one, 
                                                
63 Agamben, Giorgio, The Coming Community, translated by Michael Hardt (Minneapolis and London: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2007), p. 47. 
64 Kracauer, 1995, p. 216. 
65 Kracauer, 1995, p. 217. 
66 Jay, 1985, p. 229. 
67 Kracauer, Siegfried, The Mass Ornament. Weimar essays, translated and edited by Thomas Y. Levin 
(Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard U.P., 1995b), p. 234. 
68 Kracauer, 1997, p. 69. 
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but which subsists between them, excluding any uniform transmission, any identity of 
cause and effect”.69 As suggested in the previous chapter, film’s ontological 
indeterminacy (its existence in-between process and object) gives it the potential to 
meet the spectator psychologically and physiologically halfway and thus makes the 
challenge of becoming an artist and/or philosopher an everyday ordinary activity. It is 
this democratization of intellectual practice, the blurring of what constitutes (to quote 
Rancière again) “those who act and those who look: between individuals and 
members of a collective body”, that delimits without defining utopia as an extent 
concrete reality in-between versions of our manifold present.70 The utopian nature of 
Kracauer’s Theory of Film (its relation to the redemption of physical reality) is also its 
performative character; its reflexivity as both record of and participant in a process 
that correlates antinomic phenomena and reveals them as sharing the same reality 
character. In this respect the cinematic approach is more heuristic than hermeneutic 
method. In “Farewell to the Linden Arcade”, the 1930 essay with which Kracauer 
concludes his collection of Weimar texts The Mass Ornament, he describes his 
boyhood preference for the moving landscapes glimpsed through the peepholes of the 
World Panorama to the photographs of cities on picture postcards.71 “These 
landscapes”, he writes, “are already almost homeless images, illustrations of passing 
impulses that gleam here and there through the cracks in the wooden fence that 
surrounds us”.72 This visual experience like ones that he describes later in Theory of 
Film are, to paraphrase Kracauer, the “pre-appearance [Vor-Schein] of the utopian”.73  
 
What has become evident from writing this study is that the conceptual porosity that 
Kracauer worked so hard to cultivate in his work, motivated by his “fear of all that is 
definitely fixed”, invites misinterpretation.74 For example, as Pauline Kael’s reading 
of Theory of Film demonstrates, the heuristic impulse that motivates Kracauer’s 
cinematic approach can be read as both naïve and supercilious. From one perspective 
(e.g. Rancière’s) Kracauer’s ambiguous subject position is evidence of an 
emancipatory practice; from another (Kael’s) it is the expression of an innate 
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71 For a detailed account of the role of the panorama in the development of contemporary visual culture 
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arrogance that considers its conclusions as self-evident truths. But why court such 
misinterpretation? Why make the philosophical intent of your film theory so 
ambiguous? Whereas other critical strategies have looked to interpret the meaning of 
these ambiguities in various ways (as ciphers for an arcane personal philosophy or 
evidence of literary sleight of hand) the perspective of film-philosophy allows the 
reader of Theory of Film to assign them a less definite critical status.75 This does not 
mean that the film-philosophy approach works to negate the significance of the 
obscure motifs that recur throughout in Theory of Film. What film-philosophy brings 
to Kracauer scholarship is an understanding of how (like the trees in Proust’s novel) 
interpretation affects the nature of their ambiguity and with it their critical potential. 
Alongside an analogy with Proust’s work, the non-philosophical potential of 
Kracauer’s cinematic approach is also substantiated (though unwittingly) by Pauline 
Kael’s critique of his film theory. 
 
In her polemic against Kracauer’s Theory of Film, Kael argues that, in general, film 
theory acts as a barrier; an unnecessary mediation, between film and our proper 
appreciation of it. Kracauer’s contribution to this prohibition is particularly 
deplorable, she argues, because it is not entirely convincing as a theory either because 
it is riddled with inconsistencies. Kracauer’s argument, concludes Kael, is full of 
holes.76  However, like Kafka’s depiction of the Great Wall of China, the film-
philosophy approach facilitates an understanding of the gaps and fissures in 
Kracauer’s film theory not as problems (that need to be fixed for it to perform as 
intended), but as openings for the practice functional transformation. In other words, 
its inability to be one hundred percent one thing (film theory) allows it to be the locus 
of many of activities.77 As Kracauer states in History, holes in walls allow “the 
improbable to slip in”.78  
 
As discussed in Chapters 8 and 9, the ambiguous nature of the imagery in Theory of 
Film relates to Kracauer’s attempt to preserve a sense of film’s kinetic nature (and 
therefore its potential to induce a peculiar critical experience) in his theory. “The truth 
ceases to be true as soon as it becomes a dogma”, Kracauer states in History, “thus 
                                                
75 Carel, Havi and Greg Tuck (eds.), New Takes in Film-Philosophy (Basingstoke and New York: 
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76 See Chapter 2.2 
77 Kracauer, 1995b, p. 276. 
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forfeiting the ambiguity which marks it as truth”.79 By reading the ambiguity of the 
cinematic approach as incidences of a transformative encounter with its object (rather 
than symbolic of a deeper meaning), film-philosophy also offers a different 
perspective on its practical application as a critical method. As Kracauer readily 
admits in History, the successful replication of his approach is difficult to ascertain by 
conventional standards, as the results it produces are often “intangible as a transient 
glow in the night, a fairy-tale's promise”. 80 However, as the film of the fireflies in 
Ray's Aparajito demonstrates, recording such evanescent phenomena is immanent to 
the cinematic approach thus making their “promise” of something different a public 
rather than a private experience. Through the reproducibility of its content and effect, 
the cinematic approach reveals philosophical practice not as an extraordinary activity 
but an everyday experience (what Kracauer describes in Theory of Film as “a mode of 
human existence”). 81 As Gershom Scholem, the Jewish scholar (and friend of 
Benjamin and Kracauer) explains to those wishing to understand the “messianic” 
impulse in Benjamin’s work states: 
 
Judaism, in all of its forms and manifestations, has always 
maintained a concept of redemption as an event, which takes place 
publicly, on the stage of history and within the community. It is an 
occurrence which takes place in the visible world and which cannot 
be conceived apart from such a visible appearance.82 
 
I am not arguing (as Hansen does) for Kracauer’s work to be read as a secularisation 
of a covert theological tendency but what Scholem’s text does bring to the fore is the 
fundamental public and communal nature of Kracauer’s “redemption of physical 
reality”.83 As discussed in Chapter 7, for Kracauer, the “pre-appearance [Vor-Schein] 
of the utopian” in film is a communal performative practice that (using the work of 
                                                
79 Kracauer, 1995, p. 10. 
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Kafka and Chaplin as guides) has no metaphysical guarantee but originates from an 
interaction with the residues that Idealism (in any form) leaves behind. 84 
 
If film-philosophy revitalises the cinematic approach can their relationship be 
understood as reciprocal? What can Kracauer’s historic film theory contribute to the 
film-philosophy debate apart from a spurious intellectual pedigree? What keeps 
Kracauer’s cinematic approach from being film-philosophy is also what makes it 
relevant to its future development. Kracauer’s understanding of what constitutes film, 
philosophy and art is historically fixed; it is temporally conditioned. Developments in 
contemporary art practice, in particular its use of digital video and computers as well 
as internet based modes of dissemination, are well beyond the remit of an historical 
theory of the film medium that baulks at the idea of colour photography.85 However, 
in response to Wartenberg’s complaint about the blinkered view of the movies 
maintained by many philosophers86 and Mullarkey’s criticism of the film-
philosopher’s “transcendent choice of film”, Kracauer’s cinematic approach does 
offer an alternative approach to what constitutes the cinematic.87 As demonstrated by 
his enthusiasm for Fred Astaire’s dance routines (Chapter 9), Kracauer’s notion of the 
cinematic is in part immanent to its effect and therefore not entirely reliant on 
predetermined technological or cultural criteria.  
 
The apparent asceticism that Kracauer articulates in the introduction of Theory of 
Film is not, as has been interpreted by Kael and Hansen, the statement of an 
essentialist view of what constitutes the medium’s pure aesthetic form (e.g. the black 
and white 35mm narrative film) but recognition of its infinitely manifold nature. Film, 
states Kracauer, is a “very complex medium” and “the best method of getting at its 
core is to disregard, at least temporarily, its less essential ingredients and varieties”.88 
The core of the medium, its “intrinsic nature”, Kracauer argues, relates to the effect 
on the spectator of its animated photographic elements. If “my book”, writes Kracauer 
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(prefiguring Mullarkey’s complaint), “halfway serves [its] purpose, as I dare hope it 
does, it must of course apply to all elements and derivatives of the medium”.89 
 
 I am not suggesting that Kracauer’s theory represents a philosophy of media 
convergence avant la lettre but it is intriguing to think of what he would make of the 
experience of our contemporary heterogeneous modes of video production and 
reception. 90 For example, in Theory of Film (in the context of Roger Tilton’s Jazz 
Dance), Kracauer is reluctant to attribute a revealing (critical) function to 
experimental films made entirely of ambiguous “deviant images” stripped of an 
establishing material context. However, would such criticism still be valid if such a 
film was physically contextualised within a dynamic material context (i.e. was 
watched online on a phone whilst travelling on a bus on the way to the cinema)?  
Maybe asking what Kracauer would think misses the point? “If one claims that film 
can think”, states Mullarkey, “then all films can think: one doesn’t prove the claim 
that all humans can do mathematics just by studying the minds of Fermat and 
Poincaré”.91 Equally, one doesn’t prove that everybody can do film-philosophy by 
studying Deleuze and Cavell, but a case could be made for such a democratization of 
the discipline from the study of Kracauer’s peculiar theory. 
 
In a letter he wrote to Adorno in 1955, Kracauer agrees with his former pupil that 
sometimes, in the writing of fiction, “essential things can be said only in German”.92 
However, he adds: 
 
your Catonian [inflexible] dictum is certainly invalid for the 
expression of thought, of theory – I am referring here to my 
thoughts, my theory […] My ideal style would have language 
disappear in the subject of inquiry, as does the Chinese painter in 
the picture, though I am aware of the fact that the painter and the 
picture are one – up to a point.93 
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Kracauer returns to the image of the Chinese painter four years later in his essay on 
the spectator. In this text (discussed in Chapter 6), Kracauer suggests that the 
spectator: 
 
much like the legendary Chinese painter who, longing for the peace 
of the landscape he had created, moved into it, walked toward the 
faraway mountains suggested by his brush strokes, and disappeared 
in them never to be seen again.94 
 
Kracauer’s explication of the cinematic approach in Theory of Film is as much about 
his search for his “ideal style” as it is about recording the medium’s peculiar revealing 
function in relation to philosophy and theory. In a 1925 article called “Der Künstler in 
dieser Zeit” [The Artist in His Time], Kracauer wrote: “America will disappear only 
when it discovers itself fully.”95 It is my conclusion that the problem of philosophy in 
Kracauer’s Theory of Film (or indeed in any film theory) will also disappear only 
when it discovers itself fully; that is “discovers itself” as communal practice that 
includes the object of its study. Amidst this co-generated performance, the individual 
artist or philosopher can lose themselves in the terra incognita between looking and 
doing.  
 
So, what does film-philosophy bring to Kracauer scholarship apart from just another 
way of interpreting his work? What film-philosophy brings to the mixed (or “mixte’ – 
to use Laruelle’s term) approach to Kracauer is a sense of reflexivity. This is the same 
reflexivity that Kracauer articulates in relation to the cinematic approach (amongst 
other things) where the object and subject of thought and experience exist as a 
dynamic and intertwined performance (see Chapter 5). In other words, the perspective 
of film-philosophy can help the contemporary reader comprehend the performative 
nature of being Kracauer (as spectator, philosopher, theorist and poet) and also 
Kracauer’s theory (as film theory, aesthetic theory, political theory, etc.). What a 
composite of Mullarkey’s non-philosophy of cinema, Wartenberg’s moderate pro-
cinematic position and Sinnerbrink’s Romantic film-philosophy affords Kracauer’s 
film theory is an epiphenomenal conceptual space from which it is allowed to show 
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rather than tell how film democratises the philosophical process by presenting 
objectivity as a felt reality. This reality is a construction in which we all participate 
alongside Kracauer and his peculiar theory of philosophy’s remnants. 
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FILMOGRAPHY 
 
Alphabetical by English title: 
 
50 Years Before Your Eyes, directed by Robert Youngson (USA: Warner Brothers, 
1950) 
 
Alexander Nevsky [Russian: Александр Невский (Aleksandr Nevskii)], directed by 
Sergei M. Eisenstein (USSR: Mosfilm, 1938) 
 
An Andalusian Dog [French: Un Chien Andalou], directed by Luis Buñuel (France: 
Buñuel, 1929) 
 
Aparajito / The Unvanquished [Bengali: Ôporajito], directed by Satyajit Ray (India: 
Epic, 1955) 
 
About Nice [French: À Propos de Nice], directed by Jean Vigo (France: Vigo, 1930) 
 
The Arrival of a Train at La Ciotat Station [French: L'arrivée d'un train en gare de La 
Ciotat], directed by Auguste and Louis Lumière (France: Lumière, 1895) 
 
Arsenal or January Uprising in Kiev in 1918 [Russian: Арсенал], directed by 
Alexander Dovzhenko  (USSR: VUFKU, 1928/9) 
 
L’Atalante, directed by Jean Vigo (France: Jean-Louis Nounez, 1934) 
 
Battleship Potemkin [Russian: Броненосец «Потёмкин», (Bronyenosyets 
Potyomkin)], directed by Sergei M. Eisenstein (USSR: Goskino, 1925) 
 
Ben-Hur: A Tale of the Christ, directed by Fred Niblo (USA: Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, 
1925) 
 
Bicycle Thieves [Italian: Ladri di biciclette], directed by Vittorio De Sica (Italy: De 
Sica, 1948)  
 
The Blood of the Beasts [French: Le Sang des Bêtes], directed by George Franju 
(France: Legros, 1949) 
 
The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari [German: Das Kabinet des Dr Caligari], directed by 
Robert Wiene (Germany: Decla-Bioscop, 1920) 
 
Crimes and Misdemeanors, directed by Woody Allen (USA: Orion Pictures, 1989) 
 
Desert Victory, directed by David MacDonald (UK: Office of War Information, 1943) 
 
Don Quixote [Spanish: Don Quijote de Orson Welles], directed by Orson Welles 
(Jesús Franco) (Spain: El Silencio Producciones, 1992) 
 
Earth [Russian: Зeмля (Zemlya)], directed by Alexander Dovzhenko  (USSR: 
VUFKU, 1930) 
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Empire, directed by Andy Warhol (USA: Warhol, 1964) 
 
Employees Leaving Vickers and Maxim's in Barrow, directed by James Kenyon and 
Sagar Mitchell (UK: Mitchell & Kenyon, 1901) 
 
The End of St. Petersburg [Russian: Конец Санкт-Петербурга (Konets Sankt-
Peterburga)], directed by Vsevolod Pudovkin. (USSR: Mezhrabpom, 1927) 
 
Eternal Sunshine of the Spotless Mind, directed by Michel Gondry (USA: Focus 
Features, 2004) 
 
Feeding the Baby / Baby’s Dinner [French: Repas de bébé], directed by Louis 
Lumière (France: Lumière, 1895) 
 
The Floorwalker, directed by Charlie Chaplin (USA: Mutual, 1916) 
 
The Golden Twenties, directed by Richard De Rochemont (USA: March of Time, 
1950)  
 
The Gold Rush, directed by Charlie Chaplin (USA: United Artists, 1925) 
 
The Hustler, directed by Robert Rossen (USA: 20th Century Fox, 1961) 
 
The Immigrant, directed by Charlie Chaplin. (USA: Mutual, 1917) 
 
Intolerance: Love's Struggle Throughout the Ages, directed by D.W. Griffith (USA: 
Triangle Film Corporation, 1916) 
 
The Iron Horse, directed by John Ford (USA: Fox Films, 1924) 
 
Jazz Dance, directed by Roger Tilton (USA: Tilton, 1954) 
 
Little Fugitive, directed by Ray Ashley, Morris Engel and Ruth Orkin (USA: Little 
Fugitive Production Company, 1953) 
 
Louisiana Story, directed by Robert Flaherty (USA: Flaherty / Standard Oil, 1948) 
 
Metropolis, directed by Fritz Lang (Germany: Universum Film (UFA), 1927) 
 
The Mystery of Picasso [French: Le Mystère Picasso], directed by Henri-Georges 
Clouzot (France: Filmsonor, 1956) 
 
The Nights of Cabiria [Italian: Le Notti di Cabiria], directed by Federico Fellini (Italy 
/ France:  Dino de Laurentiis Cinematografica / Les Films Marceau, 1957). 
  
Old and New / The General Line [Russian: Старое и новое (Staroye i novoye)], 
directed by Sergei M. Eisenstein / Grigori Aleksandro (USSR: Sovkino, 1929) 
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The Forgotten Ones / The Young and the Damned [Spanish: Los Olvidados], directed 
by Luis Buñuel (Mexico: Ultramar Films, 1950) 
 
One A.M. directed by Charlie Chaplin (USA: Mutual, 1916) 
 
Paisan [Italian: Paisà], directed by Roberto Rossellini (Italy: Organizzazione Film 
Internazionali, 1946) 
 
Pandora's Box [German: Die Büchse der Pandora], directed by G. W. Pabst 
(Germany: Süd-Film, 1929] 
 
Paris 1900, directed by Nicole Védrès (France: Panthéon Productions, 1947) 
 
Pather Panchali / Song of the Little Road [Bengali: Pôther Pãchali], directed by 
Satyajit Ray (India: Government of West Bengal, 1955) 
 
The Quiet One, directed by Sidney Meyers (USA: Film Documents, 1948) 
 
The Road [Italian: La Strada], directed by Federico Fellini (Italy: Ponti-De Laurentiis 
Cinematografica, 1954)  
 
Rome, Open City [Italian: Roma, città aperta], directed by Roberto Rossellini (Italy: 
Excelsa Film, 1945)  
 
Sallie Gardner at a Gallop or The Horse in Motion, photographed by Eadweard 
Muybridge (USA: Leland Stanford, 1877) 
 
Shadows, directed by John Cassavetes (USA: Lion International, 1959) 
 
Strike [Russian: Стачка (Stachka)], directed by Sergei Eisenstein (USSR: Goskino / 
Prolekult, 1925) 
 
Swing Time, directed by George Stevens (USA: RKO Radio Pictures, 1936) 
 
Top Hat, directed by Mark Sandrich (USA: RKO Radio Pictures, 1935) 
 
Umberto D., directed by Vittorio De Sica (Italy: Rizzoli-De Sica-Amato, 1952) 
 
Waxworks [German: Das Wachsfigurenkabinett], directed by Paul Leni (Leo Birinsk) 
(Germany: Universum Film (UFA), 1924) 
 
Zero for Conduct [French: Zéro de Conduite], directed by Jean Vigo (France: 
Franfilmdis / Argui-Film, 1933) 
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